UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
LOS  ANGELES 


GIFT  OF 

Col.   Glen  F.  Jenks 


TACTICAL 
PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 


Copyright  1910  ky  MATTHEW  ELTING  HANNA 


TACTICAL 

PRINCIPLES  AND 

PROBLEMS 

BY 

MATTHEW  ELTING  HANNA 

CAPTAIN,   GENERAL   STAFF    CORPS,   UNITED   STATES   ARMY 


FORMERLY  INSTRUCTOR,  DEPARTMENT  OF   MILITARY  ART 

ARMY  STAFF    COLLEGE    AND   ARMY  SCHOOL   OF  THE    LINE 

FORT    LEAVENWORTH,    KANSAS 


Adapted  by  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  use  in  the 
Garrison  Schools 


PRESS  OF 

CEO.    BANTA    PUBLISHING   COMPANY 
M  ENASHA.    WiS. 


Library 


PREFACE  TO  THE  THIRD  EDITION 

The  time  has  come  for  the  publication  of  another 
edition  of  this  book.  The  demand  for  it  has  steadily 
increased.  It  is  being  used  with  gratifying  success  in 
the  Army  Service  Schools  at  Fort  Leavenworth  and 
Fortress  Monroe,  and  by  the  National  Guard  of  a 
number  of  states.  It  has  been  adopted  for  use  in  the 
garrison  schools  of  the  regular  army,  and  will  receive 
its  first  trial  therein  during  the  coming  school  term. 
Orders  from  abroad,  especially  from  Great  Britain, 
indicate  that  it  is  of  value  to  foreign  services.  The 
service  journals  and  scores  of  officers  of  the  regular 
army  and  militia  have  subscribed  to  its  merit.  Only  a 
few  changes  in  the  text  have  been  suggested,  and  they 
are  unimportant.  Accordingly,  this  edition  is  pub- 
lished without  change  in  the  preceding  edition. 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  THE  AUTHOR. 

July  31,  1911. 

PREFACE  TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION. 

The  first  edition  of  "Tactical  Principles  and  Prob- 
lems" has  been  received  with  such  universal  favor  that 
it  is  necessary  to  publish  a  second  edition  to  meet  the 
steadily  increasing  demand  from  the  Regular  Army 
and  National  Guard,  as  well  as  from  the  British 
Service  and  elsewhere. 

The  author  is  indebted  to  friendly  critics  for  a  few 
suggested  changes  in  the  text,  but  it  has  been  decided 
not  to  make  these  changes  at  this  time,  mainly  because 
they  relate  to  minor  points  concerning  which  slight 
difference  of  opinion  is  to  be  expected. 

Except  that  this  edition  is  accompanied  by  much 
improved  maps,  it  differs  in  no  essential  from  the  first 
edition.  THE  AUTHOR. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C., 
SEPTEMBER  9,  1910. 


523437 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION 

This  book  has  been  written  in  the  hope  that  it  may 
help  junior  officers  of  the  regular  service  and  militia 
who  are  beginning  the  study  of  tactics.  In  tactics, 
as  in  other  sciences,  the  first  steps  are  the  most  diffi- 
cult to  make,  especially  if  the  student  has  no  instruct- 
or, as  necessarily  must  frequently  be  the  case.  With 
this  fact  uppermost  in  his  mind,  the  author  has  en- 
deavored so  to  present  the  subjects  herein  treated  that 
the  book  may  be  of  special  value  to  the  student  who  is 
working  without  assistance. 

The  problems  have  been  restricted  to  the  simpler 
and  more  usual  operations  of  small  forces  of  infantry 
and  of  cavalry,  and  of  these  two  arms  united.  Ar- 
tillery has  not  been  dealt  with  because  it  is  believed 
that  the  student  will  make  better  progress  if  he  be- 
comes familiar  with  the  tactics  of  infantry  and  cavalry 
before  undertaking  the  much  more  difficult  subject  of 
the  three  arms  combined.  After  the  student  has  mas- 
tered this  book,  he  may  take  up  with  advantage  the 
study  of  the  many  excellent  works  on  the  applied 
tactics  of  the  three  arms,  most  noted  of  which  is  Grie- 
penkerl's  Letters  on  Applied  Tactics. 

The  so  called  applicatory  method  followed  in  this 
text  is  so  well  understood  as  to  need  no  explanation, 
and  its  superiority  over  all  other  methods  of  teaching 
tactics  is  well  established;  the  method  will  give  very 
poor  results,  however,  unless  the  student  pursue  it 

VI 


PREFACE  vn 

properly.  This  means  many  hours  of  close  applica- 
tion with  map,  dividers,  pencil  and  paper.  This  book 
is  not  intended  for  casual  reading,  and  the  student 
will  derive  but  little  benefit  from  it  unless  he  study  it 
in  some  manner  such  as  will  now  be  outlined. 

For  each  subject  herein  discussed,  there  are  at  least 
two  chapters.  In  the  first  of  these  a  problem  and  its 
solution  are  given,  together  with  a  discussion  of  the 
ordinary  tactical  principles  involved  in  the  particular 
kind  of  operation  that  is  being  illustrated.  In  the 
following  chapter,  a  similar  problem  and  its  solution 
are  given,  together  with  comments  on  the  solution. 
The  first  chapter  of  any  particular  subject  should  be 
studied  in  the  most  painstaking  manner  in  connection 
with  the  map,  and  not  until  the  student  thinks  he  is 
familiar  with  the  tactical  principles  illustrated  in 
the  Solution  and  Discussion  of  this  chapter  should  he 
proceed  to  consider  the  problem  given  in  the  following 
chapter.  For  this  problem  he  should  make  his  own 
solution,  PREFERABLY  IN  WRITING,  before  reading  the 
solution  and  comments  given  in  the  text.  (*)  This 
method  will  require  work,  but  a  method  for  learning 
tactics  which  does  not  involve  labor  has  not  yet  been 
devised,  and  the  student  will  find  his  reward  in  full 
measure  in  the  progress  he  makes.  If  a  single  chap- 
ter is  taken  each  week,  the  book  furnishes  the  student 

(*)  Students  who  have  had  no  previous  experience  in  solving  tact- 
ical problems  should  read  a  pamphlet  entitled  Estimating,  Tactical  Sit- 
uations and  Composing  Field  Orders,  by  Captain  Roger  S.  Fitch,  2d 
Cavalry,  which  may  be  obtained  on  request  made  to  the  Secretary  of 
The  Army  Service  Schools,  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas.  Also,  students 
who  find  it  difficult  to  read  military  maps,  should  study  Military  Map 
Beading  by  Captain  C.  O.  Sherrill,  Corps  of  Engineers,  which  may  be 
purchased  of  the  U.  S.  Cavalry  Association,  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kan- 
sas, for  50  cents. 


viii  PREFACE 

with  a  course  he  can  complete  in  six  months  and  yet 
have  much  spare  time  for  study  along  other  lines. 

A  word  concerning  the  solutions  given  in  the  text. 
They  are  by  no  means  the  only  good  solutions  for  the 
respective  problems  given,  nor  are  they  faultless,  nor 
are  they  necessarily  the  best.  They  are  merely  the 
best  that  occurred  to  the  author  at  the  time  they  were 
written.  The  aim  has  been  to  give  solutions  that 
violate  no  sound  tactical  principle,  that  are  simple  of 
execution,  and  that  will  accomplish  the  desired  end  if 
the  troops  are  well  led  throughout  the  operation.  Any 
solution  that  observes  these  three  essential  ideas  is 
good,  no  matter  how  much  it  may  differ  from  the  one 
given  herein.  This  point  is  deemed  of  such  import- 
ance that  it  is  frequently  reverted  to  in  the  text- 

The  advance  sheets  of  the  revision  of  the  Field  Ser- 
vice Regulations,  to  which  the  author  has  had  access, 
have  formed  the  tactical  basis  for  the  work,  and  it  is 
believed  that  the  solutions  are  in  accord  with  the  prin- 
ciples therein  laid  down.  Many  books  have  been  con- 
sulted in  the  preparation  of  this  work,  but  most  fre- 
quent reference  has  been  made  to  the  following,  to 
all  of  which  the  author  takes  pleasure  in  acknowl- 
edging his  obligation : 

Griepenkerl's  Letters  on  Applied  Tactics, 

Balck's  Modern  European  Tactics, 

Von  Alten's  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics, 

Von  Bernhardi's  Cavalry  in  Future  Wars, 

Von  Verdy's  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops,  and 

Cleiy's  Minor  Tactics, 

The  author  finds  it  difficult  adequately  to  express 
his  gratitude  to  Major  John  F.  Morrison,  General 
Staff,  Assistant  Commandant  and  Senior  Instructor, 


PREFACE  ix 

Department  of  Military  Art  at  the  Army  Service 
Schools;  to  Captain  T.  O.  Murphy,  19th  Infantry; 
Captain  G.  F.  Baltzell,  5th  Infantry;  Captain  LeRoy 
Eltinge,  15th  Cavalry;  Captain  Roger  S.  Fitch,  2d 
Cavalry,  Instructors,  Department  of  Military  Art, 
Army  Service  Schools;  and  to  Captain  A.  E.  Saxton, 
8th  Cavalry,  Secretary,  Army  Service  Schools,  for  the 
valuable  criticism,  suggestions  and  other  assistance 
they  have  given  him  during  the  months  this  book  was 
being  written.  M.  E.  H. 

ARMY  SERVICE  SCHOOLS, 

FORT  LEAVENWORTH,  KANSAS, 

MARCH  9,  1910. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  FACE 

I.  LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL  -  1 

II.  LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL  -  18 

III.  LEADING  OF  A  CAVALRY  PATROL   -  28 

IV.  LEADING  OF  A  CAVALRY  PATROL   -  48 
V.  AN  ADVANCE  57 

VI.  AN  ADVANCE  86 

VII.  AN  ADVANCE  GUARD       -  96 

VIII.  AN  ADVANCE  GUARD       -  118 

IX.  AN  ADVANCE  GUARD       -  128 

X.  A   RETREAT  -  133 

XI.  A   RETREAT  -  154 

XII.  A  REAR  GUARD      -  163 

XIII.  A   REAR  GUARD       -  -       190 

XIV.  A  PURSUIT     -  201 
XV.  A  PURSUIT     -  224 

XVI.  INFANTRY  ATTACK  234 

XVII.  AN  ATTACK  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY  -  259 

XVIII.  INFANTRY  DEFENSE        -  278 

XIX.  A  DEFENSE  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY  -  302 

XX.  CAVALRY  COMBAT  (MOUNTED)  322 

XXI.  CAVALRY  COMBAT  (DISMOUNTED)     -  343 

XXII.  CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY       -  358 

XXIII.  A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  384 

XXIV.  A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  -       400 

XXV.  OUTPOSTS  -       413 

XXVI.  OUTPOSTS         -------       443 


CHAPTER  I. 
LEADING   OF   AN    INFANTRY   PATROL. 

SITUATION. 

(See  4-inch  map). 

A  small  Blue  infantry  force  in  hostile  country  has 
just  crossed  the  Missouri  river  at  Fort  Leavenworth, 
and  is  about  to  establish  outposts  for  the  night  ( Sep- 
tember 29-30 )  on  a  general  north  and  south  line  along 
Prison  Lane. 

A  force  of  the  enemy  is  reported  advancing  from 
the  west,  and  is  believed  to  be  east  of  the  Big  Stran- 
ger (western  edge  of  2-inch  map).  Contact  has  not 
yet  been  established. 

At  4  p.  m.,  while  the  outposts  are  getting  into  posi- 
tion, Lieutenant  A  is  given  the  following  instructions 
by  the  outpost  commander  on  Long  Ridge:  "I  be- 
lieve the  enemy  will  camp  near  Salt  creek  to-night. 
Take  a  patrol  from  the  support  on  Long  Ridge,  pro- 
ceed to  the  vicinity  of  Frenchman  and  find  out  what 
you  can  about  the  enemy.  A  patrol  will  be  sent  out 
under  Sergeant  B  to  reconnoiter  along  Sheridan's 
Drive  to  the  north,  and  another  under  Corporal  C  to 
reconnoiter  along  the  Zimmerman  road.  It  is  espe- 
cially important  to  determine  the  enemy's  strength 
and  locate  his  camp  for  the  night.  Send  your  reports 
to  me  here.  Return  when  darkness  prevents  further 
reconnaissance . ' ' 

Note — In    addition    to    the    requirements    stated   -below,    you 


2  TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

should  write  on  the  regular  blank  all  reports  that  Lieutenant  A 
would  make  during  his  reconnaissance. 

Required : 

1.  (a)  How  many  men  will  Lieutenant  A  take? 
Give  reasons  for  the  number  selected. 

(b)  State  the  route  and  formation  of  the  patrol 
for  the  Brst  mile  of  its  march,  supposing  nothing  is 
seen  of  the  enemy. 

SOLUTION  AND  DISCUSSION. 

(a)  Lieutenant  A  will  take  a  non-commissioned 
officer  and  three  men  with  him.    The  patrol  is  meant 
to  observe ;  it  should  accomplish  its  task  by  stealth,  not 
by  fighting,  and  consequently  should  be  small.  Every 
man  added  to  the  patrol  makes  it  more  difficult  to 
conceal.    With  four  men,  two  or  three  messages  can 
be  sent  and  still  Lieutenant  A  will  be  left  with  at  least 
one  companion.    It  will  not  be  necessary,  in  all  prob- 
ability, to  send  more  messages  than  these,  as  the  pa- 
trol will  not  be  out  very  long,  and  the  distance  to  be 
covered  is  not  great. 

Three,  five,  or  six  men  would  not  be  a  wrong  num- 
ber to  take,  but  should  fewer  than  three  or  more  than 
six  be  taken,  the  patrol  would  in  one  case  be  too  small 
to  send  many  messages,  and  in  the  other  case  it  would 
be  too  large  for  easy  concealment.  Of  course  a  patrol 
of  ten  or  twelve  men  is  quite  unsuited  to  the  mission 
given  Lieu  tenant  A. 

(b)  The  patrol  would  move  down  the  ravine  on 
the  southeast  slope  of  Long  Ridge  in  column  of  twos, 
and  enter  the  bed  of  Corral  creek  about  150  yards 
west  of  XX.     It  would  follow  Corral  creek,  under 
cover  of  its  banks  and  the  timber  along  them,  until 


LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL  3 

it  entered  the  wooded  ravine  on  the  southern  slope  of 
Atchison  hill.  It  would  be  in  single  file,  with  distan- 
ces of  about  20  yards;  although  other  formations, 
easily  concealed  and  furnishing  protection  against 
surprise,  would  do  quite  as  well. 

In  this  part  of  the  march,  the  chief  considerations 
are  rapidly  to  gain  the  heights  to  the  west,  and  to  re- 
main concealed  during  the  march  from  any  hostile 
patrols  that  may  be  in  observation  on  those  heights. 
The  march  of  the  patrol  should  not  be  delayed  to  rec- 
onnoiter  the  railroad  cuts,  ravines  and  high  ground  to 
the  north  and  south  of  Corral  creek.  Such  reconnais- 
sance, in  all  probability,  will  secure  no  information  of 
importance  which  cannot  be  obtained  by  the  outposts, 
and  may  reveal  the  presence  and  route  of  the  patrol. 
For  similar  reasons,  the  houses  at  10  should  be  avoid- 
ed, and  the  14 — 16  road  should  be  observed  from  the 
edge  of  the  woods  to  the  east  of  it. 

The  route  along  the  north  branch  of  Corral  creek, 
via  XXII  and  XXIII,  is  objectionable  because  of 
the  400  yards  of  open  target  range  to  be  crossed; 
moreover,  it  infringes  on  the  territory  assigned  to 
Sergeant  B.  However,  were  this  route  the  better  for 
reaching  Atchison  hill,  time  and  invisibility  consider- 
ed, it  would  be  perfectly  proper  to  intrude  on  Ser- 
geant B's  territory  for  this  purpose. 

Continuation  of  the  Situation. 

At  4 :40  p.  m.  Lieutenant  A  is  on  Atchison  hill  with 
his  patrol,  and  observes  a  hostile  cavalry  patrol  of  five 
troopers  turn  north  on  the  trail  leading  to  Sheridan's 
Drive  between  F  and  E  and  disappear  in  the  woods. 

(c)     What  action  does  he  take? 


4  TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

(d)  What  route  will  he  take  from  this  point? 
Give  reasons. 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 

(c)  He  remains  concealed  with  the  patrol  and 
sends  the  following  message,  after  assuring  himself 
that  the  hostile  patrol  is  not  followed  by  other  hostile 
troops : 

No.   1  Officer's  Patrol, 

To  Atehison  Hill, 

Outpost  Commander.  29  Sept. — ,  4:50  P.  M. 

At  4:40  p.  m.  a  hostile  cavalry  patrol  of  5  troopers  turned 
north  on  the  trail  leading  from  the  F — E  road,  and  disappeared 
in  the  woods  about  600  yards  northeast  of  here.  So  far  as  I  can 
see,  it  is  not  followed  by  other  hostile  troops.  I  will  advance  im- 
mediately to  SENTINEL  hill  and  continue  my  reconnaissance 
from  there.  ^ 

Lieut. 

This  is  the  first  time  the  enemy  has  been  seen  in  this 
operation  of  the  Blue  force.  For  this  reason  the  in- 
formation is  important.  It  is  an  easy  matter  for 
Lieutenant  A  to  send  it  to  the  outpost  commander  and 
doing  so  will  not  interfere  with  the  further  execution 
of  his  mission.  Under  these  circumstances,  for  him  to 
trust  to  Sergeant  B  to  forward  information  of  the 
presence  of  the  hostile  patrol  would  be  a  mistake. 

(d)  Through  the  woods  on  the  northern  slope  of 
Atehison  hill,  crossing  the  railroad  tracks  and  wagon 
road  between  Schmidt  and  McGuire,  and  entering 
the  ravine  that  starts  at  F.    Thence  down  this  ravine 
600  yards  to  the  point  where  it  makes  a  sharp  bend  to 
the  north;  thence  due  west  in  the  small  swale  to  the 
top  of  Sentinel  hill.     This  route,  as  far  as  can  be 
judged  from  the  map,  affords  as  good,  or  better  cover 


LEADING  or  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL  5 

than  any  other  direct  route  to  Sentinel  hill.  Good 
cover  from  the  inhabitants  and  the  hostile  patrol 
might  be  found  on  a  shorter  line  through  the  woods  on 
the  northwest  slope  of  Atchison  hill  and  across  the 
road  between  Moore  and  Schmidt,  but  it  is  preferable 
to  get  the  patrol  in  the  ravine  at  F  as  quickly  as  pos- 
sible. 

Of  course,  all  the  houses  in  this  settlement  should 
be  most  carefully  avoided.  Their  occupants  are  hos- 
tile and  would  give  no  reliable  information;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  they  probably  would  report  the  pres- 
ence of  the  patrol,  should  they  get  an  opportunity  to 
do  so.  To  move  directly  along  the  16 — G  road  is  to 
expose  the  patrol  to  view  with  few  compensating  ad- 
vantages. 

By  way  of  16, 18,  20,  and  the  trail  and  ravine  to  the 
northward  via  Frenchman,  and  then  east  to  Sentinel 
hill,  the  patrol  might  find  good  cover  and  avoid  houses, 
but  the  greater  length  of  this  route  and  its  other  dis- 
advantages far  outweigh  its  advantages. 

The  patrol  might  go  to  Hund  hill  or  Eleven  Hun- 
dred Foot  hill  for  further  observation,  were  it  not  that 
the  outpost  commander  evidently  intended  Corporal 
C  to  observe  from  those  points  and  wished  Lieuten- 
ant A  to  observe  in  the  territory  between  Corporal  C 
and  Sergeant  B. 

Continuation  of  the  Situation. 

Nothing  further  was  seen  of  the  Red  patrol  after  it 
disappeared  in  the  woods  north  of  E,  and  at  5:30  p. 
m.  Lieutenant  A  is  on  Sentinel  hill  with  his  patrol  ob- 
serving Salt  Creek  valley,  when  a  troop  of  hostile 
cavalry  coming  along  Atchison  pike  from  the  west 


6  TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

halts  and  dismounts  at  the  Mottin  house,  while  a  squad 
of  ahout  sixteen  men  from  this  troop  continues  the 
march  to  Frenchman  and  dismounts  there. 
(e)     Further  intentions  of  Lieutenant  A. 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 

(e)  To  continue  his  observations  from  his  present 
position.  If  he  wishes  to  risk  weakening  his  patrol, 
he  might  send  a  message  containing  information  of 
the  presence  of  the  hostile  troop.  This  message  would 
add  so  little,  under  the  conditions  of  this  problem,  to 
the  information  contained  in  the  first  message  sent, 
that  there  is  no  great  necessity  for  hastening  to  send 
it  back.  However,  if  Lieutenant  A  had  reached  Sen- 
tinel hill  with  four,  five  or  more  men,  as  would  be  the 
case  if  he  had  started  with  five  or  more  men,  he  could 
well  afford  to  spare  one  or  two  of  them  to  carry  this 
message. 

Continuation  of  the  Situation. 

Lieutenant  A  remained  in  unmolested  observation 
on  Sentinel  hill.  By  dusk  two  regiments  of  infantry 
and  a  baggage  train  had  halted  in  the  field  1,000  yards 
northwest  of  Mottin  and  had  sent  small  detachments 
towards  Mottin  and  Hill  900  about  1000  yards  south 
of  19.  Ten  more  troopers  from  the  troop  at  the  Mot- 
tin  house  had  joined  the  cavalry  at  Frenchman,  and 
two  patrols  from  this  detachment  had  moved  by  G  and 
disappeared  in  the  direction  of  E  and  16.  The  road 
from  Frenchman  to  G  was  being  constantly  patrolled 
by  two  troopers.  A  message  was  sent  to  the  outpost 
commander  by  the  two  remaining  privates  soon  aft- 
er the  head  of  the  hostile  infantry  column  came  into 
sight  on  Atchison  pike. 


LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL  7 

(f )  Inferences  drawn  by  Lieutenant  A  from  his 
observations. 

(g)  Further  intentions  of  Lieutenant  A. 

(h)  His  route  on  returning  to  his  camp,  on  the 
supposition  that  he  decides  to  return  as  soon  as  it 
grows  dark.  State  reasons  for  selecting  route  chosen. 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 

(f )  That  the  enemy's  whole  force  in  this  vicinity 
consists  of  1  troop  of  cavalry  and  2  regiments  of  in- 
fantry, and  that  he  is  going  into  camp  and  placing 
outposts  for  the  night.    Were  this  the  advance  guard 
of  a  larger  force,  we  would  expect  it  to  have  more  cav- 
alry in  its  front  and  most  probably  we  would  have  seen 
artillery.     However,  conclusive  deductions  as  to  the 
total  strength  of  the  hostile  force  can  not  be  drawn 
from  these  facts,  nor  from  the  additional  fact  that  the 
force  has  been  joined  by  its  baggage  train. 

(g)  To  remain  where  he  is  until  it  is  dark  enough 
to  conceal  his  movements  and  then  to  return  to  camp 
unless  further  developments  in  the  meantime  should 
warrant  a  different  procedure. 

(h)  Due  east  until  he  enters  the  woods  on  Sheri- 
dan's Drive  and  then  southeast  by  the  roads  to  his 
outposts.  He  might  return  as  far  as  McGuire's  by 
the  route  over  which  he  came,  thence  south  of  and 
along  the  railroads  to  the  vicinity  of  10,  and  thence 
east  to  Long  Ridge.  This  route,  however,  is  very  dan- 
gerous and,  if  taken,  great  care  should  be  exercised  in 
crossing  the  road  and  railroads,  and  in  moving  along 
them;  even  then  it  is  far  less  desirable  than  the  route 
due  east. 

It  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  follow  compli- 


8  TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

cated  routes  in  the  darkness  in  an  unknown  country, 
and  for  this  reason  we  prefer  the  simple  route  due 
east;  it  can  be  followed  with  ease  and  without  the  use 
of  the  compass,  which  usually  can  not  be  read  at  night 
without  the  risk  that  accompanies  striking  a  match. 
Routes  down  Salt  creek  and  up  ravines  to  Wagner 
point  or  Bell  point  are  unnecessarily  complicated  and 
roundabout.  The  same  is  true  of  routes  to  the  south 
over  Government  or  Southwest  hills. 


Before  starting  from  Long  Ridge  Lieutenant  A 
would  inspect  his  patrol  and  give  his  orders  and  in- 
structions. The  inspection  is  mainly  to  determine 
whether  the  men  are  in  fit  condition,  have  serviceable 
arms  and  a  proper  supply  of  ammunition,  and  have 
taken  the  usual  precautions  to  avoid  the  glitter  of 
weapons  and  equipments.  No  regimental  insignia  or 
other  devices  that  show  the  organization  to  which  the 
patrol  belongs  should  be  worn,  for  an  intelligent  ene- 
my well  informed  of  our  organization  will  get  much 
valuable  information  from  these  should  the  patrol  be 
captured. 

The  orders,  which  would  be  given  to  all  the  mem- 
bers of  the  patrol,  would  be  about  as  follows:  "A 
force  of  the  enemy  is  reported  advancing  from  the 
west  (indicating  the  points  of  the  compass)  and  Ma- 
jor A  (the  outpost  commander)  believes  it  will  camp 
near  Salt  creek  to-night.  Here  is  Salt  creek  on  the 
map;  it  is  about  a  mile  west  of  that  ridge  (pointing 
towards  Atchison  hill).  We  are  to  go  to  the  vicinity 
of  this  bridge  over  Salt  creek  (indicating  Frenchman 
bridge  on  the  map)  and  find  out  what  we  can  of  the 


LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL  9 

enemy.  Major  A  is  specially  anxious  to  know  the 
enemy's  strength  and  his  camping  place  for  the  night. 
All  messages  are  to  be  sent  to  Major  A,  here,  and  we 
are  to  stay  out  until  it  is  too  dark  to  reconnoiter.  Ser- 
geant B  will  reconnoiter  on  our  right  along  that  ridge 
(Sheridan's  Drive  ridge)  to  the  north,  and  Corporal 
C  is  to  reconnoiter  on  our  left  along  this  road  (point- 
ing out  the  Zimmerman  road  on  the  map).  Atch- 
ison  hill  (indicating  on  both  map  and  ground)  will 
be  our  first  objective,  and  we  will  reach  it  by  follow- 
ing up  that  creek  (Corral  creek)." 

If  Lieutenant  A's  patrol  is  composed  of  experi- 
enced soldiers,  the  above  orders  will  be  sufficient,  but, 
if  he  has  one  or  more  inexperienced  men,  he  may  have 
to  add  instructions  regarding  signals  to  be  used,  the 
necessity  for  concealment,  firing  pieces,  and  other 
matters  depending  on  the  training  of  the  men.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  designate  a  second  in  command,  for 
that  duty  naturally  falls  to  the  non-commissioned  of- 
ficer, and  it  is  too  soon  to  prescribe  a  point  where  the 
patrol  will  assemble  in  case  it  is  scattered. 

The  orders  received  by  commanders  of  larger  bod- 
ies of  troops  are  not  explained  in  such  detail  to  the 
individual  soldier,  but  in  the  case  of  small  patrols  it  is 
important  that  each  may  be  fully  informed,  for  the 
reason  that  the  duty  requires  the  exercise  of  indi- 
vidual knowledge  and  judgment;  moreover,  in  the 
event  of  the  patrol  leader  being  captured  or  killed, 
or  of  the  patrol  being  scattered,  each  man  should  have 
a  complete  understanding  of  the  situation  so  as  to  be 
able  to  act  independently  and  intelligently  under  the 
circumstances. 

We  should  not  make  the  mistake  of  concluding  that 


10         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  formation  of  the  patrol  in  single  file  as  it  moved 
up  Corral  creek  is  the  only  suitable  one,  or  one  that 
will  best  fit  all  cases.  In  any  case,  we  should  seek  a  for- 
mation that  favors  rapid  marching,  facilitates  conceal- 
ment and  observation,  renders  surprise  difficult,  and 
makes  probable  the  escape  of  at  least  one  man,  in  case 
the  patrol  is  surprised.  The  marching  formations  of 
patrols  are  governed  by  this  general  principle  and 
they  will  vary  with  the  terrain  and  other  conditions. 

It  may  be  asked,  Why  did  not  Lieutenant  A  go 
alone  on  this  mission?  In  truth  he  might  well  have 
done  so,  had  he  thought  there  would  be  no  occasion  for 
sending  a  message  back  before  he  had  completed  his 
reconnaissance.  Alone,  his  single  pair  of  eyes  could 
have  seen  everything  that  was  to  be  observed,  and 
there  would  have  been  less  chance  for  his  movements 
being  discovered  by  the  enemy.  If  a  patrol  has  with 
it  a  single  man  unskilled  in  scouting,  it  is  in  constant 
danger  of  having  its  whereabouts  disclosed  by  his  stu- 
pid blunders.  To  this  extent  the  efficiency  of  a  patrol 
is  measured  by  that  of  its  least  trained  member.  If 
this  fact  is  fully  appreciated,  the  wise  patrol  leader 
will  select  the  men  who  are  to  accompany  him  with  the 
greatest  care  allowable  under  the  circumstances,  and 
he  will  reduce  the  strength  of  his  patrol  rather  than 
take  along  a  man  whose  presence  is  a  constant  men- 
ace. 

A  patrol  leader,  as  well  as  the  commander  of  larger 
forces,  should  make  his  decisions  and  movements  dove- 
tail into  what  he  considers  the  most  probable  inten- 
tions of  his  enemy.  This  the  lieutenant  did  when  he 
took  careful  precautions  against  discovery  while  ap- 
proaching Atchison  hill.  An  intelligent  hostile  patrol 


LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL  11 

on  this  or  adjoining  hills  should  be  able  to  detect  any 
movement  not  made  under  cover  on  the  low  ground 
to  the  east.  Naturally,  the  lieutenant  was  eager  to 
reach  Atchison  hill  which  promised  a  view  to  the  west, 
but  he  realized  that  his  patrol  must  be  as  well  con- 
cealed during  this  part  of  the  journey  as  later  on,  even 
though  its  march  was  somewhat  delayed.  As  an  addi- 
tional precaution,  it  would  have  been  well  for  the 
patrol,  as  soon  as  it  entered  the  woods  on  the  slope 
of  Atchison  hill,  to  move  300  or  400  yards  to  the  right 
flank  and  then  ascend  the  hill;  if  the  enemy  had  ob- 
served the  previous  march  of  the  patrol  and  set  a  trap 
for  it,  the  trap  might  thus  have  been  avoided;  in 
general,  it  is  well  for  a  patrol  thus  to  move  to  a  flank, 
or  otherwise  to  change  the  direction  of  its  march  on 
entering  a  woods. 

It  might  have  been  better  for  the  patrol  to  ascend 
Atchison  hill  along  the  spur  which  is  about  on  the  line 
connecting  the  words  "Atchison  hill"  with  the  num- 
ber "XXV",  instead  of  following  up  the  ravine.  The 
latter  is  apt  to  be  rocky  or  overgrown  with  dense  un- 
derbrush ;  noises  would  rise  from  it  to  the  enemy,  were 
he  on  the  hill  above,  and  to  be  caught  in  it  would  be 
embarrassing.  As  a  general  rule,  it  is  better  to  follow 
along  spurs  or  near  the  ridge  line  in  traversing  woods , 
if  such  a  route  is  available  and  open  to  the  patrol. 

Lieutenant  A  might  have  passed  through  these 
woods  with  his  patrol  extended  in  a  line  of  skirmishers 
with  wide  intervals.  Such  a  formation  might  be  excel- 
lent if  he  wished  to  beat  up  the  woods  to  determine 
whether  small  parties  of  the  enemy  were  hiding  in 
them;  but  such  was  not  the  lieutenant's  purpose;  on 
the  contrary,  his  object  was  to  reach  the  top  of  the  hill 


12         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

without  being  seen,  and  this  he  could  best  do  by  keep- 
ing the  patrol  in  a  more  compact  formation. 

Having  arrived  near  the  western  edge  of  the  woods, 
the  lieutenant  approached  the  top  of  the  hill  with  the 
greatest  possible  caution,  making  sure  before  leaving 
the  woods  that  the  enemy  was  not  already  in  posses- 
sion of  the  hill  as  an  observation  point.  The  patrol, 
except  the  man  who  was  observing  the  14 — 16  road, 
was  left  in  the  edge  of  the  woods  and  the  lieutenant 
alone  crept  to  the  top  of  the  hill  without  exposing 
himself  on  the  sky-line ;  there,  lying  flat,  with  only  his 
head  showing  above  the  crest,  he  closely  searched  the 
visible  country  through  his  field-glass. 

It  is  difficult  at  maneuvers  to  get  men  on  reconnais- 
sance to  observe  even  such  simple  precautions  as  these, 
unless  we  in  some  way  stimulate  their  interest  in  the 
game.  There  are  many  ways  in  which  this  can  be 
done.  One  good  method  which  can  always  be  em- 
ployed in  the  preliminary  training  of  the  company  in 
patrolling  is  to  have  the  patrols  operate  against  each 
other  from  opposite  directions  along  the  same  road. 
As  many  pairs  of  patrols  as  there  are  roads  available 
can  thus  be  trained  at  the  same  time.  With  three  or 
four  roads,  it  should  be  an  easy  matter  to  put  the  en- 
tire company  through  this  exercise  in  a  single  morn- 
ing. Later,  the  exercise  may  be  varied  in  numerous 
ways  that  will  readily  suggest  themselves  to  the  mind 
of  the  enthusiastic  officer.  If  our  men  are  properly 
taught  correct  methods  of  scouting  in  time  of  peace, 
we  may  be  sure  that  they  will  employ  those  methods 
when  in  the  face  of  an  enemy  and  constantly  men- 
aced by  death  or  capture. 


LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL 


13 


The  message  sent  from  Atchison  hill,  written  on  a 
field  message  blank,  would  be  as  follows: 


WIRILESS.    LANTERN,     HCLIO! 
fLAO,  CYCLIST.  FOOT  Mcsme.n- 

INTEO     MLSUNOEH 


7»4f.  AC.6pWZi*4<Z4*eC 


If  Lieutenant  A  had  not  been  supplied  with  mes- 
sage blanks,  as  will  often  be  the  case,  he  would  have 
written  the  message  on  a  leaf  from  his  note  book,  or 
on  any  other  piece  of  ordinary  paper;  in  that  case 
the  message  would  have  been  worded  as  in  the  solu- 
tion, without  any  attempt  to  reproduce  the  ruled  lines, 
etc.  of  the  blank  form.  The  object  of  the  message 
blank,  when  it  is  furnished,  is  merely  to  prevent  the 
sender  from  forgetting  some  important  part  of  the 
message. 

The  lieutenant  was  careful  not  to  state  the  location 
of  the  outpost  commander,  or  the  organization  to 
which  the  outpost  belonged.  This  would  add  noth- 
ing to  the  value  of  the  message,  but  would  give  the 
enemy  important  information  should  the  message  fall 
into  hostile  hands.  The  messenger,  however,  is  told 
where  and  to  whom  he  is  to  take  the  message.  The 
lieutenant  intrusted  the  message  to  a  single  messenger, 


14         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

and  informed  him  of  its  contents  before  starting  him 
off;  the  envelope  (if  one  was  used)  was  left  un- 
sealed so  that  the  messenger  might  further  study  the 
message,  if  he  saw  fit.  This  was  a  wise  precaution,  for 
a  messenger  may  have  to  destroy  a  message  at  any  mo- 
ment to  prevent  its  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  ene- 
my; consequently,  he  should  be  familiar  with  its  con- 
tents, when  practicable.  Information  is  sent  by  one, 
or  by  two  or  more  messengers,  depending  on  its  im- 
portance, the  dangers  of  the  road,  distance  to  be  trav- 
eled, etc.  A  single  messenger  is  not  so  confident  and 
something  may  happen  to  him,  or,  if  he  is  mounted, 
to  his  horse;  but  the  lieutenant  was  so  near  his  out- 
post line  that  he  did  not  believe  it  necessary  to  weaken 
his  patrol  further  by  sending  two  messengers. 

The  lieutenant  took  his  time  in  writing  the  message, 
without  being  unduly  deliberate.  Ten  minutes 
elapsed  from  the  moment  he  saw  the  hostile  patrol  to 
the  moment  he  finished  the  message.  A  part  of  that 
time  he  was  observing  the  country  in  every  direction, 
but  especially  along  the  Atchison  pike,  to  see  wheth- 
er the  hostile  patrol  was  followed  by  other  hostile  for- 
ces ;  at  the  same  time,  he  was  deliberating  on  what  he 
would  say  in  the  message.  Before  he  could  complete 
the  message  he  had  also  to  decide  what  his  further 
movements  were  to  be,  for  his  commander  would 
want  to  know  of  them. 

It  is  suggested  that  the  message  be  carefully  cop- 
ied to  see  how  long  it  takes  to  write  it.  It  will  take 
about  4  minutes  to  make  a  legible  copy,  unless  one 
writes  a  legible  hand  with  more  than  ordinary  rapidi- 
ty. But  is  is  not  the  writing  alone  that  takes  time,  al- 
though this  is  generally  done  under  great  difficulties  in 


LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL  15 

the  field.  For  every  minute  spent  in  writing,  we  prob- 
ably will  spend  one  or  two  minutes  in  considering  what 
we  will  say,  and  in  re-reading  the  message  to  see  that 
we  have  omitted  nothing.  The  message  might  be 
made  shorter  and  say  all  that  should  be  reported ;  even 
so,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  shorter  message  can 
be  more  quickly  written.  Our  Field  Service  Regu- 
lations say  that  a  message  should  be  brief  and  clear, 
resembling  a  telegram;  but  this  does  not  mean  that 
clearness  shall  be  sacrificed  for  brevity.  "Searching 
for  the  shortest  form  of  expression  might  take  longer 
than  rapidly  writing  several  longer  sentences,  and 
might  result  in  ambiguities.  It  is  most  appropriate  to 
say  'Please  excuse  this  long  letter;  I  haven't  time  to 
write  a  shorter  one.'  ' 

Yet  this  is  time  valuably  spent.  How  frequently  at 
maneuvers  have  we  seen  messages  so  carelessly  com- 
posed that  it  was  well  nigh  impossible  to  get  any  defin- 
ite information  from  them,  and  so  illegibly  written 
that  it  was  exceedingly  difficult  to  read  such  incom- 
plete information  as  they  contained!  We  have  seen  a 
patrol  leader  work  with  great  patience  for  hours  in 
leading  his  patrol  to  a  point  from  which  he  got  a  per- 
fect view  of  the  enemy,  only  to  send  in  an  incomplete 
and  garbled  account  of  his  discovery,  written  in  an 
illegible  scrawl;  whereas,  had  he  spent  five  minutes 
more  on  the  preparation  of  his  message,  he  could  have 
written  a  complete  and  easily  understood  report  of  in- 
estimable value  to  his  commander. 

The  lieutenant  realized  that  he  was  running  a  risk, 
in  taking  his  patrol  to  Sentinel  hill,  of  having  it  cut 
off  and  captured.  At  the  first  glance,  this  lone  high 
hill  appealed  to  him  strongly  as  an  observation  point, 


16         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

but  he  reflected  that  the  enemy's  patrols  might  search 
its  top  and  sides  in  the  hope  of  discovering  him.  He 
thought  of  choosing  some  less  conspicuous  point,  as 
Eleven  Hundred  Foot  hill,  but  for  the  reasons  given 
in  the  solution,  and  because  there  were  many  "back 
doors"  through  which  he  might  escape  from  Sentinel 
hill,  he  finally  chose  the  latter. 

What  should  our  lieutenant  have  done  had  he  ob- 
served the  glow  of  camp  fires  to  the  westward  of  the 
hostile  force  he  had  seen?  This  would  be  an  indica- 
tion that  the  force  he  had  observed  was  but  the  ad- 
vance guard  of  a  larger  column.  We  have  seen  that 
the  patrol  leader  based  his  conclusion  that  he  had  seen 
the  enemy's  entire  force  on  the  rather  scant  facts  that 
he  had  seen  but  one  troop  of  cavalry,  and  no  artillery, 
and  that  the  infantry  was  followed  by  its  field  train. 
What  appear  to  be  the  most  convincing  signs  are  at 
times  deceptive.  The  lack  of  cavalry  and  artillery 
might  be  explained  in  many  ways.  In  general,  the 
field  train  of  an  advance  guard  does  not  follow  imme- 
diately in  its  rear,  but  accompanies  the  rest  of  the 
baggage  in  rear  of  the  main  column ;  but  this  instance 
may  be  an  exception,  or  the  baggage  may  have  been 
pushed  ahead  to  join  the  advance  guard  for  the  night. 

Under  this  supposition,  should  our  lieutenant  have 
continued  his  reconnaissance?  His  orders  do  not  re- 
quire him  to  return  at  dark  and  he  has  the  whole  night 
before  him  in  which  to  work.  By  sending  back  the 
non-commissioned  officer  to  report  the  result  of  the 
reconnaissance  thus  far  made,  and  pushing  on  alone, 
he  would,  if  successful,  be  able  to  return  by  morning 
with  a  more  complete  report  of  the  enemy.  Of  course, 
in  so  doing,  he  would  entrust  the  delivery  of  the  im- 


LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL  17 

portant  information  already  in  his  possession  to  the 
non-commissioned  officer,  whose  skill  is  inferior  to  his 
own,  but  he  could  not  be  censured  if  his  zeal  should 
lead  him  to  undertake  the  hazardous  enterprise  of  a 
night  reconnaissance  within  the  hostile  outposts. 

No  doubt  it  may  be  thought  strange  that  we  would 
approve,  even  in  a  guarded  way,  of  the  return  journ- 
ey being  made  in  part  over  the  route  by  which  the  pa- 
trol went  out,  apparently  in  violation  of  what  our 
Field  Service  Regulations  say  on  the  subject.  The 
regulations  do  not  establish  an  absolute  rule  to  be  fol- 
lowed under  all  circumstances.  It  is  the  danger  of 
ambuscade  on  the  old  route  that  makes  it  more  dan- 
gerous than  a  new  one,  and  for  this  reason  the  old 
route,  generally,  should  be  avoided.  General  Bad- 
en-Powell says  that  the  only  time  he  violated  this 
rule  he  lost  his  hat  and  very  nearly  lost  his  life  by  the 
bullets  of  a  hidden  party  of  the  enemy.  But  the  route 
along  the  railroad  from  F  is  suggested  as  practicable, 
although  lined  with  danger,  for  the  following  reasons : 
There  is  no  hostile  infantry  east  of  Frenchman;  the 
hostile  cavalry  patrols  will  probably  confine  their 
movements  to  the  roads  during  the  night,  and  in  order 
to  observe  our  camp,  standing  patrols  probably  will 
be  on  the  high  ground  only  at  E  and  16.  Even  so,  our 
patrol  would  have  to  thread  its  way  very  carefully 
through  the  dangerous  section  between  F  and  10. 


CHAPTER  II. 

LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL. 

PROBLEM. 

(See  4-inch  map). 

On  September  1,  a  Blue  regiment  in  hostile  terri- 
tory is  advancing  on  Leaven  worth  via  the  Kickapoo 
— 17 — H — G  road.  Small  detachments  of  hostile  in- 
fantry are  known  to  be  in  the  vicinity  of  Leaven- 
worth. 

At  11  a.  m.,  after  6  hours  of  forced  marching,  the 
column  is  halted  for  a  rest  of  45  minutes,  when  the  ad- 
vance party  reaches  the  Taylor  house  ( about  one-half 
a  mile  south  of  17).  The  advance  guard  commander 
had  previously  given  Lieutenant  A  the  following  or- 
ders: "When  the  column  halts  to  rest,  take  two  squads 
from  the  advance  party  and  determine  whether  the 
enemy  occupies  Sentinel  hill  and  the  ridge  to  the  south 
and  east  of  it.  Leave  your  packs  under  guard  at  the 
Taylor  house  to  be  picked  up  by  your  company  wag- 
on when  it  passes.  Send  your  messages  to  me  with 
the  advance  guard." 

Note — Salt  creek  is  very  low  and  can  be  crossed  by  infantry 
dry  shod. 

Required : 

(a)  What  route  will  the  patrol  take  for  the  first 
mile  and  a  half  of  its  journey?  Give  reasons. 

SOLUTION. 
The  mission  of  the  patrol  is,  in  part,  to  determine 


LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL  19 

whether  Sentinel  hill  is  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and 
the  only  certain  way  of  doing  this  is  to  reconnoiter  the 
top  and  slopes  of  the  hill.  Consequently,  Sentinel  hill 
becomes  the  first  objective  of  the  patrol,  and,  if  prac- 
ticable, it  should  be  reached  under  cover. 

There  are  four  available  covered  approaches  to  the 
hill.  (1)  South  along  the  road  as  far  as  the  stream 
between  the  Dolman  house  and  the  Burns  house, 
thence  along  this  stream  to  Salt  creek,  thence  up  the 
creek  and  through  the  woods  bordering  the  northern 
spur  of  Sentinel  hill  to  the  top  of  the  hill.  ( 2 )  South 
along  the  road  to  the  stream-crossing  350  yards  north 
of  Frenchman,  thence  down  this  stream  to  Salt  creek, 
thence  across  the  creek  and  through  the  same  woods  as 
before  to  the  top  of  the  hill.  (3)  South  along  the 
road  to  the  bridge  over  Salt  creek  at  Frenchman, 
thence  along  the  right  bank  of  the  creek  and  through 
the  woods  to  the  top  of  the  hill  as  before.  (4)  Di- 
rectly east  from  Taylor's,  keeping  on  the  north  side  of 
the  hedge  until  Salt  creek  is  reached,  thence  along  the 
creek  and  through  the  woods  to  the  top  of  the  hill. 

There  is  not  much  choice  among  the  first  three  of 
these  routes.  Route  4  is  fairly  well  concealed,  but  is 
much  more  roundabout  than  any  of  the  others,  and  is 
entirely  across  country;  hence  progress  by  this  route 
will  be  slow.  By  routes  2  and  3,  the  patrol  will  re- 
main longer  on  the  road,  and  may  reach  its  destina^ 
tion  more  quickly  and  with  less  fatigue.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  first  route  has  the  advantage  of  better  cov- 
er, for  the  low-cut  hedge  along  the  road  forms  but 
imperfect  cover  for  so  large  a  patrol.  Consequently, 
Lieutenant  A  decides  to  take  the  first  route. 


20         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Continuation  of  the  Problem. 
(b)     On  the  supposition  that  the  patrol  takes  the 
route  first  described  above,  and  does  not  encounter  the 
enemy,  what  will  be  its  formation  until  it  reaches  the 
top  of  Sentinel  hill? 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 

While  on  the  road,  a  non-commissioned  officer  and 
three  men  will  form  a  point;  the  non-commissioned 
officer  will  send  one  man  50  yards  in  advance  of  him- 
self and  the  other  two.  The  remaining  twelve  men 
will  march  in  one  body  in  single  or  double  file,  de- 
pending on  the  cover  furnished  by  the  hedge,  and  will 
follow  the  point  at  200  yards.  The  files  will  follow 
each  other  at  a  distance  of  about  10  yards,  thereby 
making  it  more  difficult  for  an  observing  enemy  to 
determine  the  full  strength  of  the  patrol.  Two  men 
will  be  sent  to  the  Dolman  house  to  examine  the  coun- 
try to  the  east  of  there  not  visible  from  the  road,  and 
then  to  return  to  the  patrol. 

On  leaving  the  road  the  point  does  not  change  its 
formation.  Two  of  the  twelve  men  fell  back  100 
yards  and  follow  as  a  rear  point.  The  remaining  ten 
men  keep  the  formation  they  had  while  on  the  road, 
half  observing  to  the  right  and  half  to  the  left.  This 
formation  is  preserved  until  the  patrol  enters  the  lar- 
ger wood  about  the  bends  in  Salt  creek.  From  here 
to  the  top  of  Sentinel  hill,  the  wood  is  thick  and  about 
250  yards  wide  and  dispositions  should  be  made  for 
observing  from  both  its  edges.  Accordingly,  two  men 
are  sent  out  to  each  flank  to  follow  along  the  edges  of 
the  wood,  and  the  six  men  in  the  main  body  of  the  pa- 
trol are  closed  up  to  the  usual  distances  between  files. 


LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL  21 

Lieutenant  A  has  remained  with  or  near  the  main 
body  of  the  patrol  throughout  the  march.  The  route 
of  the  patrol,  after  it  reaches  the  top  of  the  hill,  will 
depend  on  the  amount  of  cover  furnished  by  minor 
features ;  it  may  be  necessary  for  the  patrol  to  contin- 
ue along  the  east  slope  of  the  hill  under  cover  of  the 
narrow  strip  of  wood. 

Continuation  of  the  Problem. 
(c)  On  reaching  the  top  of  Sentinel  hill  at  11:40 
a.  m.,  Lieutenant  A  halts  his  patrol  under  cover,  with 
two  men  observing  each  of  the  four  slopes  of  the  hill 
while  he  carefully  scans  the  surrounding  country,  par- 
ticularly the  ridge  to  the  south  and  east.  His  search 
reveals  no  indications  of  the  enemy.  His  own  column 
is  not  in  sight  and  apparently  has  not  yet  resumed  its 
march.  What  action  should  he  now  take?  Give  rea- 
sons. 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 
He  should  send  a  message  giving  the  result  of  his 
reconnaissance  up  to  this  time,  and  then  continue  his 
advance  along  the  best  available  route  towards  the 
ridge  to  the  southeast.  That  Sentinel  hill  is  not  occu- 
pied by  the  enemy  is  important  information  for  the 
advance  guard  commander  and  this  information 
should  be  sent  to  him  without  delay.  It  tells  him  that 
he  has  nothing  to  fear  from  this  commanding  position 
on  the  flank  of  the  Blue  line  of  advance.  But  Lieuten- 
ant A's  reconnaissance  can  not  stop  here,  if  he  accom- 
plishes his  full  mission.  He  must  definitely  deter- 
mine, by  a  closer  inspection  than  he  can  make  from 
Sentinel  hill,  whether  the  ridge  towards  Leavenworth 
is  occupied  by  the  enemy. 


22         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

His  message  is  simple  and  reads  as  follows  : 

Officer's  Patrol, 

Sentinel  Hill, 

To  1  Sept.—,  11:50  A.  M. 

Advance  Guard  Commander. 

SENTINEL  hill  is  not  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and  there  is 
no  sign  of  the  enemy  on  the  ridge  to  the  south  and  east.  I  will 
proceed  at  once  to  ATCHISON  hill.  A. 

Lieutenant. 

Continuation  of  the  Problem. 
(d)  The  above  message  was  sent  by  two  messen- 
gers. Soon  after  their  departure,  as  Lieutenant  A 
is  about  to  resume  his  advance,  the  non-commissioned 
officer,  observing  toward  G,  reports  a  hostile  patrol  of 
four  men  coming  through  the  wood  up  the  hill  from 
the  direction  of  G.  What  should  be  Lieutenant  A's 
action  in  this  situation?  Give  reasons. 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 
For  several  reasons,  the  lieutenant  should  attempt 
to  capture  the  hostile  patrol.  His  own  patrol  is  so 
large  and  the  east  and  west  slopes  of  Sentinel  hill  are 
so  open  that  he  probably  could  not  avoid  being  seen, 
unless  he  retraced  his  steps  to  the  large  wood  on  the 
north  slope  of  the  hill,  and  from  there  he  could  not 
reach  the  ridge  to  the  east  under  cover  without  mak- 
ing a  wide  detour.  His  own  reconnaissance  would  be 
blocked  and  the  hostile  patrol  would  be  permitted  to 
observe  the  Blue  column.  Lieutenant  A  was  given  a 
strong  patrol  in  order  that  his  reconnaissance  might 
not  be  checked  by  small  hostile  patrols,  and  the  im- 
portant thing  for  him  now  is  to  push  on  to  Atchison 
hill  and  discover  the  exact  situation  along  that  ridge 
and  in  the  open  country  towards  Leavenworth.  This 


LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL  23 

he  can  hardly  hope  to  do  without  colliding  with  the 
small  hostile  patrol,  and  it  will  be  to  his  advantage  to 
bring  about  the  collision  in  such  a  way,  if  possible,  that 
he  may  capture  the  entire  patrol.  This  appears  the 
more  probable  since  the  hostile  patrol,  apparently,  is 
not  aware  of  Lieutenant  A's  presence. 

Continuation  of  the  Problem. 

(e)  Lieutenant  A  hastily  prepared  an  ambus- 
cade and  captured  three  of  the  hostile  patrol,  but  the 
fourth  man  escaped  towards  G.    There  are  no  other 
signs  of  the  enemy.    It  is  now  12  o'clock  and  the  head 
of  the  Blue  column  is  passing  the  Burns  house.  What 
disposition  will  he  make  of  the  three  prisoners? 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 

After  disarming  and  searching  the  prisoners,  each 
is  questioned  out  of  the  hearing  of  the  other  two,  and 
subsequently  they  are  not  allowed  to  communicate 
with  each  other.  They  are  then  placed  under  the 
guard  of  a  non-commissioned  officer  and  one  man  and 
are  sent  back  to  join  the  column.  The  bolts  are  re- 
moved from  their  rifles  and  they  are  required  to  carry 
their  arms  and  ammunition.  The  non-commissioned 
officer  was  present  when  the  prisoners  were  ques- 
tioned, and  he  is  directed  to  report  their  answers  and 
the  circumstances  of  their  capture  to  the  advance 
guard  commander.  Lieutenant  A  does  not  delay  his 
reconnaissance  in  order  to  send  a  written  message  em- 
bracing the  answers  to  the  questions  asked  the  pris- 
oners. 

Continuation  of  the  Problem. 

(f)  From  the  prisoners,  Lieutenant  A  learned 
that  the  enemy  is  attempting  to  concentrate  his  scat- 


24         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

tered  detachments  at  Leavenworth  and  that  no  hostile 
forces  are  along  the  ridge  to  the  south  and  east  of 
Sentinel  hill.  The  Blue  patrol  (now  reduced  to  12 
men)  continued  its  advance  at  12:12  p.  m.,  as  the  ad- 
vance party  of  the  Blue  column  was  crossing  Salt 
creek  bridge.  At  12:30  p.  m.,  the  patrol  is  near  16 
and  the  Blue  advance  party  is  approaching  G.  Lieu- 
tenant A  observes  about  a  battalion  of  Red  infantry 
advancing  in  column  on  the  72 — 14  road,  the  point  of 
its  advance  guard  being  at  the  railroad  crossing  just 
east  of  14,  while  the  tail  of  the  column  is  concealed  by 
the  Penitentiary  walls.  What  action  should  Lieu- 
tenant A  take? 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 
He  should  deploy  his  patrol  in  the  edge  of  the 
woods  southeast  of  16  and  open  a  vigorous  fire  on  the 
advancing  column.  The  two  hostile  columns  are 
about  equally  distant  from  the  top  of  the  ridge  near 
16,  and  the  one  that  reaches  it  first  will  have  a  great 
advantage  of  position.  There  is  no  good  reason  why 
Lieutenant  A  should  try  longer  to  conceal  his  pres- 
ence, and  his  fire  may  check  the  Red  column  sufficient- 
ly to  permit  the  Blues  to  get  easy  possession  of  the 
ridge.  Moreover,  opening  a  rapid  fire  is  the  quick- 
est way  of  informing  the  advance  guard  of  the  neces- 
sity for  haste. 

COMMENTS. 

It  should  be  observed  that  Lieutenant  A  allowed 
no  member  of  his  patrol,  excepting  those  who  carried 
the  message  and  escorted  the  prisoners,  to  get  more 
than  200  to  300  yards  away  from  him  at  any  time. 
During  the  reconnaissance,  the  patrol  was  under  his 


LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL  25 

immediate  control,  and  all  its  members  that  had  not 
heen  sent  to  the  rear  could  be  assembled  in  less  than  a 
minute  for  any  action  he  might  wish  to  take. 

Throughout  this  book,  much  will  be  said  of  the  evil 
consequences  of  dispersion — of  scattering  a  com- 
mand on  a  front  so  broad  that  its  full  strength  can  not 
be  opportunely  united  at  the  decisive  point — for  ex- 
perience has  shown  this  to  be  a  very  frequent,  if  not 
the  most  frequent,  tactical  mistake  made  by  those  be- 
ginning the  application  of  tactical  principles  to  prac- 
tical problems.  The  principle  in  concentration  of 
forces  there  is  strength,  in  dispersion  there  is  weak- 
ness, is  simple  enough.  It  requires  no  demonstration 
to  convince  one  that  eleven  football  players  dispersed 
at  equal  intervals  across  the  gridiron  would  make  a 
sorry  showing  against  the  attack  of  the  concentrated 
wedge  of  their  opponents.  The  game  of  war,  in  this 
respect,  is  not  unlike  the  game  of  football.  The  diffi- 
culty, however,  lies  not  so  much  in  learning  the  princi- 
ple as  iii  recognizing  what  constitutes  dispersion  with 
commands  of  various  strengths,  and  this  difficulty  we 
hope  to  clear  away,  little  by  little,  as  we  go  through 
this  book. 

The  principle  applies,  whatever  the  size  of  the  com- 
mand. Even  a  single  man,  fighting  alone,  must  con- 
centrate his  efforts  in  the  proper  direction,  if  he  is  to 
secure  the  maximum  benefits  for  the  energy  expend- 
ed. We  are  liable  to  fall  into  the  error  of  saying  the 
principle  does  not  apply  to  a  very  small  command, 
certainly  not  to  a  command  so  small  as  a  patrol.  From 
this  very  weakness  of  the  patrol  springs  the  greatest 
necessity  for  utilizing  every  particle  of  its  strength. 

Now  let  us  see  what  would  constitute  dispersion  in 


26         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

this  particular  case.  As  a  general  rule,  every  member 
of  a  patrol  will  accompany  the  patrol  leader,  and  de- 
tachments should  be  sent  no  farther  away  than  is  nec- 
essary to  protect  the  front,  flanks,  and  rear  of  the  pa- 
trol, while  it  is  marching  or  halted,  or  to  make  obser- 
vations from  points  very  close  by.  Of  course  there 
are  exceptions,  but  we  will  make  fewer  mistakes,  if  we 
adhere  closely  to  the  rule  until  we  have  mastered  the 
difficulty;  later,  we  will  have  but  little  trouble  in  rec- 
ognizing the  exceptions;  whereas,  if  we  search  for 
them  in  the  beginning,  we  are  liable  to  consider  every 
case  an  exception. 

For  example,  Lieutenant  A  was  told  to  reconnoiter 
"Sentinel  hill  and  the  ridge  to  the  south  and  east  of 
it."  He  might  have  tried  to  perform  both  these 
tasks  at  the  same  time,  by  sending  a  part  of  the  patrol 
over  Sentinel  hill  while  the  remainder  followed  along 
the  road,  or  some  other  route,  to  the  ridge.  Had  he 
done  so,  he  would  have  dispersed  the  patrol.  Or,  he 
might  have  kept  the  patrol  together  as  far  as  the  top 
of  Sentinel  hill  and  scattered  it  after  reaching  that 
point.  "The  ridge  to  the  south  and  east"  measures 
two  miles  or  more  along  its  crest,  and  he  might  have 
tried  to  reconnoiter  its  whole  length  at  one  time  by 
sending  a  few  men  to  Wagner  point,  a  few  to  Atch- 
ison  hill,  and  a  few  more  to  Southwest  hill.  Had  he 
done  so,  again  he  would  have  dispersed  the  patrol. 
These  tasks  should  be  done  one  at  a  time  in  the  order 
of  their  importance,  and,  since  the  most  direct  route 
for  his  regiment  is  via  16,  that  is  where  he  is  most  like- 
ly to  find  the  enemy,  and  is  the  point  on  which  he 
should  direct  his  further  march.  It  was  not  necessary 
to  approach  16  along  the  road,  and  if  he  had  tried  to 


LEADING  OF  AN  INFANTRY  PATROL  27 

get  on  the  flank  of  any  small  force  that  might  be  near 
16,  by  ascending  the  northern  slope  of  Atchison  hill, 
there  could  be  no  criticism  of  his  action,  provided  he 
kept  the  patrol  together. 

Frequently,  we  will  unwittingly  disperse  our  com- 
mand as  a  result  of  not  having  studied  the  map  with 
sufficient  care.  It  is  advisable  always  to  apply  the 
scale  of  the  map  to  the  distances  involved  in  the,  di- 
vision of  a  command,  before  making  a  decision  to  di- 
vide it.  More  than  that,  we  should  read  the  map  in- 
telligently, and  should  remember  that  the  terrain  is 
very  different  from  what  we  are  likely  to  picture  it, 
unless  we  have  made  a  study  of  terrain  from  a  mili- 
tary standpoint,  and  are  able  to  use  our  imagination 
with  intelligence  when  reading  the  map. 

Lastly,  we  should  not  attempt  on  the  map  what  we 
would  not  do  on  the  ground.  In  solutions,  such  ex- 
pressions as  the  following  are  not  uncommon:  "I  will 
send  3  men  to  Wagner  point  to  signal  me  what  they 
see  there"  Or,  "I  will  march  towards  16  with  the  re- 
mainder of  the  patrol  and,  if  I  encounter  the  enemy, 
will  signal  the  patrols  on  Wagner  point  and  South- 
west hill  to  rejoin."  We  have  but  to  measure  the  dis- 
tances on  the  map,  and  get  a  correct  mental  picture 
of  the  terrain,  to  realize  that  these  signals  probably 
would  not  be  seen,  and,  even  if  they  were,  there  is  lit- 
tle chance  of  their  being  understood,  for  only  the  sim- 
plest messages  can  be  sent  in  this  manner,  and  the  sig- 
nals for  these  must  be  prearranged.  Manifestly,  we 
cannot  foresee  all  the  contingencies  that  may  arise  and 
devise  a  signal  to  meet  each  one  of  them. 


CHAPTER  III. 

LEADING  OF  A  CAVALRY  PATROL. 

SITUATION. 

(See  2  and  4-inch  maps). 

The  Missouri  river  is  the  boundary  between  hostile 
states.  A  Red  force  east  of  the  river  is  known  to  be 
advancing  on  Leaven  worth. 

A  Blue  separate  brigade  with  one  squadron  of  cav- 
alry has  been  pushed  forward  by  rail  to  Winchester 
(19  miles  west  of  Leavenworth)  with  orders  to  march 
on  Leavenworth  and  seize  the  bridges  over  the  Mis- 
souri at  and  near  that  point.  The  brigade  was  to  camp 
at  Winchester  the  night  of  September  20-21,  covered 
by  the  cavalry  which  had  been  pushed  forward  toward 
Easton  (11  miles  west  of  Leavenworth) .  At  2  p.  m., 
September  20,  when  the  most  advanced  troop  of  the 
cavalry  was  approaching  Easton,  without  having  seen 
anything  of  the  enemy,  its  commander  gave  Lieuten- 
ant A  the  following  verbal  order: 

"The  brigade  commander  has  received  information  that  the 
enemy  is  moving  troops  by  rail  to  Beverley. 

"Take  a  patrol  of  five  privates  from  your  platoon,  proceed  by 
way  of  Rock  Island  bridge  to  the  vicinity  of  Beverley,  and  ob- 
tain information  of  any  hostile  forces  that  may  be  concentrating 
at  that  point. 

"I  will  send  another  patrol  under  Sergeant  A  with  similar 
instructions  via  Terminal  bridge. 

"The  squadron  will  camp  on  the  line  of  the  Big  Stranger  (11 


LEADING  OF  A  CAVALRY  PATROL      29 

miles  west  of  Leavenworth)  to-night,  with  headquarters  at  Eas- 
ton.     You  will  go  prepared  to  remain  out  over  night."      (*) 

Lieutenant  A  selected  five  of  the  best  men  of  his 
platoon  and  satisfied  himself  that  they  and  their  hors- 
es were  in  fit  condition  and  that  the  latter  were  well 
shod  and  had  no  bad  habits,  such  as  neighing,  which 
would  render  them  unsuited  for  the  work  in  hand. 
Rations,  arms,  ammunition,  accoutrements,  and 
equipment  were  carefully  inspected  and  defects  cor- 
rected. No  cooked  rations  were  available  or  they 
would  have  been  taken.  The  inspection  completed, 
Lieutenant  A  acquainted  the  men  with  the  orders  he 
received  from  the  troop  commander,  taking  great 
pains  to  insure  their  fully  understanding  the  situa- 
tion and  what  was  expected  of  the  patrol.  The  gen- 
eral principals  governing  the  conduct  of  infantry  pa- 
trols are,  as  a  rule,  equally  applicable  to  cavalry  pa- 
trols, and  to  avoid  a  repetition  of  the  preceding  chap- 
ters only  such  principles  will  be  mentioned  here  as 
are  peculiar  to  the  conduct  of  cavalry  patrols. 

What  route  should  Lieutenant  A  have  taken  for  the 
first  five  miles  of  his  march,  supposing  nothing  was 
seen  of  the  enemy? 

During  the  march  up  to  this  point,  Lieutenant  A 
had  been  studying  his  map  with  the  possibility  of  just 
such  a  mission  as  this  in  mind,  and  it  took  him  but  a 
moment  to  decide  that  his  route  at  first  would  be  along 
the  Atchison  pike  via  Frenchman.  The  Millwood 
road  further  to  the  north  possibly  might  have  been  a 
less  dangerous  route,  but  the  patrol  would  have  been 
practically  blindfolded  the  moment  it  entered  the 

*  Fort  Leavenworth  is  ungarrisoned. 


30         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

woods  east  of  Salt  creek.  If  the  enemy's  cavalry  had 
crossed  the  Missouri  river  it  was  more  likely  to  be  en- 
countered in  force  on  the  Atchison  pike  than  on  the 
Millwood  road,  but  Lieutenant  A  took  this  chance  in 
order  to  get  a  view  to  the  east  from  the  hills  south- 
east of  Frenchman.  A  patrol  should  remain  con- 
cealed from  the  enemy,  yet  it  must  see  what  is  going 
on  about  it,  and,  if  to  do  this  it  becomes  necessary  to 
expose  itself,  this  additional  risk  must  be  taken  with- 
out hesitation.  Lieutenant  A  pointed  out  on  his  map 
to  his  patrol  the  route  he  proposed  to  take  as  far  as 
the  hills  west  of  Leavenworth;  he  gave  this  informa- 
tion to  Sergeant  A  also,  and  learned  from  him  that 
he  would  enter  Leavenworth  via  the  Zimmerman 
road. 

The  formation  and  conduct  of  the  patrol  as  far  as 
Frenchman. 

The  patrol  then  took  up  the  march.  Lieutenant  A 
and  one  man  were  in  the  lead,  two  men  were  about 
100  yards  to  the  rear  and  the  remaining  two  men  were 
100  yards  still  farther  to  the  rear.  All  followed  the 
road,  taking  advantage  of  such  cover  as  was  afforded 
by  ditches,  hedges,  etc.  A  patrol  must  advance  quick- 
ly. The  peculiar  value  of  a  cavalry  patrol  lies  in  its 
great  mobility.  To  cross  country,  following  woods, 
ravines,  and  other  cover,  would  wholly  sacrifice  this 
mobility  for  increased  security;  the  horses  would  be- 
come a  mere  burden  and  the  patrol  would  be  less  mo- 
bile and  efficient  than  one  composed  of  infantry.  In 
this  case,  mobility  was  of  special  importance.  Bev- 
erley,  Lieutenant  A's  objective,  was  15  miles  away, 
and  the  afternoon  was  already  partly  gone.  As  he 


LEADING  OF  A  CAVALRY  PATROL  31 

drew  nearer  to  Beverley  his  march  would  have  to  be 
conducted  with  greater  caution;  consequently  Lieu- 
tenant A  appreciated  the  necessity  for  making  as 
much  speed  as  possible  in  the  early  part  of  the  jour- 
ney, without  taking  undue  chances;  he  did  not  lose 
sight  of  the  fact  that  he  might  meet  hostile  forces  at 
any  time,  especially  cavalry.  The  enemy,  apparently, 
was  pursuing  precisely  the  same  tactics,  in  his  efforts 
to  secure  possession  of  the  Missouri  river  bridges,  as 
was  the  Blue  separate  brigade,  and,  if  he  were  de- 
training troops  at  Beverley,  he  would  undoubtedly 
push  his  cavalry  forward  at  the  earliest  possible  mo- 
ment. 

For  the  first  few  miles  the  patrol  was  in  compara- 
tive safety,  since  the  road  it  followed  had  already 
been  passed  over  by  the  most  advanced  scouts  of  the 
squadron,  and  Lieutenant  A,  without  neglecting  to 
observe,  trotted  out,  walking  on  the  hills  only,  until 
he  came  up  with  a  patrol  from  his  platoon  about  four 
miles  east  of  Easton.  From  this  point  he  proceeded 
with  greater  caution  and  more  slowly,  occasionally 
stopping  on  commanding  points  to  reconnoiter  the 
country  to  the  front,  orient  his  map  and  point  out  the 
location  of  the  patrol  to  his  men.  Little  time  was  lost 
in  this  part  of  the  journey  in  reconnoitering  side 
roads,  since  it  was  the  duty  of  other  patrols  to  warn 
the  squadron  of  the  near  approach  of  hostile  patrols 
and  Lieutenant  A's  chief  concern  was  to  reach  the 
vicinity  of  Beverley  without  being  discovered  by  the 
enemy. 

At  3 :45  p.  m.,  the  patrol  was  about  one  mile  west  of 
Frenchman.  Here  it  met  a  farmer  returning  home 
from  Leavenworth,  who  told  Lieutenant  A  that  when 


32         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

he  left  Leavenworth  at  a  little  before  2  p.  m.,  it  was 
rumored  that  Red  troops  were  being  detrained  at  Bev- 
erley  and  that  some  of  their  cavalry  had  been  seen 
along  the  east  bank  of  the  Missouri  river  about  noon. 
Lieutenant  A  did  not  delay  to  question  him  further, 
but  hastened  on  in  an  effort  to  gain  the  hills  in  his 
front  before  they  could  be  reached  by  the  enemy's  pa- 
trols, which  he  now  felt  sure  would  soon  be  across  the 
river  if  they  were  not  so  already.  At  Frenchman,  he 
delayed  long  enough  to  water  the  horses — the  road 
from  the  north  and  that  from  the  east  being  observed, 
in  the  meantime,  by  mounted  sentinels;  he  also  in- 
quired if  the  country  to  the  east  was  visible  from  the 
top  of  Sentinel  hill,  and  was  told  that  it  was  not,  this 
information  verifying  the  accuracy  of  his  map.  Be- 
fore leaving  here,  the  men  were  told  to  observe  this 
point  well  as  it  would  be  the  place  of  assembly  in  case 
the  patrol  were  scattered. 

How  should  the  patrol  have  been  led  from  French- 
man to  the  high  ridge  to  the  southeast? 

With  his  patrol  still  in  the  same  formation  as  at  the 
start,  he  covered  the  dangerous  stretch  of  road  south- 
east of  Frenchman  at  a  swift  trot,  without  delaying 
to  question  the  inhabitants;  he  pulled  down  to  a  walk 
at  the  forks  of  the  road  at  the  Moore  house  and  took 
the  right  hand  fork  as  being  the  easiest  and  quickest 
way  to  the  top  of  the  hill.  He  proceeded  along  the 
road  to  the  cut  on  the  top  of  the  hill  and  then  turned 
sharply  off  to  the  left  and  followed  along  the  ridge, 
under  cover,  to  a  point  on  Atchison  hill  from  which 
the  low  ground  to  the  east  was  open  to  his  view.  It 
was  then  4:15  p.  m.  Lieutenant  A  sent  four  mounted 


LEADING  OF  A  CAVALRY  PATROL  33 

men  with  instructions  so  to  post  themselves,  two  on 
either  flank  of  the  patrol  at  a  distance  of  about  200 
yards,  as  to  prevent  the  patrol  from  being  surprised. 
Lieutenant  A  then  carefully  examined  the  country  in 
his  front  through  his  field  glass  for  the  purpose  of 
determining  whether  the  enemy  had  yet  crossed  the 
Missouri  river  and  what  the  subsequent  movements  of 
the  patrol  should  be. 

He  remained  here  for  some  minutes  without  seeing 
any  signs  of  the  enemy  and  had  about  decided  to  move 
down  the  hill  and  strike  Hancock  avenue  when  five 
mounted  men,  evidently  a  hostile  patrol,  appeared  on 
the  road  along  the  north  side  of  the  U.  S.  Peniten- 
tiary, and  moved  at  a  trot  towards  Atchison  Cross. 

What  action  should  Lieutenant  A  have  taken  in  this 

situation? 

Lieutenant  A  immediately  decided  that  he  must 
move,  and  remained  but  a  moment  longer  to  make 
sure  that  the  Red  patrol  was  not  closely  followed  by 
other  hostile  forces ;  he  then  assembled  the  patrol,  gave 
it  all  the  information  he  had  obtained  up  to  that  time, 
explained  his  present  intentions,  and  moved  it  through 
the  woods  towards  the  Schmidt  house.  As  the  patrol 
was  about  to  emerge  from  the  woods,  four  Red  troop- 
ers were  seen  on  the  road  just  north  of  the  railroads 
corning  down  the  hill  towards  the  McGuire  house. 
Lieutenant  A  immediately  dismounted  one  man  and 
left  him  to  observe  the  movements  of  this  second  pa- 
trol while  he  conducted  the  remainder  of  the  patrol 
and  the  led  horse  to  a  place  of  concealment  in  the  little 
watercourse  on  the  north  slope  of  Atchison  hill  where 
all  dismounted.  One  man  was  then  sent  towards  the 


34         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

cut  at  E  to  overlook  the  country  to  the  east,  one  was 
sent  to  the  southern  edge  of  the  little  woods,  two  were 
left  with  the  horses,  and  Lieutenant  A  joined  the  man 
who  had  been  left  to  watch  the  hostile  patrol.  He 
found  that  the  hostile  patrol  had  halted  at  the  Schmidt 
house,  but  presently  it  moved  on  along  the  road  to  the 
west.  Moving  along  the  side  of  the  hill  under  cover, 
Lieutenant  A  was  able  to  keep  the  patrol  in  sight,  and 
was  much  relieved  to  see  it  joined  at  G  by  five  Red 
cavalrymen  from  the  direction  of  Atchison  Cross,  evi- 
dently the  first  patrol  seen.  The  two  patrols  remained 
here  for  some  minutes,  apparently  conferring  with 
each  other,  and  then  all  nine  men  continued  their 
march  west  along  Atchison  pike  and  were  soon  out  of 
sight  beyond  Sentinel  hill.  This  was  at  4 :50  p.  m. 

What  should  Lieutenant  A  have  done  at  this  time? 

Leaving  the  man  in  observation,  Lieutenant  A  hast- 
ened back  to  his  horses,  called  in  his  two  sentinels  and 
learned  from  them  that  they  had  seen  no  further  in- 
dications of  the  enemy.  Since  this  was  the  first  con- 
tact with  the  enemy  in  this  operation,  information  of 
it  should  be  sent  at  once  to  the  cavalry  commander  at 
Easton.  He  and  the  brigade  commander  should  know 
as  soon  as  possible  that  the  enemy  had  actually  set 
foot  on  the  western  bank  of  the  Missouri.  Moreover, 
the  message  bearers  could  get  through  with  less  dan- 
ger then  than  later  on  when  more  hostile  cavalry  prob- 
ably would  be  between  Lieutenant  A  and  his  squad- 
ron. But  Lieutenant  A  did  not  want  to  spare  the 
messengers.  Even  if  he  sent  the  message  by  one  man 
only,  he  would  be  able  to  send  but  one  more  message. 
The  truth  of  the  matter  is  the  patrol  was  too  small  for 


LEADING  or  A  CAVALRY  PATROL  35 

its  mission.  Lieutenant  A  should  have  had  at  least 
1  non-commissioned  officer  and  7  men;  then  he  could 
have  sent  three  messages  and  still  have  been  left  with 
an  escort  of  2  men.  Two  non-commissioned  officers 
and  8  men  would  have  been  a  still  more  appropriate 
strength  for  the  patrol,  but  commanders  often  will  be 
compelled  to  make  patrols  much  weaker  than  they 
would  like,  so  many  are  the  demands  on  the  cavalry. 
Under  the  circumstances,  Lieutenant  A  decided  it 
was  best  to  delay  sending  the  message  by  a  messen- 
ger until  he  had  determined  whether  other  hostile 
troops  were  following  the  patrol  he  had  seen,  and  to 
attempt,  in  the  meantime,  to  telephone  the  informa- 
tion he  had  already  secured  to  Easton. 

Once  more  the  patrol  was  mounted  and  started 
through  the  woods  towards  the  Schmidt  house  (which 
was  found  to  be  unoccupied),  picking  up  the  sentinel 
on  the  way.  It  regained  the  road,  turned  east  and 
trotted  up  the  hill  beyond  the  McGuire  house  until 
Lieutenant  A  reached  the  trail  leading  north  along 
the  ridge  to  Sheridan's  Drive.  Here  Lieutenant  A 
signaled  the  patrol  to  halt,  dismounted  and  deliber- 
ately scanned  the  country  in  his  front  without  seeing 
any  signs  of  the  enemy.  He  then  mounted  and  took 
one  man  with  him  to  the  McGuire  house,  where  he 
found  a  telephone,  but  was  told  by  the  operator  at 
Leavenworth  that  there  had  been  no  communication 
with  Easton  for  more  than  half  an  hour.  He  ceased 
his  efforts  to  telephone,  rejoined  the  patrol,  and  sig- 
naled it  to  assemble.  The  rear  men  having  come  up, 
he  pointed  out  the  principal  features  of  the  country 
and  stated  that  their  further  march  would  be  along 
Hancock  and  Pope  avenues  to  the  river  bridge  and 


36         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  timber  beyond.    The  march  was  then  resumed  at  a 
walk. 

As  the  patrol  passed  the  target  butts,  one  of  the 
central  men  was  directed  to  skirt  the  woods  south  of 
Hancock  avenue.  Sheridan's  Drive  was  passed  with- 
out halting.  Just  as  Lieutenant  A  reached  the  wes- 
tern corner  of  the  National  cemetery  the  right  flank- 
er signaled  the  enemy  in  sight,  and  Lieutenant  A, 
halting  the  patrol,  hastened  to  his  side.  Two  hostile 
troopers  were  seen  on  Engineer  hill,  and  three  on 
Merritt  hill  moving  west  along  the  road  across  the 
cavalry  drill  ground. 

What  was  a  correct  course  to  follow  in  this  situation? 
Lieutenant  A  believed  these  to  be  the  advanced 
scouts  of  a  larger  force,  probably  then  crossing  the 
river  bridge,  and  it  took  him  but  a  moment  to  decide 
that  his  patrol  must  be  moved  to  a  point  where  it 
would  be  more  secure  from  discovery,  yet  from  which 
it  could  observe  the  country  about  Fort  Leavenworth. 
Sending  the  flanker  back  to  his  former  place  in  the 
center,  he  turned  the  patrol  into  the  woods  and  started 
up  the  hill  north  of  the  road.  As  the  patrol  entered 
the  woods,  the  distances  were  reduced  to  about  50 
yards.  After  a  few  moments,  a  faint  trail  was  found 
on  top  of  the  ridge;  this  was  followed  for  about  300 
yards  to  the  northeast  until  the  top  of  the  hill  was 
reached,  from  which  the  surrounding  country  was 
plainly  visible.  The  patrol  was  then  dismounted  un- 
der cover  and  two  men  with  the  led  horses  were  hid- 
den deep  in  the  woods;  two  men  were  sent  to  post 
themselves  as  sentinels  about  200  yards  away  on  the 
trail,  one  in  each  direction,  while  Lieutenant  A  and 
one  man  watched  the  country  below. 


LEADING  OF  A  CAVALRY  PATROL  37 

The  hostile  patrols  had  disappeared,  but  four  Red 
troopers  were  seen  moving  west  along  Pope  avenue, 
followed  at  about  200  yards  by  about  20  more;  a 
third  detachment,  carrying  a  guidon,  followed  about 
500  yards  further  to  the  rear,  and,  as  it  came  nearer, 
it  was  seen  to  be  the  larger  part  of  a  troop.  The  head 
of  the  column  soon  disappeared  under  the  hill,  but  ap- 
peared a  few  moments  later  on  the  north  slope  of  En- 
gineer hill,  where  nearly  an  entire  troop  was  soon  as- 
sembled. About  the  same  time,  the  head  of  a  column 
of  cavalry  appeared  on  Pope  avenue  and  a  few  min- 
utes later  it  turned  off  the  road  onto  West  End  par- 
ade, formed  column  of  troops,  halted  and  dismounted. 
There  were  three  troops  in  this  column  and  appar- 
ently they  were  going  into  camp  for  the  night.  It 
was  evident  that  there  was  at  least  a  squadron  of  cav- 
alry west  of  the  river.  In  the  meantime,  the  troop 
on  Engineer  hill  had  sent  small  detachments  to  Mer- 
ritt  hill  and  toward  Long  ridge,  as  though  it  were 
putting  out  outposts ;  the  remainder  of  the  troop  had 
dismounted. 

What  would  be  your  estimate  of  this  situation  and 
your  decision? 

From  what  he  had  seen,  Lieutenant  A  believed  that 
the  enemy  had  sent  a  squadron  of  cavalry  to  seize  the 
bridge  at  Fort  Leavenworth  and  hold  the  ground 
west  of  it,  and  that  it  had  gone  into  camp  and  put  one 
troop  on  outposts  for  the  night.  He  could  scarcely 
hope  to  get  across  the  bridge  under  the  circumstances, 
for  the  enemy  would  certainly  have  it  closely  watched 
by  a  detached  post.  What  then  was  he  to  do?  He 
thought  of  making  a  wide  detour  and  attempting  to 


38        TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

cross  at  the  Terminal  bridge,  but  he  knew  that  Ser- 
geant A  was  on  that  road  so  he  rejected  the  idea.  He 
had  secured  valuable  information  of  the  enemy,  but 
he  had  not  yet  completed  his  mission.  To  cany  out 
his  original  order  appeared  impracticable,  but  he  be- 
lieved that  by  remaining  in  the  vicinity  over  night  and 
continuing  his  reconnaissance  in  the  morning,  he 
might  discover  what  forces  were  in  the  rear  of  the 
squadron.  This  he  decided  to  do.  His  position  at  that 
moment  was  exceedingly  dangerous,  yet  to  move  was 
still  more  so.  If  the  enemy's  patrols  were  moving  on 
the  trails  through  the  woods,  the  best  way  to  avoid 
them  was  to  remain  concealed  in  one  place.  It  was 
now  a  few  minutes  after  six  o'clock;  by  7  p.  m.,  it 
would  be  quite  dark  and  the  enemy's  patrols  would 
then  probably  confine  themselves  to  the  main  roads; 
besides,  he  wished  to  continue  his  observations  from 
his  present  good  position  as  long  as  there  was  suffi- 
cient light.  So  he  remained  where  he  was  until  dark, 
but  without  seeing  anything  new,  and  then  assembled 
the  patrol. 

While  daylight  lasted,  he  wrote  a  message  giving 
the  result  of  his  reconnaissance  up  to  that  time,  and 
shortly  after  dark  two  men  were  each  given  a  copy 
and  sent  together  to  carry  it  to  Easton.  They  were 
instructed  to  go  by  the  road  over  which  they  came, 
Lieutenant  A  fearing  that  they  might  lose  their  way 
in  the  darkness  if  sent  by  a  new  route.  The  remain- 
der of  the  patrol  was  then  moved  down  the  hill,  and, 
after  the  horses  had  been  watered  in  Quarry  creek, 
they  were  concealed  in  a  small  watercourse  south  of 
the  creek.  One  man  was  placed  on  duty  as  sentinel, 
and  one  to  hold  the  horses.  In  this  way,  two  reliefs 


LEADING  OF  A  CAVALRY  PATROL  39 

were  formed,  Lieutenant  A  taking  his  turn  with  the 
others.  There  was  no  talking  nor  smoking,  nor  were 
the  cinchas  loosened  nor  the  bridles  removed.  Lieu- 
tenant A  had  no  grain  in  his  nose  bags  when  he  re- 
ceived his  orders,  and  he  had  neglected  to  fill  them  at 
any  of  the  farm  houses  in  Salt  creek  valley.  He  now 
regretted  this  thoughtlessness ;  but  the  horses  were  al- 
lowed to  browse  and  green  branches  were  cut  for 
them.  The  horseholder  was  instructed  to  watch  the 
horses  for  indication  of  danger;  the  patrol  was  told 
to  scatter  in  case  of  attack  and  to  assemble  at  day- 
break the  following  morning  at  Kickapoo,  the  loca- 
tion of  which  was  explained. 

What  plan  would  you  have  formed,  as  patrol  com- 
mander., for  the  following  day? 

The  night  was  passed  without  alarm.  During  the 
night  Lieutenant  A  had  deliberated  on  a  course  of 
action  for  the  next  day  .  He  believed  that  the  enemy's 
cavalry  would  resume  its  march  the  following  morn- 
ing and  that  it  would  be  closely  followed  by  such  oth- 
er hostile  troops  as  were  east  of  the  river.  He  thought 
of  moving  through  the  woods  to  a  point  north  of  the 
river  bridge  from  which  the  bridge  could  be  seen,  and 
of  observing  the  crossing  of  the  enemy  from  this  new 
position.  But  doing  so  would  have  been  more  haz- 
ardous than  leaving  the  patrol  in  its  hiding  place  while 
reconnoitering  from  the  top  of  the  hill.  Troops  from 
the  other  side  of  the  river  would  come  into  view  soon 
after  crossing  the  bridge.  The  woods  were  very  thick 
and  there  was  a  dense  undergrowth  that  made  them 
difficult  to  get  through,  and  it  was  not  possible  to  see 
the  horses  fifty  yards  away.  The  trail  leading  to 


40         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  hiding  place  was  so  faint  as  to  be  scarcely  dis- 
cernible, and,  as  it  evidently  had  not  been  used  for 
some  months,  it  was  not  probable  that  the  point  where 
it  entered  the  woods  would  be  noticed.  So  at  day- 
break, Lieutenant  A,  leaving  two  men  with  the  horses, 
took  one  man  and  ascended  the  hill  to  his  observation 
point  of  the  evening  before;  this  man  he  posted  to 
watch  the  trail  towards  the  west  while  he  himself 
watched  the  approach  from  the  east  as  best  he  could, 
at  the  same  time  observing  what  was  going  on  below 
him. 

The  cavalry  was  early  astir  and  was  in  column  of 
march  towards  the  west  by  sunrise.  Soon  the  cav- 
alry had  disappeared  and  for  an  hour  nothing  was 
seen  except  one  or  two  mounted  patrols;  but  about 
6:30  a.  m.,  infantry  was  seen  approaching  on  Pope 
avenue  in  advance  guard  formation.  The  column 
moved  west  along  the  road  until  it  disappeared  under 
the  hill.  For  an  hour  the  successive  parts  of  the  ad- 
vance guard  and  main  body  continued  to  march  by 
in  plain  view  of  Lieutenant  A.  He  had  carefully  ob- 
served the  passing  of  the  different  portions  of  the 
column  and  found  its  strength  to  be  three  regiments 
of  infantry  and  two  batteries  of  field  artillery.  For 
half  an  hour  longer,  or  until  8  a.  m.,  Lieutenant  A 
waited,  thinking  that  other  troops  might  follow,  but 
nothing  appeared. 

What  should  Lieutenant  A  have  done  at  this  time? 

Lieutenant  A  had  finished  the  first  part  of  his  mis- 
sion. He  had  complete  information  of  the  enemy's 
strength,  but  the  task  yet  before  him  promised  to  be 
the  most  dangerous  of  all — to  deliver  this  information 


LEADING  OF  A  CAVALRY  PATROL  41 

to  his  commanding  officer.  For  the  second  time,  he 
realized  that  his  patrol  was  not  made  as  strong  as  it 
should  have  been.  The  information  he  had  was  too 
important  to  take  any  risks  in  its  delivery,  yet  he  did 
not  wish  to  cease  his  observations.  He  knew  he  might 
justly  be  censured,  despite  the  brilliant  success  of  his 
reconnaissance,  if  he  ceased  his  observations  before 
fatigue  or  reduced  numbers  compelled  him  to  return, 
and  his  first  inclination  was  to  send  his  information 
back  by  two  men  while  he  continued  to  observe  the 
hostile  force  from  a  position  on  its  flank.  Had  he 
had  a  good  non-commissioned  officer  to  carry  the  mes- 
sage he  would  have  done  this,  but  he  reflected  that  by 
attempting  too  much,  he  might  fail  to  deliver  the  im- 
portant information  already  in  his  possession,  so  he 
decided  to  return  for  at  least  a  part  of  the  way  with 
the  remaining  three  men. 

Without  delay,  he  assembled  the  patrol,  mounted 
it,  carefully  explained  to  the  three  men  all  the  infor- 
mation in  his  possession,  and  instructed  them,  in  case 
the  patrol  were  scattered,  to  make  every  effort  to 
reach  their  command.  Stopping  a  moment  to  water 
the  horses,  the  patrol,  in  single  file,  with  about  50 
yards  distance  between  files,  then  took  a  northerly 
direction  through  the  woods,  picking  its  way  as  best  it 
could,  and  following  the  contour  of  the  hills.  Lieu- 
tenant A  was  in  the  lead  and  made  all  speed  possible 
under  the  circumstances,  stopping  occasionally  to  list- 
en, or  when  about  to  cross  a  trail  through  the  woods. 
After  about  two  miles  of  this  hard  marching,  the  pa- 
trol, at  9:05  a.  m.,  reached  a  well  defined  road  run- 
ning east  and  west  through  the  woods.  Lieutenant 
A  turned  west  on  this  road  (which  he  believed  to  be 


42         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  5 — 9 — 11  road  marked  on  his  map),  signaled  the 
leading  man  to  join  him  and  the  others  to  increase 
their  distances,  and  took  the  trot. 

In  a  few  minutes,  he  came  to  the  edge  of  the  woods 
and  saw  Salt  creek  valley,  and  the  Millwood  road 
leading  straight  to  the  west  before  him.  He  delayed 
here  a  moment  to  search  the  country  but  saw  nothing. 
Soon  after  leaving  the  wood,  the  patrol  was  fired  on 
from  Hancock  hill  but  it  reached  the  ravine  at  the 
Schroeder  house  without  casualty  and  followed  the 
ravine  under  cover  of  the  hill  to  Salt  creek  bridge 
which  it  crossed  in  safety  and  again  took  up  the  trot. 
When  approaching  the  cross-road  at  Taylor  school 
house,  distant  firing  was  heard  to  the  southwest  (*). 
About  a  mile  further  on,  he  met  a  patrol  of  five  men 
from  his  squadron.  The  non-commissioned  officer  in 
charge  told  him  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  squadron 
and  gave  him  a  man  to  guide  him  to  it,  and  at  10:30 
a.  m.  Lieutenant  A  reported  the  result  of  his  recon- 
naissance to  his  squadron  commander. 

*  It  was  learned  later  that  this  was  the  termination  of  a  cavalry 
combat  in  which  the  hostile  cavalry  was  driven  back,  the  successful 
termination  of  the  combat  being  due  largely  to  the  definite  informa- 
tion the  Blue  cavalry  commander  had  received  from  the  two  messen- 
gers sent  in  by  Lieutenant  A  the  night  of  September  20-21. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

LEADING  OF  A  CAVALRY  PATROL. 

PROBLEM. 
(See  2  and  4-inch  maps). 

A  Blue  infantry  brigade,  with  artillery  and  one 
squadron  of  cavalry  attached,  approaching  Leaven- 
worth  through  friendly  territory,  bivouacked  for  the 
night  September  29-30,  about  six  miles  east  of  the 
Platte  river.  It  is  known  that  Leavenworth  and 
Fort  Leavenworth  are  ungarrisoned,  and  that  a  Red 
force  is  approaching  these  points  from  the  northwest. 
The  Missouri  river  is  the  boundary  between  the  Blue 
and  Red  states. 

A  Blue  cavalry  patrol  of  five  men,  under  Lieu- 
tenant A,  was  sent  out  late  in  the  afternoon  of  Sep- 
tember 29  with  orders  to  cross  the  Missouri  at  Fort 
Leavenworth,  proceed  via  Kickapoo  and  obtain  in- 
formation of  the  enemy's  strength,  location,  and 
movements.  Another  Blue  patrol,  under  Lieuten- 
ant B,  was  sent  at  the  same  time  through  Leaven- 
worth and  to  the  west  towards  Easton  on  a  similar 
mission.  The  Blue  cavalry  expects  to  cross  the  Mis- 
souri, at  Leavenworth,  at  8  a.  m.,  September  30. 

At  9  p.  m.,  September  29,  Lieutenant  A's  patrol 
reached  the  farm  house  on  the  edge  of  the  U.  S.  Tim- 
ber Reserve,  about  one  mile  east  of  the  Rock  Island 
bridge,  and  stopped  for  the  night.  Here  he  obtains 
complete  information  of  the  country  about  Fort 
Leavenworth  that  supplements  that  given  on  his  map. 


44        TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Note — All  messages  that  would  be  sent  by  Lieutenant  A 
should  be  written  out  in  full  on  a  regular  message  blank. 

Required : 

1.  (a)  Lieutenant  A's  hour  of  starting  Septem- 
ber 30.  Give  reasons. 

Note — It  is  broad  daylight  at  6:00  a.  m. 

(b)  Route  or  routes  he  intends  to  take  for 
the  first  five  miles  of  the  march,  if  nothing  is  seen  of 
the  enemy. 

SOLUTION. 

(a)  Lieutenant  A  will  start  at  4:30  a.  m.    Start- 
ing at  this  hour  should  enable  him  to  get  through  or 
around  Fort  Leavenworth  without  being  seen,  and  to 
be  in  observation  on  the  heights  west  of  Fort  Leaven- 
worth  at  the  first  break  of  day.     If,  contrary  to  the 
information  he  has  of  the  enemy,  a  Red  patrol,  or 
other  small  hostile  force,  should  be  in  Fort  Leaven- 
worth,  his  chances  of  getting  across  the  Missouri  riv- 
er bridge  will  be  very  poor  whatever  he  may  do,  but 
they  will  be  best,  if  he  makes  the  attempt  before  day- 
light.   Moreover,  due  to  the  nearness  of  the  opposing 
forces,  it  is  important  to  get  information  of  the  ene- 
my's main  body  as  early  as  practicable. 

(b)  He  will  proceed  via  the  direct  route  across 
the  bridge  to  4,  thence  via  6  to  the  south  bank  of  One 
Mile  creek,  thence  across  country  to  Grant  avenue 
near  Merritt  hill,  and  then  via  8,  D  and  Sheridan's 
Drive  to  Hancock  hill. 

Continuation  of  the  Problem. 

At  6 :00  a.  m  the  patrol  is  observing  from  Hancock 
hill,  having  just  reached  here  without  seeing  any- 
thing of  the  enemy,  and  apparently  without  hav- 


LEADING  or  A  CAVALRY  PATROL  45 

ing  been  seen  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  country.  From 
here  Lieutenant  A  observes  a  hostile  cavalry  patrol  of 
eight  men  approaching  17  from  the  north.  At  17  the 
hostile  patrol  divides,  five  men  going  towards  French- 
man and  three  towards  15,  all  at  a  trot. 

(c)  Further  intentions  of  Lieutenant  A,  with 
reasons. 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 

(c)  Lieutenant  A  decides  to  conceal  the  patrol 
in  the  immediate  vicinity  until  the  hostile  patrol  has 
passed  well  beyond  his  hiding  place,  and  then  to  con- 
tinue his  reconnaissance.  The  place  of  concealment 
is  of  secondary  importance.  We  prefer  moving  to 
the  vicinity  of  13,  observing  from  the  edge  of  the 
woods  while  making  the  move,  because  at  13,  obser- 
vation can  be  continued  from  the  edge  of  the  woods, 
and  the  patrol  would  be  in  a  good  position  to  re- 
sume its  march  to  the  west.  Moreover,  the  hostile 
patrol  probably  will  move  either  via  Sheridan's 
Drive,  or  via  the  11 — 5  road  towards  Fort  Leaven- 
worth,  and  it  probably  will  not  move  towards  13. 
However,  a  hiding  place  in  the  woods  near  Hancock 
hill  probably  would  be  quite  as  good.  There  is  small 
danger  of  the  hostile  patrol  "cutting  Lieutenant  A's 
trail"  where  he  crosses  the  11 — 15  road. 

Continuation  of  the  Problem. 

Lieutenant  A  moved  to  the  vicinity  of  13  with  his 
entire  patrol  and  concealed  it  in  the  woods  until  some 
minutes  after  the  hostile  patrol  had  passed  11.  Such 
observation  as  he  can  make  from  the  edge  of  the 
woods  near  13  reveals  no  further  indications  of  the 
enemy.  He  decides  to  move  to  17  (6:45  a.  m). 


46         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

(d)  Route,  formation  and  conduct  of  the  patrol 
to  17,  with  reasons  for  the  same. 

(e)  Route  beyond  17  for  two  miles,  supposing 
nothing  is  seen  of  the  enemy  and  that  a  countryman 
met  at  17  tells  Lieutenant  A  that  the  enemy  camped 
about  six  miles  northwest  of  Kickapoo  last  night. 
Give  reasons  for  the  route  selected. 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 

(d)  The  patrol  will  move  down  the  water-course 
south  of  the  S chafer  house  to  Salt  creek  and  up  Salt 
creek  to  the  bridge  on  the  Millwood  road;  from  this 
bridge  the  patrol  will  follow  the  road  to  17.  Although 
improbable,  the  hostile  patrol  may  be  observing  to 
the  west  from  Hancock  hill,  and  consequently  the  pa- 
trol follows  the  less  exposed  route  across  country 
from  13  to  Salt  creek  bridge.  This  route  is  a  bit 
safer  than  that  along  the  11 — 15  road,  but  the  patrol 
will  be  more  mobile  if  it  takes  this  road  and  to  do 
so  does  not  constitute  a  serious  error,  for  the  chances 
are  that  the  hostile  patrol  has  continued  its  march  to 
Fort  Leavenworth  or  along  Sheridan's  Drive. 

To  attempt  to  keep  under  cover  from  all  points 
after  crossing  Salt  creek  bridge,  by  moving  down  the 
west  bank  of  the  creek  and  up  the  water-course  to  J. 
Aaron,  is  a  useless  waste  of  energy  and  time.  It  has 
been  some  time  since  the  hostile  patrol  passed,  and 
the  Blue  patrol  is  now  in  more  danger  of  observation 
from  the  west  than  from  the  east. 

Any  formation  of  the  patrol  is  correct  that  pre- 
vents surprise,  favors  reconnaissance  in  the  direction 
of  the  enemy,  and  permits  the  escape  of  the  greatest 
possible  number  of  men  in  case  the  enemy  is  encoun- 


LEADING  OF  A  CAVALRY  PATROL  47 

tered.  Lieutenant  A  and  one  man  leading,  followed 
by  three  men  at  100  yards  and  one  man  100  yards  still 
further  to  the  rear  would  be  such  a  formation.  From 
Salt  creek  bridge  to  17  the  patrol  will  keep  the  road 
and  move  at  a  trot.  Near  J.  E.  Daniels,  Lieutenant 
A  will  go  to  the  top  of  the  hill  to  observe,  or  may 
send  2  men  to  observe  and  rejoin  at  an  increased  gait 
on  the  road.  No  flankers  are  sent  out.  It  would  be  a 
mistake  to  reduce  the  gait  of  the  patrol  on  the  road 
to  keep  it  level  with  a  slowly  moving  flanker  in  the 
fields  to  the  right  or  left  of  the  road. 

(e)  If  the  enemy  camped  "about  six  miles  north- 
west of  Kickapoo  last  night,"  as  stated  by  the  coun- 
tryman at  17,  he  should  be  approaching  that  village 
when  the  patrol  is  at  17.  A  look  at  the  map,  as  well 
as  at  the  ground,  shows  that  the  roads  about  Kicka- 
poo can  be  observed  from  Crook  point,  and  the  patrol 
makes  for  this  high  ground  by  the  quickest  route,  hav- 
ing due  regard  for  cover.  This  route  lies  along  the 
17 — 19 — 21  road  to  that  spur  of  Crook  point  which 
terminates  in  a  small  hill  just  north  of  21;  thence 
northwest  across  country,  keeping  under  cover  of  this 
spur  to  the  woods  on  Crook  point.  If  it  should  ap- 
pear that  the  patrol  could  follow  the  21 — 83 — 81  road 
(see  2 -inch  map)  and  reach  the  cover  of  the  woods 
more  quickly,  that  route  could  be  taken.  The  patrol 
might  have  proceeded  west  from  17  to  85,  thence  via 
83  to  Crook  point;  this  route  is  longer,  but  it  gives  a 
view  from  Briedenbach  and  affords  a  look  along  the 
85—87  road. 

To  go  north  on  the  17 — 47  road  to  Plum  creek  and 
then  west  along  the  creek  to  Crook  point,  or  to  go 
west  on  the  17 — 19 — 85  road  to  the  Duffin  house  and 


48         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

then  north  along  the  900  foot  contour,  or  to  take  any 
other  such  difficult  route  across  country,  constitutes 
an  objectionable  sacrifice  of  mobility  for  conceal- 
ment. The  information  obtained  from  the  country- 
man at  17  is  not  from  a  sufficiently  reliable  source  to 
justify  sending  a  message. 

Continuation  of  the  Problem. 
At  8  a.  m.,  the  patrol  is  on  Crook  point  in  obser- 
vation, having  seen  nothing  more  of  the  enemy,  but 
having  been  observed  by  numerous  countrymen  along 
the  road,  from  whom  no  additional  information  was 
obtained.  At  8:02  a.  m.,  a  troop  of  Red  cavalry  is 
seen  emerging  from  Kickapoo  on  the  45 — 47 — 17 
road  with  a  patrol  on  the  23 — 19  road,  and  the  dust 
of  an  infantry  advance  guard  can  be  seen  along  the 
51 — 49 — 43  road.  Lieutenant  A  continues  to  ob- 
serve until  8:40  a.  m. ;  the  tail  of  the  column  is  then 
at  43,  and  the  head  of  the  advance  guard  is  approach- 
ing 17.  He  has  counted  two  regiments  of  infantry 
and  a  battery  of  artillery.  The  troop  of  cavalry  has 
disappeared — a  small  part  towards  11  and  the  remain- 
der beyond  Frenchman.  An  advancing  wagon  train 
extends  for  nearly  half  a  mile  west  of  49. 

(f )  Disposition  of  patrol  while  in  observation  on 
Crook  point. 

(g)  Lieutenant  A's  intentions,  together  with  the 
route  he  proposes  to  take,  if  he  moves  the  patrol  from 
its  present  position.    Give  reasons. 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 
(f)     Any  disposition  is  correct  that  conceals  the 
horses  and  men,  watches  the  83 — 81  road  and  the  83 — 
21  road,  and  keeps  the  roads  into  Kickapoo  under 


LEADING  OF  A  CAVALRY  PATROL  49 

close  observation.  Such  a  disposition  would  be  to  con- 
ceal the  horses  among  the  trees  on  the  east  slope  with 
one  man  holding  them,  while  one  man  observes  the 
83 — 21  road,  two  men  posted  together  observe  the  83 
— 81  road,  and  Lieutenant  A  and  one  man  observe 
south  and  west  of  Kickapoo. 

To  leave  the  approach  to  Crook  point  from  81  un- 
observed would  be  a  mistake,  for  the  enemy  certainly 
should  send  a  cavalry  patrol  over  this  commanding 
ground;  while  it  is  not  probable  such  a  patrol  would 
go  far  off  the  road,  much  less  examine  the  half  mile 
or  more  of  woods  on  Crook  point,  still  Lieutenant  A 
should  have  timely  warning  of  the  approach  of  such 
a  patrol  and  its  movements  should  be  watched  from 
the  moment  it  is  first  sighted  until  it  is  well  beyond 
the  Blue  patrol's  hiding  place. 

(g)  Lieutenant  A  has  the  information  he  was 
sent  out  to  secure.  The  presence  of  the  wagon  train 
indicates  that  the  force  seen  is  not  the  advance  guard 
of  a  larger  force.  The  information  should  be  deliv- 
ered to  the  squadron  commander  without  delay.  Lieu- 
tenant A  may  send  it  back  by  two  messengers,  or  he 
may  return  with  his  entire  patrol  and  make  a  report  in 
person.  The  latter  is  the  more  certain  plan,  but  it 
will  compel  Lieutenant  A  to  interrupt  his  reconnais- 
sance on  the  enemy's  flank.  However,  the  enemy  is  so 
near  the  Blue  detachment,  that  there  is  slight  prob- 
ability of  losing  touch  with  him,  and,  consequently, 
there  is  no  great  necessity  for  Lieutenant  A  to  hang 
on  to  the  flank  of  the  hostile  column.  It  would  be 
different,  were  the  enemy  still  some  miles  from  the 
Blue  detachment;  in  that  case,  Lieutenant  A  should 
send  his  information  by  messengers,  and  should  con- 


50         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

tinue  to  observe  the  enemy's  movements.  According- 
ly, he  decides  to  return  at  once  with  his  information. 

To  move  the  patrol  east  and  south  to  Leavenworth, 
where  the  Blue  cavalry  was  to  cross  at  8  a.  m.,  is  out 
of  the  question.  Even  should  the  patrol  succeed  in 
crossing  in  rear  of  the  hostile  column  and  gaining  the 
woods  along  Sheridan's  Drive,  it  certainly  should  not 
be  able  to  get  through  the  country  about  Fort  Leav- 
enworth, which  probably  is  now  occupied  by  hostile 
cavalry  and  soon  will  be  by  hostile  infantry. 

Lieutenant  A  must  keep  to  the  west  and  south  of 
the  Red  force  while  returning  with  his  patrol.  He  is 
in  little  danger  of  encountering  hostile  patrols  in  the 
first  part  of  his  march,  since  the  hostile  cavalry  has 
passed  beyond  him,  and  he  should  take  the  road  at 
once  and  make  the  best  possible  speed.  He  will  move 
via  83  west  and  south  to  85;  here  he  might  go  across 
country  to  I  if  the  terrain  is  such  as  will  not  greatly 
retard  his  patrol.  Otherwise  he  will  proceed  via  the 
87 — K — I — 100 — Zimmerman  road  and  join  the  cav- 
alry wherever  found.  The  slight  additional  security 
gained  by  making  a  wider  detour  to  the  west  and  south 
will  not  compensate  for  the  increased  delay  in  deliv- 
ering the  information. 

COMMENTS. 

In  solving  this  problem,  the  important  thing  to  de- 
termine at  the  outset  is  what  was  expected  of  the  pa- 
trol. Put  yourself  for  a  moment  in  the  place  of  the 
squadron  commander,  or  better  still  in  the  place  of  the 
brigade  commander,  and  imagine  what  your  state  of 
mind  will  be  when  you  reach  Leavenworth  to-morrow 
with  your  brigade,  and  find  the  surrounding  hills  oc- 


LEADING  or  A  CAVALRY  PATROL  51 

cupied  by  the  enemy,  while  your  cavalry  has  given 
you  no  definite  report  as  to  its  strength.  Looking 
at  the  matter  in  this  way  is  it  not  clear  that  our  two 
officers'  patrols  are  intended  to  find  the  hostile  main 
body?  Any  less  definite  information  from  them  than 
full  reports  of  the  enemy's  strength  and  movements 
will  be  disappointing  to  the  brigade  commander,  and 
if  due  to  any  fault  in  the  leading  of  their  patrols 
would  justly  entitle  them  to  censure. 

Viewing  the  situation  thus  broadly,  Lieutenant  A 
sent  no  message  from  Hancock  hill.  In  the  preced- 
ing chapters  we  found  an  opportunity  to  mention  the 
general  rule  that  first  contact  with  the  enemy  should 
be  at  once  reported,  but  here  we  have  a  situation  in 
which  there  is  doubt  as  to  whether  the  rule  should  be 
observed.  In  his  anxiety  to  clear  up  the  situation  in 
his  front,  a  patrol  leader  is  in  danger  of  neglecting  to 
give  due  importance  to  the  situation  in  his  rear.  The 
squadron  from  which  our  patrol  was  detached  is  to 
cross  the  Missouri  river  at  8  a.  m.,  and  at  this  hour 
(6  a.  m.)  it  is  probably  on  the  march,  eight  or  ten 
miles  east  of  the  river,  with  local  patrols  four  or  five 
miles  in  its  front.  These  patrols  will  probably  come 
in  contact  near  Leavenworth  or  Fort  Leavenworth 
with  the  hostile  cavalry  patrol  and  get  information  of 
its  presence  back  to  the  squadron  commander  about 
as  early  as  it  could  be  delivered  to  him  by  Lieuten- 
ant A's  messenger.  Information  of  the  mere  pres- 
ence of  a  hostile  patrol,  from  which  no  sound  infer- 
ence can  be  drawn  except  that  the  enemy  is  near — a 
fact  already  known  to  the  squadron  commander — is 
not  sufficiently  noteworthy  to  make  a  delay  of  a  few 
minutes  in  its  delivery  a  matter  of  importance ;  this  is 


52         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

especially  true  since  the  squadron  has  little  choice  of 
route  while  east  of  the  Missouri,  but  must  cross  the 
river  at  one  of  the  two  bridges.  Had  the  lieutenant 
been  sent  out  to  secure  information  of  the  hostile 
cavalry,  it  certainly  would  have  been  wrong  for  him 
to  neglect  to  send  a  message  of  this  first  contact.  But 
such  is  not  the  case;  his  mission  is  specific;  it  is  to  get 
information  of  the  strength,  location  and  movements 
of  the  enemy's  main  body.  He  has  a  right  to  hope 
that  he  will  soon  be  able  to  report  other  and  more  im- 
portant facts,  and  to  believe  that  he  may  leave  to  oth- 
er Blue  patrols  the  task  of  reporting  the  presence  of 
the  hostile  patrol  he  has  just  seen.  However,  the  case 
is  far  from  being  clear,  and  if  he  had  decided  to  spare 
at  least  one  man  and  send  a  message  he  would  not 
have  committed  a  serious  error.  Before  resuming  his 
march  from  13  the  lieutenant  made  a  note  of  his  ob- 
servations of  the  hostile  patrol,  thinking  he  might  in- 
clude it  in  a  later  message. 

It  would  not  have  been  strange  had  Lieutenant  A 
divided  the  patrol  as  soon  as  it  crossed  the  Missouri 
river  bridge  and  sent  its  parts  over  two  or  more  wide- 
ly separated  routes  with  orders  to  assemble  at  some 
point  farther  along.  This  is  a  mistake.  The  many 
contingencies  that  may  arise  to  prevent  one  portion 
or  another  from  being  at  the  designated  meeting  point 
make  this  scattering  of  the  patrol  exceedingly  objec- 
tionable. It  is  preferable  to  keep  the  patrol  together 
along  a  single  route,  so  chosen  that  observation  fre- 
quently may  be  made  from  high  points  that  afford  a 
wide  view  of  many  roads  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy. 

"In  time  of  peace,  when  fighting  capacity  does  not 
count,  where  most  persons  have  maps,  where  no  one  is 


LEADING  OF  A  CAVALRY  PATROL  53 

captured,  and  where  individual  messengers  safely  ride 
past  hostile  detachments,  the  subdivision  of  an  offi- 
cer's patrol  into  a  number  of  small  groups  may  some- 
times achieve  the  desired  end.  In  time  of  war  it  ex- 
poses the  leader  to  the  loss  of  his  escort,  which  is  nec- 
essary for  his  safety,  for  reliefs  to  messengers,  and 
for  fighting.  Ferreting  out,  recognizing,  and  observ- 
ing the  enemy  essentially  is  the  function  of  the  leader. 
He  alone  has  a  general  view  of  the  situation,  and  with 
his  map  and  field  glasses  possesses  superior  facilities 
for  the  work.  His  men  can  perform  only  secondary 
duties  for  him;  and  small  parties  of  them  will  be  de- 
tached only  for  short  distances  and  to  accomplish  some 
minor  object — otherwise  the  reins  will  slip  from  the 
leader's  hands  and  the  thinnest  hostile  screen  will  be- 
come impenetrable."  (*) 

We  may  object  to  the  route  selected  because  of  the 
difficulty  of  following  it.  From  inquiries  made  at  the 
farm  house  where  Lieutenant  A  stopped  for  the  night, 
he  will  learn  of  the  practicability  of  this  route  and,  if 
he  has  any  doubt  about  his  ability  to  follow  it  in  the 
darkness,  he  can  obtain  a  guide.  He  may  have  some 
trouble  going  through  the  woods  south  of  the  One 
Mile  creek  in  the  darkness,  but  his  compass  or  his 
guide  will  keep  him  in  the  right  direction  and  the 
roads  and  street  car  line  near  Merritt  hill  will  serve 
to  orient  him. 

There  is  little  choice  between  this  route  and  the 
route  north  from  4  via  the  trail  through  the  gardens, 
and  the  wood  road  5 — 11.  The  former  gives  the  ear- 
lier view  from  the  high  ground  west  of  Fort  Leav- 
enworth,  but  the  latter  is  the  more  direct  route  to 

*  General  von  Alten  in  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 


54         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Kickapoo  and  may  be  more  easy  to  follow;  but  it 
leads  past  the  railroad  station  and  several  houses,  and 
concealment,  which  is  of  prime  importance,  would  be 
difficult.  In  any  case  Fort  Leavenworth  should  be 
carefully  avoided.  It  is  not  probable  that  anything  of 
importance  can  be  learned  by  passing  through  the 
fort,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  patrol  might  be 
discovered  by  an  early  riser.  The  fact  that  the  patrol 
was  able  to  cross  the  river  bridge  is  sufficient  indica- 
tion that  no  large  parties  of  the  enemy  are  in  the  vi- 
cinity of  Fort  Leavenworth. 

The  route  via  the  Frenchman — 17  road  has  no  ad- 
vantages to  offset  the  disadvantage  of  being  about 
200  feet  lower  than  Sheridan's  Drive.  This  drive  is 
not  only  the  best  route  for  observation,  but  for  con- 
cealment as  well,  the  dense  woods  along  the  drive  fur- 
nishing perfect  cover. 

We  might  have  neglected  to  observe  the  teachings 
of  our  Field  Service  Regulations  that  "Patrols  should 
avoid  combat  unless  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  the 
execution  of  their  orders,"  and  have  decided  to  at- 
tempt the  capture  of  the  hostile  patrol.  Little  can  be 
said  in  favor  of  this  and  much  can  be  said  against  it. 
At  least  one  of  the  hostile  troopers  should  be  able  to 
escape  and  give  warning  of  our  presence  to  the  main 
hostile  cavalry  force,  and  this  might  make  the  fur- 
ther execution  of  our  mission  more  difficult.  Wheth- 
er we  capture  one  or  all  three,  will  the  advantages 
of  the  capture  outweigh  the  disadvantages?  Their 
regimental  insignia  may  disclose  something  to  our 
brigade  commander,  or  even  to  us  if  we  are  well  in- 
formed concerning  the  organization  of  the  enemy's 
forces.  We  will  question  them,  of  course,  if  we  can 


LEADING  OF  A  CAVALRY  PATROL  55 

speak  their  language,  but,  unless  they  are  very  stupid, 
the  information  extracted  from  them  will  not  be  re- 
liable and  we  will  have  to  continue  our  reconnaissance. 
We  examine  them  separately ;  one  says  there  is  a  regi- 
ment of  hostile  cavalry  following,  another  says  a 
squadron,  and  another  says  a  troop.  Which  are  we 
to  believe?  It  takes  time  and  skillful  questioning  to 
get  information  from  prisoners.  If  we  are  wise,  we 
will  think  of  what  disposition  we  are  to  make  of  them 
before  being  carried  away  by  our  zeal  to  capture  them. 
If  we  take  them  with  us,  the  further  march  of  the  pa- 
trol will  be  greatly  handicapped  by  their  presence.  If 
we  send  them  back  across  the  river,  we  will  have  to 
weaken  our  patrol  greatly  and,  with  five  hostile  troop- 
ers moving  toward  Fort  Leavenworth,  it  is  doubtful 
whether  we  could  send  them  across  the  bridge.  That 
prisoners  are  of  great  value  to  a  commander  is  well 
understood.  The  information  extracted  from  them 
serves  to  check  that  obtained  from  other  sources.  But 
a  small  patrol,  situated  as  was  Lieutenant  A's,  prob- 
ably will  lessen  the  sum  total  of  information  it  may 
gather,  if  it  burdens  itself  with  two  or  three  prisoners. 

While  moving  west  from  13  the  lieutenant  accom- 
panied the  point.  Ordinarily,  in  this  position  the  pa- 
trol leader  will  be  unnecessarily  exposing  himself  to 
capture;  this  he  should  studiously  avoid,  for  a  patrol 
that  has  lost  its  leader,  and  with  him  field-glasses, 
map,  etc.,  is  reduced  to  a  more  or  less  helpless  state. 
But,  as  the  country  was  open  to  the  west,  thus  pre- 
cluding a  surprise,  the  lieutenant  thought  it  not  only 
allowable,  but  advisable  to  go  to  the  head  of  his  patrol 
and  guide  the  point  across  the  country. 

Was  our  lieutenant  correct  in  not  sending  a  message 


56 

from  Crook  point  as  soon  as  he  reached  there  at  8  a. 
m.  and  saw  the  hostile  column  approaching?  Again 
we  call  attention  to  the  situation  in  his  rear.  Had  he 
given  the  matter  any  thought,  he  might  have  been 
reasonably  sure  that  there  were  but  eight  hostile 
troopers  between  him  and  his  squadron,  and  the  lat- 
ter should  have  been  just  crossing  into  Leaven  worth. 
Had  he  sent  a  message  then  (8  a.  m.),  the  messen- 
gers probably  would  have  been  able  to  get  through, 
whereas  if  he  waited  until  he  had  seen  the  entire  hos- 
tile column,  the  hostile  troop  would  be  between  him 
and  his  squadron,  thus  interrupting  the  messenger  ser- 
vice. Had  he  informed  his  major  without  delay  that 
the  enemy  was  approaching  via  Kickapoo,  the  major 
would  have  been  able  to  direct  the  march  of  his  squad- 
ron with  absolute  certainty;  and,  barring  the  enemy's 
strength,  the  situation  would  have  been  made  clear  to 
the  brigade  commander.  Why  then  did  our  lieuten- 
ant not  send  a  message.  He  probably  was  overanx- 
ious about  reducing  the  strength  of  his  patrol,  which 
was  made  not  strong  enough  in  the  beginning;  there 
was  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  entire  patrol 
would  soon  return,  and  he  may  have  thought  it  bet- 
ter to  keep  the  patrol  intact  and  preserve  its  full  fight- 
ing power  for  the  return  journey.  By  doing  so,  how- 
ever, he  delayed  the  delivery  of  important  information 
for  forty  minutes;  and  if  he  gets  through  the  hostile 
cavalry  after  8:40  a.  m.,  the  events,  so  far  as  his 
squadron  at  least  is  concerned,  probably  will  overtake 
the  message.  As  an  additional  exercise,  we  would  sug- 
gest writing  the  message  that  should  have  been  sent 
from  Crook  point  at  8  a.  m.  The  message  should  men- 
tion the  patrol  seen  at  6  a.  m.  from  Hancock  hill,  and 
the  information  obtained  from  the  countryman  at  17. 


CHAPTER  V. 
AN  ADVANCE. 

SITUATION. 
(See  2  and  4-inch  maps). 

A  Blue  detachment,  in  hostile  country,  is  attempt- 
ing to  assemble  at  Leavenworth,  by  rail  from  the 
north.  The  1st  Infantry,  and  Troop  A,  2d  Cavalry 
(accompanied  by  their  field  and  combat  trains),  com- 
manded by  Colonel  A,  are  the  first  troops  to  be  sent 
forward.  On  reaching  Kickapoo  during  the  after- 
noon of  July  14,  Colonel  A  learned  that  the  import- 
ant steel  bridge  at  the  mouth  of  Salt  creek  (on  the 
M.  P.  R.  R.  between  Kickapoo  and  Leavenworth) 
had  been  blown  up  by  Red  sympathizers.  According- 
ly, he  detrained  his  command  and  took  quarters  in 
Kickapoo.  His  cavalry  patrols  were  able  to  recon- 
noiter  through  Fort  Leavenworth  and  Leavenworth 
before  nightfall,  and  when  they  returned  to  Kick- 
apoo they  reported  both  places  free  of  the  enemy  at  8 
p.  m.  Companies  A  and  B,  and  one  platoon  of  Troop 
A  are  on  outpost  for  the  night  on  the  line  L.  A.  Aar- 
on— Plum  hill,  with  one  company  on  the  23 — 21  road 
and  one  on  the  45 — 47  road. 

At  10  p.  m.,  Colonel  A  receives  the  following  tele- 
graphic orders  from  General  B,  at  superior  headquar- 
ters: "It  appears  that  the  enemy  contemplates  mov- 
ing a  force  to  Leavenworth  over  the  Missouri  Pa- 
cific railroad  from  the  south.  It  is  important  that  he 
should  not  get  possession  of  Leavenworth.  Proceed 


58         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

to  the  south  to-morrow  with  your  entire  command,  in- 
terrupt the  railroads  to  the  south  of  Leavenworth,  es- 
pecially the  Missouri  Pacific,  and  endeavor  to  locate 
any  hostile  forces  advancing  from  the  south.  The  2d 
Infantry  will  reach  Kickapoo  some  time  July  16.  De- 
tachments from  the  3d  Infantry  are  now  guarding 
the  railroad  in  your  rear." 

Note — Missouri  is  a  neutral  state.  The  roads  are  free  from 
mud  or  thick  dust. 

Required : 

Colonel  A's  estimate  of  the  situation,  and  his  or- 
ders for  the  advance,  on  the  supposition  that  no  addi- 
tional information  of  the  enemy  is  received  before 
the  march  begins. 

SOLUTION  AND  DISCUSSION. 

We  find  no  difficulty  in  discovering  Colonel  A's 
mission  from  his  orders.  It  is  evident  that  General 
B  wishes  to  complete  his  concentration  at  Kickapoo 
before  the  enemy  can  seize  Leavenworth  and  vicinity, 
and  that  he  fears  he  will  not  be  able  to  do  this  unless 
the  enemy's  advance  on  Leavenworth  is  delayed.  Ac- 
cordingly, our  colonel  is  ordered  to  interrupt  the  rail- 
roads as  being  the  simplest  and  surest  means  of  de- 
laying the  enemy  with  the  force  at  his  disposal.  But 
we  should  not  overlook  the  second  part  of  his  mission, 
which  is  to  locate  the  advancing  enemy. 

It  would  not  be  strange,  had  we  complained  of  the 
scantiness  of  Colonel  A's  information  of  the  enemy, 
and  wondered  why  the  spy  or  other  person  who  learned 
that  the  enemy  contemplated  moving  a  force  to  Leav- 
enworth by  rail,  did  not  also  learn  when  this  move- 
ment was  to  begin.  This  ignorance  of  the  enemy  is 


AN  ADVANCE  59 

the  rule  in  war,  and  if  we  find  it  annoying  when  solv- 
ing a  map  problem,  we  may  imagine  how  very  dis- 
concerting it  must  be  when  actually  in  command  of 
troops  in  the  face  of  the  enemy.  Precisely  here  lies 
the  difficulty  of  troop  leading — that  we  seldom  know 
with  any  certainty  the  movements,  strength,  and  in- 
tentions of  the  enemy,  and  that  we  must  therefore  fall 
back  on  conjectures,  mostly  based  on  very  scant  in- 
formation. The  more  skillfully  we  learn  to  picture 
to  ourselves  the  whole  situation,  based  on  more  or 
less  trustworthy  information  available,  the  better  will 
be  our  arrangements.  But,  if  the  "fog  of  war"  con- 
ceals the  enemy's  movements,  strength  and  intentions 
from  us,  it  equally  shields  us  from  the  view  of  the  ene- 
my, and  we  may  find  comfort,  as  did  General  Grant 
according  to  his  own  statement,  in  the  thought  that  if 
we  are  mystified  the  enemy  is  no  better  off. 

We  cannot  tell  when  the  enemy  will  begin  his  move- 
ment on  Leavenworth.  It  may  be  to-night,  it  may  be 
to-morrow,  and  it  may  not  be  for  some  days.  It  is 
useless  to  speculate  on  this  point  before  additional 
information  is  obtained  from  some  source;  and,  un- 
less this  information  is  secured  from  superior  head- 
quarters, the  enemy  may  be  able  to  reach  the  vicinity 
of  Leavenworth  before  our  colonel  becomes  aware  of 
his  near  presence.  The  Blue  force  is  operating  in 
a  hostile  country,  and  it  can  not  hope  to  get  much,  if 
any,  reliable  information  from  the  inhabitants.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  Red  force  probably  is  much  bet- 
ter supplied  with  information.  The  country  is  inter- 
sected with  commercial  telegraph  and  telephone  lines, 
over  which  the  inhabitants  may  communicate  with  the 
Red  commanders.  The  destruction  of  the  railway 


60         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

bridge  at  the  mouth  of  Salt  creek,  and  Colonel  A's 
arrival  at  Kickapoo  doubtless  have  been  reported  to 
the  enemy,  and  on  this  supposition  we  may  fairly  base 
the  conclusion  that  he  will  lose  no  time  in  his  effort  to 
reach  Leaven  worth.  We  may  safely  count  on  an  in- 
telligent enemy  doing  those  things  which  we  least 
want  him  to  do,  and  should  make  our  plans  according- 
ly. The  fact  that  General  B  wishes  to  keep  the  hos- 
tile force  out  of  Leavenworth  is  the  very  best  of  rea- 
sons for  thinking  that  it  will  attempt  to  reach  that 
town  in  superior  strength  before  the  Blue  detachment 
can  complete  its  concentration  at  Kickapoo.  Conse- 
quently, Colonel  A  should  base  his  arrangements  for 
the  march  on  the  supposition  that  the  enemy  may  be 
encountered  at  any  time. 

Communications  on  the  railroads  can  be  most  easi- 
ly interrupted  by  destroying  bridges  and  culverts,  of 
which  there  are  many  to  the  south  of  Leavenworth. 
First  come  those  over  Five  Mile  creek,  and  from  the 
length  of  the  creek  and  the  area  drained  by  it,  we  may 
assume  the  bridges  are  of  some  size,  especially  the  one 
at  its  mouth.  The  map  shows  others  farther  to  the 
south,  and  there  probably  are  still  others  too  small  to 
be  indicated  on  the  map  as  well  as  those  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  map.  The  wooden  structures  may  be 
burnt,  but  those  of  steel  should  be  demolished  with 
explosives.  (*)  Although  all  three  railroads  may 
be  used  by  the  enemy,  and  consequently  should  be  in- 

*  For  a  full  description  of  how  this  is  done,  see  Engineer  Field 
Manual,  page  417,  or  Beach's  Manual  of  Military  Field  Engineering, 
Chaper  XX.  A  command  the  size  of  Colonel  A's  should  be  supplied 
with  explosives  when  sent  on  an  independent  mission,  and  we  will 
assume  it  is  so  supplied,  but  were  it  not,  explosives  could  be  obtained 
in  Leavenworth. 


AN  ADVANCE  61 

terrupted,  still  Colonel  A  should  give  his  first  and 
principal  attention  to  the  Missouri  Pacific,  for  this  is 
the  road  over  which  the  enemy  is  expected  to  advance. 

Perhaps  you  are  of  the  opinion  that  Colonel  A 
should  not  delay  his  march  at  Five  Mile  creek,  since 
that  stream  is  so  near  Leavenworth,  but  should  hasten 
on  to  bridges  farther  south.  More  delay  to  the  ene- 
my probably  will  be  secured,  however,  by  beginning 
the  demolition  at  the  earliest  practicable  hour,  for  we 
may  be  sure  the  news  of  it  will  speedily  reach  the 
enemy's  trains,  if  they  are  approaching,  and  will  make 
them  very  cautious  in  their  advance,  if  in  fact  it  does 
not  make  the  troops  detrain  and  follow  the  wagon 
roads.  It  is  preferable  to  begin  the  demolition  at 
Five  Mile  creek  and  make  certain  of  stopping  the 
trains  south  of  Leavenworth;  afterwards,  it  may  be 
wise  to  continue  the  march,  for  the  farther  south  the 
interruption  eventually  is  made  the  greater  the  advan- 
tage to  the  Blue  force.  Five  Mile  creek,  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  its  mouth,  therefore  becomes  the  first  point  on 
which  Colonel  A  will  direct  his  march. 

Although  we  should  be  prepared  to  meet  the  enemy 
at  any  moment,  still  his  near  presence  is  so  problemat- 
ical that  ease  and  rapidity  of  marching  are  the  main 
things  to  be  sought  in  the  selection  of  a  route ;  but  this 
does  not  mean  that  the  safety  of  the  command  is  to 
be  neglected.  From  Kickapoo,  it  matters  little  wheth- 
er the  regiment  moves  south  on  the  23 — 19 — 17,  or 
the  47 — 17  road,  although  the  latter  is  the  more  nat- 
ural route  and  the  more  convenient  on  account  of  its 
location  with  respect  to  the  outposts.  At  17,  the  col- 
umn may  continue  south,  or  it  may  turn  east  and  go 
through  Fort  Leavenworth  or  along  Sheridan's  Drive. 


62         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

The  route  south  from  17  is  the  shortest,  and  on  it  the 
command  will  be  in  least  danger,  since  it  avoids  the 
woods  and  always  has  its  line  of  retreat  directly  in  its 
rear.  This  road  is  also  the  best  improved  and  most 
traveled  (but  the  map  does  not  show  this),  and  con- 
sequently the  infantry  can  march  over  it  with  least 
delay  and  fatigue.  It  is  often  important  to  keep 
marching  troops  on  the  best  highways,  even  though 
they  may  be  a  trifle  longer,  for  the  extra  distance  is 
more  than  made  up  for  by  greater  speed  and  less  fa- 
tigue. From  17,  then,  Colonel  A  will  follow  the  H — 
G — 14 — 66a  road,  and  thence  along  the  outskirts  of 
Leavenworth  to  the  vicinity  of  234. 

We  should  not  attempt  at  this  time  to  choose  Col- 
onel A's  route  beyond  Five  Mile  creek,  for,  not  only 
may  he  never  get  so  far,  but  even  if  he  should,  his 
further  route  will  depend  on  many  contingencies 
which  cannot  be  foreseen. 

Let  us  now  consider  what  provisions  Colonel  A  will 
make  for  the  protection  of  his  command  while  on  the 
march.  If  troops  were  to  move  in  the  presence  of 
the  enemy  in  a  continuous  column  with  no  small  par- 
ties out  to  some  distance  to  give  warning  of  the  near 
approach  of  the  enemy,  they  would  be  in  great  danger 
of  being  suddenly  attacked,  thrown  into  confusion, 
and  maybe  defeated  before  they  could  deploy  for 
efficient  action.  To  avoid  any  such  calamity,  the  lar- 
ger part  of  a  command,  called  the  main  body,  is  pro- 
tected when  on  the  march  by  smaller  parts  in  front, 
on  the  flanks,  or  in  rear,  called  advance,  flank,  and 
rear  guards.  In  the  situation  before  us  the  column  is 
moving  towards  the  enemy  and  the  covering  duties 
are  performed  mainly  by  an  advance  guard.  In  a 


AN  ADVANCE  63 

later  situation  (*)  we  will  see  how  the  duty  of  cover- 
ing this  same  command  falls  to  the  lot  of  a  rear  guard. 

No  absolute  rule  can  be  given  for  determining  the 
strength  of  an  advance  guard.  Our  Field  Service 
Regulations  state  that,  subject  to  variation  according 
to  the  situation,  one-ninth  to  one-third  of  the  whole 
force  may  be  assumed  as  a  suitable  detachment  for 
this  purpose;  the  ratio  its  size  bears  to  the  whole  com- 
mand will  vary  with  the  object  of  the  march,  the  na- 
ture of  the  country,  the  character  of  the  enemy,  and 
the  strength  of  the  force  it  is  covering.  If  too  weak, 
it  cannot  do  what  is  expected  of  it.  If  too  strong,  the 
commander  unnecessarily  loses  immediate  control  of 
some  of  his  troops,  and  the  command  is  unnecessarily 
fatigued,  for  service  with  the  advance  guard  is  much 
more  exhausting  than  with  the  main  body.  Very 
small  commands  are  so  quickly  and  easily  put  in  fight- 
ing formation,  that  they  need  only  a  comparatively 
small  advance  guard.  Thus  a  company  might  be  am- 
ply protected  with  a  single  squad  in  its  front,  and  a 
battalion  with  a  platoon.  But  as  commands  increase 
in  size,  it  takes  longer  and  becomes  more  difficult  to 
deploy  and  prepare  them  for  action,  and  the  ratio  of 
the  strength  of  the  advance  guard  to  that  of  the  whole 
command  must  be  increased  in  proportion. 

As  far  as  practicable,  tactical  unity  should  be  pre- 
served in  detailing  an  advance  guard.  No  officer  likes 
to  be  deprived  of  a  part  of  his  command,  nor  is  the 
splitting  up  of  tactical  units  consistent  with  the  most 
efficient  employment  of  a  command;  for  once  a  com- 
pany, battalion,  or  regiment  is  divided,  we  cannot  say 
when  its  parts  will  again  be  brought  together.  We 

*  See  Chapter  XII. 


64         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

will  often  find  this  "preservation  of  tactical  unity"  ex- 
ceedingly bothersome,  for  the  situations  are  numerous 
in  which  other  considerations  are  more  important. 

Such  is  the  case  in  the  situation  before  us.  Taking 
everything  into  consideration,  two  companies  appear 
to  be  ample  infantry  for  the  advance  guard.  The  ene- 
my may  not  be  near,  the  country  is  fairly  open  so  that 
surprise  is  difficult,  and  the  far  reaching  reconnais- 
sance of  the  cavalry  will  give  timely  warning  of  the 
approach  of  the  enemy.  Under  these  conditions,  two 
companies  should  be  able  to  insure  the  uninterrupted 
progress  of  the  main  body,  in  case  the  enemy  is  not 
encountered  in  strength,  and  to  protect  the  main  body 
against  serious  attacks  without  due  warning,  in  case 
the  enemy  is  encountered  in  strength.  But  this  ar- 
rangement will  require  Colonel  A  to  split  a  battalion 
and  the  question  he  now  has  to  answer  is — Shall  I 
place  twice  as  many  men  as  are  necessary  in  the  ad- 
vance guard  in  order  to  preserve  the  tactical  unity  of 
a  battalion  ?  Should  he  do  so,  he  would  pay  too  great 
a  price  for  tactical  unity,  and  would  show  an  unreas- 
oning adherence  to  a  principle  that  is  subject  to  fre- 
quent exceptions. 

You  may  have  decided  to  detail  the  present  outpost 
infantry  (Companies  A  and  B)  for  the  advance 
guard.  This  arrangement  is  objectionable,  for  the 
outposts  should  be  shown  every  possible  consideration 
after  their  night  of  arduous  duty,  whereas  placing 
them  in  the  advance  guard  would  give  them  the  posi- 
tion of  greatest  danger  and  fatigue.  Moreover,  if 
the  advance  guard  duties  are  to  be  performed  in  the 
most  efficient  manner,  fresh  troops  should  be  assigned 
to  this  task  when  practicable.  In  exceptional  situa- 


AN  ADVANCE  65 

tions,  it  may  be  wise  to  form  the  advance  guard  from 
troops  on  outpost,  but  in  the  ordinary  case,  fresh 
troops  will  perform  this  duty  and  the  outposts  will  be 
assigned  a  place  in  the  main  body.  So  Colonel  A  fix- 
es on  two  companies  from  the  2d  Battalion  for  his 
advance  guard  infantry. 

For  several  reasons,  it  would  be  well  to  have  the 
battalion  commander  go  with  these  two  companies. 
In  the  first  place,  the  advance  guard  should  be  com- 
manded, where  practicable,  by  an  experienced  offi- 
cer. Two  companies  are  not  a  command  appropriate 
for  the  lieutenant-colonel,  but  it  may  be  given  to  a 
major.  Then  these  will  be  the  first  companies  to  be- 
come engaged  in  case  the  enemy  is  encountered,  and 
the  major  will  not  want  to  be  separated  from  them 
at  such  a  time ;  when  the  remaining  two  companies  of 
the  battalion  come  up,  he  will  have  to  take  command 
of  the  reunited  battalion,  and  he  will  be  better  pre- 
pared to  lead  it  if  he  has  been  on  the  ground  from 
the  moment  the  enemy  was  first  encountered.  So, 
also,  the  two  companies  not  in  the  advance  guard 
should  be  at  the  head  of  the  main  body,  that  they  may 
be  the  first  reinforcements  sent  to  the  advance  guard. 

It  is  Colonel  A's  duty  to  prescribe  the  distance  that 
should  be  preserved  between  the  rear  of  the  advance 
guard  and  the  head  of  the  main  body.  This  distance 
will  vary  with  the  situation.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
must  be  great  enough  to  protect  the  main  body 
against  delay,  and  to  afford  it  time  to  deploy  in  case 
the  enemy  is  encountered;  on  the  other  hand,  it  must 
not  be  so  great  that  timely  support  of  the  advance 
guard  becomes  impracticable.  Almost  any  distance 
between  500  and  700  yards  will  meet  these  require- 


66         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

ments  fairly  well  so  we  will  select  the  mean  of  these 
and  call  it  600  yards.  No  one  distance  can  be  de- 
clared better  than  any  and  all  others.  After  read- 
ing Chapter  VII,  we  will  see  that  the  leading  ele- 
ment of  the  advance  guard  infantry  is  about  1500 
yards  from  the  head  of  the  main  body,  and  that  the 
cavalry  point  is  still  farther  away.  Consequently,  it 
is  not  at  all  probable  the  main  body  will  get  within 
effective  rifle  range  of  the  enemy  before  he  has  been 
discovered  by  the  advance  guard;  and  if  the  main 
body  wishes  to  go  to  the  assistance  of  the  advance 
guard,  its  leading  companies  can  deploy  and  cover 
the  intervening  600  yards  in  about  10  minutes. 

The  distance  between  main  body  and  advance  guard 
may  be  preserved  either  by  requiring  the  advance 
guard  to  regulate  its  march  on  that  of  the  main  body, 
or  vice  versa.  In  a  command  as  small  as  this  there  is 
little  difficulty  in  keeping  touch  with  the  main  body, 
and  the  advance  guard  may  be  required  to  regulate 
its  march  on  that  of  the  main  body.  However,  when 
the  commanding  officer  rides  with  the  advance  guard, 
as  generally  will  be  the  case  when  near  the  enemy, 
it  probably  is  simpler  to  have  it  establish  the  rate  of 
march  for  the  whole  column  whatever  may  be  the  size 
of  the  command.  The  commanding  officer  will  ar- 
range for  the  halts  to  rest  as  he  sees  fit,  and  his  meth- 
od of  doing  this  may  vary  from  day  to  day  to  suit  the 
conditions  of  the  march. 

We  are  now  ready  to  consider  what  use  Colonel  A 
shall  make  of  his  cavalry,  and  it  is  assumed  that  we 
are  acquainted  with  the  essential  characteristics  of  this 
arm  and  what  it  can  accomplish  by  way  of  assisting 
the  other  arms.  However,  it  may  be  well  to  recall 


AN  ADVANCE  67 

that  its  mobility  enables  it  to  cover  much  more  ground 
than  infantry,  and  to  get  to  a  point  more  quickly, 
while  its  ability  to  fight  dismounted  as  well  as  mount- 
ed enables  it  to  combat  the  enemy  without  the  assist- 
ance of  the  other  arms.  It  is  therefore  a  very  inde- 
pendent and  self-reliant  arm,  with  a  very  wide  radius 
of  action.  It  is  the  arm  par  excellence  for  reconnais- 
sance, and  to  it  we  naturally  would  entrust  those  mis- 
sions calling  for  both  fighting  power  and  great  mobil- 
ity. 

As  a  general  rule  we  should  avoid  scattering  the 
cavalry,  and  exceptions  should  not  be  made  to  this  rule 
without  very  good  reasons.  The  amount  of  cavalry 
with  a  small  infantry  command  generally  will  be  so 
small,  and  the  tasks  we  would  like  to  give  it  so  num- 
erous, that  we  will  find  it  difficult  to  avoid  scattering 
it  to  such  an  extent  that  it  will  not  have  strength 
enough  at  any  point  to  accomplish  anything  of  im- 
portance. By  attempting  to  do  too  much,  we  end  in 
doing  nothing.  In  most  situations,  cavalry  can  only 
get  results  really  worth  while  in  the  same  way  as  in- 
fantry— by  fighting;  and  if  it  is  to  fight  advantag- 
eously, the  bulk  of  it  must  be  held  together. 

Of  all  the  tasks  we  would  like  to  give  the  cavalry  in 
any  particular  situation,  we  generally  will  find  some 
one  more  important  than  the  others;  the  bulk  of  the 
cavalry  should  be  assigned  this  task,  and  duties  of 
less  importance  should  be  performed  by  smaller  de- 
tachments, such  as  patrols.  Still,  it  will  not  always  be 
easy  to  decide  how  best  lo  employ  the  bulk  of  the  cav- 
alry, but  in  general  we  will  not  go  far  wrong  if  we 
utilize  its  mobility  and  fighting  power  in  the  execu- 
tion of  that  task  for  which  the  remainder  of  our  com- 


68         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

mand  is  not  so  well  fitted,  and  yet  is  most  essential  to 
the  accomplishment  of  our  mission. 

Were  Colonel  A's  cavalry  stronger,  it  might  be 
sent  ahead  of  the  infantry  to  begin  the  destruction  of 
the  bridges.  Alternating  the  trot  and  walk,  it  can 
make  5  miles  per  hour,  and  so  small  a  command  might 
do  better  than  this  for  two  or  three  hours  without 
over-fatigue,  if  all  the  conditions  are  favorable.  In 
three  hours  from  the  time  it  leaves  Kickapoo,  it  can 
be  five  or  six  miles  south  of  Leavenworth  ready  to  be- 
gin the  interruption  of  the  railways.  This  is  about 
three  hours  earlier  than  the  infantry  can  reach  the 
same  point.  But  it  is  unwise  to  send  so  small  a  force 
of  cavalry  so  far  ahead  of  its  infantry  support  in  a 
situation  as  uncertain  as  this.  Trains  bearing  superior 
hostile  cavalry  may  enter  Leavenworth  at  any  time, 
and  Colonel  A  cannot  afford  to  take  the  chance  of 
having  his  cavalry  cut  off  and  destroyed  or  scattered. 
Weak  cavalry,  in  the  face  of  strong  opposing  cavalry, 
is  compelled  to  remain  near  its  infantry  support.  This 
was  amply  illustrated  on  the  Japanese  side  in  the  re- 
cent Russo-Japanese  war.  The  Japanese  cavalry  was 
very  weak  in  numbers,  and  small  parties  of  it  were 
seldom  or  never  sent  so  far  in  advance  of  their  infan- 
try support  that  they  were  liable  to  become  a  sacrifice 
to  the  superior  numbers  of  the  Russian  cavalry.  (*) 

So  long  as  it  is  unknown  whether  the  enemy  reached 
Leavenworth  during  the  night,  Colonel  A's  troop 
had  better  act  with  caution  and  not  get  too  far  from 
its  infantry,  but  it  may  proceed  much  more  boldly 

*  To  those  of  our  readers  who  are  interested  in  this  subject,  we 
recommend  reading  Reconnaissance  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  by  an 
anonymous  German  writer. 


AN  ADVANCE  69 

should  it  discover  Leavenworth  unoccupied  by  hostile 
forces,  and  Colonel  A  should  then  have  no  great  hesi- 
tancy about  hurrying  the  troop  ahead  to  begin  the  de- 
molition of  the  bridges.  Of  course  the  cavalry  will  be 
depended  upon  for  far  reaching  reconnaissance,  and 
at  the  beginning  of  its  march  this  duty,  together  with 
adding  to  the  security  of  the  column,  will  constitute 
its  principal  task.  Its  employment  later  in  the  day 
will  depend  on  the  manner  in  which  the  situation  de- 
velops. 

Colonel  A  may  keep  the  cavalry  under  his  own  con- 
trol, or  he  may  place  it  in  the  advance  guard  under 
the  immediate  control  of  the  advance  guard  comman- 
der. In  the  former  case  it  is  called  "independent  cav- 
alry" and  in  the  latter  "advance  guard  cavalry"  At 
the  beginning  of  the  march  the  cavalry  and  the  ad- 
vance guard  will  have  the  same  mission ;  consequently 
tactical  unity  of  action  will  be  best  secured  by  hav- 
ing both  under  the  same  commander.  For  example, 
suppose  the  enemy's  infantry  and  cavalry  are  met  in 
force  in  the  vicinity  of  Leavenworth  (and  we  have 
seen  that  this  is  quite  probable),  the  march  of  our 
single  troop  probably  would  be  stopped,  and  the  ad- 
vance guard  would  have  to  come  to  its  assistance;  in 
which  event  each  will  cooperate  with  the  other  to  best 
advantage  if  both  are  under  the  control  of  one  mind 
from  the  beginning.  It  would  be  different,  if  the  sit- 
uation permitted  of  sending  the  cavalry  far  ahead  of 
the  advance  guard,  to  the  south  of  Leavenworth,  to 
begin  the  destruction  of  the  bridges.  Its  mission 
would  then  be  quite  separate  and  distinct  from  that  of 
the  advance  guard,  and  there  would  be  no  good  reason 
why  it  should  be  under  the  advance  guard  command- 


70         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

er.  On  the  contrary,  he  might  so  tie  it  down  to  the 
advance  guard  that  it  would  not  have  the  independ- 
ence essential  for  the  execution  of  a  mission  at  so  great 
a  distance.  Every  advance  guard  commander  is  nat- 
urally prone  to  use  cavalry  in  the  restricted  field  pro- 
viding for  the  security  of  the  march;  whereas,  the 
commander  of  the  whole  force  from  his  higher  view- 
point can  give  it  much  more  freedom  of  action;  and 
can  judge  when  it  is  necessary  by  his  intervention  to 
prevent  the  cavalry  getting  out  of  hand.  At  any  time 
the  situation  appears  to  warrant  it,  as  for  example 
should  Leavenworth  be  found  free  of  the  enemy,  Col- 
onel A  may  resume  immediate  control  of  his  cavalry 
and  send  it  off  to  the  south  on  an  independent  mis- 
sion. 

This  question,  when  to  employ  our  cavalry  inde- 
pendently and  when  not,  will  often  place  us  in  a  quan- 
dary. In  general,  it  will  be  so  employed  when  the  task 
to  be  assigned  to  it  is  outside  the  sphere  of  activity  of 
the  remainder  of  the  force,  be  it  with  reference  to  time 
or  place;  provided  its  strength  is  equal  to  the  task  and 
such  as  to  warrant  so  detaching  it  from  its  infantry 
support.  By  "strength"  is  meant  not  only  absolute 
numbers,  but  relative  fighting  power  when  compared 
with  the  opposing  cavalry.  A  force  of  cavalry,  say  a 
squadron,  amply  strong  to  act  independently  under 
one  set  of  conditions,  might  be  ridiculously  un-inde- 
pendent  under  a  different  situation.  And,  although 
it  is  unusual  to  send  so  small  a  force  as  a  troop  on  an 
independent  mission,  still  situations  will  arise  in  which 
it  will  be  perfectly  proper  to  do  so.  For  example,  in 
the  situation  before  us,  were  Colonel  A  perfectly  sure 
the  enemy  would  not  reach  Leavenworth  for  a  day  or 


AN  ADVANCE  71 

two,  the  infantry  might  remain  in  Kickapoo  and  the 
cavalry  be  sent  out,  unsupported,  to  interrupt  the  rail- 
roads. 

In  any  problem  involving  a  mixed  command,  we 
will  find  no  difficulty  in  deciding  upon  the  proper  em- 
ployment of  our  cavalry,  if  we  are  able  to  answer  the 
following  questions  correctly: 

1.  What  are  the  tasks  for  which  cavalry  is  special- 
ly fitted  by  its  mobility  and  fighting  power? 

2.  Of  these  tasks,  which  ones  are  present  in  the 
problem  before  us? 

3.  Of  the  tasks  thus  found  for  the  cavalry,  after 
a  careful  examination  of  the  problem,  which  one  is 
most  essential  to  the  accomplishment  of  our  mission? 

4.  In  order  that  the  strength  of  the  cavalry  as- 
signed this  most  essential  task  may  be  as  great  as  pos- 
sible, what  is  the  least  cavalry  we  can  get  along  with 
for  the  secondary  tasks? 

5.  Are  the  conditions  such  that  the  cavalry  as- 
signed this  most  essential  task  should  be  made  inde- 
pendent? 

We  may  now  consider  the  time  when  the  regiment 
will  begin  its  march.  If  it  is  so  important  to  keep  the 
enemy  out  of  Leavenworth,  why  did  not  General  B 
order  our  colonel  to  march  to  the  south  to-night?  The 
objections  to  this  are  that  the  command  is  in  a  hostile 
country,  it  is  not  familiar  with  the  roads  and  other 
features  of  the  terrain,  the  enemy  may  be  encountered 
in  the  darkness,  and,  most  serious  of  all,  the  disastrous 
effects  of  forced  night  marches  on  the  fighting  effi- 
ciency of  troops.  The  occasions  when  men  and  ani- 
mals must  be  pushed  ahead  day  and  night  regardless 
of  the  limits  of  physical  endurance  are  exceptional; 


72         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

yet,  in  solving  map  problems,  we  are  in  danger  of  es- 
timating every  situation  as  one  demanding  unusual 
exertions  if  not  a  forced  march.  This  is  because  we 
fail  to  think  ourselves  completely  into  the  spirit  of  the 
problem — to  appreciate  that  the  single  day's  opera- 
tions in  which  we  are  interested  was  preceded  by  many 
other  days  of  hard  work,  and  is  yet  to  be  followed  by 
many  more  which  demand  a  rational  conservation  of 
the  energies  of  the  fighting  force.  If  accurate  statis- 
tics could  be  obtained,  we  probably  would  discover 
that  the  losses  in  war  from  diseases  that  are  due  to  in- 
judicious marching  and  sheltering  of  troops  exceed 
those  caused  by  bullets. 

Accordingly,  for  the  command  to  start  for  the 
south  at  a  late  hour  to-night  is  objectionable  in  the  ex- 
treme, but  Colonel  A  should  begin  his  march  at  an 
early  hour  to-morrow  morning,  for,  as  already  seen, 
the  railroad  should  be  interrupted  at  Five  Mile  creek 
at  the  earliest  practicable  hour.  General  Griepenkerl 
has  the  following  to  say  (*)  on  the  subject:  "This 
desire  to  reach  some  place  or  other  as  quickly  as  pos- 
sible is  an  element  in  most  tactical  exercises.  But  I 
must  warn  you  not  to  fix  too  early  an  hour  for  depar- 
ture in  your  orders,  as  otherwise  you  might  encounter 
various  difficulties.  Especially  out  of  consideration 
for  the  mounted  troops,  avoid  starting  until  an  hour 
after  daybreak.  But  to  give  the  troops  as  much  as 
possible  of  the  absolutely  necessary  night's  rest,  the 
march  should  begin  even  later,  unless  it  is  desired  to 
avoid  marching  in  the  heat  of  the  day.  *  *  *  If 
you  intend  starting  at  an  exceptionally  early  hour, 
you  will  be  expected  fully  to  explain  your  reasons." 

*  In  Letters  on  Applied  Tactics. 


AN  ADVANCE  73 

This  advice  agrees  in  its  main  points  with  the  princi- 
ples laid  down  in  our  Field  Service  Regulations. 

As  already  pointed  out,  the  situation  furnishes  Col- 
onel A  with  ample  reasons  for  not  observing  the  gen- 
eral rule  as  to  the  hour  of  starting,  hut  the  uncertainty 
of  the  situation,  the  difficulty  of  marching  in  the  dark, 
and  the  annoyance  to  the  troops,  make  it  undesirable 
to  begin  the  march  while  it  is  still  dark.  Even  if  the 
troops  start  at  daybreak  they  must  be  astir  an  hour 
earlier,  and  disturbing  the  rest  of  troops  in  the  early 
morning  hours  is  specially  objectionable.  At  this 
season  of  the  year,  in  this  latitude,  the  sun  rises  at 
4:30  a.  m.,  and  daybreak  is  about  an  hour  earlier. 
Consequently  we  will  fix  3:30  a.  m.,  as  the  starting 
hour  for  the  advance  guard. 

Our  final  decision  is  as  follows:  To  start  from 
Kickapoo  at  3 :30  a.  m.,  to-morrow  and  march  via  the 
47— 17— H— G — 14— 60— 66a— 224— 226  road  to- 
wards the  railroad  bridges  over  Five  Mile  creek,  with 
two  companies  and  the  troop  of  cavalry  in  the  advance 
guard. 

In  some  of  the  situations  presented  in  subsequent 
problems,  the  detachment  commander  will  have  to 
reach  his  decision  in  a  very  few  minutes,  but  that  is 
not  true  of  the  situation  we  are  now  considering.  Col- 
onel A  has  abundant  time  for  deliberation,  but  he 
probably  will  reach  his  decision  and  be  ready  to  issue 
his  orders  by  10:30  p.  m.  At  that  hour  most  of  the 
officers  will  be  resting  for  the  night  and,  excepting 
the  advance  guard  commander,  they  need  not  be  dis- 
turbed to  receive  orders ;  the  advance  guard  command- 
er, however,  should  be  given  his  orders  at  10:30  p.  m., 
in  order  that  he  may  have  ample  time  to  deliberate  on 


74         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  situation  and  decide  on  his  arrangements  for  the 
march.  When  he  (Major  B,  commanding  the  2d 
Battalion)  has  reported,  Colonel  A  has  him  read  the 
telegram  from  General  B  (*)  and  then  adds: 

"In  compliance  with  this  telegram,  we  will  advance  to  the 
south  early  to-morrow  morning. 

"Two  companies  of  your  battalion,  and  the  cavalry  (f),  will 
constitute  the  advance  guard  under  your  command.  Have  your 
infantry  start  from  29  at  3:30  a.  m.  and  follow  the  45 — 17 — H — 
G — 14 — 66a  road.  Your  cavalry  will  start  at  the  same  hour 
and  will  reconnoiter  through  Fort  Leavenworth  and  Leaven- 
worth,  and  to  the  south ;  it  will  carefully  watch  the  woods  west  of 
Fort  Leavenworth,  and  will  patrol  the  hills  along  the  line  of 
march  west  of  Leavenworth.  I  will  specially  desire  to  know  if 
Leavenworth  is  still  unoccupied  by  the  enemy  and  you  may 
send  out  a  cavalry  patrol  before  3:30  a.  m.,  to  obtain  that  in- 
formation. The  platoon  of  cavalry  now  on  outpost  will  be  or- 
dered to  join  your  column  as  it  passes  the  line  of  outposts. 

"The  main  body  will  follow  at  a  distance  of  600  yards,  with 
the  remaining  two  companies  of  your  battalion  in  the  lead. 

"The  field  train  will  remain  provisionally  in  Kickapoo. 

"I  will  accompany  the  advance  guard." 

The  surest  method  of  imparting  orders  consists  of 
the  verbal  instructions  given  by  a  senior  officer  direct- 
ly to  those  concerned — especially  so,  as  it  affords  op- 
portunity for  explanation  and  prevention  of  misun- 
derstandings. But  the  verbal  order  should  follow  the 
same  general  form  as  a  written  order.  The  officer 
giving  the  order  is  then  less  liable  to  omit  something 

*  See   Situation,  page   57. 

f  It  is  not  necessary  for  Colonel  A  to  weaken  his  already  small 
cavalry  force  by  detaching  from  it  a  number  of  troopers  to  do  mes- 
senger service  for  him.  The  mounted  orderlies  and  the  regimental 
detachment  of  mounted  scouts  are  intended  for  this  purpose,  and 
they  are  ample.  Some  of  these  scouts  may  be  assigned  to  the 
main  body  and  advance  guard,  but  it  is  not  necessary  to  mention  this 
distribution  in  the  orders. 


AN  ADVANCE  75 

of  importance,  and  it  will  gain  in  clearness  and  con- 
ciseness for  the  officer  receiving  it.  The  form  is  the 
result  of  much  careful  thought  and  study,  and  has 
been  thoroughly  tested  by  experience.  The  different 
paragraphs  of  the  order  follow  each  other  in  logical 
sequence,  and  an  officer  trained  in  this  system  gives 
his  orders  in  the  fewest  possible  words  and  clearest 
possible  manner,  and  receives  them  with  a  clear  under- 
standing of  what  is  intended.  Without  some  form 
for  a  guide,  all  orders  and  especially  verbal  orders 
will  be  rambling  and  confusing.  Information  of  the 
enemy  and  of  supporting  troops  will  be  scattered 
throughout  its  paragraphs;  what  the  one  issuing  the 
order  proposes  to  accomplish  may  have  to  be  surmised ; 
the  commander  of  any  particular  fraction  of  the  com- 
mand may  have  to  piece  together  disjointed  sentences 
scattered  throughout  the  order,  and  still  get  only  a 
more  or  less  imperfect  idea  of  what  he  is  expected  to 
do.  This  leads  to  questions,  always  annoying  when 
unnecessary  and  frequently  impossible  to  answer  be- 
cause of  lack  of  time.  It  is  in  critical  situations  where 
seconds  are  counted,  that  the  full  value  of  system  in 
issuing  orders  becomes  apparent,  for  no  time  is  wast- 
ed in  useless  talk,  yet  every  officer  has  a  clear  under- 
standing of  what  is  to  be  done.  We  may  have  an  op- 
portunity to  illustrate  this  in  the  solution  for  a  prob- 
lem farther  along  in  this  book. 

By  reading  the  telegram  received  from  superior 
headquarters,  Major  B  obtains  a  clear  understanding 
of  the  situation  and  General  B's  wishes.  A  detach- 
ment commander  ordinarily  should  fully  explain  his 
plans  and  intentions  to  his  advance  guard  commander. 
In  general  there  should  be  few  secrets  between  them. 


76         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

The  reason  for  this  will  be  explained  in  a  later  chap- 
ter. Since  the  telegram  contained  all  fresh  informa- 
tion of  the  enemy  and  the  Blue  supporting  troops, 
(*)  the  order  begins  with  a  statement  of  Colonel  A's 
intentions.  It  is  unnecessary  to  state  the  object  of  the 
march  to  the  south,  as  that  may  be  clearly  inferred 
from  the  telegram;  there  is  no  serious  objection,  how- 
ever, to  telling  Major  B  that  the  railroads  will  be  first 
interrupted  at  the  bridges  over  Five  Mile  creek,  al- 
though this  might  divert  his  attention  from  his  main 
mission  which  is  to  cover  the  march  of  the  main  body. 
It  is  too  early  to  decide  with  absolute  certainty  when, 
where,  and  with  what  troops  the  railroad  will  be  inter- 
rupted, and  the  less  said  on  this  point  the  better. 

In  telling  Major  B  the  part  he  is  to  play  in  the 
march,  Colonel  A  confines  himself  to  a  statement  of 
the  troops  that  will  constitute  the  advance  guard,  the 
place  and  time  of  starting,  the  road  to  be  followed, 
and  the  most  important  points  to  be  reconnoitered.  No 
mention  is  made  of  the  way  in  which  the  advance 
guard  will  be  subdivided,  the  distance  separating  its 
parts,  the  local  reconnaissance  it  is  to  make,  or  the 
manner  in  which  it  will  perform  its  duties  in  general. 
With  a  properly  trained  officer  in  command  of  the  ad- 
vance guard  (and  in  all  of  the  problems  contained  in 
this  book  it  is  assumed  that  we  are  dealing  with  well 
instructed  officers,  unless  the  contrary  is  stated ) ,  this 
would  be  not  only  unnecessary,  but  an  unwarranted 
interference  with  a  subordinate.  Under  our  regula- 
tions, an  advance  guard  commander  has  certain  well 
established  duties  to  perform,  whatever  the  situation, 

*  It  is  assumed  that  the  situation  up  to  the  receipt  of  the  telegram 
was  known  to  the  command. 


AN  ADVANCE  77 

and  it  is  taken  for  granted  he  will  perform  them  to  the 
best  of  his  ability  without  making  mention  of  them 
in  his  orders,  which  should  be  confined  to  directing 
those  things  which  vary  with  the  situation. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  rather  detailed  instructions 
covering  the  reconnaissance  to  be  made  by  the  advance 
guard  cavalry  do  not  accord  with  the  above  principle, 
and  constitute  interference  with  the  advance  guard 
commander.  Doubtless  it  is  interference  but  it  is  not 
unwarranted.  We  have  seen  that  Colonel  A  thought 
seriously  of  keeping  the  cavalry  under  his  own  com- 
mand, and  only  decided  to  surrender  his  complete  con- 
trol of  it  because  there  is  not,  at  the  outset,  a  mission 
for  it  separate  and  distinct  from  that  of  the  advance 
guard.  He  may  be  pardoned  for  any  misgivings  he 
may  have  as  to  its  being  properly  employed,  for  its 
operations  probably  will  have  much  to  do  with  the  suc- 
cess or  failure  of  the  mission  of  the  detachment.  The 
chief  mission  of  an  advance  guard  is  to  provide  for 
the  security  of  the  march,  and,  if  given  absolute  free- 
dom, it  would  not  be  strange  if  the  advance  guard 
commander  should  employ  the  cavalry  in  a  very  re- 
stricted field,  and  not  give  it  that  freedom  of  action 
and  direct  it  along  those  lines  so  plainly  desirable 
when  the  situation  is  examined  from  the  broader  view 
point  of  the  detachment  commander. 

For  example,  we  know  from  Colonel  A's  estimate 
of  the  situation  that  if  he  hears,  when  on  the  march 
to-morrow  morning,  that  Leavenworth  and  Fort 
Leavenworth  are  not  occupied  by  the  enemy,  he  prob- 
ably will  hurry  his  cavalry  ahead  to  Five  Mile  creek 
to  begin  the  demolition.  Consequently,  it  is  import- 
ant that  patrols  should  be  sent  through  those  places 


78         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

and  to  the  south  and,  rather  than  take  chances  on  Ma- 
jor B  doing  this  of  his  own  accord,  Colonel  A  makes 
certain  of  this  reconnaissance  by  ordering  it.  There  is 
less  necessity  for  ordering  a  reconnaissance  of  the 
woods  and  hills  west  of  Fort  Leavenworth  and  Leav- 
enworth,  for  the  advance  guard  commander  probably 
would  examine  these  localities,  but  the  order  makes  a 
certainty  of  a  probability,  and*leaves  no  doubt  in  Col- 
onel A's  mind.  After  all,  this  is  not  strictly  interfer- 
ence with  the  advance  guard  commander,  for  when 
the  order  is  carefully  analyzed  it  will  be  seen  that  our 
colonel  has  stated  what  he  wants  done  and  has  left  the 
manner  of  doing  it  to  his  subordinate.  And,  in  gen- 
eral, any  commander  of  a  force  of  which  cavalry 
forms  a  part,  whatever  may  be  the  mission  of  the  com- 
mand, will  specify  in  his  orders  the  important  direc- 
tions in  which  his  cavalry  is  to  reconnoiter,  but  will 
leave  to  the  cavalry  commander  the  determination  of 
how  this  reconnaissance  is  to  be  made. 

By  directing  Major  B  to  start  his  cavalry  at  the 
same  hour  as  his  infantry,  Major  B  is  prevented  from 
disturbing  the  cavalry  at  an  unnecessarily  early  hour. 
It  can  gain  the  desired  distance  in  advance  of  the  in- 
fantry by  trotting  out,  for,  if  unopposed,  it  can  easi- 
ly march  three  miles  farther  than  the  infantry  in  the 
first  hour  after  starting.  However,  to  make  sure  of 
early  information  of  the  situation  in  Leavenworth, 
Major  B  is  authorized  to  start  a  patrol  in  that  direc- 
tion before  3 :30  a.  m.  Colonel  A  might  have  sent  out 
this  patrol,  merely  informing  Major  B  of  that  fact. 
Frequently  the  detachment  commander  will  thus  send 
out  his  own  patrols  when  he  is  anxious  to  secure  in- 
formation of  special  importance,  but  this  procedure 


AN  ADVANCE  79 

is  open  to  objection  when  the  advance  guard  comman- 
der can  make  this  arrangement  equally  well,  for  it  di- 
vides responsibility  for  proper  reconnaissance  and 
may  lead  the  subordinate  to  depend  on  his  superior  to 
do  this  work  for  him. 

From  the  closing  paragraphs  of  the  order,  Major 
B  learns  that  the  main  body  is  to  follow  him  at  600 
yards,  and,  consequently,  that  it  is  to  guide  its  march 
on  that  of  the  advance  guard;  and  that  the  remain- 
ing two  companies  of  his  battalion  are  placed  at  the 
head  of  the  main  body,  that  the  battalion  may  be  the 
more  easily  united  in  case  the  detachment  has  to  fight. 

In  giving  an  order,  a  commander  should  attempt 
to  state,  in  clear,  concise  and  definite  language,  every- 
thing his  subordinates  should  know  and  nothing  more. 
He  may  not  always  succeed  in  doing  this,  and  even  if 
he  does,  there  may  be  some  one  among  those  receiving 
the  orders  who  does  not  immediately  grasp  their  full 
import.  Such  a  one  should  not  hesitate  to  ask  for  fur- 
ther explanation,  and,  as  a  general  rule,  his  questions 
when  proper  should  be  fully  and  graciously  answered. 
The  subordinate  that  in  war  time  does  not  ask  a  ques- 
tion when  in  doubt  is  as  culpable  as  the  superior  that 
shows  intolerance  of  being  questioned.  Manifestly  it 
is  not  practicable  to  state  in  these  solutions  the  con- 
versation that  takes  place  between  commander  and 
subordinate  to  clear  up  doubtful  points  in  the  order. 
We  can  but  give  the  order  as  it  actually  is  issued,  and 
must  leave  the  remainder  to  the  imagination. 

There  are  other  arrangements  that  Colonel  A  has 
yet  to  make  to-night.  The  outposts  must  be  notified 
of  the  proposed  march  and  given  their  orders,  and 


80         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

provision  should  be  made  for  rousing  the  command  in 
the  morning. 

The  outposts  should  remain  in  position  and  cover 
the  rest  of  the  command  until  the  advance  guard  is 
stretched  out  on  the  road  and  ready  to  take  over  the 
duties  of  security.  They  will  then  move  by  the  most 
convenient  line  and  take  their  proper  place  in  the  col- 
umn as  it  passes.  This  method  of  withdrawal  is  un- 
derstood by  the  outpost  commander,  and  in  the  order 
sent  him  it  need  be  referred  to  only  in  the  most  gener- 
al way.  The  following  is  the  order  in  the  form  of  a 
message,  and  we  will  observe  that  Major  A  is  told 
what  he  should  know  at  this  time  and  nothing  more; 
the  object  of  the  march,  and  information  of  the  2d 
and  3d  Infantry  will  be  told  him  when  he  joins  the 
column  to-morrow  morning. 

1st  Infantry, 
Kickapoo.  Kansas, 

To  14  July—,  10:40  P.  M. 

Major  A, 

Commanding  Outpost. 

Telgram  just  received  from  superior  headquarters  states  that 
the  enemy  apparently  contemplates  moving  a  force  to  LEAVEN- 
WORTH  over  the  MISSOURI  PACIFIC  railroad.  We  will 
move  south  with  all  our  command  in  the  morning.  The  advance 
guard,  under  Major  B,  will  start  from  29  at  3:30  a.  m.  and 
follow  the  47 — 17 — H — G  road.  The  outpost  cavalry  will  join 
the  advance  guard,  and  the  outpost  infantry  will  join  the  tail  of 
the  main  body,  as  the  column  passes  the  line  of  outposts.  The 
wagons  of  the  outpost  companies  will  join  the  field  train  at 
KICKAPOO  after  the  column  is  on  the  march. 

By  order  of  Colonel  A: 

X, 
Capt.  &  Adjt.  1st  Inf.,  Adjutant. 


AN  ADVANCE  81 

At  2:30  a.  m.,  the  command  is  astir;  and  at  3  a.  m. 
Colonel  A  assembles  the  lieutenant  colonel,  Major  C 
(commanding  3d  Battalion),  all  the  captains  of  the 
main  body  (excepting  those  on  outpost),  and  his 
staff,  and  issues  the  following  verbal  orders: 

"A  telegram  received  from  General  B  last  night  states  that 
the  enemy  contemplates  moving  a  force  to  Leavenworth  over  the 
Missouri  Pacific  railroad  from  the  south,  and  directs  this  com- 
mand to  prevent  this  movement  by  interrupting  the  railroads 
south  of  Leavenworth.  We  are  also  to  endeavor  to  locate  any 
hostile  forces  advancing  from  the  south.  The  railroad  in  our 
rear  is  now  guarded  by  parts  of  the  3d  Infantry,  and  the  2d  In- 
fantry will  reach  here  some  time  to-morrow. 

"We  will  march  to  the  south  this  morning  to  carry  out  General 
B's  orders. 

"Companies  E  and  F,  and  Troop  A,  under  command  of  Ma- 
jor B,  will  constitute  the  advance  guard.  It  will  start  from  29 
at  8:30  a.  m.  and  follow  the  47 — 17 — H — G— 14 — 60 — 66a  road. 

"The  main  body  will  follow  the  advance  guard  at  600  yards, 
and  march  in  the  following  order:  Regimental  headquarters, 
Companies  G  and  H,  3d  Battalion,  1st  Battalion. 

"The  outposts  will  join  the  column  as  it  passes  the  outpost  po- 
sition. 

"The  field  train  will  remain  here  until  further  orders ;  it  will 
assemble  ready  to  march  at  4:30  a.  m. 

"I  will  be  with  the  advance  guard." 

It  is  quite  proper  for  Colonel  A  to  inform  his  offi- 
cers that  the  proposed  movement  is  being  made  in 
compliance  with  orders  from  higher  authority.  The 
command  is  small  and  may  have  a  feeling  of  isolation 
in  its  advanced  position,  and  there  will  be  greater  con- 
fidence in  the  wisdom  of  the  movement  if  the  officers 
know  it  constitutes  part  of  a  general  plan  worked 
out  at  superior  headquarters.  But  the  colonel  must 
carefully  avoid  giving  the  impression  that  he  is  crit- 


82         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

icising  the  judgment  of  his  superior,  or  is  attempting 
to  shift  responsibility  to  other  shoulders  than  his  own, 
else  he  may  spread  a  sentiment  throughout  his  com- 
mand that  might  result  in  the  failure  of  the  expedi- 
tion. This  is  mentioned  only  to  point  out  that  indis- 
cretion in  issuing  orders  may  have  serious  consequen- 
ces. The  morale  of  the  command  will  be  greatly  im- 
proved by  the  knowledge  that  the  line  of  communica- 
tions is  safe,  and  that  reinforcements  will  arrive  to- 
morrow, so  these  facts  are  mentioned.  The  most 
should  always  be  made  of  every  scrap  of  favorable  in- 
formation. 

Colonel  A  might  have  told  his  officers  a  little  less 
of  his  own  plans.  As  a  rule  it  is  not  well  for  a  com- 
mander to  state  what  he  intends  doing  far  in  advance 
of  the  event,  for  he  cannot  tell  at  what  moment  the 
enemy  may  compel  him  to  change  his  plans,  and  such 
changes  are  liable  to  decrease  the  confidence  troops 
have  in  their  leaders.  But  this  rule  applies  with  more 
force  the  larger  the  command,  and  in  a  command  as 
small  as  this,  it  may  be  a  positive  advantage  for  every 
officer  to  know  the  object  of  the  movement,  unless 
there  is  a  reason  for  secrecy.  Accordingly,  Colonel 
A  probably  was  right  in  saying  what  he  did  of  inter- 
rupting the  railroads,  and  locating  the  enemy,  there- 
by insuring  a  keener  interest  in  the  movement  and 
more  intelligent  cooperation  among  all  parts  of  the 
command. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  inform  the  officers  that  the  ad- 
vance guard  will  so  conduct  its  reconnaissance  as  to 
insure  the  safety  of  the  march,  for  that  is  what  an  ad- 
vance guard  is  for;  but  the  hour  and  place  of  starting 
and  the  road  to  be  followed  are  all  mentioned,  in  or- 


AN  ADVANCE  83 

der  that  commanders  in  the  main  body  may  regulate 
their  times  of  starting.  It  devolves  upon  the  senior 
captain  of  Companies  G  and  H  to  time  his  start  so 
that  he  will  follow  the  advance  guard  at  600  yards. 
No  harm  is  done  if  he  does  not  get  this  exact  distance 
at  the  start,  provided  he  so  regulates  his  march  as  to 
secure  it  in  the  first  few  minutes  of  the  advance.  In 
small  commands,  it  is  simpler  for  all  concerned  to  give 
the  distance  at  which  the  main  body  will  follow  the 
advance  guard  (or  the  advance  guard  will  precede  the 
main  body) ,  than  to  prescribe  the  hour  when  the  main 
body  should  start  in  order  to  have  its  proper  distance. 
The  commanding  officer  should  always  prescribe  the 
order  of  march  of  the  troops  in  the  main  body,  for  this 
is  often  a  matter  of  great  tactical  importance  (espe- 
cially in  large  commands  with  artillery).  In  this 
situation,  for  example,  the  two  companies  at  the  head 
of  the  main  body  are  from  the  same  battalion  as  the 
advance  guard,  and  the  battalion  to  which  the  out- 
posts belong  is  put  at  the  rear  of  the  column. 

Our  Field  Service  Regulations  prescribe  that  the 
field  train  (*)  will  be  guarded  as  far  as  practicable 
by  a  picked  up  guard  consisting  of  teamsters  and 
other  men  always  with  the  train,  assisted  by  convales- 
cents and  others  who  are  non-effective  in  the  ranks 
but  accompany  the  command ;  but,  if  the  situation  de- 

*  For  the  composition  of  the  field  train  see  F.  S.  E.  In  addition 
to  its  field  train  every  body  of  troops  is  accompanied  by  its  combat 
train,  which  comprises  the  led  horses  of  the  officers,  the  battalion  am- 
munition wagons  and  ambulances  temporarily  attached  to  the  various 
regiments.  It  generally  marches  directly  in  rear  of  the  unit  to  which 
it  belongs,  so  that  it  will  be  immediately  available  in  case  the  com- 
mand goes  into  a  fight.  Thus  each  battalion  ordinarily  is  followed  by 
its  ammunition  wagons,  but  the  six  wagons  of  the  regiment  may  be 
assembled  and  marched  immediately  in  rear  of  the  regiment. 


84         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

mands,  additional  guards  will  be  provided.  We  have 
assumed  that  the  train  has  such  a  picked  up  guard 
with  it.  It  would  be  unwise  to  have  the  train  follow 
the  command  before  the  situation  is  somewhat  cleared 
up.  Should  the  enemy  be  encountered  near  Leaven- 
worth  and  the  command  have  to  retreat,  the  train 
would  be  in  the  way  and  might  seriously  interfere 
with  the  movements  of  the  troops.  After  Colonel  A 
knows  he  can  continue  his  march  beyond  Leaven- 
worth,  there  will  be  ample  time  to  send  word  to  the 
train  and  have  it  join  the  command  at  its  camp  for 
the  night. 

A  commander  should  always  state  his  proposed  po- 
sition in  the  column  in  order  that  his  subordinates  can 
easily  find  him  at  any  time.  In  case  he  is  in  doubt  as 
to  where  he  will  be,  he  should  state  where  messages 
should  be  sent,  and  then  leave  a  staff  officer  at  that 
point  to  forward  messages.  Colonel  A  says  he  will 
be  with  the  advance  guard,  but  he  will  assure  himself 
that  his  entire  column  is  on  the  march  in  accordance 
with  his  intentions  before  riding  to  the  front.  Unless 
a  commander  thus  supervises  the  formation  of  his 
command,  irregularities  of  all  sorts  are  liable  to  creep 
in,  but  he  cannot  constantly  remain  with  the  main 
body;  when  contact  with  the  enemy  seems  probable, 
he  generally  should  join  the  advance  guard  where  he 
can  make  his  own  observations  of  the  situation  as  re- 
gards the  enemy  and  the  terrain,  for  he  must  not  then 
depend  on  messages  and  maps.  But  he  must  scrupu- 
lously guard  against  unwarranted  interference  with 
the  advance  guard  commander. 

Had  Colonel  A  issued  his  orders  in  writing  the 


AN  ADVANCE  85 

night  of  July  14-15  they  would  have  appeared  as  fol- 
lows: 

•n-  u  /-k  j  ls*  Infantry, 

Field  Orders  J 

XT  Kickapoo,  Kansas. 

No. 

Troops  14  July -10:45  P.M. 

(a)  Advance  Guard:  *•     I*  is  reported  that  the  enemy 

Mai  or  B.  contemplates  moving  a  force  to 

2d  Bn.  1st  Inf.  (less  LEAVENWORTH  over  the 

2  companies)  MISSOURI  PACIFIC  railroad 

Troop  A,  2d  Cav.  from  the  south.  Detachments 

,.  N  from   the    3d    Infantry   are   now 

(b)  Mam  Body — in  order  _.         .,         .,          * 

.  guarding  the  railroad  in  our  rear 

of  march:  '  °  , 

TT      «   ^       ^  »   TT  and   the   2d   Infantry   will   reach 

Hq.  &  Cos.  G  &  H,  J    R 

here  some  time  July   lo. 

1st  Inf.  _.  ..  _.     ^  . 

.  _  _    .  2.     In    compliance   with   telegra- 

3d  Bn.  1st  Inf.  r  ° 

phic  orders  from  General  B.  we 
1st  Bn.   1st  Inf.  .„      . 

will  advance  to-morrow  to  inter- 
rupt the  railroads  entering  LEAVENWORTH  from  the  south, 
and  locate  any  hostile  forces  that  may  be  advancing. 

3.  (a)     The  advance  guard  infantry  will  start  from  29  at 
3:30  a.  m.,  and  follow  the  45— 17— H— G — 14 — 60 — 66a  road. 
The  cavalry  will  start  at  the  same  hour,  and,  in  addition  to  ex- 
amining the  woods  and  hills  west  of  FORT  LEAVENWORTH 
and     LEAVENWORTH,     will     reconnoiter     through     FORT 
LEAVENWORTH  and  LEAVENWORTH  and  to  the  south. 

(b)  The  main  body  will  follow  the  advance  guard  at  600 
yards. 

(c)  The  outpost  will  assemble  and  join  the  column  as  it 
passes  the  outpost  position. 

4.  The  field  train  will  assemble  ready  to  march  at  4:30  a. 
m.,  and  then  remain  here  awaiting  further  orders. 

5.  The  commanding  officer  will  be  with  the  advance  guard. 

By  order  of  Colonel  A: 

X, 
Capt.  &  Adjt.,  1st  Inf.  Adjutant. 

Copies  to  Lt.  Col.  A,  Majors  A,  B  and  C,  Captains  C  and  G, 
and  Staff;  brief  message  to  General  B  by  wire. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

AN  ADVANCE. 

PROBLEM. 

(See  2 -inch  map). 

A  Blue  division  is  at  Platte  City,  Missouri,  with  an 
advance  brigade  near  Weston.  A  Red  force  of  all 
arms  is  reported  in  camp  about  30  miles  southwest  of 
Leavenworth.  The  bridges  over  the  Missouri  river  at 
Leavenworth  and  Fort  Leavenworth  have  been  de- 
stroyed. The  country  is  friendly  toward  the  Blue 
force. 

On  August  1,  the  Blue  brigade  is  awaiting  the  ar- 
rival of  material  with  which  to  lay  a  pontoon  bridge 
across  the  Missouri  river  about  1%  miles  south  of 
Weston,  when  a  trustworthy  report  is  received  that  a 
Red  force  of  infantry  and  cavalry  is  marching  on 
Leavenworth  from  the  southwest,  and  probably  would 
reach  the  line  of  the  Big  Stranger  about  6  miles  south 
of  Easton  this  afternoon. 

On  receiving  this  report,  a  detachment,  consisting 
of  the  1st  Infantry,  Troop  A,  1st  Cavalry,  and  Troop 
B,  1st  Cavalry  (less  the  3d  and  4th  Platoons),  under 
command  of  Colonel  A,  1st  Infantry,  is  ferried  across 
the  river  and  ordered  to  march  immediately  to  the 
neighborhood  of  Mount  Olivet  to  locate  the  Red  force 
and  delay  its  advance  while  the  bridge  is  being  con- 
structed. At  1  p.  m.,  Colonel  A  has  his  command 
assembled  on  the  west  bank  of  the  river,  a  little  more 
than  a  mile  northeast  of  the  polo  field,  ready  to  be- 


AN  ADVANCE  87 

gin  the  march.    The  detachment  is  not  accompanied 
by  wagon  transportation. 

Note: — Big  Stranger  creek  is  not  fordable. 
Required : 

Colonel  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 
His  orders  for  the  advance. 

SOLUTION. 

Viewed  broadly,  Colonel  A's  mission  is  to  delay  the 
advance  of  the  Red  force,  but,  before  he  can  do  this, 
the  enemy  must  be  found.  Consequently,  locating  the 
advancing  hostile  column  constitutes  his  first  task. 

The  information  of  the  enemy  shows  the  direction 
of  his  advance  to  be  such  as  to  bring  him  to  the  Big 
Stranger  about  six  miles  south  of  Easton.  From 
this  it  appears  that  he  is  heading  for  the  bridges  near 
182,  although  he  may  cross  this  stream  farther  south, 
or  farther  north  near  114. 

We  may  do  little  more  than  guess  at  the  enemy's 
strength.  Our  information,  which  is  reliable,  says  he 
has  but  infantry  and  cavalry.  From  this  we  may  in- 
fer that  his  force  is  less  than  a  brigade,  else  it  would 
most  probably  be  accompanied  by  artillery.  On  the 
other  hand  it  is  not  probable  that  the  enemy  would 
send  less  than  a  regiment  of  infantry  so  far  from  his 
main  force  which  apparently  has  not  moved  from  its 
camp  30  miles  southwest  of  Leavenworth.  The  best 
we  can  do  now  is  to  estimate  the  enemy's  strength  as 
being  somewhere  between  a  regiment  and  a  brigade 
of  infantry  with  not  more  than  a  squadron  of  cavalry. 

So,  also,  we  may  do  no  more  than  conjecture  the 
enemy's  intentions.  The  natural  supposition  is  that  he 
has  heard  of  the  Blue  activity  in  the  vicinity  of  Platte 


88         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

City,  and  has  pushed  a  detachment  forward  to  clear 
up  the  situation  or  to  interfere  with  the  Blue  opera- 
tions. At  any  rate,  Colonel  A  should  be  prepared  to 
meet  a  superior  enemy  with  an  aggressive  mission. 

Within  certain  limits,  Colonel  A's  destination  has 
been  selected  for  him  by  his  superior.  He  is  to  march 
to  the  neighborhood  of  Mount  Olivet  to-day,  but, 
with  this  restriction,  he  is  at  liberty  to  choose  his  line 
of  march  and  camping  place  for  the  night,  in  accord- 
ance with  his  estimate  of  the  situation  as  it  now  exists, 
or  as  it  may  change  with  information  secured  as  the 
day  advances.  It  is  between  ten  and  twelve  miles  to 
the  neighborhood  of  Mount  Olivet,  i.  e.  between  4  and 
5  hours  of  marching;  hence  the  detachment  will  not 
reach  the  end  of  its  march  much  before  six  o'clock. 

Before  discussing  the  roads  the  detachment  may 
take,  it  will  be  well  to  decide  on  the  particular  point 
Colonel  A  is  to  aim  for.  He  should  so  march  as  to 
place  his  detachment  squarely  across  the  most  proba- 
ble line  of  advance  of  the  enemy,  and  yet  be  in  a  po- 
sition from  which  he  could  quickly  meet  the  enemy 
should  he  advance  along  some  less  probable  route. 
According  to  present  information,  a  position  in  the 
vicinity  of  118  will  accomplish  this  purpose  better 
than  any  other.  If  the  enemy  crosses  the  Big  Stran- 
ger near  182,  and  advances  by  the  most  direct  road  to 
Leaven  worth,  he  must  pass  118;  while  if  he  crosses 
at  near-by  bridges  to  the  north  and  south  of  182,  such 
as  the  bridge  near  114,  Colonel  A  can  move  by  inter- 
ior lines  and  keep  between  him  and  Leavenworth. 
Also,  118  is  a  good  position  from  which  to  advance 
and  meet  the  enemy  as  he  is  crossing  the  unfordable 


AN  ADVANCE  89 

Big  Stranger,  should  later  information  make  such  a 
move  desirable. 

Considering  the  late  hour  when  Colonel  A  makes 
his  start,  the  length  of  the  march  ahead  of  him,  and 
the  distance  of  the  enemy,  he  should  choose  the  short- 
est route  between  his  present  position  and  118.  In 
this  situation  tactical  considerations  in  the  selection 
of  the  route  are  of  minor  importance.  On  the  suppo- 
sition that  all  roads  shown  on  the  map  are  equally  im- 
proved, the  route  via  the  Fort  Leavenworth — C — D 
— E— 14— 60— 56— 44— 46 — 106—128 — 124  road  is 
the  one  that  can  be  covered  in  the  shortest  time  with 
the  least  fatigue.  Routes  to  the  north  and  south  of 
this  are  longer  and  offer  no  advantages. 

The  situation  furnishes  the  cavalry  with  a  mission, 
separate  as  to  time  and  place  from  that  of  the  infan- 
try. Its  important  task  is  to  determine  the  enemy's 
location,  line  of  advance  and  strength.  If  it  is  to  do 
this  successfully,  it  must  be  permitted  to  cut  loose 
from  the  infantry ;  consequently,  it  should  be  made  in- 
dependent. The  orders  given  it  should  state  clearly 
what  it  is  to  accomplish,  but  they  should  leave  the 
cavalry  commander  free  to  execute  them  in  any  way 
he  thinks  best.  He  should  get  patrols  to  the  west  of 
the  Big  Stranger  this  afternoon,  and  should  give  spe- 
cial attention  to  reconnaissance  along  the  roads  from 
the  west  through  114,  184,  and  186.  Besides,  roads 
immediately  to  the  north  and  south  of  these  should  be 
watched,  especially  the  roads  through  Easton.  As  the 
cavalry  moves  towards  the  Big  Stranger,  it  should  ob- 
serve all  the  principal  roads  running  west  from  Leav- 
enworth, for  the  hostile  cavalry  may  be  encountered  at 
any  moment. 


90         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

The  probability  of  close  contact  with  the  enemy's 
infantry  during  the  march  is  so  remote  that  Colonel 
A  may  dispense  with  a  strong  advance  guard.  Two 
companies  are  sufficient,  but  little  or  no  harm  would 
be  done  if  a  full  battalion  were  detailed  for  this  duty. 
Some  cavalry  with  the  advance  guard  might  assist  it 
greatly,  but  the  cavalry  force  is  so  small  and  the 
task  assigned  it  so  important  that  it  is  preferable  to 
leave  the  cavalry  intact  and  use  the  mounted  scouts 
to  assist  the  advance  guard.  The  advance  guard  com- 
mander needs  no  special  instructions ;  the  first  part  of 
the  march  promises  to  be  uneventful,  and,  should  the 
enemy  appear  towards  the  end  of  the  march,  any  nec- 
essary special  orders  may  be  given  more  intelligently 
at  that  time. 

The  advance  guard  will  set  the  pace  for  the  column, 
and  the  main  body  will  follow  it  at  600  yards — the 
usual  distance  for  a  command  and  conditions  such  as 
we  are  dealing  with.  The  absence  of  the  wagons 
makes  the  column  more  mobile  and  gives  Colonel  A 
greater  freedom  of  action.  The  value  of  this  may 
not  become  so  apparent  this  afternoon  as  later  on  in 
the  operations  of  the  detachment,  when  the  enemy  is 
in  close  contact. 

Colonel  A's  decision  is  to  march  at  once  to  the  vi- 
cinity of  118,  by  the  most  direct  route  via  Fort  Leav- 
enworth,  60  and  the  Barnes  road,  sending  all  the  cav- 
alry in  advance  to  get  information  of  the  enemy. 

At  1  p.  m.,  he  assembles  his  staff,  the  three  battal- 
ion commanders,  and  the  cavalry  commander,  and 
issues  the  following  verbal  orders: 

"Reliable  information  has  just  been  received  that  a  hostile 
force  of  infantry  and  cavalry  is  advancing  towards  Leavenworth 


AN  ADVANCE  91 

from  the   southwest,   and  probably  will  reach  the  line  of  the 
Big  Stranger  about  sii  miles  south  of  Easton  this  afternoon. 

"This  regiment,  reinforced  by  Troop  A  and  %  Troop  B,  1st 
Cavalry,  will  march  immediately  to  locate  and  delay  the  ene- 
my, while  the  remainder  of  our  brigade  completes  the  pontoon 
bridge. 

"All  the  cavalry,  under  Captain  A,  will  trot  ahead  and  de- 
termine the  enemy's  strength  and  position.  Roads  from  the 
west  through  186,  184  and  114  will  be  carefully  reconnoitered, 
and  a  patrol  will  be  sent  through  Easton.  In  advancing  to  the 
Big  Stranger,  the  east  and  west  roads  through  76,  96,  108,  128, 
132  and  154  will  be  watched. 

"Major  A,  with  two  companies  from  your  battalion,  you  will 
form  the  advance  guard  and  will  march  via  the  Fort  Leaven- 
worth — C — D — E — 14 — 60 — 56 — 44 — 46 — 106 — 128 — 126  road 
to  the  vicinity  of  124.  Fifteen  mounted  scouts  will  be  di- 
rected to  report  to  you. 

"The  main  body,  in  order  of  march,  2  companies  of  the  1st 
Battalion,  2d  Battalion,  3d  Battalion,  will  follow  the  advance 
guard  at  600  yards. 

"I  will  accompany  the  main  body." 

Additional  Requirement. 

State  the  dispositions  made  by  the  cavalry  comman- 
der, in  obedience  to  his  orders,  and  show  the  posi- 
tions of  all  elements  of  the  cavalry  an  hour  and  a  half 
after  starting,  on  the  supposition  that  the  enemy  is  not 
encountered. 

Solution. 

A  patrol  of  12  troopers,  under  an  officer,  is  sent 
via  Leavenworth  and  the  Lecompton  road.  At  134, 
the  officer  is  to  send  a  non-commissioned  officer  and  4 
troopers  to  reconnoiter  along  the  152 — 154 — 168 
road,  thence  south  and  west  of  the  Big  Stranger.  The 
officer  is  to  proceed  with  the  remainder  of  the  patrol, 


92         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

via  118  and  the  bridges  near  182,  to  the  west  of  the 
creek.  This  patrol  has  just  about  reached  134. 

Three  other  patrols  are  sent  out.  One,  of  a  non- 
commissioned officer  and  5  troopers,  to  proceed  via  the 
Barnes  road,  112  and  114  to  the  west  of  the  Big 
Stranger;  another,  of  a  non-commissioned  officer  and 
3  troopers,  to  go  via  the  Zimmerman  road,  100,  and 
90  to  the  vicinity  of  88,  where  it  is  to  remain  in  ob- 
servation until  nightfall ;  and  a  third,  of  one  non-com- 
missioned officer  and  4  troopers,  to  proceed  via  the 
Atchison  pike  and  reconnoiter  to  the  west  through 
Easton.  These  three  patrols  are  started  out  together 
under  command  of  an  officer  who  starts  them  on  their 
proper  roads;  the  Easton  patrol  being  sent  off  at  E, 
and  the  other  two  at  56.  The  patrol  sent  via  the 
Barnes  road  is  near  128,  the  one  on  the  Zimmerman 
road  is  between  96  and  the  cemetery  to  the  west,  and 
the  one  that  started  on  the  Atchison  pike  is  near  80. 

All  patrols  have  made  between  six  and  seven  miles 
per  hour,  but  the  main  body  of  the  cavalry  has  pro- 
ceeded more  slowly  to  permit  the  patrols  to  get  a  lead 
of  some  miles.  At  the  end  of  the  hour  and  a  half  it 
is  on  top  of  the  ridge  between  44  and  46.  What  is 
left  of  the  two  platoons  of  Troop  B  after  sending 
out  the  patrols  constitutes  the  advance  guard,  500 
yards  ahead  of  Troop  A.  One  small  patrol  from  this 
advance  guard  is  in  advance  on  the  48 — 108  road  near 
104,  and  another  is  on  the  106 — 128  road  about  half 
a  mile  southwest  of  106. 

COMMENTS. 

You  have  covered  the  essential  points  of  this  prob- 
lem if,  in  your  solution,  you  have  discovered  the  true 


AN  ADVANCE  93 

mission  of  the  cavalry  and  have  so  disposed  of  it  that 
it  may  work  most  efficiently  in  the  execution  of  that 
mission;  have  wisely  chosen  the  point  on  which  you 
are  to  march;  and,  in  your  choice  of  route  and  for- 
mation for  your  infantry,  have  duly  considered  the 
desirability  of  getting  it  to  its  destination  without  un- 
necessary fatigue. 

If  you  have  not  given  your  cavalry  the  task  of 
searching  out  the  position  and  strength  of  the  enemy, 
or  have  subordinated  this  task  to  some  other  duty, 
you  have  misconceived  its  mission  in  this  situation. 
Until  Colonel  A  knows  the  enemy's  line  of  advance  he 
is  groping  in  the  dark.  The  cavalry  can  give  its  en- 
tire attention  to  reconnaissance  and  yet  not  wholly 
neglect  covering  duties,  for  the  very  information  it 
secures  by  its  reconnaissance  will  serve  to  cover  the  in- 
fantry by  the  warning  it  gives  of  approaching  dan- 
ger. If  hostile  cavalry  is  encountered,  Colonel  A's 
cavalry,  in  all  probability,  will  have  to  fight  to  carry 
out  its  reconnaissance,  and  in  fighting  to  secure  in- 
formation, it  will  at  the  same  time  be  warding  off 
hostile  reconnaissance. 

You  may  have  formed  a  proper  conception  of  the 
cavalry's  mission,  and  yet  assigned  it  to  the  advance 
guard.  This  arrangement  is  open  to  objection,  for, 
should  the  advance  guard  commander  restrict  the 
operations  of  the  cavalry  to  nearby  reconnaissance,  as 
he  is  liable  to  do,  Colonel  A  will  have  to  interfere  or 
stand  idly  by  and  see  the  cavalry  robbed  of  its  inde- 
pendence— neither  of  which  he  will  wish  to  do. 

If  you  have  assigned  a  few  troopers  to  your  ad- 
vance guard,  no  serious  criticism  can  be  made  of  your 
action,  for  this,  as  well  as  the  precise  orders  you  may 


94         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

have  given  for  patrolling,  is  but  a  minor  matter  when 
compared  in  importance  with  employing  the  cavalry 
independently  and  ordering  it  to  find  the  enemy. 

In  view  of  the  information  furnished,  118  or  116 
appears  to  be  the  most  natural  point  for  the  infantry 
to  march  on,  but  some  other  point  near  Mount  Olivet 
may  do,  provided  your  dispositions  are  such  as  will 
stop  the  enemy  at  the  Big  Stranger  if  you  reach  that 
stream  ahead  of  him.  If  you  have  overlooked  the  val- 
ue of  this  stream  to  you  in  your  effort  to  delay  the 
enemy,  you  have  missed  one  of  the  important  points  in 
the  problem. 

If  you  have  selected  some  other  destination  than 
118,  your  route  for  the  infantry  may  not  be  the  same 
as  ours,  but  it  can  not  be  criticised  if  you  have  se- 
lected the  shortest  road,  and  have  not  taken  a  round- 
about route  because  of  some  fancied  tactical  advan- 
tage. It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  elaborate  pre- 
cautions, such  as  flank  guards,  are  wholly  unnecessary 
at  the  beginning  of  the  march,  although  some  special 
flank  protection  might  be  advisable  before  the  march 
is  ended.  If  so,  the  necessary  flank  detachments  can 
be  sent  out  at  that  time.  The  order  is  not  perfect  if  it 
does  not  follow  the  prescribed  form — information  in 
the  first  paragraph,  statement  of  your  intentions  in 
the  second,  tactical  dispositions  of  the  different  ele- 
ments of  your  command  in  succeeding  paragraphs  up 
to  the  last,  which  will  state  your  position.  As  the  field 
train  does  not  accompany  the  column,  nothing  is  said 
of  it  in  the  order.  It  will  be  strange  if  you  have  not 
inserted  in  those  paragraphs  of  the  order  which  refer 
to  the  cavalry  and  advance  guard,  much  that  amounts 
to  interference  with  your  subordinate  commanders. 


AN  ADVANCE  95 

It  is  suggested  that  you  carefully  revise  all  your  or- 
ders with  the  idea  of  eliminating  such  undesirable 
matter. 

The  additional  requirement  was  given  that  you 
might  test  your  knowledge  of  the  proper  leading  of 
cavalry.  If  you  have  sent  out  a  few  patrols  over 
carefully  chosen  routes  with  instructions  to  get  to  the 
west  of  the  Big  Stranger  and  find  the  enemy,  and 
have  kept  the  remainder  of  the  cavalry  together  in 
one  compact  column,  you  have  made  a  correct  disposi- 
tion of  the  cavalry,  and  it  matters  little  whether  you 
have  located  your  patrols  at  exactly  the  same  points  on 
the  map  as  have  we.  On  the  other  hand,  a  disposition 
that  widely  scatters  the  cavalry  in  numerous  small  de- 
tachments, and  fails  to  hold  the  bulk  of  it  together  on 
some  central  road,  is  faulty;  soon  or  late,  cavalry  on 
reconnaissance  will  have  to  fight,  and  it  should  always 
keep  the  bulk  of  its  strength  concentrated  in  anticipa- 
tion of  this  moment,  for  there  can  be  no  certainty 
about  your  ability  to  get  your  widely  scattered  de- 
tachments together  in  time.  In  concentration  there  is 
strength,  in  dispersion  weakness,  is  a  principle  that 
applies  not  alone  to  infantry,  but  to  cavalry  as  well. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

AN  ADVANCE  GUARD. 

SITUATION. 

(See  2  and  4-inch  maps). 

The  situation  is  the  continuation  of  that  given  in 
Chapter  V. 

The  1st  Infantry,  and  Troop  A,  2d  Cavalry,  part 
of  a  Blue  detachment  in  hostile  country,  which  is  at- 
tempting to  assemble  at  Leavenworth  by  rail  from 
the  north,  reached  Kickapoo  the  afternoon  of  July 
14,  and  took  quarters  there  for  the  night.  Companies 
A  and  B,  and  one  platoon  of  Troop  A  are  on  out- 
post for  the  night  on  the  line  L.  A.  Aaron — Plum 
hill.  During  the  night,  Colonel  A,  the  detachment 
commander,  received  the  following  telegram  from 
General  B  at  superior  headquarters : 

"It  appears  that  the  enemy  contemplates  moving  a  force  to 
Leavenworth  over  the  Missouri  Pacific  railroad  from  the  south. 
It  is  important  that  he  should  not  get  possession  of  Leaven- 
worth. Proceed  to  the  south  to-morrow  with  your  entire  com- 
mand, interrupt  the  railroads  to  the  south  of  Leavenworth,  es- 
pecially the  Missouri  Pacific,  and  endeavor  to  locate  any  hos- 
tile forces  advancing  from  the  south.  The  2d  Infantry  will 
reach  Kickapoo  some  time  July  16.  Detachments  from  the  3d 
Infantry  are  now  guarding  the  railroad  in  your  rear." 

In  compliance  with  this  order,  the  detachment  com- 
mander decides  to  march  south  early  on  the  morning 
of  July  15.  'Major  B  is  to  command  the  advance 
guard,  consisting  of  2  companies  of  his  battalion  (the 
2d)  and  the  cavalry.  His  infantry  is  to  start  from 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  97 

29  at  3:30  a.  m.,  and  follow  the  45— 17— H— G — 14 
— 66a  road.  His  cavalry  is  to  start  at  the  same  hour, 
being  joined  by  the  platoon  on  outpost  as  the  column 
passes  the  outpost  line.  The  cavalry  is  to  reconnoiter 
through  Fort  Leavenworth  and  Leavenworth,  and  is 
to  patrol  the  hills  along  the  line  of  march.  Colonel 
A  specially  desires  to  know  if  Leavenworth  is  still  un- 
occupied by  the  enemy,  and  Major  B  may  send  out  a 
cavalry  patrol  before  3 :30  a.  m.  to  obtain  that  infor- 
mation. The  main  body  is  to  follow  the  advance 
guard  at  600  yards.  The  field  train  is  to  remain  at 
Kickapoo.  Major  B  selects  Companies  E  and  F 
from  his  battalion  for  the  infantry  of  his  advance 
guard,  and  Colonel  A  gives  him  5  mounted  scouts. 
Required : 

Major  B's  estimate  of  the  situation  and  his  orders. 

SOLUTION  AND  DISCUSSION. 

In  discussing  the  orders  given  Major  B  in  Chap- 
ter V  (*)  it  was  pointed  out  that  he  need  not  be  told 
anything  of  the  duties  of  an  advance  guard  in  gen- 
eral, for  these,  as  well  as  the  general  principles  gov- 
erning the  formation  and  conduct  of  an  advance 
guard,  are  prescribed  in  the  Field  Service  Regula- 
tions, and  every  well  instructed  officer  is  supposed  to 
be  familiar  with  them.  But,  if  the  detachment  com- 
mander wishes  his  advance  guard  to  do  some  special 
task,  he  should  state  it  in  the  orders  given  its  com- 
mander. The  only  special  mission  given  Major  B  is 
the  cavalry  reconnaissance  that  he  is  directed  to  make 
along  both  sides  of  the  line  of  march,  through  Fort 
Leavenworth  and  Leavenworth,  and  to  the  south,  and 

*  See  page  76. 


98         TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

one  result  of  this  reconnaissance  specially  desired  at 
an  early  hour  is  information  as  to  the  situation  in 
Leavenworth,  for  on  this  may  depend  all  the  later 
operations  of  the  detachment.  So  we  find  no  difficul- 
ty in  determining  Major  B's  mission  from  the  orders 
given  him.  In  solving  a  map  problem,  it  is  well  at 
the  very  outset  to  obtain  a  clear  understanding  of  the 
mission  assigned  us  ( as  we  would  do  were  we  actually 
in  command  on  the  ground),  for  we  can  make  no  in- 
telligent plans  until  we  fully  comprehend  what  we 
are  expected  to  accomplish. 

An  advance  guard  commander's  task  naturally 
separates  into  two  parts — first,  making  the  prelimin- 
ary arrangements  for  the  march,  to  include  preparing 
and  issuing  the  orders;  and  second,  conducting  the 
advance  guard  after  the  march  begins.  The  first  is 
comparatively  simple,  although  care  must  be  taken 
to  start  all  parts  of  the  command  in  the  right  direc- 
tions and  with  proper  orders;  but  the  second  gener- 
ally furnishes  the  true  test  of  an  advance  guard  com- 
mander's ability.  We  will  examine  these  two  phases 
of  the  problem  in  the  order  named. 

To  avoid  a  repetition  of  much  that  was  said  in 
Chapter  V,  we  will  not  devote  much  time  to  the  con- 
sideration of  the  enemy.  Major  B's  analysis  of  this 
part  of  the  situation  probably  would  take  the  same 
form  as  Colonel  A's  and  lead  to  similar  conclusions, 
the  most  important  of  which  is  that,  although  the  ene- 
my was  not  in  Leavenworth  at  8  p.  m.,  he  may  reach 
there  at  any  moment.  The  arrangements  for  the 
march  should  be  made  on  this  supposition.  Without 
being  timid,  it  is  often  advisable  in  reaching  a  tactical 
decision  to  take  that  view  of  the  situation  least  f  avora- 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  99 

ble  to  yourself.  If  plans  made  on  that  supposition 
are  designed  to  be  successful,  they  certainly  will  be 
no  less  so  should  the  situation  turn  out  better  than  ex- 
pected. 

That  the  enemy  in  superior  force  should  arrive  at 
Leavenworth  to-night  and  advance  on  Kickapoo  to- 
morrow morning,  probably  is  the  most  unfavorable  of 
all  reasonable  views  of  the  situation  before  us.  Such 
an  advance  could  be  made  via  Fort  Leavenworth  (or 
Sheridan's  Drive)  and  the  Millwood  road,  but  it  is 
not  probable  he  would  take  this  roundabout  route 
through  the  thick  woods  while  he  has  the  more  direct 
and  open  route  available  via  14 — G — H — 17.  An 
advance  on  routes  to  the  west  of  the  one  last  men- 
tioned is  scarcely  to  be  expected.  If  Major  B  judi- 
ciously makes  his  plans  for  the  march,  on  the  suppo- 
sition that  the  enemy  may  be  encountered  between 
Leavenworth  and  Kickapoo  on  some  one  of  the  roads 
mentioned,  he  will  be  doing  no  more  than  reasonably 
is  to  be  expected  of  him,  and  should  it  turn  out  that 
the  enemy  has  not  reached  Leavenworth,  he  will  still 
have  proper  dispositions  for  the  further  execution  of 
the  mission  assigned  him. 

During  the  first  part  of  the  advance,  therefore,  the 
three  roads  above  mentioned  must  be  watched.  The 
orders  given  by  Colonel  A  prescribe  that  the  advance 
guard  infantry  will  follow  the  road  due  south  from 
Kickapoo,  but  arrangements  for  protection  on  the 
roads  to  the  east  are  left  to  the  judgment  of  Major 
B.  Sheridan's  Drive  is  more  than  a  mile,  and  the 
road  through  Fort  Leavenworth  is  more  than  two 
miles  from  the  main  line  of  advance.  Small  infan- 
try detachments  on  these  roads  would  be  dangerously 


far  from  support.  If  the  enemy  were  encountered  in 
force,  they  would  fail  to  accomplish  what  is  expected 
of  them,  and  in  all  probability  they  would  be  de- 
stroyed before  assistance  could  reach  them.  The  oc- 
casion rarely  or  never  arises  when  a  small  advance 
guard,  advancing  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  is  jus- 
tified in  dispersing  its  force  on  two  or  more  widely 
separated  roads.  On  the  contrary,  the  strength  of 
small  detachments  should  be  concentrated,  so  far  as 
possible,  in  one  column,  to  be  broken  up  only  when 
absolutely  necessary.  This  is  the  rule  of  concentra- 
tion of  forces  applied  to  a  command  on  the  march, 
and  as  we  proceed  through  this  book  we  will  find  that 
a  similar  principle  applies,  whatever  may  be  the  tac- 
tical situation.  Concentration  strengthens  a  com- 
mand, while  dispersion  weakens  it.  We  need  have 
little  fear  of  concentrating  our  force  in  too  small  a 
space  for  this  mistake  is  seldom  made,  but  we  should 
constantly  combat  the  tendency  to  disperse  our  com- 
mand., else  it  will  lead  us  into  more  errors  than  any 
other  tactical  sin. 

The  cavalry,  however,  is  well  suited  for  the  task  of 
covering  the  roads  east  of  the  line  of  march.  Not 
that  it  is  exempt  from  the  application  of  the  principle 
just  stated,  but  its  mobility  makes  its  safe  radius  of 
action  greater  than  that  of  infantry.  There  need  be 
no  hesitation  about  sending  it  over  these  roads,  for  if 
properly  handled  it  should  have  no  difficulty  about 
getting  beyond  danger  of  hostile  infantry,  and  effi- 
cient reconnaissance  in  its  front  should  prevent  its  be- 
ing cut  off  by  hostile  cavalry,  provided  it  does  not  go 
too  far  from  its  infantry  support.  So  this  becomes 
the  chief  mission  of  the  cavalry,  and,  in  accordance 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  101 

with  the  principles  mentioned  in  Chapter  V,  (*)  the 
detachments  made  from  the  troop  for  all  secondary 
purposes  should  be  as  small  as  possible;  our  attention 
and  our  efforts  should  be  centered  on  the  main  task 
and  not  diverted  from  it  by  minor  considerations. 
The  infantry  of  the  advance  guard  should  always 
be  preceded,  if  practicable  by  a  few  troopers  on  the 
main  line  of  march  to  give  early  warning  of  the  near 
presence  of  the  enemy  and  thereby  avoid  a  sur- 
prise or  ambush;  a  small  patrol  of  four  or  five 
men,  called  the  cavalry  point,  will  be  ample  for 
this  purpose.  Another  small  patrol  will  be  suffi- 
cient to  reconnoiter  the  hills  west  of  Leavenworth. 
The  patrol  sent  to  examine  Leavenworth  should  be 
stronger,  for  it  has  an  important  task,  but  it  can  also 
make  the  reconnaissance  to  the  south  after  it  has  dis- 
covered the  situation  in  the  town. 

Major  B  may  personally  give  these  patrols  their 
orders  and  send  them  out,  or  he  may  provide  for  this 
reconnaissance  in  his  orders  to  the  troop  commander 
and  permit  him  to  make  all  the  arrangements.  The 
latter  is  the  better  plan,  for  the  arrangements  made 
at  the  start  probably  will  have  to  be  modified  as  the 
march  progresses,  and  this  can  be  done  to  best  advan- 
tage by  the  cavalry  commander  who,  in  his  advanced 
position,  is  first  to  become  aware  of  changes  in  the 
situation.  In  any  case,  the  cavalry  point  is  under  the 
orders  of  the  officer  commanding  the  leading  element 
of  the  advance  guard. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  disposition  to  be  made  of 
the  infantry.  The  primary  duty  of  an  advance  guard 
is  to  secure  the  safe  and  uninterrupted  advance  of  the 

*  See  page  67. 


102       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

main  body.  If  hostile  patrols  or  other  comparatively 
weak  hostile  bodies  are  encountered,  they  must  be  un- 
hesitatingly driven  back,  else  the  march  of  the  main 
body  will  be  delayed.  If  the  enemy  is  encountered  in 
force,  he  must  be  held  off  long  enough  to  permit  the 
main  body  to  deploy.  This  protection  and  uninter- 
rupted march  of  the  entire  command  is  secured,  as  far 
as  is  possible,  by  dividing  the  advance  guard  into  re- 
serve and  support,  the  latter  sending  forward  an  ad- 
vance party  which  in  turn  is  preceded  by  a  point,  and 
separating  these  various  fractions  by  variable  distan- 
ces, usually  increasing  from  front  to  rear. 

There  can  be  no  fixed  rule  for  determining  the  pro- 
portionate strength  of  these  parts  of  the  advance 
guard,  as  they  will  vary  with  the  convenience  of  sub- 
division and  the  military  situation;  it  may  be  said, 
however,  that  the  reserve  will  usually  consist  of  from 
one-half  to  three-fourths  of  the  advance  guard.  These 
subdivisions  decrease  in  strength  toward  the  enemy, 
thus  placing  small  fractions,  that  can  be  quickly  de- 
ployed for  fighting,  in  the  positions  of  greatest  dan- 
ger; each  of  these  in  succession  should  secure  the  nec- 
essary delay  to  permit  the  next  larger  fraction  in  rear 
to  prepare  for  action. 

The  distance  which  separates  the  different  portions 
of  the  advance  guard  from  each  other,  and  the  ad- 
vance guard  from  the  main  body,  give  the  column 
great  elasticity  and  help  to  protect  its  different  ele- 
ments against  delay.  Were  troops  to  march  in  an  un- 
broken column,  any  check  to  the  head  of  the  column 
would  run  through  its  entire  length,  but  a  check  to 
the  head  of  an  advance  guard  is  not  immediately 
transmitted  to  the  main  body  of  the  command,  and 


AN  ADVANCE  GTJABD  103 

before  the  march  of  the  latter  is  affected  the  advance 
guard  may  push  back  what  has  been  opposing  it  and 
resume  the  march. 

The  distances  vary  with  the  size  of  the  force  and 
the  special  situation  of  each  case,  but  they  must  be 
large  enough  on  the  one  hand  to  protect  the  bodies  in 
rear  from  surprise,  and  small  enough  on  the  other 
hand  to  permit  the  bodies  in  front  to  be  supported. 
For  example,  Colonel  A  has  prescribed  600  yards  as 
the  distance  to  separate  the  head  of  the  main  body 
from  the  tail  of  the  advance  guard.  Now  from  the 
point  to  the  tail  of  the  advance  guard  the  distance 
should  be  such  that  the  total  distance  from  the  point 
of  the  advance  guard  to  the  head  of  the  main  body 
will  be  ample  to  protect  the  main  body  from  surprise,, 
as  well  as  to  allow  it  to  make  timely  deployment,  pro- 
vided the  advance  guard  properly  performs  the  duties 
of  reconnaissance  and  security.  These  distances  can- 
not be  worked  out  with  mathematical  accuracy,  nor 
will  they  always  conform  exactly  with  this  rule,  but 
this  is  the  principle  upon  which  they  are  based- 

Not  all  commands  need  have  both  a  reserve  and  a 
support  in  their  advance  guard;  small  bodies  can  be 
so  quickly  deployed  for  action  and  placed  under  cover 
that  they  do  not  require  so  much  warning  and  protec- 
tion as  larger  commands.  A  company  should  be  able 
to  deploy  for  action  in  less  than  a  minute,  and  may 
be  amply  protected  with  only  a  strong  point  in  its 
front;  a  battalion  may  gain  all  the  time  it  needs  for 
deployment,  if  preceded  by  nothing  more  than  an  ad- 
vance party  with  its  point ;  and  for  a  single  regiment, 
a  reserve  in  the  advance  guard  will  generally  be  un- 
necessary. 


104        TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

In  the  situation  before  us,  the  cavalry  should  dis- 
cover the  enemy  some  time  before  the  infantry  comes 
within  range,  so  we  need  not  fear  to  dispense  with  a 
reserve  in  the  advance  guard.  In  accordance  with  the 
principles  stated  above,  the  two  companies  will  be  di- 
vided between  the  advance  party  and  support,  with 
half  a  company  in  the  former,  and  a  company  and  a 
half  in  the  latter.  Tactical  unity  would  be  preserved 
by  placing  a  company  in  each,  but  this  would  unduly 
weaken  the  support  and  would  make  the  advance  par- 
ty unnecessarily  strong  for  its  advanced  and  danger- 
ous position. 

When  an  advance  guard  is  divided  into  reserve, 
support  and  advance  party,  an  officer  should  be  as- 
signed to  the  command  of  the  support  and  advance 
party  combined,  but  the  advance  guard  commander 
generally  will  retain  immediate  command  of  the  re- 
serve, to  insure  against  its  being  employed  contrary  to 
his  wishes.  Similarly,  when  the  advance  guard  has 
no  reserve,  the  commander  probably  will  assign  no 
separate  commander  to  the  support,  for  if  he  is  to  ex- 
ercise any  material  influence  on  a  critical  situation  he 
must  have  complete  control  over  a  part  of  his  com- 
mand. Accordingly  our  major  will  assign  a  captain 
to  the  command  of  the  advance  party  and  give  him  a 
lieutenant  to  assist  him,  and  will  assign  no  one  to 
command  the  support. 

The  decision  therefore  is:  To  advance  with  the  in- 
fantry in  one  column,  divided  into  advance  party  and 
support;  and  to  have  the  bulk  of  the  cavalry  observe 
the  roads  and  country  towards  Fort  Leavenworth  and 
along  Sheridan's  Drive,  while  making  all  secondary 
reconnaissance  with  small  patrols. 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  105 

Major  B  received  his  orders  at  10:30  p.  m.,  and  has 
time  to  estimate  the  situation  with  deliberation.  Still, 
he  probably  will  reach  his  decision  before  11  p.  m. 
The  cavalry  commander  should  be  given  his  orders  at 
once,  for  his  task  is  one  which  he  may  wish  to  consider 
to-night,  and  at  least  one  patrol  (the  one  going  to 
Leaven  worth)  will  be  started  before  the  remainder  of 
the  command.  When  he  has  reported,  Major  B  gives 
him  the  following  order: 

"The  commanding  officer  has  just  received  a  telegram  from 
General  B  stating  that  the  enemy  is  expected  to  move  a  force 
to  Leavenworth  via  the  Missouri  Pacific  railroad,  and  ordering 
the  command  to  advance  to-morrow  morning  to  interrupt  the 
railroads  entering  Leavenworth  from  the  south,  and  locate  any 
hostile  forces  that  may  be  advancing.  The  3d  Infantry  is  now 
guarding  the  railroad  in  our  rear,  and  the  2d  Infantry  will 
reach  here  day  after  to-morrow. 

"Companies  E  and  F  and  your  troop,  under  my  command, 
will  form  the  advance  guard.  We  will  move  provisionally  on 
Leavenworth. 

"The  advance  guard  infantry  will  start  from  29  at  3:30  a. 
m.  and  follow  the  47 — 17 — H — G — 14  road.  The  main  body 
will  follow  it  at  600  yards. 

"You  will  start  with  your  troop  at  the  same  hour  and  trot 
ahead  of  the  infantry.  With  the  bulk  of  your  force,  examine 
the  roads  and  country  east  of  the  line  of  march  and  protect 
the  left  flank  of  the  column  against  attacks  from  that  direction; 
and  with  patrols,  watch  the  hill  country  west  of  Leavenworth 
and  reconnoiter  to  the  south  of  that  town.  Get  me  information 
of  the  situation  in  Leavenworth  by  the  time  the  advance  guard 
reaches  14,  sending  out  a  patrol  for  that  purpose  whenever  nec- 
essary. Have  a  non-commissioned  officer  and  four  men  report  to 
me  for  a  cavalry  point.  The  platoon  now  on  outpost  will  join 
you  as  you  pass  the  outpost  position. 

"The  field  train  is  to  remain  here  provisionally. 

"I  will  be  with  the  support." 


106       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

In  this  order,  we  see  the  measures  taken  by  Major 
B  to  carry  out  the  instructions  he  received  from  Col- 
onel A  concerning  the  employment  of  the  cavalry  (*) 
and  we  may  judge  whether  they  are  adequate.  The 
cavalry  commander  is  given  all  reasonable  freedom 
of  action.  Specifying  the  task  to  be  performed  by 
the  bulk  of  the  cavalry  is  in  no  sense  an  interference 
in  its  tactical  employment.  If  Major  B's  plan  con- 
templates protecting  the  left  flank  of  the  column  with 
his  cavalry,  the  cavalry  commander  should  be  told  this 
in  unmistakable  language,  especially  if  cavalry  and 
infantry  of  the  advance  guard  are  to  cooperate  to  the 
best  advantage  in  protecting  the  column  during  its 
march.  We  could  not  have  criticized  Major  B  had  he 
even  specified  the  road  to  be  taken  by  the  main  body 
of  the  troop,  but  he  probably  followed  the  wiser  course 
in  leaving  the  cavalry  commander  free  to  select  his 
own  route. 

At  3  a.  m.,  our  major  assembles  all  of  the  officers 
of  the  advance  guard,  excepting  those  of  the  cavalry 
troop,  and  gives  them  the  following  verbal  orders: 

"A  telegram  was  received  last  night,  stating  that  a  move 
ment  of  the  enemy  over  the  Missouri  Pacific  railroad  to  Leav- 
enworth  is  expected,  and  General  B  has  ordered  the  regiment 
to  advance  this  morning  to  interrupt  the  railroads  south  of 
Leavenworth  and  locate  any  hostile  forces  advancing  from  the 
south.  The  2d  Infantry  will  reach  here  to-morrow,  and  the 
3d  Infantry  is  now  guarding  the  railroad  in  our  rear. 

"Companies  E  and  F  and  Troop  A  will  form  the  advance 
guard  under  my  command,  and  will  march  provisionally  on  Leav- 
enworth. 

"The  cavalry  will  cover  the  left  flank  of  the  column,  and  rec- 
onnoiter  west  and  south  of  Leavenworth.  It  is  expected  to  get 

*  See  page  74. 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  107 

us  information  of  the  situation  in  Leavenworth  by  the  time  the 
advance  guard  reaches  14. 

"Captain  E,  one  platoon  of  your  company  (E)  will  form 
the  advance  party  under  your  command.  Start  from  29  at 
3:30  a.  m.,  and  follow  the  47 — 17 — H — G — 14  road.  A  non- 
commissioned officer  and  4  troopers  will  be  sent  to  you  for  a 
cavalry  point. 

"The  remaining  company  and  a  half  will  form  the  support 
and  follow  the  advance  party  at  400  yards,  with  the  other  pla- 
toon of  Company  E  in  the  lead.  The  main  body  of  the  regi- 
ment is  to  follow  the  support  at  600  yards. 

"The  field  train  is  to  wait  further  orders  at  Kickapoo.  Have 
your  wagons  join  it  here  before  4:30  a.  m. 

"I  will  be  with  the  support." 

By  stating  that  the  command  is  to  march  provision- 
ally on  Leavenworth,  all  the  officers  are  given  to  un- 
derstand that  the  further  progress  of  the  march  will 
depend  on  the  situation  in  that  town.  They  are  told 
enough  of  the  movements  of  the  cavalry  to  assure 
them  that  it  is  to  furnish  protection  on  the  left  flank, 
and  reconnoiter  in  other  directions.  Captain  E  is  told 
nothing  of  the  way  in  which  he  is  to  conduct  the  ad- 
vance party,  for  that  is  his  task  and  he  should  be  per- 
mitted to  do  it  in  his  own  way;  for  reasons  already 
mentioned,  no  commander  is  designated  for  the  sup- 
port. 

Had  Major  A  prepared  a  combined  written  order, 
it  would  have  appeared  as  follows: 

Field  Orders  Advance  Guard,  1st  Infantry, 

No.  1  Kickapoo,  Kansas, 

Troops  14  July-,  11:00  P.M. 

(a)     Advance   Cavalry:  1.     A    movement    of    the    enemy 

Captain  A.  to    LEAVENWORTH    over   the 

Tr.  A,  2d  Cav  (less  1  n.  MISSOURI    PACIFIC    railroad 

c.  o.  and  4  troopers),  is   anticipated   at   superior   head- 


108        TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

(b)  Advance  Party:  quarters.      Parts    of   the   3d    In- 

Captain  E.  fantry     are     now     guarding    the 

Co.  E,  1st  Inf.  (less  1  railroad  in  our  rear,  and  the  2d 
plat.)  1  n.  c.  o.  &  4  Infantry  will  reach  here  July  16. 
troopers,  Tr.  A,  2d  Cav.  In  compliance  with  telegraphic 

orders    from   General   B   our  en- 

(c)  Support — in  order  of  .       . 

tire    command    advances    to-mor- 
march: 

_    .        row  to  interrupt  the  railroads  en- 
1  plat.  Co.  E,  1st  Inf.  »OTVTwr/\»»ms     t 

terms    LEAVE NWORTH    from 
Co.  F,  1st  Inf. 

the  south,  and  locate  any  advan- 
cing hostile  forces.  The  main  body  will  follow  the  advance 
guard  at  600  yards. 

2.  The  advance  guard  will  march  provisionally  on  LEAV- 
EN WORTH. 

3.  (a)     The  advance  cavalry  will  start  from  29  at  3:30  a. 
m.      The  main  part  of  the  troop  will  examine  the  roads   and 
country  east  of  the  line  of  march  and  protect  the  left  flank  of 
the   column   against   attack   from   that   direction,   while   patrols 
reconnoiter  south  and  west  of  LEAVENWORTH.      Informa- 
tion of  the  situation  in  LEAVENWORTH  will  be   furnished 
the  advance  guard  commander  before  the  head  of  the  column 
passes   14.     The  outpost  cavalry  will  join  as  the  advance  cav- 
alry passes  the  outpost  position. 

(b)  The  advance  party  will  start  from  29  at  3:30  a.  m.  and 
follow  the  47 — 17 — H — G — 14  road. 

(c)  The  support  will  follow  the  advance  party  at  400  yards. 

4.  The  field  train  is  to  assemble  ready  to  march  at  4:30  a. 
m.,  and  remain  here  awaiting  further  orders.     The  wagons  of 
the  advance  guard  will  join  it  before  that  hour. 

5.  I  will  be  with  the  support. 

B. 
Major,  1st  Inf.  Commanding. 

Copies  to  Captains  A,  E  and  F,  battalion  staff,  and  Colonel 
A. 

With  the  issuance  of  his  orders,  Major  B  completes 
the  more  important  of  the  preliminary  arrangements 
for  the  march,  and  the  actual  leading  of  the  advance 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  109 

guard  begins  when  the  column  takes  the  road.  With- 
out going  into  too  great  detail,  we  may  get  some  idea 
of  this  leading  by  examining  the  positions  of  all  frac- 
tions of  the  command  an  hour  after  it  starts,  on  the 
supposition  that  the  enemy  is  not  encountered. 

This  brings  us  to  a  consideration  of  the  marching 
rates  of  troops  in  campaign,  the  frequency  of  halts, 
and  the  road  spaces  occupied  by  troops,  with  all  of 
which  we  should  be  familiar.  These  matters  are  very 
fully  discussed  in  the  Field  Service  Regulations  (*) 
and  we  will  not  devote  much  time  to  them  here.  A 
small  infantry  command  such  as  we  are  dealing  with, 
will  make  three  miles  per  hour,  or  88  yards  per  min- 
ute, while  marching.,  provided  the  conditions  are  fav- 
orable; if  we  include  a  ten  minute  halt  every  hour  in 
our  calculations,  the  rate  will  be  2%  miles  per  hour. 
In  actual  practice,  all  these  calculations  are  influenced 
by  many  conditions  which  it  is  impracticable  to  con- 
sider when  solving  problems  on  the  map,  and  unless 
something  is  said  to  the  contrary,  2%  miles  per  hour, 
including  halts  will  be  the  marching  rate  used  for  in- 
fantry throughout  this  book. 

Nor  can  there  be  any  rigid  rule  as  to  the  length  and 
frequency  of  halts.  If  the  march  is  to  be  short  (say 
6  to  8  miles),  or  if  tactical  considerations  make  con- 
serving the  energy  of  the  troops  a  matter  of  secon- 
dary consideration,  the  halts  may  be  few  and  short, 
or  even  completely  eliminated.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
there  is  no  necessity  for  haste,  the  march  is  to  be  a  long 
one,  the  roads  are  heavy,  or  the  weather  is  hot,  the 

*  See  Chapter  on  Marches,  F.  8.  B.  Bead  also  what  General  Griep- 
enkerl  says  on  this  subject  in  his  Second  Letter  in  Letters  on  Applied 
Tactics. 


110       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

halts  may  be  more  frequent  and  longer.  Ordinarily, 
there  will  be  a  halt  of  15  minutes  during  the  first 
hour,  and  one  of  10  minutes  every  hour  thereafter. 

We  will  assume  that  Major  B's  advance  guard 
marched  for  forty-five  minutes  and  then  rested  for 
fifteen  minutes.  At  the  end  of  the  first  hour,  it  is 
ready  to  resume  the  march  with  its  different  frac- 
tions occuping  positions  as  follows  (see  4-inch 
map)  (*) : 

The  infantry  point  ( a  non-commissioned  officer  and 
7  men)  is  3960  yards  (88  x  45),  or  VA  miles  from  29. 
This  puts  it  at  the  Taylor  house,  Vz  mile  south  of  17, 
on  high  ground  where  it  can  observe  towards  the  ene- 
my during  the  halt.  The  advance  party  is  300  yards 
in  rear  of  the  point,  where  the  lane  from  the  Moss 
house  enters  the  main  road ;  in  this  position,  it  has  been 
perfectly  covered  from  view  from  the  south  by  the 
spur  running  from  the  Moss  to  the  Taylor  house; 
two  flanking  groups  of  3  men  each  that  were  sent 
out  when  the  advance  party  passed  17,  halted  when 
they  saw  the  advance  party  halt  and  remained  in  ob- 
servation during  the  fifteen  minutes  the  command  was 
resting — one  on  the  900  foot  hill  400  yards  northwest 
of  the  Moss  house,  and  the  other  on  the  hill-side  about 
400  yards  east  of  the  advance  party. 

The  support  is  in  the  northwest  angle  of  the  cross- 
roads at  17.  It  is  more  than  the  prescribed  400  yards 
in  rear  of  the  advance  party,  but  it  was  stopped  here 
to  take  advantage  of  the  cover  of  the  small  ravine 
running  north  from  17.  A  patrol  of  8  men  is  on  the 
road  about  400  yards  east  of  17  in  observation,  and 

*  It  will  be  found  of  great  assistance  to  mark  the  positions  of  the 
troops  on  the  map  with  pins,  or  with  light  pencil  marks. 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  111 

another  patrol  of  4  men  is  at  Taylor  school  house 
(Taylor  S.  H.  on  the  map)  watching  towards  the 
west.  Four  connecting  files,  working  in  pairs,  are  on 
the  road  between  the  advance  party  and  the  support, 
and  six  are  between  the  support  and  main  body. 
These  numbers  might  be  reduced  to  two  and  four  re- 
spectively, but  the  work  of  connecting  files  is  not  fa- 
tiguing and  it  is  better  to  have  too  many  than  not 
enough. 

When  the  signal  to  halt  was  passed  along  the  col- 
umn by  the  connecting  files,  the  head  of  the  main  body 
was  in  front  of  the  J.  Aaron  house  south  of  Plum 
creek  bridge,  and  its  tail  was  still  300  yards  north  of 
the  bridge  (*).  Six  companies  rested  south  of  the 
creek,  and  1  battalion  rested  just  north  of  the  bridge. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  distribution  of  the  cavalry. 
At  3  a.  m.,  Captain  A  (the  cavalry  commander) 
started  a  patrol  of  8  troopers  to  Leavenworth  to  make 
a  report  of  the  situation  there,  and  then  to  reconnoiter 
to  the  south  of  the  town.  At  4:30  a.  m.,  it  has  just 
reached  the  Union  depot  in  Leavenworth,  having  cov- 
ered the  7l/2  miles  in  lH  hours  without  seeing  any- 
thing of  the  enemy,  (t)  At  3:30  a.  m.,  the  remain- 
der of  the  troop  started  from  Kickapoo,  with  the  re- 
mainder of  the  platoon  from  which  the  Leavenworth 
patrol  was  taken,  400  yards  in  front  as  an  advance 
guard.  At  17,  a  patrol  of  6  troopers  was  sent  from 
the  main  body  of  the  cavalry  to  the  south  to  recon- 
noiter the  woods  and  roads  in  the  hills  west  of  Leav- 

*  There  are  2  battalions  and  2  companies  in  the  main  body,  occu- 
pying a  road  space  of  about  700  yards. 

f  Alternating  the  trot  and  walk  the  marching  rate  of  cavalry  is 
about  5  miles  per  hour.  At  a  walk  it  is  about  3*4  to  3^  miles 
per  hour,  including  halts. 


112       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

enworth  and  protect  the  column  from  surprise  in  that 
direction;  and  it  is  now  (4:30  a.  m.)  in  the  vicinity 
of  22.  Another  patrol  (of  4  troopers) ,  also  from  the 
main  body,  was  sent  east  from  17  to  follow  the  15 — 
11 — 9 — 5  road  and  reconnoiter  through  Fort  Leaven- 
worth,  and  is  now  examining  the  streets  of  the  fort. 
The  remainder  of  the  troop  moved  east  at  17  and  fol- 
lowed the  roads  and  trails  (via  15  and  11 )  to  Hancock 
hill,  and  thence  along  Sheridan's  Drive  to  the  south. 
At  4:30  a.  m.,  the  troop  is  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile 
south  of  Wagner  point  where  the  trail  and  drive 
unite,  and  Captain  A  has  a  good  view  to  the  south  and 
west.  Here,  the  troop  makes  its  first  halt  after  march- 
ing 5  miles  in  one  hour.  The  captain  would  have 
halted  some  minutes  earlier  had  the  map  not  shown 
this  as  a  good  point  from  which  to  observe  the  roads 
about  Leavenworth.  While  halted,  the  advance  guard 
is  at  D,  and  4  troopers  are  observing  from  the  spur 
just  north-west  of  E. 

The  cavalry  point,  under  the  orders  of  the  com- 
mander of  the  advance  party,  trotted  ahead  of  the  in- 
fantry and  is  at  G  examining  the  road  to  F  before 
moving  up  the  hill  towards  16. 

Ten  minutes  before  the  column  resumes  its  march, 
two  patrols  of  5  men  each  are  sent  forward  from  the 
advance  party  to  gain  Sentinel  hill  and  Eleven  Hun- 
dred Foot  hill.  They  remain  together  on  the  road 
until  they  reach  the  stream  between  the  Burns  and 
Dolman  houses.  The  patrol  going  to  Sentinel  hill 
follows  down  this  stream  and  climbs  the  hill  through, 
the  woods  on  its  northern  spur.  It  will  rejoin  the  ad- 
vance party  as  it  passes  G.  The  other  patrol  probably 
will  gain  the  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  where  it  crosses 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  113 

Salt  creek,  follow  the  railroad  to  the  base  of  Eleven 
Hundred  Foot  hill,  and  ascend  the  hill  through  the 
woods.  At  4:30  a.  m.,  these  two  patrols  are  just 
about  to  separate  where  the  road  crosses  the  stream 
near  the  Burns  house. 

The  drill  ground  methods  for  forming  and  con- 
ducting an  advance  guard  are  liable  to  be  misleading 
when  troops  are  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy.  On  the 
open  and  level  parade  ground  it  is  an  easy  matter  to 
send  out  flankers  to  a  prescribed  distance  and  have 
them  march  parallel  to  and  abreast  of  the  advance 
party,  support  or  reserve.  But,  should  we  find  such 
ground  when  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy,  it  would 
be  folly  to  keep  flankers  out  a  uniform  distance  from 
the  column,  for  they  could  see  nothing  of  importance 
that  cannot  be  seen  from  the  column  itself.  On  the 
varied  terrain  along  the  line  of  march  of  troops  in 
campaign,  such  a  formation  generally  is  impracti- 
cable or  poorly  suited  to  the  purpose  in  view.  The 
topography  of  the  country  seldom  is  such  as  to  make 
this  use  of  flankers  consistent  with  securing  proper 
reconnaissance  in  the  least  fatiguing  way. 

Flankers  off  the  road  cannot  be  expected  long  to 
maintain  the  same  marching  rate  as  the  column  on 
the  road,  especially  as  their  duties  require  a  certain 
amount  of  caution  in  their  movements.  Floundering 
over  plowed  ground  or  through  standing  grain,  climb- 
ing fences  and  jumping  ditches  soon  exhaust  men 
weighed  down  with  gun  and  pack,  and  unless  they  are 
frequently  relieved  by  fresh  men,  the  column  will  be 
delayed  or  reconnaissance  neglected.  Accordingly, 
observation  on  the  flanks  of  the  column  should  gener- 
ally be  made  by  patrols  sent  out  from  time  to  time 


114       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

with  instructions  to  perform  a  definite  task  and  then 
rejoin  the  column;  it  will  seldom  or  never  be  advisa- 
ble to  have  the  same  groups  perform  the  duties  of 
flankers  throughout  the  entire  march.  In  the  pres- 
ence of  the  enemy,  other  considerations  than  beauty 
and  regularity  of  formation  control.  We  are  then 
seeking  protection  against  the  enemy  and  the  un- 
interrupted march  of  the  main  body,  and  that  forma- 
tion is  best  which  secures  these  objects  with  least  fa- 
tigue to  the  command,  although  it  may  differ  from 
the  typical  or  normal  formation  we  have  seen  pic- 
tured in  books. 

In  this  way,  an  advance  guard  is  conducted  through 
the  successive  stages  of  its  journey,  and,  even  be- 
fore the  enemy's  whereabouts  are  known,  constant 
supervision  of  the  march  is  required  of  the  higher 
leaders.  But  the  real  task  of  the  advance  guard  com- 
mander begins  when  the  enemy  is  encountered,  for, 
while  the  general  purpose  of  an  advance  guard  is 
always  the  same,  the  special  manner  in  which  it  should 
be  handled  when  confronted  by  the  enemy  will  vary 
with  the  situation.  One  general  rule  can  be  given  for 
our  guidance:  An  advance  guard  should  be  so  con- 
ducted as  to  contribute  most  to  the  success  of  the  main 
body  following  it. 

When  the  enemy  is  first  met,  his  strength  generally 
will  be  unknown,  and  developing  it  without  involving 
the  entire  advance  guard  in  a  fight  is  often  very  dif- 
ficult. Should  it  appear  that  only  a  small  party  is 
blocking  the  way,  it  generally  should  be  unhesitating- 
ly attacked  and  driven  in,  else  the  advance  guard  com- 
mander will  find  himself  in  the  ridiculous  situation  of 
permitting  a  handful  of  men  to  stop  the  march  of  an 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  115 

entire  column.  This  requires  boldness  and  aggressive- 
ness on  the  part  of  the  leading  elements  of  the  ad- 
vance guard,  and  service  with  the  point  and  advance 
party  consequently  is  very  hazardous.  But  war  is 
largely  a  matter  of  calculating  and  heartless  equiva- 
lents. The  sacrifice  of  half  a  dozen  men  of  the  point 
of  an  advance  guard  matters  little,  if  it  secure  the 
steady  forward  march  of  some  thousands  of  men  in 
the  rear  who  are  advancing  for  the  accomplishment 
of  some  important  mission. 

What  should  be  done  if  the  enemy  is  encountered 
in  force,  is  not  so  easily  answered,  and  a  definite  an- 
swer is  not  at  all  possible  without  knowing  the  par- 
ticular circumstances  at  that  moment.  In  one  situ- 
ation, the  advance  guard  may  properly  assume  a  vig- 
orous offensive ;  in  another,  it  may  at  once  occupy  the 
most  favorable  ground  in  the  vicinity  for  defense; 
and  in  still  another,  it  may  fall  back  on  the  main  body. 
Of  one  thing  we  may  be  sure:  whatever  the  decision 
of  the  advance  guard  commander,  he  must  be  guided 
in  reaching  it  by  consideration  for  the  main  body. 
Any  independent  action  by  an  advance  guard  com- 
mander most  probably  will  seriously  embarrass  the 
higher  commander,  if  such  action  is  not  strictly  in  ac- 
cord with  his  plans  and  intentions. 

We  do  not  have  to  search  far  to  find  the  reason  for 
this.  An  advance  guard  is  not  an  independent  com- 
mand. It  constitutes  but  one  element  of  a  fighting 
force,  the  remaining  element  of  which  is  the  main 
body  in  its  rear,  and  the  duty  and  responsibility  of 
deciding  how,  when,  and  where  this  force  shall  fight 
rests  on  its  commander.  If  the  advance  guard  com- 
mander engages  in  an  enterprise  that  forces  on  the 


116       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

higher  commander  a  line  of  action  he  never  contem- 
plated, supreme  authority  passes  into  bunds  that  are 
not  intended  to  possess  it.  In  such  a  situation,  there 
is  great  danger  that  the  main  hody,  hastening  to  the 
assistance  of  the  advance  guard,  instead  of  fighting 
as  a  unit  will  be  thrown  into  the  fight  by  driblets  to 
reinforce  hard  pressed  points  of  the  line.  Thus  the 
commander  may  see  his  whole  force  beaten  in  detail 
while  he  is  unable  to  prevent  it,  all  because  of  the  pre- 
cipitate action  of  the  advance  guard  commander. 

We  see  therefore,  that  it  is  of  the  utmost  import- 
ance that  the  advance  guard  commander  should  know 
the  intentions  of  the  commander  of  the  whole  force. 
Even  so,  the  superior  commander  can  do  no  more  than 
state  his  general  plan  and  intentions,  in  harmony  with 
which  the  advance  guard  must  operate.  Without  be- 
ing a  clairvoyant,  he  cannot  state  the  specific  action  to 
be  taken  by  the  advance  guard  in  any  particular  situa- 
tion, and  for  this  reason,  he  usually  rides  with  the  ad- 
vance guard  when  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  that 
he  may  quickly  communicate  with  the  advance  guard 
commander  in  such  emergencies.  Even  if  his  duties 
should  take  him  elsewhere,  he  probably  would  join 
the  advance  guard  the  moment  that  firing  or  mes- 
sages indicate  that  it  has  met  the  enemy  in  some  force. 
If  the  advance  guard  commander  shows  good  judg- 
ment in  developing  the  enemy's  strength,  before  com- 
mitting his  advance  guard  to  a  serious  fight,  he  should 
have  no  difficulty  in  learning  the  superior  command- 
er's wishes  in  ample  time  to  make  his  own  actions  con- 
form to  them. 

The  above  principles  may  be  applied  to  the  follow- 
ing situations : 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  117 

First: — As  the  point  of  the  advance  guard  is  cross- 
ing the  railroad  at  G  it  is  fired  on  from  the  northern 
end  of  the  cut  in  the  road  at  16. 

Second : — The  steps  taken  to  determine  the  strength 
of  the  enemy  at  16  resulted,  in  less  than  15  minutes, 
in  developing  a  firing  line  from  Atchison  hill  to  the 
spur  northwest  of  16;  at  the  same  time,  a  message  is 
received  from  the  cavalry  troop  saying  it  was  falling 
back  towards  Sheridan's  Drive  before  superior  cav- 
alry, and  that  about  2  regiments  of  hostile  infantry 
were  moving  towards  Kickapoo  from  Leavenworth 
on  the  70 — 72 — 14  road  with  the  support  of  their  ad- 
vance guard  at  14  (the  message  was  dated  15  min- 
utes ago). 

Required: — Major  B's  action  in  each  situation,  un- 
der the  supposition  that  Colonel  A  is  temporarily  ab- 
sent. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
AN  ADVANCE  GUARD. 

PROBLEM. 

(See  2-inch  map). 

The  situation  is  the  continuation  of  that  stated  in 
Chapter  VI. 

August  1,  an  advance  brigade  of  a  Blue  division 
is  preparing  to  build  a  pontoon  bridge  across  the  Mis- 
souri river,  about  1/4  miles  south  of  Weston.  The 
1st  Infantry  and  a  troop  and  a  half  of  the  1st  Cav- 
alry have  been  ferried  across  the  river,  and  are  as- 
sembled on  the  west  bank,  a  little  more  than  a  mile 
northeast  of  the  polo  field. 

Reliable  information  having  been  received  that  a 
hostile  force  of  infantry  and  cavalry  is  advancing  to- 
wards Leavenworth  from  the  southwest,  and  proba- 
bly will  reach  the  line  of  the  Big  Stranger  about  six 
miles  south  of  Easton  this  afternoon,  this  detachment 
has  been  given  orders  to  march  to  the  west  and  locate 
and  delay  the  enemy,  while  the  pontoon  bridge  is  be- 
ing constructed. 

At  1  p.  m.,  Colonel  A,  the  detachment  commander, 
gives  his  orders  for  the  march.  The  cavalry  is  to  trot 
ahead  and  determine  the  enemy's  strength  and  posi- 
tion; it  is  to  send  a  patrol  through  Easton,  is  to  rec- 
onnoiter  the  roads  from  the  west  through  186,  184 
and  114,  and  is  to  observe  the  east  and  west  roads 
through  76,  96,  108,  128,  132  and  154. 

Major  A,  with  2  companies  from  his  battalion,  and 


AN  ADVANCE  GTJABD  119 

15  mounted  scouts,  is  to  form  the  advance  guard, 
and  is  to  march  at  once  via  the  Fort  Leavenworth — 
C  —  D  — E— 14— 60— 56— 44— 46 — 106—128—126 
road,  to  the  vicinity  of  124.  The  main  body  is  to  fol- 
low the  advance  guard  at  600  yards. 
Required : 

Major  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

His  orders. 

SOLUTION. 

Unless  Major  A  delays  the  march  of  the  column, 
which  of  course  he  should  not  do,  he  will  have  little 
opportunity  to  deliberate  on  the  situation  before  start- 
ing the  advance  guard  on  its  way.  The  solution  will 
be  found  most  instructive  if  it  follows  the  same  se- 
quence as  Major  A's  thoughts  and  actions. 

His  first  concern  should  be  to  begin  the  march  in 
an  orderly  manner  with  the  least  possible  delay.  To 
do  this,  he  has  only  to  decide  upon  the  subdivisions  of 
the  advance  guard,  and  the  distances  that  will  separ- 
ate them,  and  issue  a  very  short  order.  An  advance 
guard  of  two  companies,  for  a  single  regiment  with 
independent  cavalry  in  its  front,  has  no  need  of  a  re- 
serve. Probably  the  best  division  of  the  two  compan- 
ies, between  support  and  advance  party,  will  be  to 
place  one-half  of  one  company  under  its  captain  in 
the  advance  party,  and  the  other  company  and  a  half 
in  the  support,  separating  the  two  by  a  distance  of 
400  yards. 

Having  decided  on  this,  the  Major  issues  the  fol- 
lowing order  to  his  staff  and  the  officers  of  the  two 
companies : 

"It  is  reliably  reported  that  hostile  infantry  and  cavalry  are 
marching  on  Leavenworth  from  the  west,  and  probably  will 


120       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

reach  the  Big  Stranger  about  six  miles  south  of  Easton  this 
afternoon.  Our  regiment  and  a  troop  and  a  half  of  the  1st 
Cavalry  are  to  march  at  once  to  the  west,  to  locate  and  delay 
the  enemy,  while  the  pontoon  bridge  is  being  completed.  The 
cavalry  is  to  trot  ahead  and  it  will  watch  the  principal  roads 
leading  towards  the  enemy. 

"Companies  A  and  B  and  fifteen  mounted  scouts  will  form 
the  advance  guard,  under  my  command. 

"Captain  A,  one  platoon  of  your  company  will  form  the 
advance  party  under  your  command,  and  will  move  out  at  once 
via  this  wood  trail  and  the  road  to  Fort  Leavenworth;  from 
Fort  Leavenworth  you  will  follow  the  C — B — E — 14 — 60 — 56 — 
44 — 46 — 106 — 128 — 126  road. 

"The  other  half  of  your  company  and  Company  B,  march- 
ing in  the  order  named,  will  form  the  support  and  follow  you 
at  400  yards.  The  main  body  will  follow  the  support  at  600 
yards. 

"I  will  join  you  as  soon  as  the  support  starts." 

Major  A  may  now  reflect  upon  the  situation.  Since 
it  is  only  probable  the  enemy  will  reach  the  line  of  the 
Big  Stranger  this  afternoon,  and  the  detachment  is  to 
march  only  to  the  vicinity  of  124,  it  is  not  at  all  likely 
that  the  hostile  infantry  will  be  encountered  during 
the  march.  It  is  otherwise,  however,  with  respect  to 
the  hostile  cavalry.  It  is  perfectly  possible  for  it  to 
appear  suddenly  at  any  moment,  although  timely 
warning  of  its  near  presence  should  be  given  by  the 
Blue  independent  cavalry.  Even  the  hostile  infantry 
may  be  nearer  than  our  information  leads  us  to  think. 
So  it  appears  that  Major  A  cannot  be  certain  that  his 
advance  guard  will  complete  the  march  without  com- 
ing in  contact  with  hostile  cavalry,  although  the  prob- 
ability of  .encountering  hostile  infantry  is  remote. 

Although  Colonel  A  has  properly  made  the  inde- 
pendent cavalry  responsible  for  the  general  recon- 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  121 

naissance  towards  the  enemy,  yet  Major  A  must  not, 
on  that  account,  neglect  to  reconnoiter  the  country 
near  the  line  of  march.  He  is  responsible  for  the  im- 
mediate protection  of  the  main  body.  The  mounted 
scouts  may  well  be  used  to  assist  in  this  limited  rec- 
onnaissance, but  they  should  not  be  sent  out  to  rec- 
onnoiter points  that  can  be  reconnoitered  equally  well 
by  dismounted  patrols. 

The  advance  party  should  send  out  such  dismount- 
ed patrols  as  may  be  necessary  (e.  g.,  one  from  14  to 
move  along  the  16 — 18 — 20  road,  from  which  a  good 
view  of  Salt  creek  valley  is  obtainable) .  Such  patrols 
probably  will  be  unable  to  rejoin  the  advance  party, 
and  will  naturally  join  the  support  upon  completion 
of  their  reconnaissance.  Major  A  may  well  keep  con- 
trol of  most  of  the  mounted  scouts,  as  in  this  way 
he  can  be  certain  that  they  are  used  to  the  best  advan- 
tage, and  yet  are  not  needlessly  sent  out  to  examine 
points  that  dismounted  patrols  could  reconnoiter  quite 
as  well. 

Consequently,  Major  A  decides  to  keep  eleven  of 
the  mounted  scouts  with  him  and  attach  four  to  the 
advance  party  to  serve  as  a  mounted  point.  The  elev- 
en he  will  send  out  from  time  to  time  as  circumstances 
warrant.  In  the  first  part  of  the  march,  while  the 
Blue  cavalry  is  near,  he  need  make  no  use  of  them,  but 
after  the  first  hour  or  two  their  information  will  be 
most  valuable.  For  example,  four  may  be  sent  to 
Leavenworth  to  inquire  whether  the  enemy's  cavalry 
patrols  have  been  seen  there,  and  then  rejoin  at  60; 
at  60,  three  may  be  sent  to  pass  over  the  68 — 50  road 
and  rejoin  at  52;  at  56,  three  may  be  sent  via  the 


122       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Zimmerman  road  to  rejoin  at  44;  and  so  on  through- 
out the  march. 

Major  A  is  now  ready  to  join  Captain  A  and  give 
him  his  four  mounted  scouts,  and  then  assume  gen- 
eral supervision  of  the  advance  guard. 


This  solution  has  caused  us  so  little  trouble  that  an- 
other and  more  difficult  advance  guard  problem  will 
be  given  in  the  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

AN  ADVANCE  GUARD. 

PROBLEM. 

(See  2 -inch  map). 

A  Blue  division,  marching  south  in  friendly  coun- 
try, is  camped  ten  miles  north  of  Weston,  and  a  Red 
division  is  concentrating  thirty  miles  southeast  of 
Leavenworth.  There  are  no  Red  forces  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  Missouri  in  this  theater  of  operations. 
The  possession  of  the  bridges  over  the  Missouri  at 
Leavenworth  and  Fort  Leavenworth  is  of  great  im- 
portance to  both  the  opposing  forces. 

A  Blue  detachment  under  Colonel  B,  consisting  of 
2  regiments  of  infantry,  a  battery  and  2  troops  of  cav- 
alry, has  been  pushed  forward  to  Weston,  and,  after 
an  exhausting  march,  goes  into  camp  there  late  in  the 
evening  of  30  September.  At  8:30  p.  m.,  Colonel  B 
gives  Lieutenant-Colonel  A  the  following  verbal  or- 
ders : 

"Reliable  information  has  just  been  received  that  a  hostile 
detachment  of  all  arms,  marching  from  the  southeast,  bivouacked 
eight  miles  south  of  Farley,  about  5  p.  m.  to-day,  and  hostile 
cavalry  patrols  were  seen  four  miles  south  of  Farley  this  after- 
noon. Our  division  will  continue  its  advance  to-morrow. 

"This  detachment  will  move  south  to-morrow  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  advancing  between  the  Platte  and  Missouri  rivers. 

"The  1st  Battalion,  1st  Infantry,  machine  gun  platoon  at- 
tached, and  Troops  E  and  F,  7th  Cavalry,  will  constitute  the 
advance  guard  under  your  command,  and  will  march  via  the  29 — 
21 — 15 — 50 — Farley  road.  The  platoon  of  cavalry  on  outpost 
will  report  to  you  when  your  cavalry  passes  the  outpost  line. 


124       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

"The  main  body  will  start  from  81  at  6  a.  m.  and  follow  the 
advance  guard  at  700  yards.  Time  your  start  accordingly. 

"The  wagons  of  the  advance  guard  will  join  the  field  train 
at  81  at  7  a.  m." 

When  Lieutenant-Colonel  A  inquired  if  he  should 
make  any  special  reconnaissance  Colonel  B  told  him 
to  use  his  own  judgment. 

Note — The  Platte  river  is  unfordable. 
Required : 

Lieutenant-Colonel  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

His  orders. 

SOLUTION. 

The  object  of  the  movement  south  is  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  advancing  between  the  Platte  and  Mis- 
souri rivers,  and  the  broad  mission  of  the  advance 
guard  is  to  cooperate  with  the  main  body  of  the  de- 
tachment in  accomplishing  this  object.  If  it  has  a 
more  specific  mission  it  should  become  apparent  as 
the  situation  is  analyzed. 

The  information  of  the  enemy  leaves  his  strength 
undetermined.  The  order  refers  to  the  force  as  a 
"detachment,"  and  Colonel  B  would  not  have  used 
this  term  had  he  believed  that  the  entire  hostile  divis- 
ion was  bivouacked  near  Farley.  The  presence  of 
artillery  suggests  a  force  of  at  least  two  regiments, 
while  the  very  limited  cavalry  reconnaissance  made 
to  the  north  suggests  weakness  in  that  arm.  How- 
ever, so  far  as  Lieutenant-Colonel  A's  initial  disposi- 
tions are  concerned,  the  definite  location  of  the  ene- 
my's bivouack  eight  miles  south  of  Farley  is  import- 
ant. 

If  the  enemy  continues  his  advance  with  the  inten- 
tion of  crossing  the  Platte  river,  as  is  to  be  expected 
since  the  possession  of  the  bridges  across  the  Mis- 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  125 

souri  is  of  great  importance  to  the  Red  commander, 
the  bridge  at  72  is  his  nearest  and  most  natural  cross- 
ing place.  Just  north  of  the  bridge  the  road  crosses 
the  flat,  open  valley  of  the  Platte,  dominated  by  the 
heights  at  Farley.  In  this  vicinity  may  be  found  the 
best  position  from  which  to  block  the  hostile  advance, 
for,  even  if  the  enemy  should  succeed  in  crossing  the 
river,  he  will  be  compelled  to  fight  with  it  in  his  imme- 
diate rear.  The  left  flank  of  the  position  will  rest  on 
the  Platte  river,  and  the  right  cannot  be  assailed  ex- 
cept by  troops  crossing  the  open  ground  between  the 
bluffs  and  the  Missouri  river.  Moreover,  the  position 
is  far  enough  to  the  front  to  cover  the  Missouri  river 
bridges  from  long  range  artillery  fire. 

If  the  detachment  gains  this  position,  the  enemy 
will  have  to  abandon  his  line  of  advance,  or  attack  at 
a  disadvantage.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  enemy  suc- 
ceeds in  crossing  the  Platte  and  advancing  north  of 
Farley,  the  detachment  may  have  to  fight  on  equal 
terms,  for  the  positions  in  the  vicinity  of  48,  50  and 
52  offer  about  the  same  opportunities  to  both  sides. 
The  bridge  at  72,  then,  is  the  immediate  objective  of 
the  advance  guard,  and  the  enemy  is  about  five  miles 
nearer  it  than  is  Lieutenant-Colonel  A. 

The  detachment  is  to  begin  its  march  at  6  a.  m., 
which  is  about  sunrise  in  the  latitude  of  Leavenworth 
at  this  season.  The  enemy  may  start  at  about  the 
same  hour,  but  it  is  not  probable  he  will  start  earlier. 
Starting  at  the  same  hour,  his  infantry,  if  unopposed, 
can  reach  72  about  two  hours  ahead  of  the  Blue  infan- 
try, and  he  will  have  time  to  establish  himself  on  the 
heights  north  of  Farley  before  Lieutenant-Colonel 
A's  advance  guard  can  get  up.  Even  if  he  should  not 


126       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

start  until  an  hour  after  sunrise,  his  infantry  may  be 
across  the  river  in  considerable  force  before  it  encoun- 
ters the  Blue  advance  guard. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  A's  chances  of  stopping  the 
hostile  advance  at  the  bridge  at  72  appear  to  be  small, 
but  he  must  make  the  effort.  If  properly  employed 
and  well  led,  his  cavalry  may  enable  him  to  succeed, 
for  if  it  can  get  possession  of  the  bridge,  it  may  be 
able  to  hold  it  until  the  infantry  comes  to  its  assist- 
ance; and  in  this  endeavor  it  will  have  a  marked  ad- 
vantage if  it  can  beat  the  hostile  cavalry  to  the  bridge. 

The  cavalry  might  cover  the  twelve  miles  from 
Weston  to  72  in  an  hour  and  a  half,  but  more  proba- 
bly it  will  take  it  longer,  and  the  hostile  cavalry  may 
be  expected  to  cover  the  seven  miles  from  its  camp 
at  72  in  about  an  hour.  Should  the  Blue  cavalry  start 
at  5:30  a.  m.,  a  half  hour  before  its  infantry,  and 
should  the  Red  cavalry  start  about  sunrise  (6  a.  m.), 
they  would  meet  near  the  bridge.  It  will  be  better  for 
the  cavalry  to  start  at  5  a.  m.,  thereby  getting  a  great- 
er margin  of  safety  and  allowing  for  a  possible  earlier 
start  of  the  hostile  cavalry. 

The  special  mission  of  the  cavalry,  then,  is  to  hast- 
en to  Farley  and  keep  the  enemy  south  of  the  Platte 
until  the  infantry  of  the  advance  guard  can  come  to 
its  support;  and  it  should  guard  against  being  drawn 
away  from  this,  its  chief  mission,  by  occurrences  of 
minor  importance  elsewhere.  If  it  encounters  no  op- 
position, and  the  situation  does  not  change,  it  should 
go  directly  to  Farley  and  stop  the  hostile  advance  at 
the  Platte.  If  it  encounters  hostile  cavalry,  as  may  be 
the  case,  it  must  be  guided  by  circumstances  without 
losing  sight  of  its  mission.  The  roads  to  the  east 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  127 

through  Platte  City  and  across  the  Platte  river  bridg- 
es near  54  and  60  are  important  routes  to  be  reconnoit- 
ered,  and  the  bridges  over  the  Missouri  should  be  ob- 
served. 

Since  the  cavalry  will  be  so  far  in  advance  of  the 
infantry,  a  few  troopers  should  be  attached  to  the 
support  for  local  reconnaissance,  but  the  number 
should  be  kept  small  to  avoid  weakening  the  main  cav- 
alry force.  The  platoon  on  outpost  will  be  sufficient 
for  this  purpose. 

Considering  the  strength  of  the  main  body  of  the 
detachment  and  the  fact  that  it  has  artillery,  it  is  best 
to  divide  the  advance  guard  into  support  and  reserve, 
and  a  reasonable  division  of  the  infantry  will  be  to 
place  two  companies  in  each.  In  an  advance  guard 
no  larger  than  a  battalion,  the  machine  gun  platoon 
had  better  accompany  the  reserve.  The  reserve  will 
follow  the  support  at  500  yards. 

The  hour  at  which  the  advance  guard  must  start 
from  31  to  give  the  proper  distance  (700  yards)  be- 
tween it  and  the  main  body,  may  now  be  calculated, 
The  total  road  space  of  the  advance  guard  is  about 
1350  yards,  composed  as  follows: 

Road  space  of  a  battalion 250  yards 

Distance  from  point  to  advance  party.  200 
Distance  from  advance  party  to  support  400 
Distance  from  support  to  reserve  ....  500 

Total 1350  yards     (*) 

*  On  the  march,  after  a  command  is  straightened  out  on  the  road, 
a  certain  amount  of  elongation  always  takes  place,  the  amount  de- 
pending on  many  circumstances  such  as  condition  of  roads  and  weath- 
er, sometimes  being  as  much  as  25  per  cent.  For  large  commands  it  is 
quite  necessary  to  take  this  elongation  into  consideration  in  calculat- 
ing the  length  of  a  column  of  troops  (elongation  should  not  affect  the 
distance  between  columns),  but  it  is  a  negligible  refinement  of  calcula- 
tion when  considering  a  force  no  larger  than  a  battalion. 


The  tail  of  the  advance  guard  must  be  700  yards 
beyond  Weston  at  6  a.  m.;  consequently  the  point 
must  be  1350  +  700  =  2050  yards  from  Weston  at 
the  same  hour.  The  column  will  not  halt  until  about 
three-quarters  of  an  hour  after  starting,  and  during 
this  time  should  make  about  3  miles  per  hour,  or  88 
yards  per  minute.  Hence,  the  point  should  start 
from  Weston  2050  -s-  88  =  23  minutes  before  6  a.  m., 
i.  e.  at  5 :38  a.  m.  To  be  on  the  safe  side,  the  hour  had 
best  be  fixed  at  5 :35  a.  m.,  adjusting  the  distances  be- 
tween fractions  of  the  command  after  it  gets  on  the 
road. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  A's  decision  is  to  send  the  cav- 
alry ahead  at  5  a.  m.,  to  seize  the  bridge  at  72  and  hold 
it  until  reinforced  by  the  infantry,  which  will  be  hast- 
ened to  its  assistance. 

At  9 :30  p.  m.,  Lieutenant-Colonel  A  assembles  his 
officers  (the  battalion,  company,  and  troop  command- 
ers, and  staff)  and  gives  them  the  following  verbal 
orders : 

"A  hostile  detachment  of  all  arms,  marching  from  the  south- 
east, has  bivouacked  eight  miles  south  of  Farley.  Hostile  cav- 
alry patrols  were  seen  four  miles  south  of  Farley  this  after- 
noon. Our  division  will  continue  its  advance  to-morrow.  Our 
detachment  will  start  south  from  Weston,  at  6 :00  a.  m.  to-morrow, 
to  prevent  the  advance  of  the  enemy  between  the  Platte  and  Mis- 
souri rivers. 

"The  1st  Battalion,  1st  Infantry,  with  machine  gun  platoon, 
and  Troops  E  and  F,  7th  Cavalry,  under  my  command,  will  form 
the  advance  guard  of  our  detachment  to-morrow. 

"Captain  A,  you  will  command  the  cavalry,  less  the  platoon 
now  on  outpost,  which  will  accompany  the  support.  You  will 
leave  your  bivouac  at  5  a.  m.,  march  rapidly  to  Farley,  and  hold 
the  enemy  south  of  the  Platte  until  the  arrival  of  the  infantry  of 
the  advance  guard.  You  will  reconnoiter  the  roads  to  the  east 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  129 

through  Platte  City,  54>,  and  60  and  observe  the  Rock  Island  and 
Terminal  bridges. 

"Major  B,  you  will  command  the  support,  which  will  consist 
of  the  platoon  of  cavalry  on  outpost,  and  Companies  A  and  B 
of  your  battalion.  You  will  start  your  point  from  the  south- 
east exit  of  Weston  at  5:35  a.  m.,  and  follow  the  29 — 21 — 15 — 
D — 50 — Farley  road. 

"Companies  C  and  D  and  the  machine  gun  platoon  will  form 
the  reserve  and  will  follow  the  support  at  500  yards. 

"Lieutenant  A  (battalion  quartermaster),  assemble  the  field 
train  of  the  advance  guard  in  time  to  have  it  join  that  of  the 
detachment  at  31,  at  7  a.  m. 

"I  will  accompany  the  reserve." 

COMMENTS. 

If  this  problem  has  proven  difficult,  very  little  com- 
fort will  be  found  in  the  thought  that  it  deals  with 
only  the  simplest  part  of  an  advance  guard  command- 
er's task.  The  truly  difficult  part  of  his  task,  the  act- 
ual leading  of  the  advance  guard,  especially  in  the 
face  of  opposition,  is  not  touched  on.  For  this  reason, 
we  selected  for  the  problem  such  a  situation  that  the 
success  of  the  advance  guard  would  depend  largely  on 
the  initial  dispositions  made  by  its  commander. 

We  miss  the  main  point  in  the  problem,  if  we  fail 
to  appreciate  the  tactical  value  to  us,  and  to  the  ene- 
my, of  the  terrain  about  Farley,  and  the  importance 
of  starting  our  cavalry  early  to  get  possession  of  the 
bridge  at  72  ahead  of  the  enemy. 

This  will  become  apparent  if  we  consider  for  a  mo- 
ment what  reasonably  may  be  expected  to  happen  if 
we  tie  the  cavalry  to  the  advance  guard,  or  send  it  in 
some  direction  other  than  towards  Farley.  If  the  two 
forces  start  at  the  same  hour  and  march  at  the  same 
rate,  the  head  of  the  hostile  infantry  column  will  be 


130        TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

crossing  the  bridge  at  72,  when  the  point  of  our  ad- 
vance guard  is  at  52.  The  hostile  cavalry  will  be  firm- 
ly established  on  the  heights  north  of  Farley,  and  in 
less  than  an  hour,  or  before  our  infantry  point  can 
reach  48,  he  will  have  a  full  regiment  of  infantry  up 
and  in  position.  The  most  energetic  action  at  this 
late  hour  may  not  avoid  the  consequences  of  the  initial 
mistake  in  the  employment  of  the  cavalry. 


In  concluding  this  chapter  it  may  be  interesting  and 
instructive  to  examine  briefly  the  leading  of  the  caval- 
ry during  its  march  on  Farley. 

Just  before  starting  from  Weston,  Captain  A 
(commanding  the  cavalry)  will  send  a  patrol  of  a 
non-commissioned  officer  and  6  troopers  to  patrol 
through  Platte  City  and  to  the  east;  another,  of  1 
non-commissioned  officer  and  4  troopers,  to  proceed 
along  the  river  road  via  G  to  observe  the  Rock  Island 
and  Terminal  bridges ;  and  a  third,  of  an  officer  and  6 
troopers,  to  trot  out  along  the  21 — E — 12 — 50 — 48 
road  to  Farley,  and  thence  south  of  the  Platte  to  gain 
contact  with  the  enemy. 

The  command  then  begins  the  march,  via  the  21 — 
15 — 50  road  with  the  remainder  of  Troop  E  (*)  in 
the  lead  as  advance  guard,  at  a  distance  of  500  yards, 
preceded  by  a  point  of  1  non-commissioned  officer  and 
8  troopers  at  300  yards.  At  21,  Captain  A,  who  is 
riding  with  Troop  E,  sends  a  patrol  of  1  non-com  - 

*  About  half  the  troop,  this  troop  having  furnished  the  patrols  and 
the  platoon  on  outpost.  This  advance  guard  is  stronger  than  nec- 
essary, but  its  strength  will  be  reduced  by  patrols  yet  to  be  sent  out, 
and  it  is  desirable  to  keep  the  remainder  of  the  troop  together  under 
its  captain. 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  131 

missioned  officer  and  4  troopers  to  proceed  via  G  and 
the  road  along  the  foot  of  the  bluff  to  Farley;  at  50, 
two  more  patrols,  of  1  non-commissioned  officer  and 
4  troopers  each,  are  sent  to  reconnoiter  east  of  the 
Platte,  one  on  the  54 — 56  road,  and  the  other  via  48 
to  take  the  60 — 58  road.  All  patrols  are  given  defin- 
ite instructions  as  to  what  is  expected  of  them,  and 
are  told  the  route  to  be  taken  by  the  main  body  of  the 
cavalry,  and  by  the  infantry  advance  guard. 

One  officer,  5  non-commissioned  officers  and  28 
troopers  are  now  doing  patrol  duty ;  this  has  consider- 
ably reduced  the  strength  of  the  main  cavalry  force, 
much  against  Captain  A's  wishes,  but,  as  he  reflects 
on  this  point,  he  believes  it  would  not  have  been  wise 
to  send  out  a  less  number  of  patrols,  nor  to  make  any 
of  them  weaker. 

When  passing  50,  at  6:40  a.  m.,  two  troopers  rode 
up  at  a  gallop,  bearing  a  message,  sent  from  the 
heights  north  of  Farley  by  the  officer's  patrol  that  was 
to  go  south  of  the  Platte,  stating  that  about  a  troop 
of  hostile  cavalry  is  approaching  from  the  south,  and 
was  two  miles  south  of  72  at  6:25  a.  m.  Captain  A 
continues  his  advance,  and  when  approaching  48,  the 
remainder  of  this  patrol  meets  him,  and  its  leader, 
Lieutenant  A,  reports  as  follows:  "When  I  left  the 
heights  at  6:45,  the  hostile  cavalry  was  crossing  the 
bridge  at  72.  I  estimate  the  total  strength  at  60 
troopers.  As  far  as  I  could  see,  about  two  miles  south 
of  the  Platte,  the  hostile  cavalry  was  not  followed  by 
other  hostile  forces." 

What  should  Captain  A  do?  It  should  take  him 
but  a  moment  to  decide.  The  hostile  infantry  proba- 
bly is  following  the  hostile  cavalry,  but  it  still  is  at 


132       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

least  about  two  miles  south  of  the  Platte,  and  proba- 
bly will  not  be  at  the  bridge  south  of  Farley,  in  any 
force,  much  before  8  a.  m.  By  good  marching,  the 
infantry  following  Captain  A  can  reach  the  heights 
north  of  Farley  by  about  9 :30  a.  m.  At  best,  Captain 
A  has  but  a  slim  chance  of  holding  the  enemy  south  of 
the  Platte  until  the  infantry  advance  guard  can  come 
to  his  assistance,  but  of  one  thing  he  is  convinced — he 
has  no  chance  at  all  unless  the  hostile  cavalry  in  his 
front  is  pushed  out  of  the  way.  He  now  has  with  him 
one  complete  troop  and  about  half  of  another,  or  two 
troopers  to  the  enemy's  one.  Consequently  he  de- 
cides to  continue  his  advance  and  attack  the  hostile 
cavalry  if  it  stands  in  his  way. 


CHAPTER  X. 
A  RETREAT. 

SITUATION. 

(See  2  and  4-inch  maps). 

The  situation  is  the  continuation  of  that  given  in 
Chapters  V  and  VII. 

The  Blue  command  marched  to  the  south  (July 
15),  destroying  the  railroad  bridges  on  the  way.  In 
the  afternoon,  when  about  5  miles  south  of  Leaven- 
worth,  it  was  forced  to  fall  back  on  the  190 — 224 — 
66a  road,  before  a  superior  hostile  force,  estimated  as 
being  2  regiments  of  infantry  and  2  troops  of  cavalry, 
but  did  not  become  seriously  engaged;  it  bivouacked 
late  in  the  evening  in  the  open  fields  just  south  of  66a, 
with  outposts  (Companies  A  and  B,  and  %  Troop  A) 
on  the  line  216 — 210 — 138.  The  field  train  has  joined 
from  Kickapoo. 

The  enemy  followed  the  Blues  closely  and  estab- 
lished outposts  at  nightfall  on  the  south  bank  of  Five 
Mile  creek,  from  the  road  junction  one-half  mile  west 
of  228  to  the  bridge  at  Wells  Park.  Later  his  cav- 
alry patrols  were  encountered  between  the  Blue  out- 
post position  and  Five  Mile  creek. 

At  11  p.  m.,  Colonel  A  receives  the  following  or- 
der from  his  superior  commander,  General  B,  sent  via 
the  railroad  guard  at  Kickapoo : 

"Continue  your  retreat  July  16th  and,  without  becoming  seri- 
ously engaged,  check  the  enemy's  pursuit  sufficiently  to  permit 
the  2d  Infantry,  which  will  reach  Kickapoo  at  8 :30  a.  m.,  to  oc- 


184       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

cupy  a  position  on  the  southern  edge  of  Kickapoo,  where  the 
enemy  will  be  opposed  until  the  arrival  of  the  remainder  of  the 
detachment  from  the  north." 

Required : 

Colonel  A's  estimate  of  the  situation  and  his  orders 
for  the  retreat. 

SOLUTION  AND  DISCUSSION. 

Colonel  A  is  ordered  to  continue  his  retreat  July 
16th.  Were  it  not  that  the  orders  sent  him  impose 
duties  upon  him  which  materially  affect  the  character 
of  his  retreat,  he  could  start  from  his  bivouac  south  of 
66a  at  an  early  hour  and  place  so  much  distance  be- 
tween his  force  and  that  of  the  enemy,  that  it  would 
not  be  possible  for  the  pursuing  force  to  overtake  him 
before  he  reached  Kickapoo.  The  camps  of  the  two 
forces  are  about  four  miles  apart  and,  even  if  the  two 
forces  should  start  at  the  same  hour,  the  Red  force 
should  not  be  able  to  inflict  any  serious  loss  on  the 
Blue. 

But  our  colonel  has  to  think  of  something  more 
than  merely  getting  his  little  force  to  the  cover  of  his 
supporting  troops  at  Kickapoo.  His  task  is  compli- 
cated and  rendered  much  more  difficult  and  dangerous 
by  that  portion  of  his  orders  which  directs  him  to  de- 
lay the  enemy  sufficiently  to  allow  the  2d  Infantry 
to  occupy  a  position  along  the  crest  of  the  hills  just 
south  of  Kickapoo.  From  the  enemy's  bivouac  to 
these  hills,  the  distance  is  about  9  miles,  and,  marching 
3  miles  per  hour  the  enemy  could  cover  this  distance 
in  three  hours.  That  is,  if  the  enemy  should  start  at 
sunrise  (at  4:30  a.  m.),  and  if  his  march  were  unop- 
posed, the  head  of  his  column  by  good  marching  could 
reach  the  vicinity  of  Kickapoo  by  about  7:30  a.  m., 


A  RETREAT  135 

this  is  an  hour  before  the  2d  Infantry  will  reach  Kick- 
apoo,  and  probably  two  hours  before  it  will  be  in  po- 
sition on  the  slope  south  of  that  town.  So  if  Colonel 
A  accomplishes  the  full  mission  assigned  him,  he,  in 
all  probability,  will  have  to  delay  the  hostile  force  for 
about  two  hours  at  some  point  or  points  between  its 
present  camp  and  Kickapoo. 

However,  in  attempting  to  do  this,  he  must  not 
become  seriously  engaged.  His  force  must  not  be 
drawn  into  a  fight  so  stubborn  that  the  entire  regiment 
may  become  involved  and  defeated,  possibly  thus  con- 
verting an  orderly  retreat,  in  which  the  regiment  may 
suffer  insignificant  losses,  into  a  disorganized  rout  in 
which  it  may  meet  disaster.  So  long  as  he  makes  but 
a  show  of  force,  with  but  a  small  fraction  of  his  com- 
mand, while  holding  the  bulk  of  it  well  in  hand,  as- 
sembled under  cover  or  in  column  on  the  road,  it  will 
be  an  easy  matter  to  break  off  the  engagement  and 
resume  the  orderly  retreat  without  great  loss.  But  it 
will  be  entirely  different  if  the  entire  command  is 
thrown  into  the  fight  to  secure  delay.  It  is  one  thing 
to  withdraw  from  a  fight  a  thin  skirmish  line  or  a 
small  detachment  here  and  there,  probably  not  more 
than  100  men  in  all;  but  it  is  quite  another  matter  to 
break  off  the  fight  when  all  twelve  companies  of  the 
regiment  have  entered  the  contest.  In  the  one  case, 
the  withdrawal  is  made  as  a  part  of  the  general  plan ; 
so  few  men  are  involved  that  they  can  be  quickly  re- 
assembled to  the  rear  and  reorganized;  and,  if  neces- 
sary, other  troops  can  assist  in  covering  their  with- 
drawal. In  the  other  case,  the  withdrawal  is  a  matter 
of  necessity ;  the  troops  may  have  fought  well  but  the 
attack  by  superior  numbers  has  overwhelmed  them; 


136       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

they  break  to  the  rear  without  fresh  troops  to  cover 
their  withdrawal  or  reorganization ;  the  fleeing  swarms 
give  up  all  thought  of  further  resistance;  and,  if  the 
enemy  has  fresh  troops  with  which  to  pursue,  the  re- 
treat degenerates  into  a  complete  rout.  Then  iso- 
lated bodies  of  the  victor  may  follow,  and  hundreds 
will  often  thrown  down  their  arms  before  a  few  horse- 
men. 

So,  instead  of  attempting  to  cause  the  enemy  the 
necessary  delay  by  making  a  determined  stand  at  one 
point  with  his  entire  force,  Colonel  A  will  delay  the 
hostile  advance  with  but  a  fraction  of  his  command 
falling  back  from  position  to  position.  This  becomes 
the  task  of  the  rear  guard.  At  first  glance,  it  may 
appear  strange  that  a  small  part  of  a  retreating  force 
should  be  expected  to  delay  a  pursuing  enemy,  and 
then  get  safely  away  to  another  position  farther  to 
the  rear  from  which  it  can  repeat  these  tactics.  Why 
will  the  enemy  permit  a  comparatively  insignificant 
force  thus  to  delay  him,  when  great  results  are  to  be 
secured  by  his  overtaking  the  retreating  main  body? 
This  question  will  be  fully  answered  in  Chapters  XII 
and  XIV,  but  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  state  here 
that  it  is  partly  because  of  the  "fog  of  war"  that  hangs 
over  the  battlefield.  Defense  is  so  powerful  that  it  is 
not  attacked  without  hesitation.  The  pursuing  force 
can  never  be  quite  sure  that  it  has  only  a  weak  rear 
guard  in  its  front ;  a  change  in  the  situation  may  have 
required  the  entire  retreating  force  to  make  a  deter- 
mined stand;  or  it  may  have  been  reinforced.  The 
pursuer's  advance  must  be  made  with  a  certain 
amount  of  caution  until  reconnaissance  has  cleared  up 
the  situation.  Even  if  the  pursuing  enemy  acts  with 


A  RETREAT  137 

great  boldness,  still  a  part  of  his  force  must  be  de- 
ployed before  the  rear  guard  will  withdraw.  All  this 
takes  time  and  accomplishes  the  delay  the  rear  guard 
is  supposed  to  secure. 

If  the  terrain  is  particularly  favorable,  it  may  be- 
come a  powerful  ally  for  the  retreating  force.  The 
Field  Service  Regulations  suggest  a  number  of  ways 
in  which  the  pursuit  may  be  delayed  by  placing  obsta- 
cles in  the  enemy's  path.  In  the  situation  before  us, 
there  is  but  little  opportunity  for  this,  as  will  be  seen 
after  a  consideration  of  the  roads  along  which  the  re- 
treat may  be  made.  The  66 — 14 — G — H — Kickapoo 
road  is  the  most  direct  route  by  which  Colonel  A  can 
continue  his  retreat.  By  turning  to  the  west  at  60  and 
following  the  Zimmerman  road,  not  only  would  the 
column  have  farther  to  go  but  it  would  also  make  a 
dangerous  flank  march  of  two  and  one-half  miles  from 
60  to  100,  which  would  give  the  enemy  a  splendid  op- 
portunity to  strike  the  column  in  flank.  For  simi- 
lar reasons,  the  route  via  Sheridan's  Drive,  11  and  17 
is  objectionable.  The  most  direct  route  appears  to 
be  the  best,  and  the  terrain  along  it  favors  delaying 
action  by  the  rear  guard.  The  few  natural  obstacles 
along  this  route  are  of  little  importance,  but  the  best 
possible  use  should  be  made  of  them.  The  bridges  at 
66a,  near  60,  and  at  H  can  be  destroyed.  Although 
the  streams  crossed  by  the  first  two  bridges  are  insig- 
nificant, still  they  flow  in  deep  cut  channels  with  steep 
banks,  and  the  enemy  will  be  delayed  a  few  minutes  in 
crossing  each.  Salt  creek  is  a  more  formidable  stream 
and  the  destruction  of  the  bridge  at  H  should  delay 
the  enemy  still  longer.  But  the  bridge  over  Plum 
creek,  between  17  and  47,  should  not  be  destroyed 


188       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

without  the  authority  of  the  detachment  commander 
at  Kickapoo,  for  it  is  within  his  immediate  radius  of 
action  and  its  destruction  may  not  fit  in  with  his  plans. 

If  Colonel  A  took  the  precaution  before  starting  on 
this  expedition  to  supply  himself  with  explosives,  it 
will  be  a  simple  matter  to  render  these  bridges  im- 
passable. Otherwise,  he  can  remove  and  burn  the 
flooring;  this  should  not  be  very  difficult,  if  kerosine 
can  be  obtained  from  nearby  farm  houses.  In  any 
case,  the  preparatory  work  must  be  done  by  other 
troops  than  the  rear  guard,  for  if  it  is  closely  pressed, 
it  probably  will  not  have  time  to  do  more  than  com- 
plete the  demolition.  A  small  force,  therefore,  will 
be  sent  ahead  from  the  main  body  to  prepare  the  ex- 
plosive charges  for  firing,  or  to  pry  loose  the  bridge 
flooring  and  collect  kerosine.  This  force  may  accom- 
pany the  field  train  which  should  be  sent  far  in  ad- 
vance in  order  that  it  may  not,  because  of  its  slower 
marching  rate,  or  any  unforseen  incident,  delay  the 
march  of  the  main  body.  The  train  should  start  at 
least  two  hours  ahead  of  the  main  body.  Of  course 
this  means  that  the  troops  must  suffer  some  discom- 
fort because  of  the  wagons  being  packed  at  so  early 
an  hour,  but  in  this  situation  the  safety  of  the  wag- 
ons and  detachment  is  of  far  greater  importance  than 
any  considerations  as  to  comfort. 

It  is  not  possible  to  say  with  certainty  at  this  time 
just  where  the  rear  guard  will  occupy  positions  to  se- 
cure the  necessary  two  hours'  delay.  The  terrain  alone 
does  not  determine  this  matter ;  on  the  contrary,  it  de- 
pends largely  on  the  conduct  of  the  pursuing  force, 
and  the  positions  to  be  occupied  cannot  be  definitely 
located  until  the  column  is  on  the  march  and  the  move- 


A  RETREAT  139 

ments  of  the  enemy  are  known.  For  this  reason,  Col- 
onel A  should  leave  the  selection  of  these  positions  to 
his  rear  guard  commander.  However,  this  does  not 
mean  that  they  should  not  fully  talk  the  situation 
over  together,  and  discuss  the  merits  of  positions  along 
the  line  of  retreat  that  may  be  occupied  to-morrow. 

In  all  probability,  the  rear  guard  will  make  its  first 
stand  in  the  present  position  of  the  line  of  observation 
of  the  outposts,  along  the  ridge  from  138  through  210 
to  Pilot  Knob.  This  commanding  ridge  is  200  feet 
higher  than  the  hostile  outpost  position,  along  the 
south  bank  of  Five  Mile  creek,  and  but  little  more 
than  a  mile  from  it.  The  enemy  can  make  no  advance 
in  force  from  his  position,  not  covered  by  darkness, 
that  will  not  be  plainly  visible  from  some  point  on  this 
ridge.  Should  he  move  across  Five  Mile  creek 
straight  against  the  position,  he  will  come  under  severe 
fire  the  moment  he  reaches  effective  range  of  the  bas- 
tion-like southern  spur  of  Pilot  Knob,  and  the  ad- 
vance will  have  to  be  made  in  extended  order.  His  ig- 
norance as  to  how  Colonel  A's  situation  (strength, 
etc.)  may  have  changed  during  the  night,  combined 
with  the  naturally  formidable  character  of  the  Pilot 
Knob  position,  will  make  him  cautious  about  attack- 
ing before  making  a  preliminary  reconnaissance. 
If  Colonel  A  succeeds  in  deceiving  him  as  to  the 
force  along  the  ridge,  the  bulk  of  the  hostile  force 
may  be  deployed  for  the  attack  before  the  rear  guard 
has  to  withdraw  to  avoid  becoming  too  seriously  en- 
gaged. Much  of  the  necessary  delay  would  thus  be 
secured;  nor  would  the  enemy  gain  much,  if  any- 
thing, by  attempting  to  march  to  the  west  around  the 
position. 


140       TACTICAL  PBINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

So  our  colonel  may  at  least  order  the  rear  guard 
commander  to  hold  on  to  the  outpost  position  as  long 
as  practicable.  Another  important  reason  why  the  ene- 
my should  be  given  his  first  check  from  this  position 
is  that  by  so  doing  he  is  kept  in  ignorance  of  the  fact 
that  our  force  has  resumed  its  march  to  the  rear.  Let 
us  imagine  ourselves  in  the  place  of  the  enemy.  We 
have  observed  Colonel  A  establish  his  outposts  in  the 
evening,  and  during  the  night  our  patrols  have  kept 
in  touch  with  him  sufficiently  well  to  know  he  did  not 
make  a  night  march.  Suddenly,  at  daybreak,  all  seri- 
ous resistance  to  our  patrols  ceases  from  Pilot  Knob 
and  along  the  ridge,  and  they  are  able  to  reach  the 
top  of  the  ridge.  We  at  once  feel  confident  that  our 
opponent  has  resumed  his  retreat,  and  we  take  up  the 
pursuit  without  hesitation.  If  on  the  other  hand,  our 
patrols  are  driven  back  from  all  points  along  the  ridge, 
we  will  be  in  the  dark  as  to  Colonel  A's  intentions  un- 
til further  action  on  our  part  throws  light  on  the  situ- 
ation. 

A  study  of  the  terrain  along  the  line  of  retreat 
shows  other  good  positions  available  for  the  rear 
guard.  North  of  the  outpost  position  for  nearly  two 
miles,  the  road  crosses  comparatively  low  ground, 
flanked  on  the  west  at  effective  small  arms  range  by 
hills  about  150  feet  higher  than  the  road.  While  a 
squad  or  two  along  these  hills  would  cause  the  enemy 
some  annoyance,  if  he  were  in  column  on  the  road, 
still  a  force  much  larger  than  this  could  not  occupy  a 
position  there,  with  its  flank  exposed  to  the  enemy, 
without  great  risk  of  being  totally  destroyed.  The 
rear  guard  probably  will  not  find  another  opportunity 
for  seriously  delaying  the  enemy  before  reaching  the 
vicinity  of  Government  hill. 


A  RETREAT  141 

Although  it  is  not  only  permissible,  but  advisable 
as  well,  for  Colonel  A  to  order  his  rear  guard  com- 
mander to  make  his  first  stand  on  the  Pilot  Knob  posi- 
tion, still  he  should  not  attempt  to  prescribe  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  position  will  be  occupied,  how  and 
when  the  withdrawal  will  be  made,  and  later  positions 
to  be  occupied.  These  are  details  that  directly  con- 
cern the  rear  guard  commander,  who  should  be  chosen 
for  his  ability  properly  to  execute  them.  Colonel  A 
may  feel  that  he  can  handle  the  rear  guard  better  than 
its  commander,  and  probably  he  can,  but  there  are 
other  important  duties  to  which  he  should  devote  his 
attention.  He  should  not  for  a  moment  forget  that  he 
is  the  commander  of  the  whole  force,  and  as  such  must 
exercise  supervision  over  the  movements  of  all  parts  of 
it.  No  doubt  he  should  spend  much  time  near  the  rear 
guard  and  satisfy  himself  that  it  is  properly  led,  but 
he  should  studiously  avoid  taking  command  out  of  the 
hands  of  the  rear  guard  commander.  Two  men  can- 
not successfully  command  the  same  force  on  the  bat- 
tlefield. 

When  practicable,  the  distances  of  the  rear  guard 
from  the  main  body,  and  between  the  fractions  of  the 
rear  guard  are  about  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  an  ad- 
vance guard.  The  rear  guard  may  guide  on  the  main 
body  and  vice  versa.  If  the  object  of  the  movement  is 
to  avoid  contact  with  the  enemy,  the  rear  guard  will 
ordinarily  take  its  distance  from  the  main  body 
and,  excepting  necessary  halts,  will  keep  on  the  move. 
But,  if  the  rear  guard  is  ordered  to  delay  the  pur- 
suers, the  main  body  probably  will  conform  its  move- 
ments to  those  of  the  rear  guard. 

This  does  not  mean  that  it  always  will  be  practica- 


142       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

ble  to  preserve  a  uniform  distance  between  the  main 
body  and  the  rear  guard,  and  a  little  reflection  on 
this  situation  will  show  why  this  is  the  case.  By  the 
time  the  enemy  gets  possession  of  Pilot  Knob  ridge, 
the  main  body  should  be  under  cover  near  Atchison 
Cross;  otherwise  its  march  from  66a  to  14  could  be  ob- 
served, and  the  enemy  would  be  given  information 
which  he  should  not  be  allowed  to  secure,  and  which 
would  enable  him  to  make  his  next  move  with  great 
certainty.  At  the  very  beginning  of  the  march,  the 
main  body  will  thus  be  separated  from  the  rear  guard 
by  about  two  miles.  This  is  but  a  temporary  con- 
dition, however,  for  under  the  shelter  of  Govern- 
ment hill  the  main  body  can  await  the  arrival  of 
the  rear  guard.  Later,  when  the  rear  guard  has  safe- 
ly withdrawn  from  its  first  position  and  has  occupied 
its  second  in  the  vicinity  of  Atchison  Cross  (presup- 
posing the  retreat  will  take  this  particular  form),  the 
main  body  will  again  resume  its  march  in  time  to  be 
beyond  Salt  creek  when  the  rear  guard  is  again  forced 
to  fall  back.  Thus,  if  all  goes  well,  the  retreat  will 
progress  by  successive  stages  until  Kickapoo  is 
reached. 

The  main  body  should  not  be  called  upon  to  go  to 
the  assistance  of  the  rear  guard,  and  the  commander 
of  the  latter  should  know  that  he  is  expected  so  to 
lead  his  rear  guard  that  such  assistance  will  not  be 
necessary.  If  reinforcements  are  furnished  the  rear 
guard  by  the  main  body  while  still  continuing  the  re- 
treat, we  simply  expose  additional  troops  to  the  ene- 
my's attack,  and  in  case  we  try  to  relieve  them  we  will 
run  the  risk  of  involving  our  entire  force,  contrary  to 
our  original  intentions. 


A  RETREAT  148 

What,  then,  is  the  necessity  for  the  main  body  re- 
maining in  supporting  distance  of  the  rear  guard? 
Why  should  it  not  continue  its  march  to  Kickapoo  and 
leave  the  rear  guard  to  delay  the  enemy  unsupported? 
The  answer  is  that,  despite  the  efforts  of  the  most  ef- 
ficient rear  guard  commander,  the  rear  guard  may  be- 
come so  involved  that  it  will  require  the  assistance  of 
the  main  body  to  cover  its  withdrawal.  This  is  es- 
pecially true  when  dealing  with  a  force  no  larger  than 
Colonel  A's.  Even  if  the  main  body  should  not  be 
called  upon  to  enter  the  fight,  still  the  knowledge  of 
its  near  presence  gives  powerful  moral  support  to 
every  member  of  the  rear  guard.  And,  if  the  main 
body  should  continue  an  uninterrupted  retreat,  and 
if  the  enemy  should  discover  this  fact  by  his  cavalry 
reconnaissance,  all  reason  for  great  caution  on  his  part 
would  disappear  and  the  rear  guard  should  be  over- 
whelmed ;  it  would  at  least  lose  its  delaying  power,  and 
it  would  be  fortunate  were  it  not  cut  off  and  de- 
stroyed. 

If  the  main  body  is  not  to  be  called  upon  to  assist 
the  rear  guard  by  detaching  troops  to  its  support,  the 
rear  guard  must  be  strong  enough  to  enable  the  rear 
guard  commander  to  take  up  rallying  positions  with 
one  part  of  his  force  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the 
other  portion  nearest  the  enemy.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  it  be  made  too  strong,  there  is  danger  of  its  be- 
coming seriously  involved  in  a  fight,  thereby  bringing 
about  the  very  condition  we  are  trying  to  avoid.  Our 
Field  Service  Regulations  state  that  a  detachment 
of  about  one-third  to  one-sixth  of  the  whole  force 
would  in  ordinary  cases  furnish  a  suitable  rear  guard, 
but  this  is  qualified  by  the  further  statement  that  its 


144       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

strength  will  vary  with  the  nature  of  the  country  and 
the  character  of  the  pursuit. 

The  strength  of  a  rear  guard  will  also  depend  on 
the  particular  mission  assigned  it.  If  it  has  only  to 
protect  the  retreat  of  the  main  body,  it  may  be  con- 
siderably weaker  than  when  it  has  also  to  cause  the 
enemy  a  certain  amount  of  additional  delay  for  some 
other  purpose.  The  latter  is  the  case  in  the  situation 
before  us.  Should  Colonel  A  blindly  follow  the  rule 
given  in  the  Field  Service  Regulations,  and  attach  no 
weight  to  the  special  task  assigned  him,  he  would  be 
in  great  danger  of  making  his  rear  guard  too  weak. 
Two  companies  (that  is,  one-sixth  of  the  infantry), 
assisted  by  the  cavalry,  might  be  sufficient  force  to 
insure  the  uninterrupted  retreat  of  the  main  body,  but 
not  sufficient  to  secure  the  needed  two  hours'  delay. 
Consequently,  we  think  a  full  battalion  will  not  be 
too  large  a  force  in  this  situation.  Three  companies 
might  be  ample  but,  if  we  employ  more  than  two  com- 
panies, it  will  be  better  to  preserve  tactical  unity  and 
give  the  battalion  commander  all  four  of  his  com- 
panies. 

The  defensive  power  of  the  rear  guard  will  be 
greatly  increased,  and  its  mobility  not  impaired,  by 
attaching  to  it  the  machine  gun  platoon.  The  great 
volume  of  fire  from  these  guns  in  a  commanding  posi- 
tion, such  as  Pilot  Knob,  will  compel  the  enemy  to 
begin  his  deployment  when  still  at  extreme  small  arms 
range,  and  may  cause  him  to  attack  with  great  cau- 
tion. When  compelled  to  withdraw,  the  guns  can  be 
moved  to  the  rear  as  quickly  as  infantry,  and  may  be 
able  to  assist  from  a  second  position  in  covering  the 
withdrawal  of  the  latter. 


A  RETREAT  145 

We  have  seen  (*)  that,  in  an  advance,  the  outposts 
generally  stand  fast  until  the  advance  guard  has 
marched  through  the  outpost  position,  after  which 
they  assemble  and  take  their  proper  place  in  the  col- 
umn as  the  main  body  passes.  In  this  manner  fresh 
troops  are  placed  in  the  advance  guard,  and  the  out- 
posts are  shown  the  maximum  amount  of  considera- 
tion after  their  night  of  arduous  duty.  In  a  retreat, 
however,  it  is  not  advisable  or  practicable  to  relieve 
the  outposts  at  the  beginning  of  the  march;  on  the 
contrary,  they  are  generally  assigned  to  the  rear  guard 
and  ordered  to  remain  in  their  night  positions  as  long 
as  possible.  Thus,  the  enemy  may  for  some  time  be 
kept  in  ignorance  of  the  resumption  of  the  retreat  by 
the  main  body.  It  is  unfortunate  that  the  troops  that 
have  been  on  outpost  during  the  night  are  given  the 
most  trying  duty  during  the  day,  but  this  cannot  be 
avoided  without  endangering  the  success  of  the  re- 
treat. Fresh  companies  might  be  sent  out  at  an  early 
hour  to  relieve  the  outposts  and  permit  them  to  join 
the  main  body  before  it  takes  up  the  march.  Such  a 
movement  is  complicated  and  should  be  condemned 
for  this  reason,  if  for  no  other,  for  only  simple  maneu- 
vers can  be  depended  upon  for  success;  but,  aside 
from  its  being  complicated,  it  rouses  a  part  of  the 
command  at  an  early  hour  or  delays  the  march  of  the 
main  body,  and,  at  a  critical  moment,  replaces  the 
outpost  troops,  that  are  familiar  with  the  ground  and 
situation,  by  troops  that  have  not  seen  the  position 
before  and  can  but  faintly  appreciate  its  military  val- 
ue in  the  dim  morning  light.  It  is  a  fair  example  of 
what  one  of  our  most  distinguished  statesmen  para- 

*  In  Chapter  V. 


146       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

phrased  as  "swapping  horses  in  the  middle  of  the 
stream"  and,  as  such,  generally  should  be  condemned. 
In  the  rear  guard,  then,  should  be  placed  the  out- 
posts and  the  remaining  companies  ( C  and  D )  of  the 
1st  Battalion,  together  with  the  machine  gun  pla- 
toon, if  it  is  not  already  assigned  to  this  battalion. 
All  the  cavalry  should  also  be  given  to  the  rear  guard. 
The  enemy  is  believed  to  have  two  troops,  i.  e.  twice 
as  much  cavalry  as  Colonel  A.  In  a  later  problem, 
(*)  we  will  go  fully  into  the  subject  of  how  this  hos- 
tile cavalry  probably  will  be  handled.  It  will  be  suf- 
ficient at  this  time  to  call  attention  to  the  road  along 
the  ridge  via  140,  138,  136,  50,  40,  and  22  to  16,  and 
to  the  roads  leading  to  the  east  (toward  Colonel  A's 
line  of  march)  at  136,  50,  52  and  24.  If  the  two  hos- 
tile troops  should  move  over  these  roads  and  reach  the 
flank  of  Colonel  A's  main  body,  or  even  of  his  rear 
guard,  they  might  so  delay  his  column  as  to  permit 
the  pursuing  infantry  to  overtake  it.  To  prevent 
this  becomes  the  chief  duty  of  Colonel  A's  cavalry; 
but  the  cavalry  must  also  keep  in  touch  with  the  hostile 
main  body,  for  the  latter  may  at  any  moment  cease 
its  advance  or  change  the  direction  of  its  march,  while 
continuing  the  pursuit  with  but  a  small  fraction  of  the 
command.  Information  of  the  location  and  move- 
ments of  the  hostile  main  body  may  be  of  such  im- 
portance in  later  operations  (as,  for  example,  when  all 
of  the  Blue  detachment  has  assembled  at  Kickapoo), 
that  the  cavalry  should  endeavor  not  to  lose  touch  for 
a  moment  with  the  main  hostile  force.  One  or  two 
carefully  led  patrols  will  be  sufficient,  however,  for 
this  purpose,  and  the  bulk  of  the  Blue  troop  should 

•  See  Chapter  XIV. 


A  RETREAT  147 

be  given  the  task  of  protecting  the  flank  of  the  Blue 
main  body  and  rear  guard. 

Our  colonel  may  retain  the  cavalry  under  his  im- 
mediate command  or  he  may  turn  it  over  to  the  rear 
guard  commander.  In  small  detachments  it  is  highly 
desirable  to  leave  the  whole  question  of  security  and 
information  to  the  rear  guard  commander,  to  whom 
all  information  concerning  the  enemy  should  be  sent 
direct  and  at  first  hand.  As  a  general  rule,  the  cav- 
alry should  be  directly  under  the  detachment  com- 
mander only  when  the  enemy  is  so  distant  that  the 
cavalry  designed  to  maintain  touch  with  him,  must 
be  left  far  behind,  thereby  virtually  losing  touch  with 
the  rear  guard ;  or  when  our  cavalry  has  to  keep  touch 
with  some  hostile  movement  very  far  towards  a  flank. 
In  other  words,  if  the  cavalry  has  not  a  mission  dis- 
tinct, as  to  time  and  place,  from  that  of  the  rear  guard, 
it  should  be  under  the  orders  of  the  rear  guard  com- 
mander. The  situation  does  not  present  Colonel  A's 
cavalry  with  any  such  mission.  Its  chief  task  will  be 
to  protect  the  flanks  of  the  retreating  column,  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  the  line  of  march.  Consequent- 
ly, to  secure  the  best  possible  tactical  cooperation  be- 
tween it  and  the  infantry  of  the  rear  guard,  both 
should  be  under  the  orders  of  the  rear  guard  com- 
mander. 

Since  the  colonel  has  (presumably)  but  half  as 
much  cavalry  as  the  enemy,  the  task  assigned  it  may 
be  too  great  for  its  power.  Should  the  hostile  cavalry 
defeat  or  ride  around  the  Blue  troop,  and  get  in  rear 
of  the  main  body  or  even  between  the  rear  guard  and 
main  body,  it  might  seriously  embarrass  the  retreat. 
The  hostile  cavalry  is  most  liable  thus  to  annoy  the 


148       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

column  from  some  point  along  the  ridge  between  22 
and  16,  and  some  provision  may  have  to  be  made  for 
protecting  the  right  flank  of  the  column  while  pass- 
ing this  dangerous  section.  This  can  be  done  by  de- 
taching a  company  from  the  main  body  as  it  passes 
60,  and  sending  it  to  the  vicinity  of  22  with  orders  to 
keep  hostile  cavalry  out  of  range  of  the  main  body. 
Whether  this  will  be  necessary,  and  just  when  this 
company,  if  so  detached,  may  withdraw  and  rejoin 
the  main  body  will  depend  on  the  enemy's  movements ; 
it  probably  would  have  to  remain  in  position  until 
relieved  by  a  company  from  the  rear  guard. 

Colonel  A  has  based  his  time  calculations  on  the 
supposition  that  the  enemy  will  not  resume  the  pur- 
suit before  sunrise  July  16.  If  the  rear  guard  secures 
the  delay  that  is  expected  of  it  in  the  present  outpost 
position,  the  main  body  might  remain  in  its  camp  at 
66a  until  a  half  hour  after  sunrise  and  yet  reach  Gov- 
ernment hill  before  the  enemy  got  possession  of  Pilot 
Knob.  But  it  is  well  to  allow  a  half  hour  for  a  possi- 
ble earlier  start  by  the  enemy,  and  for  other  unfor- 
seen  contingencies,  and  start  the  main  body  at  sun- 
rise— i.  e.  at  4:30  a.  m. 

After  thus  considering  the  situation,  Colonel  A 
finally  reached  the  following  decision.  To  start  the 
field  train  at  2 :30  a.  m.,  and  to  have  a  small  force  of 
infantry  accompany  it  with  orders  to  prepare  the 
bridges  for  destruction;  to  have  the  main  body  start 
at  4:30  a.  m.  and  march  without  halting  to  the  cover 
of  Government  hill;  to  assign  all  of  the  1st  Battalion, 
the  machine  guns,  and  Troop  A,  to  the  rear  guard  and 
order  it  to  delay  the  enemy  at  the  outset  in  the  outpost 
position ;  and  to  have  the  rear  guard  secure  the  remain- 


A  RETREAT  149 

der  of  the  necessary  two  hours'  delay  in  subsequent 
positions. 

On  reaching  his  decision,  Colonel  A  assembles  his 
staff,  the  lieutenant  colonel,  the  commanders  of  the 
2d  and  3d  Battalions  and  of  Troop  A,  and  Lieuten- 
ant A  (all  of  whom  are  in  camp)  and  gives  them  the 
following  order :  ( * ) 

"There  is  no  additional  information  of  the  enemy,  (f )  Our  2d 
Infantry  will  reach  Kickapoo  to-morrow  at  8:30  a.  m.  and  will 
occupy  a  position  on  the  hills  just  south  of  that  place  to  oppose 
the  enemy  until  the  arrival  of  the  remainder  of  our  detachment 
from  the  north. 

"In  compliance  with  orders  just  received  from  General  B,  we 
will  continue  to  fall  back  slowly  on  Kickapoo  to-morrow  and, 
without  becoming  seriously  engaged,  will  delay  the  enemy  suffi- 
ciently to  permit  the  2d  Infantry  to  get  into  position. 

"The  2d  and  3d  Battalions  will  constitute  the  main  body.  It 
will  start  from  camp  at  4:30  a.  m.,  and  will  proceed  via  the  66a — 
14 — G — H — Kickapoo  road. 

"The  rear  guard  will  be  commanded  by  Colonel  B  (the  lieu- 
tenant-colonel) and  will  consist  of  the  1st  Battalion,  machine 
gun  platoon,  and  Troop  A.  It  will  delay  the  enemy  for  at  least 
two  hours  between  here  and  Kickapoo,  but  will  avoid  becoming 
seriously  engaged.  The  present  outpost  position  will  be  held  as 
long  as  practicable.  The  cavalry  will  specially  guard  the  right 
(f  f )  of  the  line  of  march,  and  will  keep  in  touch  with  the  hostile 
main  body. 

"The  field  train,  escorted  by  a  section  from  the  3d  Battalion 
under  command  of  Lieutenant  A,  will  start  from  camp  at  2:30 
a.  m.,  and  will  proceed  directly  to  Kickapoo.  The  escort  will 

*  The  commander  of  the  1st  Battalion  is  absent  commanding  the 
outposts  and  will  receive  his  orders  later  from  the  lieutenant-colonel, 
who  is  to  command  the  rear  guard. 

f  It  is  assumed  that  all  of  the  assembled  officers  have  the  informa- 
tion of  the  enemy,  given  in  the  problem.  This  probably  would  be  the 
case  in  so  small  a  detachment. 

tf  This  means   the  right  when   facing  the   enemy. 


150       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

loosen  the  flooring  of  the  bridges  along  the  route,  and  collect  ma- 
terial for  burning  the  same. 

"Reports  will  reach  me  after  4  a.  m.  at  Pilot  Knob." 

A  few  paragraphs  are  necessary  by  way  of  ex- 
plaining this  order  .  The  assembled  officers  are  given 
full  information  of  what  is  taking  place  at  Kickapoo, 
for  they  will  find  encouragement  in  the  knowledge 
that  reinforcements  are  to  reach  that  place  early  to- 
morrow morning.  In  his  orders,  Colonel  A  has  told 
them  what  he  learned  from  General  B's  message,  and 
he  has  fully  acquainted  them  with  General  B's  plans. 
They  were  told  these  things  because  they  have  a  di- 
rect bearing  on  the  operations  of  the  next  day,  and 
not  merely  to  gratify  their  desire  to  know  what  is  go- 
ing on  at  higher  headquarters.  Information  that 
serves  no  better  purpose  than  to  satisfy  idle  curiosity 
had  better  be  withheld. 

It  is  not  necessary,  nor  is  it  wise,  to  state  that  the 
main  body  will  halt  at  Government  hill  and  await  the 
approach  of  the  rear  guard.  To-morrow's  opera- 
tions may  not  work  out  as  Colonel  A  believes  they  will, 
and  it  may  be  advisable  to  halt  the  main  body  before 
it  reaches  Government  hill,  or  not  to  halt  it  at  all. 
Nor  should  anything  be  said  in  the  order  of  the  tenta- 
tive plan  to  send  a  company  from  the  main  body  to 
the  vicinity  of  22,  for  this  also  is  contingent  on  the 
situation  when  the  main  body  reaches  the  vicinity  of 
60.  Colonel  A  probably  will  be  with  the  main  body 
at  that  time  and  can  give  these  or  other  appropriate 
orders  at  the  moment  they  are  to  be  executed.  How- 
ever, it  would  be  well  for  him  fully  to  make  known 
this  phase  of  his  intentions  to  the  rear  guard  com- 


A  RETREAT  151 

mander,  for  it  directly  concerns  the  latter 's  opera- 
tions. 

As  a  rule  orders  must  be  worded  so  as  to  make  a 
rear  guard  commander  far  more  independent  than  an 
advance  guard  commander,  because  most  of  the  meas- 
ures to  be  adopted  by  the  former  are  dependent  on 
the  nature  of  the  enemy's  pursuit.  The  actions  of  a 
small  force  in  retreat  are  dictated  by  the  enemy  to  a 
much  greater  degree  than  in  the  case  of  a  large  force 
advancing.  Moreover,  in  a  retreat  the  detachment 
commander  often  will  be  at  a  much  greater  distance 
from  the  rear  guard  than  he  would  be  from  the  ad- 
vance guard  in  an  advance,  as  it  is  often  necessary 
for  him  to  ride  in  advance.  Colonel  A's  interference 
with  the  rear  guard  commander  is  limited  to  directing 
him  to  make  his  first  stand  in  the  present  outpost 
position,  and  guard  carefully  the  right  flank  of  the 
line  of  march  with  his  cavalry.  Each  of  these  meas- 
ures is  vitally  connected  with  the  safe  withdrawal  of 
the  main  body  in  the  first  stage  of  the  march,  and  the 
attention  of  the  rear  guard  commander  should  be 
called  to  them.  However,  he  is,  and  should  be,  al- 
lowed absolute  freedom  as  to  the  manner  in  which  he 
will  dispose  of  his  force  in  carrying  out  these  orders. 

It  is  difficult  to  state  the  location  of  the  command- 
ing officer  in  a  retreat.  His  movements  will  depend 
greatly  on  the  changing  situation.  At  one  moment 
his  presence  will  be  needed  near  the  rear  guard,  at 
another  with  the  main  body.  So  it  is  not  generally 
possible  to  state  any  but  his  first  position  in  the  or- 
ders. When  he  quits  his  position  some  one  should  be 
left  behind  to  direct  messengers  to  his  new  position. 
Early  on  the  morning  of  the  16th,  Colonel  A  will  ride 


152       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

to  Pilot  Knob  to  observe  towards  the  enemy,  but  his 
later  movements  can  not  be  foreseen  with  any  cer- 
tainty, and  he  makes  no  attempt  to  state  them  in  his 
orders. 

Were  Colonel  A  to  move  his  command  directly  to 
the  rear  on  the  highway  from  17  to  47  he  might 
mask  the  fire  of  the  2d  Infantry  from  its  command- 
ing position  on  the  southern  outskirts  of  Kickapoo. 
To  avoid  this,  he  should  endeavor  to  clear  the  front 
of  the  position  and  march  the  regiment  by  one  of  its 
flanks.  The  roads  and  terrain  do  not  favor  this  to  the 
east  of  the  17  —  47  road,  but  he  may  be  able  to  pass 
the  right  flank  by  taking  the  17  —  19  —  23  road. 
Whether  or  not  he  can  do  this  will  depend  on  the  sit- 
uation when  the  main  body  reaches  17,  and  he  should 
not  attempt,  at  this  time,  to  give  any  orders  covering 
this  point.  It  would  be  attempting  to  arrange  mat- 
ters too  far  in  advance. 

Colonel  A's  orders,  if  placed  in  written  form  with 
the  troops  stated  in  the  margin,  would  be  as  follows: 

Field  Orders  1st  Infantry, 

No.  -  66a,  just  west  of  Leavenworth, 

15  July  —  ,  11:30  P.  M. 

Troops  1.     Nothing  new  has  been  heard 

/    N      T      j-        m  of  the  enemy.     Our  2d  Infantry 

(a)     Leadmg  Troops: 


CKAPOO 
Lieut.  A. 

«j  T>         ^  T   f          row  flt  8:30  a.  m..  where  it  will 
1  sec.  3d  Bn.  1st  Inf. 

occupy  a  position  to  hold  off  the 

(b}     Main  Body  —  in  order  enemy  until  the  arrival  of  the  re- 

of  march:  mainder  of  our  detachment  from 

Hq.  1st  Inf.  the  north. 

3d  Bn.  1st  Inf.  (less  2.     In    compliance    with    orders 

1  sec.)  just  received,  we  will  continue  to 

2d  Bn.  1st  Inf.  fall  back  slowly  on  KICKAPOO 


A  RETREAT  153 

(c)     Rear  Guard:  to-morrow,    delaying    the    enemy 

Lieut   Col   B  sufficiently  without  becoming  seri- 

1st  Bn.  1st  Inf.  ously  engaged>  to  permit  the  2d 

Mach.  Gun  Plat.  Infantry   to   occupy   its   position. 

Troop  A,  2d  Cav.  3'     (a)     The  leadinS  tro°Ps  wiU 

escort   the    field   train,    and    will 

loosen  the  flooring  of  all  bridges  on  the  line  of  march  of  the  main 
body,  and  collect  material  for  burning  the  same. 

(b)  The  main  body  will  march  from  camp  at  4 :30  a.  m.  and 
follow  the  66a — 14 — H — 17  road. 

(c)  The  rear  guard  will  delay  the  enemy  for  at  least  two 
hours  between  here  and  KICKAPOO,  but  will  avoid  becoming 
seriously  engaged.     The  present  outpost  position  will  be  held  as 
long  as  practicable.     Touch  with  the  hostile  main  body  must  not 
be  lost  and  the  cavalry  should  specially  guard  the  right  flank  of 
the  line  of  march. 

4.  The  field  train  will  leave  camp  at  2:30  a.  m.  and  will 
proceed  directly  to  KICKAPOO. 

5.  The  regimental  commander  will  be  at  PILOT  KNOB  aft- 
er 4  a.  m. 

By  order  of  Colonel  A: 

X. 
Captain  &  Adjutant. 

Verbally  to  staff,  Lt.-Col.  B,  commanders  of  2d  and  3d  Bns. 
and  Lieut.  A.     Copy  (or  message)  to  General  B  at  Kickapoo. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

A  RETREAT. 

PROBLEM. 
(See  2-inch  map). 

The  hostile  town  of  Leavenworth  is  garrisoned  by 
a  Blue  force  of  all  arms.  It  is  reported  that  the  ene- 
my is  concentrating  a  force  of  all  arms  at  Easton. 

March  15,  Colonel  A  was  ordered  to  take  the  1st 
Infantry  and  the  1st  Squadron,  15th  Cavalry,  and 
reconnoiter  towards  Easton  to  determine  the  correct- 
ness of  this  report.  As  the  detachment  approached 
78,  the  cavalry  reported  that  it  had  found  the  bridges 
over  the  Big  Stranger  near  Easton  held  by  the  enemy. 
A  half  hour  later,  as  the  detachment  approached  82, 
another  message  was  received  from  the  cavalry,  say- 
ing Easton  is  occupied  by  hostile  infantry.  Colonel 
A  continued  his  advance,  and  at  1  p.  m.,  when  the 
point  of  the  advance  guard  (1st  Battalion,  less  Com- 
panies C  and  D,  and  1  platoon  of  cavalry)  is  at  the 
bend  in  the  road  a  mile  and  a  half  west  of  84,  and  the 
head  of  the  wagon  train  approaching  82,  the  follow- 
ing message  is  received  from  the  squadron  command- 
er, sent  from  near  Q  at  12:50  p.  m. : 

"A  patrol,  sent  through  Millwood,  reports  a  hostile  column 
of  all  arms,  apparently  about  a  brigade,  advancing  from  the 
northwest.  The  infantry  point  of  this  column  is  now  approach- 
ing 89  (1%  miles  north  of  Easton)  on  the  Millwood — Easton 
road.  I  can  see  hostile  cavalry,  apparently  a  squadron,  ap- 
proaching Lowemont  on  the  Millwood — Lowemont  road.  I  will 
move  to  the  crossroads  at  P." 


A  RETREAT  155 

At  the  same  time  this  message  is  received,  the  ad- 
vance guard  commander  reports  hostile  infantry 
scouts  on  the  spur  south  of  S,  and  an  advancing  col- 
umn of  hostile  infantry  crossing  the  Big  Stranger 
on  the  U — T  road. 

Required  : 

Colonel  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 
His  orders. 

SOLUTION. 

Colonel  A's  original  mission  was  to  secure  infor- 
mation of  the  reported  concentration  at  Easton,  and 
his  reconnaissance  has  shown  the  report  to  be  correct. 
He  has  learned  that  Easton  is  now  occupied  by  in- 
fantry and  that  a  column  of  all  arms  is  approaching 
the  village  from  the  north.  He  has  secured  this  in- 
formation without  fighting,  but  his  command  is  now 
in  a  dangerous  situation  that  may  rapidly  become  crit- 
ical, and  his  immediate  mission  is  to  get  it  to  a  place  of 
safety.  If  he  is  to  succeed  in  this,  he  must  at  once  be- 
gin a  well  conducted  retreat.  With  the  enemy  in 
greatly  superior  force  advancing  against  him  in  front, 
and  hostile  cavalry  equal  in  strength  to  his  own  ap- 
proaching his  flank  and  rear,  delaying  in  his  present 
position,  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  more  definite  infor- 
mation of  the  enemy's  strength,  is  too  hazardous  to  be 
undertaken. 

The  cavalry  reported  Easton  occupied  by  infantry 
only,  but  it  failed  to  determine  the  size  of  the  force. 
However,  as  a  part  or  all  of  this  force  is  now  moving 
out  of  the  town  against  Colonel  A's  advance  guard,  it 
is  probable  that  more  will  soon  be  known  of  its 
strength.  This  force  appears  to  be  aggressively  dis- 


156       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

posed,  and  well  it  may  be,  if  it  even  approximates 
Colonel  A's  strength,  for  the  head  of  a  strong  rein- 
forcing column  of  infantry  and  artillery  is  but  little 
more  than  a  mile  behind  it.  Colonel  A  is  in  hostile 
territory,  and  the  enemy  may  be  well  informed  of  his 
strength.  If  so,  it  may  be  his  intention  to  use  the  in- 
fantry in  Easton,  and  his  cavalry,  to  hold  the  Blue 
detachment 'to  its  position  until  his  main  column  can 
get  up  and  join  in  the  fight.  However,  whatever  his 
intentions,  the  situation  most  probably  will  develop  in 
this  way,  unless  Colonel  A  does  everything  possible  to 
avoid  a  fight. 

The  regiment  must  be  protected  from  attack  on  two 
sides.  If  the  hostile  cavalry  gets  between  Colonel  A 
and  Leavenworth,  or  even  within  striking  distance  of 
his  flank,  it  may  delay  him  until  he  is  overtaken  by 
the  pursuing  infantry.  His  squadron  must  be  sent  at 
once  to  get  in  front  of  the  hostile  cavalry  and  oppose 
its  advance.  By  this  time,  the  squadron  probably  is 
at  the  crossroads  at  P,  a  good  point  to  move  from  to 
meet  the  hostile  squadron,  which  may  advance  via  the 
69 — O — P  road,  or  the  Lowemont — N  road.  Infan- 
try would  be  of  little  or  no  assistance  to  the  squadron 
on  such  a  mission,  for  it  could  not  keep  up  with  the 
squadron,  and  the  hostile  cavalry  could  ride  around  it. 
Instead  of  dispersing  the  infantry  in  this  way,  it  is 
better  to  hold  it  together  in  one  column,  and  send  out  a 
company  or  more  to  a  short  distance,  only  as  the  ne- 
cessity arises;  as,  for  example,  to  drive  away  the  hos- 
tile cavalry  should  it  get  in  rear,  or  on  the  immediate 
flank  of  the  line  of  march. 

Protection  from  the  force  advancing  from  Easton 
must  be  furnished  by  a  rear  guard,  and  it  should  be 


A  RETREAT  157 

formed  in  the  quickest  possible  way.  This  will  be  by 
facing  the  column  to  the  rear  and  letting  the  original 
advance  guard  serve  as  a  rear  guard.  It  may  or  may 
not  be  reinforced  by  the  remaining  two  companies  of 
the  battalion,  but,  if  left  with  its  present  strength  of 
two  companies  and  a  platoon  of  cavalry,  there  proba- 
bly will  be  less  danger  of  a  serious  fight  with  the  pur- 
suing enemy,  and  the  remaining  two  companies  may 
be  sent  to  the  assistance  of  the  rear  guard  at  any  time 
this  becomes  necessary.  However,  the  delaying  pow- 
er of  the  rear  guard  will  be  considerably  increased  by 
the  addition  of  the  machine  gun  platoon,  and  it  should 
be  sent  to  join  it  at  once. 

The  controlling  idea  in  the  retreat  should  be  to 
place  distance  between  the  detachment  and  the  enemy, 
and  a  wise  choice  of  roads  will  assist  in  doing  this.  If 
the  detachment  returns  by  the  road  it  came  out  (via 
82,  78,  76,  74 ),  it  needlessly  gives  the  hostile  cavalry 
an  opportunity  to  check  its  retreat  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  road  junctions  at  78,  76  and  74.  But  the  84 — 
90 — 94 — 100  road  will  take  Colonel  A  farther  away 
from  the  hostile  cavalry,  and  give  him  a  better  chance 
of  avoiding  it.  If  he  succeeds  in  eluding  the  pursu- 
ing force  until  his  rear  guard  has  passed  the  bridge 
over  Salt  creek  at  100,  he  will  be  comparatively  safe, 
for  the  hostile  cavalry  will  find  it  difficult  to  operate 
in  the  broken  and  wooded  country  south  of  Salt  creek, 
and  the  pursuing  infantry  will  not  be  able  to  make  a 
rapid  advance  against  the  rear  guard  occupying  posi- 
tions on  the  slopes  east  of  100.  Moreover,  the  detach- 
ment will  be  approaching  the  sphere  of  action  of  the 
Leavenworth  garrison,  from  which  it  may  expect  sup- 
port. As  soon  as  the  retreat  is  started,  and  Colonel  A 


158       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

has  the  opportunity,  he  should  inform  his  command- 
ing officer  at  Leavenworth  of  the  situation. 

The  position  of  the  detachment  favors  its  turning 
south  to  the  90 — 100  road.  The  main  body  can  march 
by  the  84 — 90  road,  and  the  wagon  train  by  the  82 — 
92  road.  From  92  the  train  may  move  east  via  96 
and  100,  and  precede  the  infantry  without  causing  the 
latter  any  delay  at  the  outset;  but  it  will  be  better  to 
have  the  train  turn  south  at  94  and  follow  the  110 — 
108 — 104  road,  thereby  placing  the  main  body  be- 
tween it  and  the  hostile  cavalry.  It  should  be  accom- 
panied by  a  special  escort  of  a  company  or  a  platoon. 

The  pursuing  infantry  must  not  be  allowed  to  get 
in  range  of  the  column  while  it  is  making  its  flank 
march  on  the  84 — 90  road.  Consequently,  the  rear 
guard  should  not  let  the  enemy  cross  the  ravine  about 
1200  yards  west  of  the  84 — 90  road  until  the  tail  of 
the  main  body  has  passed  St.  Joseph's  church.  The 
relative  positions  of  the  two  forces  are  such  that  the 
rear  guard  should  succeed  in  doing  this.  Besides,  the 
successive  ridges  between  the  T — 88  and  the  84 — 90 
roads  afford  splendid  positions  where  the  rear  guard 
may  fight  delaying  actions. 

Colonel  A's  decision  is  to  retreat  immediately,  with 
the  infantry  via  the  84 — 90 — 100  road,  and  with  the 
field  train  via  the  94 — 110 — 108 — 104  road,  convert- 
ing the  present  advance  guard  reinforced  by  the  ma- 
chine guns  into  a  rear  guard,  and  sending  the  cavalry 
squadron  to  oppose  the  hostile  cavalry. 

We  will  assume  that  Colonel  A  is  with  the  main 
body.  He  gives  the  following  verbal  order  to  the 
lieutenant-colonel,  who  has  not  seen  the  last  messages 
from  the  cavalry  and  advance  guard  commanders,  but 
is  otherwise  familiar  with  the  situation: 


A  RETREAT  159 

"A  hostile  column  of  infantry  and  artillery,  estimated  at 
about  a  brigade,  is  approaching  Easton  from  the  north.  The 
head  of  the  column  is  near  89.  About  a  squadron  of  hostile  cav- 
alry was  approaching  Lowemont  on  the  Millwood — Lowemont 
road  ten  minutes  ago.  A  column  of  hostile  infantry,  advancing 
on  the  U — T  road,  is  crossing  the  Big  Stranger.  Our  squadron 
is  moving  from  near  Q  to  the  cross-road  at  P. 

"We  will  withdraw  to  Leaven  worth  at  once. 

"The  advance  guard  will  now  act  as  rear  guard. 

"The  cavalry  will  oppose  the  hostile  cavalry. 

"Send  the  machine  gun  platoon  to  reinforce  the  rear  guard, 
and  march  the  main  body  via  the  84 — QO — 100 — Zimmerman 
road.  Turn  the  field  train  south  at  82  and  have  it  withdraw  via 
the  92 — 94 — 110 — 108 — 104  road,  with  an  escort  of  one  pla- 
toon. 

"I  will  now  join  the  rear  guard." 

Colonel  A  then  addresses  his  adjutant  as  follows: 

"Find  the  cavalry  commander,  explain  the  situation  and  my 
intentions  to  him,  and  direct  him  to  prevent  the  hostile  cavalry 
from  interfering  with  our  retreat." 

The  colonel  then  rides  forward  to  the  advance 
guard  commander  and  gives  him  the  following  order: 

"About  a  brigade  of  hostile  infantry  with  artillery  is  advan- 
cing on  Easton  from  the  north.  The  head  of  the  column  was 
approaching  89  at  12:50  p.  m.  At  the  same  hour  about  a  squad- 
ron of  hostile  cavalry  was  approaching  Lowemont  on  the  Mill- 
wood— Lowemont  road.  Our  squadron  is  in  the  vicinity  of  P. 

"We  will  withdraw  to  Leavenworth  at  once. 

"The  main  body  will  march  via  the  84 — 90 — 100  road;  the 
field  train  via  the  82 — 92 — 94 — 110 — 108 — 104  road. 

"The  cavalry  will  oppose  the  hostile  cavalry. 

"Your  advance  guard  will  now  become  the  rear  guard.  You 
will  hold  the  enemy  west  of  this  ravine  (indicating  the  water 
course  1200  yards  west  of  84)  until  the  main  body  has  passed 
St.  Joseph's  church,  and  will  then  follow  the  column.  The  ma- 
chine gun  platoon  will  join  you  in  a  few  moments. 

"I  will  be  near  here  for  the  present." 


160       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Something  should  be  said  of  the  effect  the  hostile 
artillery  may  have  on  the  retreat.  The  artillery  proba- 
bly is  marching  with  the  main  body  of  the  hostile  col- 
umn, and  was  about  a  mile  and  a  half  north  of  89 
at  12:50  p.  m.  The  1100  hill,  southeast  of  82,  is  the 
nearest  point  from  which  it  may  fire  effectively  on 
the  retreating  column.  Most  of  the  road  from  92  to 
100  is  visible  from  this  hill  top.  From  the  position  of 
the  artillery  at  12:50  p.  m.  to  the  top  of  this  hill  the 
distance  is  about  8  miles,  and  should  the  artillery  hast- 
en ahead,  trotting  where  practicable,  it  could  reach 
the  hill  and  be  in  position  in  about  an  hour  and  a  half, 
say  by  2:15  p.  m.  At  that  hour,  the  tail  of  the  regi- 
ment will  be  passing  the  cemetery  on  the  94 — 96  road, 
and  the  column  will  make  a  splendid  target  for  the  ar- 
tillery. Should  the  situation  develop  in  this  way,  the 
rear  guard  might  have  to  hold  on  to  the  1100  hill,  sac- 
rificing itself  if  necessary,  to  permit  the  main  body  to 
reach  safety. 

COMMENTS. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  the  usual  rule  was  fol- 
lowed and  all  the  cavalry  of  the  retreating  force  was 
placed  in  the  rear  guard.  That  was  done  to  insure 
tactical  cooperation  between  the  rear  guard  and  the 
cavalry,  in  a  situation  such  that  it  appeared  they  would 
be  operating  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  each  other. 
In  this  problem  the  cavalry  is  made  independent  be- 
cause its  special  mission  promises  to  take  it  far  from 
the  scene  of  operations  of  the  rear  guard.  Should  la- 
ter developments  bring  the  cavalry  and  rear  guard 
together  in  such  manner  that  their  missions  become 
identical,  and  it  is  desirable  to  have  closer  tactical  co- 


A  RETREAT  161 

operation  between  the  two,  this  may  be  secured  by 
placing  the  cavalry  under  the  orders  of  the  rear  guard 
commander  at  that  time. 

Also,  it  is  important  that  the  cavalry  should  get  its 
orders  without  delay,  which  would  not  be  the  case  if  it 
had  to  wait  until  Colonel  A  had  given  his  orders  to  the 
rear  guard  commander,  and  the  latter  had  repeated 
them  to  the  cavalry  commander. 

With  the  hostile  cavalry  threatening  the  flank  of 
the  retreating  column,  the  field  train  would  be  in 
great  danger  should  it  precede  the  main  body.  Should 
the  hostile  cavalry,  even  in  small  numbers,  succeed  in 
reaching  the  bridge  at  100  ahead  of  the  train,  great 
delay  could  be  caused  the  wagons  by  damage  to  the 
bridge ;  such  damage,  however,  could  not  so  affect  the 
march  of  the  main  body,  for  the  creek  is  fordable  for 
infantry,  although  its  steep  banks  make  it  impassable 
for  wagons.  Fortunately,  this  difficulty  could  be 
avoided  by  turning  the  train  on  to  a  road  parallel  to 
that  taken  by  the  main  body,  and  on  the  protected 
flank. 

Until  the  main  body  is  in  the  vicinity  of  100,  be- 
yond artillery  range  from  hill  1100  east  of  the  82 — 92 
road,  Colonel  A  should  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that 
he  may  have  to  reinforce  the  rear  guard.  It  might  be 
well,  even,  to  leave  the  remaining  two  companies  of 
the  1st  Battalion  in  the  vicinity  of  that  hill,  from 
which  position  they  could  go  quickly  to  the  assistance 
of  the  rear  guard. 

In  his  orders  to  the  rear  guard,  Colonel  A  has  men- 
tioned only  the  necessity  of  keeping  the  hostile  infan- 
try away  from  the  flank  of  the  column  while  it  is 
marching  from  84  to  90,  but  this  will  not  prevent  him 


162       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

from  ordering  a  more  stubborn  resistance  on  the  spurs 
west  of  the  84 — 90  road,  if  the  developments  of  the 
next  half  hour  show  this  to  be  practicable  and  desira- 
ble. The  longer  the  enemy  is  delayed  west  of  this 
road,  the  shorter  the  time  the  rear  guard  will  have  to 
stand  on  the  1100  hill  north  of  92  to  prevent  the  hos- 
tile artillery  from  firing  on  the  column. 

Important  orders  should,  as  a  rule,  be  sent  to  a  dis- 
tant commander  in  writing,  for  a  verbal  order  is  liable 
to  undergo  fatal  changes  in  the  transmission,  even 
though  it  be  delivered  by  an  experienced  officer.  But 
the  situation  often  will  arise  where  time  is  such  an 
important  factor  that  we  cannot  afford  to  delay  to 
write  the  message.  In  such  a  case,  the  message  should 
be  sent  by  the  most  experienced  available  person,  pref- 
erably by  an  officer,  especially  if  it  is  at  all  complicat- 
ed. Consequently,  Colonel  A  sent  his  adjutant  with 
the  orders  for  the  cavalry. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

A  REAR  GUARD. 

SITUATION. 

(See  2  and  4-inch  maps). 

The  situation  is  the  continuation  of  that  given  in 
Chapters  V,  VII  and  X. 

The  1st  Infantry  and  Troop  A,  2d  Cavalry  (Blue) 
reached  Kickapoo,  from  the  north,  the  afternoon  of 
July  14,  and  took  quarters  there  for  the  night.  Dur- 
ing the  night,  Colonel  A  (the  detachment  command- 
er) learned  that  the  enemy  contemplated  moving  a 
force  to  Leavenworth,  over  the  Missouri  Pacific  rail- 
road from  the  south.  To  interfere  with  this  move- 
ment, the  command  moved  to  the  south  of  Leaven- 
worth,  July  15,  destroying  the  railroad  bridges  on 
the  way.  When  about  5  miles  south  of  Leavenworth, 
it  was  forced  to  fall  back  before  a  superior  hostile 
force,  estimated  as  being  2  regiments  of  infantry  and 
2  troops  of  cavalry.  It  bivouacked  just  south  of  66a, 
with  outposts  occupying  night  positions  as  follows : 

One  platoon  of  Company  A  at  216;  the  remaining 
platoon  of  Company  A  at  214;  one  platoon  of  Com- 
pany B  at  212;  the  remaining  platoon  of  Company  B 
at  210,  with  a  detached  post  of  20  men  at  Pilot  Knob. 
One  platoon  of  Troop  A  is  distributed  among  the  in- 
fantry supports  at  216,  214,  and  212,  and  another 
platoon  of  Troop  A  is  at  138. 

During  the  night  Colonel  A  received  the  following 
message  from  his  superior  commander,  General  B : 


164       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

"Continue  your  retreat  July  16,  and,  without  becoming  seri- 
ously engaged,  check  the  enemy's  pursuit  sufficiently  to  permit 
the  2d  Infantry,  which  will  reach  Kickapoo  at  8 :30  a.  m.  to  occu- 
py a  position  on  the  southern  edge  of  Kickapoo,  where  the  enemy 
will  be  opposed  until  the  arrival  of  the  remainder  of  the  detach- 
ment from  the  north." 

Accordingly,  Colonel  A  issued  orders  at  11:30  p. 
m.  to  fall  back  slowly  on  Kickapoo,  July  16,  without 
becoming  seriously  engaged,  but  delaying  the  enemy 
sufficiently  to  permit  the  2d  Infantry  to  get  into  po- 
sition. The  field  train  will  leave  camp  at  2 :30  a.  m., 
with  a  small  escort  which  is  to  loosen  the  flooring  of 
the  bridges  along  the  route  and  collect  material  for 
burning  the  same.  The  main  body  is  to  start  from 
the  camp  at  4:30  a.  m.,  and  proceed  via  the  66a — 14 — 
G — H — Kickapoo  road. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  B  is  to  command  the  rear  guard, 
consisting  of  the  1st  Battalion,  machine  gun  platoon, 
and  Troop  A.  He  is  to  delay  the  enemy  for  at  least 
two  hours  between  the  outpost  position  and  Kickapoo, 
but  is  to  avoid  becoming  seriously  engaged.  The  out- 
post position  is  to  be  held  as  long  as  practicable,  and 
the  cavalry  is  to  guard  the  right  of  the  line  of  march 
and  keep  in  touch  with  the  hostile  main  body. 
Required : 

Lieutenant-Colonel  B's  estimate  of  the  situation 
and  orders  for  the  rear  guard,  on  the  supposition  that 
he  receives  no  further  information  regarding  the  ene- 
my before  4  a.  m. 

SOLUTION  AND  DISCUSSION. 

We  may  find  in  this  solution  a  repetition  of  much 
that  was  said  in  Chapter  X,  for  the  two  situations 
run  into  each  other.  The  repetition  may  be  tiresome, 


A  REAR  GUARD  165 

but  it  will  not  be  wholly  without  value  if  it  serves  to 
fix  more  firmly  in  our  minds  some  of  the  principles 
governing  a  retreat  and  rear  guard  action. 

In  a  simple  retreat,  the  mission  of  a  rear  guard  is  to 
cover  the  remainder  of  the  command,  to  accomplish 
which  it  has  only  to  delay  the  enemy  sufficiently  to 
prevent  him  from  getting  in  range  of  the  main  body. 
If  the  pursuing  force  is  a  small  command,  such  as  we 
are  here  dealing  with,  it  will  not  dare  split  up  and  pur- 
sue by  two  or  more  roads  widely  separated,  but  will 
generally  follow  directly  on  the  heels  of  its  retreating 
opponent ;  and,  unless  the  pursuers  have  superior  cav- 
alry, they  will  have  little  chance  of  overtaking  their 
foe  until  the  latter  so  desires.  With  large  commands 
of  all  three  arms  the  problem  becomes  much  more 
complicated. 

But  Lieutenant-Colonel  B  has  no  such  simple  task, 
for,  in  addition  to  protecting  the  main  body  of  the 
regiment,  he  is  ordered  to  delay  the  enemy  for  at  least 
two  hours  between  his  present  position  and  Kickapoo. 

(•) 

Moreover,  his  task  is  further  complicated  by  the 
superior  strength  of  the  hostile  cavalry,  and  the  addi- 
tional order  to  accomplish  this  delay  without  becoming 
seriously  engaged.  If  we  will  again  refer  to  the 
orders  issued  by  Colonel  A  (*)  we  will  not  fail  to 
note  that  he  twice  emphasized  the  importance  of  not 

*  This  is  on  the  supposition  that  the  enemy  will  renew  the  pursuit 
at  about  the  same  hour  that  Colonel  A  resumes  his  retreat.    Of  course, 
if  the  enemy  should  not  start  until  some  time  later,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
B 's  task  will  be  simpler.    But  Lieutenant-Colonel  B,  as  well  as  Colonel 
A,  quite  properly  took  a  more  unfavorable  view  of  the  enemy's  proba- 
ble intentions,  when  making  his  arrangement  for  the  retreat. 

*  See  page  149. 


166       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

involving  the  command  in  a  serious  engagement,  and 
in  such  manner  as  to  indicate  clearly  that  this  was  the 
expressed  wish  of  General  B.  In  other  words,  the 
safety  of  the  regiment  is  still  of  paramount  import- 
ance, and  the  delay  of  two  hours,  although  very  de- 
sirable, is  but  a  secondary  consideration.  It  is  of  more 
importance  to  General  B  that  the  regiment  should 
reach  Kickapoo  ahead  of  the  2d  Infantry  but  intact, 
than  to  have  it  reach  there  an  hour  or  so  later  but  de- 
moralized by  defeat  and  reduced  in  numbers.  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel B  must  not  for  a  moment  lose  sight 
of  this  important  limitation  on  his  actions. 

In  general,  a  rear  guard  will  accomplish  its  pur- 
pose as  a  delaying  force  by  occupying  one  defensive 
position  after  another  in  succession,  along  the  line  of 
march  wherever  the  terrain  is  favorable.  Its  defen- 
sive attitude  will  compel  the  enemy  first  to  reconnoiter 
the  position,  then  to  bring  up  an  adequate  force  to  at- 
tack it,  and  finally  to  deploy  this  force  from  column 
of  march  to  battle  formation.  All  this  requires  time 
and  secures  the  delay  the  rear  guard  is  seeking.  If 
the  positions  are  chosen  with  good  judgment,  and,  if 
the  hostile  cavalry  can  be  kept  from  flank  and  rear 
(there  being  no  artillery),  the  rear  guard  should  be 
able  to  force  the  deployment  of  the  enemy  and  then 
withdraw  to  another  position  without  suffering  loss- 
es of  any  consequence. 

The  withdrawal,  however,  must  be  made  at  the 
proper  moment.  If  it  is  put  off  too  long,  the  rear 
guard  will  suffer  heavily  in  getting  away,  and  it  may 
be  tied  to  the  position  and  destroyed.  Troops  on  the 
defensive,  especially  when  the  attacker  has  no  artillery, 
have  comparatively  few  losses  in  the  opening  stage  of 


A  REAR  GUARD  167 

an  engagement  when  the  enemy  is  maneuvering  his 
troops  into  position  for  the  attack.  The  real  losses 
are  inflicted  after  the  attacker  completes  his  deploy- 
ment and  begins  the  advance  with  the  entire  force, 
and  they  are  liable  to  be  specially  severe  after  the  de- 
fender is  driven  from  his  position,  particularly  so  if 
he  has  held  on  to  it  stubbornly  until  the  attacker  is 
quite  near.  Consequently,  each  position  should  be  held 
only  until  the  enemy's  dispositions  for  carrying  or 
turning  it  become  so  developed  as  to  insure  his  suc- 
cess. Then  the  rear  guard  should  move  rapidly  off 
to  repeat  the  same  maneuver  on  the  next  suitable 
ground. 

Let  us  illustrate  this  with  the  situation  before  us. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  B  is  ordered  to  make  his  first  stand 
on  the  Pilot  Knob  ridge.  Early  in  the  morning  of 
July  16  the  enemy  resumes  his  advance.  He  will  not 
fail  to  note  how  this  ridge  commands  all  the  surround- 
ing country,  and  his  advance  will  be  cautious  (i.  e. 
slow)  until  his  cavalry  and  infantry  patrols  have 
gained  its  crest.  When  these  patrols  have  drawn  fire 
and  been  checked  at  all  points  of  the  ridge  from  the 
Pilot  Knob  spur  to  the  spur  northwest  of  142  the  ene- 
my may  be  sure  that  the  ridge  is  held,  but  he  will  be 
in  doubt  as  to  the  force  occupying  it.  This  force  may 
be  but  a  few  scattering  detachments,  it  may  be  the 
Blue  rear  guard,  and  it  may  be  the  entire  Blue  regi- 
ment, reinforced  during  the  night,  and  the  only  cer- 
tain and  speedy  way  to  clear  up  this  uncertainty  is  to 
attack.  Once  the  enemy  has  discovered  the  fact  that 
he  has  but  a  rear  guard  in  his  front,  as  will  be  the  case 
when  Lieutenant-Colonel  B  is  driven  from  the  ridge, 
he  may  act  with  great  boldness  in  his  attacks,  but  in 


168       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

this  first  attack  of  the  day  it  will  not  be  surprising  if 
he  deploys  his  entire  force  for  a  determined  attack 
against  Pilot  Knob  or  some  other  part  of  the  ridge. 
It  has  taken  the  hostile  patrols  some  ten  or  fifteen 
minutes  to  get  their  information,  and  the  hostile  com- 
mander has  been  five  or  ten  minutes  more  in  reaching 
his  decision  and  giving  his  orders  for  the  attack.  In 
the  meantime,  he  may  have  had  a  part  of  his  force 
(say  the  advance  guard)  deploy  and  begin  to  advance 
from  the  race  track  towards  Pilot  Knob.  This  will 
draw  the  fire  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  B's  machine  guns 
and  the  advance  probably  will  not  proceed  far  before 
it  will  be  ordered  to  stop  and  await  the  deployment 
and  support  of  the  remainder  of  the  force.  This  may 
be  moved  to  one  flank  or  the  other  of  the  force  al- 
ready deployed,  let  us  say  to  its  right  flank,  down 
Five  Mile  creek  and  through  the  southern  outskirts  of 
Leavenworth,  under  such  cover  as  it  can  find.  It  will 
move  across  country  and,  whether  in  column  or  de- 
ployed, its  progress  will  be  slow.  We  can  safely  say 
that  at  the  very  least  another  half  hour  will  elapse  be- 
fore the  whole  force  will  be  deployed  and  ready  to 
make  the  decisive  attack. 

The  engagement  probably  would  not  follow  these 
exact  lines,  but  the  time  element  would  be  practically 
the  same  however  the  attack  should  be  made.  The 
time  that  elapses  between  contact  with  the  enemy  in 
position  and  the  termination  of  the  attack  on  that  posi- 
tion increases  with  the  size  of  the  command  and  may  be 
divided  into  two  periods — the  time  required  to  deploy 
the  command  and  place  it  on  the  line  from  which  the 
decisive  attack  is  to  be  made,  and  the  time  from  then 
until  the  decisive  attack  succeeds,  is  brought  to  a 


A  REAR  GUARD  169 

standstill,  or  is  thrown  back.  A  rear  guard  fighting 
a  delaying  action  should  not  put  off  its  withdrawal 
beyond  the  termination  of  the  first  period,  for,  aside 
from  the  danger  of  being  cut  off,  it  will  suffer  losses 
in  the  second  period  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  delay 
it  imposes  on  the  enemy. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  B  may  feel  quite  confident  he 
will  be  able  to  delay  the  hostile  column  for  at  least 
an  hour  in  his  present  outpost  position,  and  if  he  de- 
lays the  enemy  for  another  hour,  in  other  positions 
farther  to  the  rear,  he  will  accomplish  his  full  mission. 
These  latter  positions  cannot  be  chosen  definitely  at 
this  time  (11 :30  p.  m.) .  Our  lieutenant-colonel  should 
study  his  map  and  tentatively  select  a  number  of  po- 
sitions along  the  line  of  march  that  appear  suited  to 
his  purpose,  but  orders  to  occupy  them  should  not  be 
issued  until  it  is  clear  such  occupation  is  necessary  and 
possible.  The  character  of  the  hostile  pursuit  plays  a 
very  large  part  in  determining  where  the  rear  guard 
can  make  a  stand. 

When  the  terrain  and  other  conditions  permit,  each 
position  should  be  far  enough  from  the  one  in  which 
the  last  stand  was  made  to  induce  the  pursuing  enemy 
again  to  form  column  on  the  road  rather  than  march 
his  deployed  command  a  long  distance  across  coun- 
try. If  the  positions  are  too  near  each  other,  the  ene- 
my may  continue  his  advance  with  a  part  of  his  com- 
mand deployed,  the  rear  guard  will  not  Be  given  time 
enough  to  recover  from  its  disorder,  the  position  will 
be  hastily  occupied,  and  there  is  danger  that  the  rear 
guard  will  be  tied  to  the  position  by  the  closely  pur- 
suing enemy. 

There  should  be  enough  distance  between  the  posi- 


170       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

tions  to  permit  the  rear  guard  to  shake  itself  loose 
from  the  enemy,  and  occupy  the  next  position  with 
due  deliberation  before  the  enemy  can  begin  his  de- 
ployment for  the  new  attack.  To  illustrate  this  let  us 
return  to  our  hypothetical  attack.  The  enemy's  re- 
serve probably  will  be  still  intact,  and  in  the  vicinity 
of  226,  when  the  rear  guard  begins  its  withdrawal 
from  Pilot  Knob.  (If  the  attack  had  been  made 
against  the  right  of  the  rear  guard,  this  reserve  would 
be  similarly  located  on  the  other  flank.)  The  enemy 
certainly  will  not  lose  valuable  time  waiting  for  his 
original  advance  guard  (now  deployed  and  fighting) 
to  reform  column,  and  it  cannot  pursue  with  any  vig- 
or in  its  present  deployed  formation.  His  best  plan 
probably  will  be  to  form  a  new  advance  guard  of  his 
assembled  reserve  and  resume  the  pursuit  at  once  via 
224,  the  remainder  of  his  command  to  follow  as  soon 
as  it  has  assembled  and  reformed.  This  new  advance 
guard  should  be  so  close  on  the  heels  of  the  retreating 
rear  guard  that  the  latter  probably  will  not  be  able  to 
occupy  a  new  position  until  it  has  crossed  to  the  north 
side  of  the  56 — 60  road. 

Between  this  road  and  Government  hill  there  are 
two  fairly  good  positions  for  the  rear  guard,  if  the 
enemy  should  continue  his  pursuit  via  the  66a — 60 
road.  One  of  these  (see  the  4-inch  map)  is  along  the 
edge  of  the  woods  on  the  spur  just  north  of  the  56 — 
60  road,  and  the  other  is  along  the  spur  followed  by 
the  tramway  to  the  stone  quarry.  The  first  position 
is  the  better.  It  overlooks  the  valley  of  Three  Mile 
creek  from  54  to  Leavenworth,  and  an  attempted 
turning  movement  by  the  enemy  could  be  seen  when 
still  some  distance  away;  it  has  a  good  field  of  fire 


A  REAR  GUARD  171 

to  the  east  and  west,  but  the  field  to  the  south  is  ob- 
structed by  the  fringe  of  timber  along  Three  Mile 
creek;  and  the  rear  guard  may  be  withdrawn  under 
cover  of  the  woods  along  the  trail  on  top  of  the  ridge 
to  16.  In  the  second  position,  the  field  of  fire  is  good 
to  the  south  and  east,  but  the  enemy  could  move  under 
cover  and  easily  turn  the  right  of  the  position.  Neith- 
er of  these  positions  would  be  of  great  value,  should 
the  enemy  continue  north  from  224  through  Leaven- 
worth,  and  advance  from  the  vicinity  of  the  U.  S. 
Penitentiary  towards  Atchison  Cross.  In  this  event, 
the  best  position  probably  would  be  along  the  railroad 
cuts  and  in  the  edge  of  the  woods  near  14,  facing 
Leavenworth. 

Whatever  position  Lieutenant-Colonel  B  takes  up 
in  this  vicinity,  he  must  so  time  and  shape  his  with- 
drawal from  it  as  to  permit  the  rear  guard  to  get  un- 
der cover  or  beyond  rifle  range  before  the  enemy 
reaches  the  top  of  Southwest  hill — Government  hill 
— Atchison  hill  ridge ;  otherwise  the  rear  guard  would 
suffer  heavily  in  getting  away. 

The  enemy  would  have  such  a  good  field  of  fire 
to  the  north  and  west  from  this  ridge  that  the  rear 
guard  should  not  attempt  to  make  a  stand  on  it;  but 
it  should  occupy  Sentinel  hill  instead.  This  lone  hill 
is  on  the  flank  of  the  line  of  march  and  within  easy 
range  of  it,  and  the  hostile  column  could  not  move 
along  the  road  at  its  base,  so  long  as  Lieutenant- Col- 
onel B  remained  in  undisturbed  possession  of  its  top. 
From  it  there  is  a  good  field  of  fire  to  the  east,  south 
and  west,  and  withdrawal  can  be  made  under  cover 
through  the  woods  on  the  northern  spur  of  the  hill  and 
along  Salt  creek.  In  fact,  if  Lieutenant-Colonel  B 


172       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

has  succeeded  in  causing  the  enemy  a  delay  of  an  hour 
or  more  at  Pilot  Knob,  he  may  move  directly  from 
there  to  Sentinel  hill  and  pass  by  the  inferior  inter- 
mediate positions.  Should  a  stand  be  made  here, 
the  rear  guard  will  have  to  wade  Salt  creek,  and  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel B  must  not  neglect  to  send  a  small  de- 
tachment to  remove  the  flooring  from  the  bridge  at 
H. 

It  is  worth  while  repeating  that,  in  this  considera- 
tion of  the  terrain  and  possible  positions  he  may  oc- 
cupy to  delay  the  enemy,  Lieutenant-Colonel  B  avoids 
all  effort  to  work  out  the  minor  details  of  his  tactical 
dispositions.  The  definite  selection  of  a  position,  the 
detailed  manner  in  which  it  will  be  occupied,  and  the 
later  conduct  of  the  withdrawal  are  all  matters  that 
can  not  be  decided  until  the  enemy's  movements  give 
some  idea  of  his  intentions. 

All  the  positions  our  lieutenant-colonel  has  consid- 
ered (with  the  possible  exception  of  the  one  along  the 
tramway)  afford  a  good  view  of  the  surrounding 
country  toward  the  enemy.  If  this  view  from  the  po- 
sition itself  is  supplemented  by  patrols  well  out  on 
its  flanks  and  by  efficient  cavalry  reconnaissance,  the 
rear  guard  should  be  in  no  danger  of  being  cut  off 
by  the  hostile  infantry  reaching  its  rear,  provided  it 
does  not  too  long  delay  its  withdrawal.  It  is  in  great 
danger,  however,  from  the  hostile  cavalry,  which  is 
double  the  strength  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  B's  caval- 
ry. Although  the  single  Blue  troop  probably  will 
not  be  able  to  hold  off  the  two  hostile  troops  indefin- 
itely, it  should,  at  the  very  least,  maintain  touch  with 
them,  and  keep  Lieutenant-Colonel  B  informed  of 
their  whereabouts;  and  if  they  should  attempt  to 


A  REAR  GUARD  173 

strike  the  rear  guard  or  main  body  in  flank,  it  should 
be  able  to  delay  them  sufficiently  to  save  the  infan- 
try from  surprise. 

The  hostile  cavalry  will  certainly  try  to  reach  the 
flank  or  rear  of  the  rear  guard  or  main  body,  ( * )  and 
it  is  free  to  choose  either  the  right  or  left  flank  for  its 
operations.  If  it  operates  on  the  right  flank  of  its 
column,  it  will  have  to  pass  through  the  town  of 
Leavenworth  where  its  march  may  easily  be  delayed; 
it  will  be  in  plain  view  from  the  ridge  to  the  west  when 
it  emerges  into  the  open  country  north  of  Leaven- 
worth,  and  its  movements  will  be  restricted  by  the 
nearness  of  the  Missouri  river.  Cavalry  should  have 
plenty  of  room  in  which  to  operate,  and  the  two  hos- 
tile troops  will  find  this  to  the  west  of  the  line  of 
march.  They  may  not  be  able  to  pass  immediately  in 
front  of  the  outpost  position  along  the  142 — 140  trail, 
but  they  should  be  able  to  move  via  the  next  road  to 
the  south.  If  they  should  leave  the  hostile  camp 
(which  probably  is  in  the  vicinity  of  190) ,  and  march 
at  sun  up  (4:30  a.  m.)  by  the  190 — 150 — 144 — 152 — 
134 — 140  road,  they  could  reach  138  (distant  about 
7  miles)  before  6  a.  m.,  if  unopposed.  That  portion 
of  the  rear  guard  which  had  occupied  the  Pilot  Knob 
position  would  not  have  recovered  its  organization, 
and  would  be  in  a  particularly  helpless  state,  if  sud- 
denly attacked  in  flank  by  these  two  hostile  troops. 

This  danger  was  foreseen  by  Colonel  A  when  he  or- 
dered Lieutenant-Colonel  B  specially  to  guard  the 
right  of  the  line  of  march  with  his  troop  of  cavalry. 
One  platoon  of  it  is  at  138  for  the  night,  one  platoon 
is  divided  amongst  the  infantry  supports  of  the  out- 

*  For  the  reason  see  Chapter  XIV. 


174       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

post,  and  the  remaining  two  platoons  are  in  camp  at 
66a.  All  the  troops,  except  the  few  absolutely  nec- 
essary detachments,  for  important  duty  elsewhere, 
should  be  assembled  early  in  the  morning  at  188,  and 
its  commander  should  be  given  the  clean  cut  mission 
of  protecting  the  right  flank  of  the  column  from  hos- 
tile cavalry.  Incidentally,  he  should  be  told  to  keep 
in  touch  with  the  hostile  main  body.  A  single  well  led 
patrol  will  be  ample  to  reconnoiter  between  the  line 
of  march  and  the  Missouri  river,  and  locate  the  hos- 
tile infantry  if  it  should  continue  through  the  town, 
or  the  hostile  cavalry  if  by  any  chance  it  is  sent  in  this 
direction;  in  the  event  of  the  latter,  Lieutenant-Col- 
onel B  may  have  to  notify  his  troop  to  move  from  his 
right  to  his  left  flank,  unless  the  troop  commander 
moves  there  on  his  own  initiative,  in  which  case  he 
would  of  course  report  his  movement  to  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  B.  Another  cavalry  patrol  for  the  rear 
point  is  desirable,  but  it  is  not  so  necessary  as  to  war- 
rant further  weakening  the  already  inferior  cavalry. 
It  is  useless  for  Lieutenant-Colonel  B  to  speculate 
now  as  to  just  where  the  two  hostile  troops  may  ap- 
pear to-morrow  on  his  flank  or  rear,  and  attempt  to 
make  dispositions  to  meet  them  with  his  infantry. 
They  may  move  east  on  the  136 — 66a,  the  50 — 68, 
the  52 — 60,  or  the  28 — 22  road;  or  they  may  move 
across  country  between  these  roads.  Any  attempt  to 
distribute  a  part  of  the  infantry  of  the  rear  guard 
along  the  two  miles  from  66a  to  Government  hill,  in 
such  manner  as  to  watch  this  entire  stretch  of  coun- 
try, is  impracticable  and  unnecessary,  for  if  the  Blue 
troop  does  its  duty  it  will  give  warning  of  the  ap- 
proach of  the  two  hostile  troops.  Moreover,  Lieuten- 


A  REAR  GUARD  175 

ant-Colonel  B  knows  from  his  talk  with  Colonel  A 
that  the  latter  will  make  dispositions  to  protect  the 
main  body  on  this  flank  after  it  passes  60. 

Our  lieutenant-colonel  is  ordered  to  hold  the  pres- 
ent outpost  position  as  long  as  practicable,  and  must 
consider  the  disposition  he  will  make  of  his  infantry 
in  order  to  comply  with  this  portion  of  the  order.  Of 
the  troops  that  are  to  form  the  rear  guard,  two  com- 
panies are  now  on  outpost  and  two  companies  with 
the  machine  gun  platoon  and  half  of  Troop  A  are  in 
camp  with  the  remainder  of  the  regiment  just  south 
of  66a.  Company  A  is  equally  divided  between  the 
two  supports  at  216  and  214;  and  Company  B  is  sim- 
ilarly divided  between  the  two  supports  at  212  and 
210.  From  the  support  at  210,  a  detached  post  of 
20  men  has  been  sent  about  half  a  mile  to  the  east  of 
Pilot  Knob.  Thus  the  main  infantry  outpost  line  ex- 
tends from  216  through  214  and  212  to  210,  but  this 
position  is  not  so  well  suited  for  delaying  the  enemy's 
advance  to-morrow  morning  as  is  the  position  along 
the  top  of  the  ridge  from  210  to  Pilot  Knob,  which 
faces  the  direction  from  which  the  enemy  is  expected 
to  advance,  and  overlooks  the  valley  of  Five  Mile 
creek.  If  this  position  be  properly  occupied,  the  ene- 
my may  be  deceived  as  to  the  strength  of  the  force 
opposed  to  him,  and  induced  to  deploy  all  of  his  force 
before  attacking. 

Since  a  rear  guard  seeks  only  to  cause  the  pursuing 
enemy  to  deploy  and  lose  time,  it  may  occupy  a  much 
broader  front  than  a  force  of  the  same  size  that  in- 
tends fighting  a  defensive  action  to  a  decision.  In  lat- 
er problems,  (*)  we  will  see  that  a  force  the  size  of 

*  See  Chapters  XVIH  and  XIX. 


176       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Lieutenant- Colonel  B's,  fighting  a  stubborn  defensive 
fight,  loses  defensive  power  at  all  points  unless  its 
fighting  front  be  kept  within  very  narrow  limits. 
Tactical  dispositions  should  be  suited  always  to  the 
object  in  view.  Lieutenant-Colonel  B's  object  is  to 
delay  the  pursuing  force,  and  if  possible  without  seri- 
ous loss  to  his  rear  guard.  To  do  this,  he  should  so 
dispose  his  troops  as  to  perplex  the  enemy,  and  should 
withdraw  them  from  their  position  before  they  be- 
come seriously  engaged  at  close  quarters.  From  210 
to  the  southern  spur  of  Pilot  Knob,  the  distance  is 
nearly  a  mile.  This  is  a  position  none  too  short  for 
two  full  brigades  fighting  a  defensive  engagement  to 
a  decision,  but  it  will  not  be  wrong  for  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  B,  bearing  in  mind  his  particular  mission,  to 
distribute  a  small  part  of  his  rear  guard  along  this 
entire  front.  As  already  pointed  out,  the  hostile  pa- 
trols will  thus  come  under  fire  from  a  position  about  a 
mile  long,  and  the  enemy  will  be  in  a  quandry  as  to 
whether  it  is  lightly  or  strongly  held.  However  he 
may  proceed,  some  time  will  elapse  before  the  situa- 
tion is  cleared  up,  and  its  uncertainties  may  compel 
him  to  deploy  his  entire  force  before  making  a  deci- 
sive attack,  which  when  finally  made  will  be  against 
an  abandoned  position,  provided  Lieutenant-Colonel 
B  properly  handles  his  command. 

He  should  deploy  no  more  men  than  absolutely 
necessary  thus  to  deceive  the  enemy.  It  will  be  bet- 
ter for  him  to  put  too  few  than  too  many  on  the  line 
at  the  outset.  It  is  easier  to  strengthen  the  front  line 
by  putting  in  local  supports,  than  to  withdraw  troops 
already  deployed.  If  one  company  on  the  firing  line 
will  check  the  enemy's  advance  and  compel  him  to 


A  REAR  GUARD  177 

deploy  the  larger  part  of  his  command,  it  is  unnec- 
essary to  complicate  the  final  withdrawal  by  having 
two  or  more  companies  deployed  and  out  of  hand. 
There  will  be  time  enough  for  putting  the  second 
company  into  the  fight  when  the  necessity  for  increas- 
ing the  volume  of  fire  becomes  apparent.  Then,  also, 
the  point  where  it  is  most  needed  on  this  one  mile  line 
will  be  evident  from  the  direction  of  the  hostile  ad- 
vance, whereas,  had  it  been  put  on  the  line  before  the 
enemy  began  his  advance,  it  might  have  to  be  with- 
drawn and  shifted  to  another  position. 

Let  us  see  how  a  single  company  may  occupy  this 
line.  If  the  detached  post  of  20  men  at  Pilot  Knob 
be  reinforced  by  the  remainder  of  its  platoon  now  at 
210,  it  will  be  sufficient  to  man  this  commanding  po- 
sition in  such  manner  as  to  cover  the  ground  to  the 
east,  south,  and  west  with  its  fire.  The  remaining 
platoon  of  Company  B  (now  at  212)  may  be  moved 
to  the  top  of  the  ridge  and  posted  with  one  section  at 
210,  and  the  remaining  section  about  500  yards  to  the 
east.  No  part  of  this  mile  or  more  of  front  can  then 
be  approached  by  the  enemy  without  his  coming  un- 
der fire.  Now,  if  the  machine  guns  be  placed  on  the 
spur  of  Pilot  Knob,  where  they  can  fire  towards  three 
points  of  the  compass,  the  position  will  be  greatly 
strengthened  and  the  hostile  advance  may  be  more 
cautious.  It  would  be  well  to  send  a  strong  patrol  of 
ten  or  fifteen  men  from  the  section  at  210,  to  proceed 
along  the  spur  towards  142  to  drive  back  any  hostile 
patrols  that  may  attempt  to  advance  through  the 
woods  from  this  direction. 

The  platoon  and  machine  guns  on  Pilot  Knob  prob- 
ably will  be  the  first  troops  to  withdraw  (although 


178       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

this  will  depend  on  the  manner  in  which  the  enemy  ad- 
vances), and  they  will  have  to  make  their  withdrawal 
along  the  top,  or  northern  slope,  of  the  ridge  in  the 
general  direction  of  212  and  66a.  It  may  be  diffi- 
cult for  this  part  of  the  force  to  break  off  the  engage- 
ment and  get  away  without  serious  loss,  and  some 
provision  should  be  made  for  covering  its  movement 
to  the  rear  with  the  fire  of  troops  not  already  de- 
ployed. This  may  be  done  by  assembling  Company 
A  (now  at  214  and  216)  and  moving  it  to  the  vicinity 
of  210,  where  it  can  be  held  under  cover  in  the  woods 
on  the  northern  slope  of  the  spur.  From  this  posi- 
tion, it  may  be  used  to  reinforce  the  firing  line  (should 
that  appear  desirable ) ,  to  cover  Company  B  as  it  falls 
back,  and  to  meet  the  hostile  cavalry  should  it  ad- 
vance from  the  direction  of  138. 

Every  effort  should  be  made  to  avoid  involving 
more  than  two  companies  in  this  action  on  the  ridge, 
and  probably  it  would  be  well  to  employ  them  in  such 
manner  that  they  will  be  able  to  cover  their  own  with- 
drawal from  rifle  range  of  the  enemy.  The  two  re- 
maining companies  of  the  rear  guard  will  then  be  free 
to  resume  the  retreat  to  the  second  position  to  be  oc- 
cupied. They  are  now  at  66a,  a  little  more  than  half 
a  mile  from  the  top  of  the  ridge  at  210,  and  it  would 
not  be  wise  to  move  them  any  nearer  the  position.  If 
they  have  to  assist  in  covering  the  withdrawal  of  Com- 
panies A  and  B,  it  should  be  from  near  their  present 
position  at  66a,  or  a  position  farther  to  the  rear.  If 
the  entire  rear  guard  were  to  become  involved  in  the 
fight  along  the  210  ridge,  it  would  be  in  great  danger 
of  being  cut  off  and  destroyed. 

It  may  be  well  again  to  recall  that  this  disposition 


A  REAR  GUARD  179 

of  the  rear  guard  is  based  on  those  movements  of  the 
enemy  which  appear  to  be  most  probable.  If  the  ene- 
my advances  as  Lieutenant-Colonel  B  expects  he  will, 
the  position  may  be  occupied  as  planned.  On  the 
other  hand,  should  he  make  some  unexpected  move, 
the  rear  guard  may  have  to  meet  him  with  very  dif- 
ferent dispositions  and  in  another  position;  for  exam- 
ple, improbable  as  it  may  appear,  the  enemy  might 
move  with  his  entire  force  via  roads  or  across  country 
and  attack  from  some  point  between  142  and  140.  In 
that  event,  the  platoon  and  machine  guns  on  Pilot 
Knob  would  have  to  be  shifted  a  mile  or  more  to  the 
west  before  they  would  confront  the  enemy.  Or  Com- 
pany A,  in  support  near  210,  might  be  moved  to  meet 
this  unexpected  advance  of  the  enemy,  while  Com- 
pany B  was  being  assembled  as  a  new  support  near 
210.  Or  some  other  equally  good  disposition  might 
be  made  to  meet  this  changed  situation.  A  com- 
mander to  succeed  must  always  be  ready  and  willing 
to  modify  his  dispositions  to  meet  the  movements  of 
the  enemy.  Of  course,  to  make  a  tactical  decision  and 
plan  of  action,  it  is  necessary  to  form  an  idea  of  the 
enemy's  probable  intentions  and  movements,  but  de- 
feat and  disaster  often  will  surely  follow  if  such  pre- 
conceived ideas  are  stubbornly  adhered  to  regardless 
of  the  actions  of  the  enemy. 

A  rear  guard  is  subdivided  similarly  to  an  advance 
guard  into  rear  point,  rear  party,  support  and  re- 
serve. When  the  pursuit  is  not  close  the  subdivis- 
ions will  march  in  column  on  the  road  and  retain  their 
proper  relative  positions,  with  the  point  nearest  the 
enemy  and  preceded  by  the  remaining  subdivisions  in 
the  order  named.  If  the  pursuit  is  close  and  vigorous, 


180       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  subdivisions  may  exchange  places  or  even  become 
mixed  in  deployed  lines.  So  also  the  distances  be- 
tween subdivisions  may  be  subject  to  great  varia- 
tion. If  the  enemy  be  distant,  they  will  be  about  the 
same  as  in  an  advance  guard  of  the  same  size.  If  the 
enemy  be  pressing  a  close  pursuit,  the  whole  situation 
alone  will  determine  what  they  should  be. 

In  the  situation  before  us,  a  good  and  convenient 
division  of  the  infantry  would  be  to  place  Companies 
C  and  D  in  the  reserve  and  Companies  A  and  B  and 
the  machine  gun  platoon  in  the  support,  which  fur- 
nishes the  rear  party  and  rear  point.  This  places  one- 
half  the  infantry  in  the  support,  which  is  not  an  un- 
usual proportion;  and  preserves  the  tactical  unity  of 
the  companies.  The  immediate  command  of  the  sup- 
port naturally  will  fall  to  Major  A,  commanding  the 
1st  Battalion.  He,  and  not  Lieutenant-Colonel  B, 
should  further  subdivide  the  support  into  support 
proper,  rear  party,  and  rear  point,  but  the  situation 
will  not  permit  of  his  doing  this  at  this  time.  Just 
what  will  constitute  the  rear  party,  and  what  the  sup- 
port proper,  and  just  when  they  can  form  column  in 
their  relative  positions  with  proper  distances,  if  they 
can  do  this  at  all,  will  depend  on  the  manner  in  which 
the  withdrawal  is  made  from  the  Pilot  Knob  ridge. 
This  part  of  the  rear  guard  may  be  so  closely  pressed 
by  the  enemy  that  it  may  have  to  fall  back  deployed, 
and  even  exchange  places  with  the  reserve.  These 
are  matters  of  troop  leading  which  can  not  be  provid- 
ed for  in  orders  issued  beforehand,  but  must  be  reg- 
ulated by  the  proper  commanders  to  meet  the  chang- 
ing situation  after  the  retreat  begins. 

The  reserve  should  remain  under  the  immediate 


A  REAR  GUARD  181 

control  of  the  rear  guard  commander.  The  safety  of 
the  rear  guard,  and  consequently  of  the  main  retreat- 
ing force,  so  depends  on  the  proper  and  timely  em- 
ployment of  the  reserve  in  accordance  with  the  plan  of 
the  rear  guard  commander,  that  it  would  be  unwise 
for  anyone  but  him  to  decide  how  and  when  it  should 
be  thrown  into  the  fight.  Of  course  he  can  not  remain 
with  the  reserve  at  all  times,  but  he  should  assure 
himself  before  leaving  for  other  parts  of  the  field  that 
the  senior  officer  with  the  reserve  understands  the 
limited  command  he  has  over  it.  To-morrow  morn- 
ing Lieutenant-Colonel  B  should  be  at  a  point  on  the 
ridge  from  which  he  can  observe  toward  the  enemy, 
and  he  will  have  to  leave  the  reserve  at  66a  under  the 
temporary  control  of  the  senior  captain  with  it.  As 
the  enemy  advances  and  reveals  his  intentions,  our 
lieutenant-colonel  will  reach  a  decision  as  to  his  fur- 
ther plans,  and  will  then  send  the  reserve  orders  that 
will  move  it  in  accordance  therewith.  Thus  the  re- 
serve and  support  are  made  to  cooperate  with  each 
other. 

While  at  66a,  the  senior  officer  with  the  reserve  will 
make  the  necessary  dispositions  for  its  local  protection. 
It  already  has  been  pointed  out  that  the  hostile  cav- 
alry may  appear  early  on  the  right  flank,  and  to  give 
timely  warning  of  its  approach  a  strong  patrol  should 
be  sent  well  towards  136,  and  another  to  the  cross 
roads  at  68;  a  third  should  be  sent  to  218  to  give 
warning  of  any  hostile  force  that  may  elude  the  cav- 
alry patrol  on  that  flank  and  advance  through  the 
town. 

As  a  result  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  B's  delibera- 
tions, he  decides  to  place  Companies  A  and  B  and  the 


182       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

machine  gun  platoon  in  the  support  under  command 
of  Major  A,  and  Companies  C  and  D  in  the  reserve; 
to  make  his  first  stand  to  delay  the  enemy  with  the 
support  along  the  210 — Pilot  Knob  ridge  and  with 
the  reserve  near  66a ;  to  observe  on  his  left  flank  with 
a  single  cavalry  patrol,  and  send  the  remainder  of  his 
cavalry  troop  towards  140  to  cover  his  right  flank; 
and  to  delay  the  enemy  further  in  subsequent  posi- 
tions selected  in  accordance  with  the  later  situations. 

Our  lieutenant-colonel  may  issue  his  orders  now 
(about  11:45  p.  m.)  or  he  may  wait  until  to-morrow 
morning.  It  would  be  well  for  the  outposts  and  the 
cavalry  troop  to  receive  their  orders  at  once.  The  cav- 
alry should  make  an  early  start  and  its  commander 
will  want  to  give  his  part  of  the  task  some  considera- 
tion before  starting.  Major  A  (commanding  the 
outpost)  should  be  told  at  once  of  the  important  part 
he  is  to  play  at  the  beginning  of  the  retreat,  for  it 
will  take  him  some  time  to  communicate  with  all  parts 
of  his  outpost  line,  and  make  his  complete  arrange- 
ments for  withdrawing  his  supports  and  their  outly- 
ing posts  from  212,  214  and  216,  and  reposting  them 
on  the  line  to  be  held.  The  two  companies  in  the  re- 
serve need  not  be  given  their  orders  until  the  camp 
is  aroused  in  the  morning. 

Consequently  Lieutenant- Colonel  B  now  gives  the 
commander  of  Troop  A,  who  had  heard  Colonel  A's 
orders,  (*)  the  following  orders : 

"We  will  make  our  first  stand  on  the  210 — Pilot  Knob  ridge. 
The  support,  Companies  A  and  B  and  the  machine  guns  under 
Major  A,  will  occupy  a  position  there  at  daybreak.  The  re- 
serve, Companies  C  and  D,  will  be  held  near  here  (66a).  On 
falling  back  we  will  follow  the  main  body. 

*  See   page   149. 


A  REAR  GUARD  183 

"Move  out  with  your  troop  at  4  a.  m.  via  the  136 — 138 — 140 
road  and  protect  the  right  flank  of  the  column  from  attack  by 
hostile  cavalry.  Have  a  patrol  keep  in  touch  with  the  hostile 
main  body,  and  send  a  strong  patrol  to  reconnoiter  on  our  left 
flank.  One  platoon  of  the  outpost  cavalry  will  join  you  here  at 
4  a.  m.,  and  the  remaining  platoon  will  join  you  as  you  pass  138. 

"Have  your  troop  wagon  join  the  field  train  at  2:30  a.  m. 

"I  will  be  here  until  about  4  a.  m.,  when  I  will  go  to  Pilot 
Knob." 

Lieutenant-Colonel  B  then  proceeds  to  the  outpost 
and  gives  Major  A  the  following  orders: 

"The  2d  Infantry  will  reach  Kickapoo  to-morrow  at  8:30  a. 
m.  Colonel  A  has  just  received  orders  to  continue  to  fall  back 
in  the  morning.  He  is  to  delay  the  enemy  enough  to  permit  the 
2d  Infantry  to  occupy  a  position  on  the  hills  just  south  of  Kick- 
apoo. General  B  intends  making  a  stand  there  until  he  is  joined 
by  the  remainder  of  the  detachment  from  the  north.  Our  main 
body  will  start  from  its  bivouac  at  4:30  a.  m.  and  march  via  the 
66a — 14 — G — H — Kickapoo  road.  The  field  train  is  to  start  for 
Kickapoo  at  2:30  a.  m. 

"Your  battalion,  the  machine  gun  platoon  and  Troop  A  are  to 
form  the  rear  guard  under  my  command.  We  are  to  delay  the 
enemy  for  at  least  two  hours  between  here  and  Kickapoo,  without 
becoming  seriously  engaged.  We  will  make  our  first  stand  on 
the  Pilot  Knob  ridge. 

"You  will  command  the  support,  which  will  consist  of  Com- 
panies A  and  B  and  the  machine  guns.  Have  Company  B  and 
the  machine  guns  in  position  on  the  ridge  from  210  to  Pilot 
Knob  by  dawn,  but  do  not  move  Company  A  from  its  present 
position  until  daylight  reveals  the  location  and  movements  of  the 
enemy.  Hold  the  line  lightly  at  the  outset,  and  send  a  strong 
patrol  along  the  spur  towards  142.  When  compelled  to  fall 
back,  we  will  follow  the  main  body. 

"The  reserve,  Companies  C  and  D,  will  be  held  near  66a,  and 
Troop  A  will  cover  our  right  flank.  Have  your  platoon  of  cav- 
alry at  138  join  the  remainder  of  the  troop  as  it  passes  that 
point  in  the  morning.  Have  the  remainder  of  the  outpost  cav- 
alry join  the  troop  at  66a  at  4  a.  m. 


184       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

"Your  company  wagons  will  join  the  field  train  at  2:30  a.  m. 
"I  will  be  at  the  bivouac  of  the  main  body  until  about  4  a. 
m.,  when  I  will  move  to  Pilot  Knob." 

It  should  be  observed  that  Lieutenant-Colonel  B 
did  not  specify  the  manner  in  which  Major  A  should 
occupy  the  position  on  the  210 — Pilot  Knob  ridge, 
although  he  considered  this  in  some  detail  when  es- 
timating the  situation.  He  was  correct  in  thus  re- 
fraining from  undue  interference  in  matters  of  detail 
that  should  be  arranged  by  his  subordinate.  It  is  not 
always  easy  to  determine  just  where  to  draw  the  line 
between  what  a  subordinate  should  be  told  to  do  and 
what  should  be  left  to  his  own  judgment.  If  his 
training,  experience  and  record  inspire  confidence,  his 
superior  may  limit  his  orders  to  a  simple  statement 
of  what  he  desires  him  to  accomplish.  If  he  is  untried, 
or  if  his  record  shows  lack  of  ability,  it  may  be  wise 
to  assist  him  with  suggestions.  Even  so,  a  command- 
er must  not  forget  that  his  task  is  to  coordinate  the 
efforts  of  all  parts  of  his  command — a  thing  he  cannot 
do  successfully  if  he  attempts  to  direct  the  minor  ar- 
rangements and  operations  that  should  be  left  to  his 
subordinates.  If  Lieu  tenant- Colonel  B  should  take 
command  of  Major  A's  support,  and  personally  lead 
it  in  the  fight  along  the  ridge,  he  might  accomplish 
brilliant  results,  but  we  may  be  sure  that  he  soon 
would  be  ignorant  of  what  had  become  of  the  remain- 
der of  his  rear  guard,  and  it  would  not  be  strange 
should  it  slip  completely  from  under  his  control. 

Commenting  on  this  common  sin  of  tactical  inter- 
ference with  subordinates,  General  von  Verdy  has 
the  following  to  say:  (*)  "The  commander  is  anx- 

*  In  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops — The  Infantry  Division. 


A  REAR  GUARD  185 

ious  to  assist  such  of  his  troops  as  are  in  action  and 
in  danger,  by  his  own  advice  and  his  own  deed;  he 
would  like  to  see  even  the  smallest  subdivisions  of  his 
troops  act  just  as  though  he  himself  were  leading 
them.  This  temptation  is  often  very  strong,  and  few 
there  are  who  can  resist  it.  One  should  never  let  him- 
self yield  to  it.  *  *  *  *  *  *  Every  commander 
has  the  right  to  solve  his  problem  according  to  his  own 
ideas,  so  long  as  he  does  not  commit  a  manifest  error, 
and  he  may  proceed  to  do  so  in  various  ways.  Every 
one  chooses  that  which  comports  most  nearly  with  his 
character  and  training.  He  has  been  placed  in  the 
position  he  holds  in  the  confidence  that  he  will  fulfill 
the  duties  pertaining  to  it;  if  he  does  not,  then  he 
should  be  removed.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  leader  to 
give  the  necessary  orders  to  his  subordinates  in  an 
unmistakable  manner  and  to  watch  their  execution, 
and  interference  should  be  made  only  when  it  is  clear 
that  any  dispositions  are  endangering  the  end  in 
view." 

It  was  necessary  to  tell  Major  A  to  leave  the  out- 
post supports  in  their  positions  at  214  and  216  until 
it  was  known  the  enemy  had  not  moved  a  part  of  his 
force  to  this  vicinity  under  cover  of  darkness.  Oth- 
erwise, he  would  be  justified  in  believing  other  pro- 
visions had  been  made  for  protection  in  this  direction, 
and  could  not  be  criticized  for  moving  the  entire  out- 
post to  the  ridge.  By  telling  him  to  "hold  the  line 
lightly  at  the  outset"  Lieutenant-Colonel  B  gave  a 
hint  as  to  how  he  believed  the  line  should  be  occupied, 
for  he  considered  this  an  essential  feature  of  his  gen- 
eral plan,  but  he  did  not  materially  restrict  Major 
A's  freedom  of  action;  and  by  directing  the  major  to 


186       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

send  a  patrol  towards  142,  he  made  certain  of  recon- 
naissance in  this  direction  (a  matter  of  considerable 
importance)  and  called  Major  A's  attention  to  the 
danger  to  his  right.  But  Major  A  is  not  told  how 
he  shall  withdraw  his  outposts,  the  points  he  is  to 
occupy  on  his  mile  of  front,  where  he  will  place  the 
machine  guns,  or  the  use  to  be  made  of  Company  A 
when  it  is  brought  up  to  the  ridge. 

It  would  be  a  mistake  to  prescribe  in  the  order  the 
manner  in  which  the  rear  guard  is  to  withdraw  from 
the  position;  where  and  how  it  is  to  occupy  a  second 
position;  and  whether  the  reserve  is  to  occupy  a  ral- 
lying position  to  cover  the  withdrawal.  This  would 
be  attempting  to  arrange  matters  too  far  in  advance. 
Withdrawal,  and  the  subsequent  occupation  of  a  sec- 
ond position,  are  so  dependent  on  the  character  of  the 
hostile  pursuit,  that  they  must  be  provided  for  in  later 
orders.  But  the  subordinate  commanders  should  be 
told  the  direction  in  which  the  rear  guard  will  retire 
when  it  falls  back,  not  only  because  the  original  dis- 
positions of  the  force  depend  materially  on  this,  but 
also  because  it  may  be  difficult  to  get  this  information 
to  them  after  the  action  has  commenced. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  B  kept  his  cavalry  under  his 
immediate  control,  whereas  he  might  have  placed  it  in 
the  support  under  the  command  of  Major  A.  This 
latter  disposition  of  the  cavalry  with  a  rear  guard  is 
frequently  desirable  for  it  keeps  the  whole  service  of 
information  where  it  should  be — in  the  hands  of  the 
commander  directly  in  contact  with  the  enemy.  He  is 
thus  assisted  in  properly  timing  the  withdrawal  of  his 
infantry,  and  its  withdrawal  can  often  be  covered  by 
the  more  mobile  cavalry.  However,  when  the  situ- 


A  REAR  GUARD  187 

ation  presents  the  cavalry  with  a  task  which  promises 
to  remove  it  from  the  tactical  sphere  of  action  of  the 
support,  it  may  be  advisable  for  the  rear  guard  com- 
mander to  direct  its  operations,  and  that  is  the  case  in 
this  situation.  The  Blue  troop  should  not  guide  its 
movements  on  those  of  the  support  but  on  those  of 
the  hostile  cavalry,  and  very  early  in  to-morrow's  op- 
erations it  may  be  widely  separated  from  Major  A's 
support.  This  single  troop  has  to  protect  not  only 
the  support,  but  the  reserve  and  main  body  as  well 
from  surprises  and  attacks  by  the  hostile  cavalry. 
Should  the  control  of  the  troop  be  surrendered  to  Ma- 
jor A,  it  is  quite  probable  he  would  keep  it  tied  down 
to  his  support,  thus  uncovering  the  reserve  and  main 
body  to  the  hostile  troops.  Only  with  cavalry  can 
hostile  cavalry  be  kept  at  a  distance.  All  this  is  ob- 
viated when  Lieutenant-Colonel  B  makes  his  cavalry 
"rear  cavalry"  and  keeps  it  under  his  own  orders. 

Considering  the  importance  of  the  cavalry  patrol 
sent  to  the  left  flank  through  Leaven  worth,  it  would 
have  been  better  had  Lieutenant-Colonel  B  given  it 
its  orders  in  person.  Knowing  the  whole  situation, 
while  the  commander  of  Troop  A  has  but  a  restricted 
view  of  it,  he  is  better  equipped  for  giving  the  patrol 
the  orders  it  should  receive.  He  would  not  be  tres- 
passing on  the  province  of  the  troop  commander,  for 
the  patrol  is  operating  quite  independent  of  the  troop, 
and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  is  seeking  information  for 
Lieutenant-Colonel  B. 

Should  Lieutenant-Colonel  B  have  issued  a  single 
combined  written  order,  with  troops  expressed  in  the 
margin,  it  would  have  been  as  follows : 


188       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 


Field  Orders 
No. 


(a) 


(b) 


(c) 


Troops 

Reserve — in  order 

of  march: 
Co.  D,  1st  Inf. 
Co.  C,  1st  Inf. 

Support : 
Major  A. 
1st  Bn.  1st  Inf.  (less 

Cos.  C  &  D) 
Machine  Gun  Platoon. 

Rear  cavalry: 

Capt.  A. 
Tr.  A,  2d  Cav. 


Rear  Guard,  1st  Infantry, 
66a,  just  west  of  Leavenworth, 

15  July  — ,  11:45  P.  M. 

1.  Nothing  new  has  been  learn- 
ed of  the  enemy.  Our  2d  In- 
fantry will  reach  KICKAPOO 
to-morrow  at  8 :30  a.  m.  Our  reg- 
iment is  to  continue  to  fall  back 
in  the  morning,  delaying  the  ene- 
my enough  to  permit  the  2d  In- 
fantry to  occupy  a  position  on  the 
hills  just  south  of  KICKAPOO, 
where  General  B  intends  making 
a  stand  until  he  is  joined  by  the 
remainder  of  our  detachment 
from  the  north.  The  main  body 
will  leave  camp  at  4:30  a.  m.  and 
march  via  the  66a — 14 — G — H — 
17  road. 

2.  The  rear  guard,  without  becoming  seriously  engaged,  will 
delay  the  enemy  for  at  least  two  hours  between  here  and  KICK- 
APOO.    The  first  stand  will  be  made  on  the  PILOT  KNOB 
ridge. 

3.  (a)      The  reserve  will  be  under  arms  at  4:30  a.  m.,  and 
will  await  further  orders  at  66a. 

(b)  The  support  will  be  in  position  on  the  ridge  from  210 
to  PILOT  KNOB,  both  inclusive,  at  dawn,  except  the  outpost 
supports  at  216  and  214,  which  will  be  left  in  position  until  day- 
light reveals  the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy.     The  position  on  the 
ridge  will  be  occupied  lightly  at  first,  and  a  strong  patrol  will  be 
sent  along  the  spur  towards  142. 

(c)  The  rear  cavalry  will  trot  out  at  4  a.  m.,  via  the  136- — 
138 — 140  road,  and  protect  the  right  flank  of  the  column  from 
attacks  by  hostile  cavalry.     Touch  will  be  maintained  with  the 
hostile  main  body,   and  a  strong  patrol   will  be  sent  through 
LEAVENWORTH  to  reconnoiter  on  our  left  flank.     One  pla- 
toon of  the  cavalry  on  outpost  will  join  the  troop  at  66a  at  4  a. 
m.,  and  the  remaining  platoon  will  join  the  troop  as  it  passes  138. 


A  REAR  GUARD  189 

(d)     When  compelled  to  fall  back,  the  rear  guard  infantry 
will  follow  the  route  of  the  main  body. 

4.  The  company  and  troop  wagons  will  join  the  field  train 
at  2:30  a.  in. 

5.  I  will  be  at  66a  until  4  a.  m.,  when  I  will  go  to  PILOT 
KNOB. 

B. 
Lieutenant-Colonel,  Commanding. 

Copies  to  Colonel  A,  Major  A,  Captain  A,  commanders  of 
Cos.  C  and  D,  and  of  the  machine  gun  platoon. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 
A  REAR  GUARD. 

PROBLEM. 

(See  2-inch  map). 

A  reinforced  Blue  brigade,  marching  north  through 
Farley,  in  hostile  country,  has  sent  forward  the  1st 
Infantry  and  Troops  A  and  B,  14th  Cavalry,  under 
Colonel  A.  This  detachment  was  forced  to  fall  back 
from  the  north  through  Weston,  and  bivouacked  for 
the  night  May  1-2  on  Bee  creek  near  49,  with  out- 
posts covering  the  23—39,  23—29,  and  Weston — G 
roads.  Company  A  with  10  troopers  is  posted  at  23; 
one  platoon  of  Troop  A  is  at  G;  and  Company  B, 
with  15  troopers,  is  in  reserve  on  the  small  brook  just 
south  of  21. 

The  enemy,  estimated  to  be  2  regiments  of  infan- 
try and  1  troop  of  cavalry,  bivouacked  near  Weston, 
with  his  outposts  in  close  contact,  on  the  31 — 29  road, 
with  those  of  Colonel  A. 

At  11  p.  m.  Major  A,  commanding  the  outpost, 
receives  the  following  order  in  the  form  of  a  message : 

Detachment,    1st    Separate    Brigade, 
49  (near  the  Platte  City — Weston  road), 

To  1  May  — ,  10:45  P.  M. 

Major  A, 

Commanding  Outpost. 

Nothing  new  has  been  heard  of  the  enemy.  The  remainder 
of  our  brigade  (2  regiments  of  infantry  and  1  battery)  will 
reach  FARLEY  at  noon  to-morrow. 


A  REAR  GUARD  191 

This  detachment  will  march  from  49  at  5:30  a.  m.,  and  fall 
back  via  the  E — 12 — 50 — FARLEY  road  on  the  remainder  of 
our  brigade. 

The  outposts,  reinforced  by  the  remainder  of  the  cavalry,  will 
constitute  the  rear  guard  under  your  command,  and  will  en- 
deavor, without  becoming  seriously  engaged,  to  hold  the  enemy 
north  of  the  30 — 48 — 60  road  until  12  o'clock  noon.  The  main 
body  will  remain  in  supporting  distance  of  the  rear  guard. 

The  field  train  will  start  from  49  at  4  a.  m. 

After  5 :30  a.  m.,  reports  will  reach  me  at  the  TODD  house  at 
E.  A. 

Colonel,  Commanding. 

Note. — Bee  creek  is  fordable. 

Required : 

Major  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

His  orders,  on  the  supposition  that  no  further  in- 
formation of  the  enemy  is  received  before  5:30  a.  m. 

SOLUTION. 

From  Weston,  the  probable  location  of  the  hostile 
force  for  the  night,  to  the  30 — 48 — 60  road,  the  dis- 
tance is  about  10  miles.  The  enemy,  if  unopposed, 
could  cover  this  distance  in  about  4  hours,  and  could 
reach  48  by  9 :30  a.  m.,  if  he  started  at  the  same  hour 
as  the  Blue  detachment.  Consequently,  Major  A  prob- 
ably will  have  to  delay  the  enemy  about  2K  hours. 

In  the  first  place,  in  order  to  keep  the  enemy  ig- 
norant as  long  as  possible  of  the  Blue  commander's 
intentions,  the  front  line  of  the  outposts  will  be  left 
in  position  until  the  enemy  resumes  the  pursuit,  when 
it  will  be  withdrawn  to  the  first  position  where  Ma- 
jor A  expects  to  make  a  stand.  This  may  be  north  of 
Bee  creek,  provided  proper  arrangements  are  made  to 
withdraw  the  delaying  force  in  safety  to  the  south 
bank  of  the  creek.  The  sharp  bend  in  the  road  at  21, 


192       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

and  the  terrain  between  the  ravines  running  south 
from  just  east  of  25  and  23  favor  a  delaying  action 
by  a  part  of  the  rear  guard.  One  company  could  be 
placed  across  the  spur  between  these  ravines  and  in  the 
northern  edge  of  the  woods  south  of  23  (just  east  of 
the  Hall  house),  where  it  would  be  on  the  flank  and 
within  easy  range  of  the  25 — 23  road.  At  the  proper 
time,  this  company  would  fall  back  behind  the  crest 
of  the  spur,  its  withdrawal  being  facilitated  by  the 
woods  east  and  south  of  the  Hall  house,  and  the  small 
ravine  on  the  southern  slope  of  the  spur,  just  west  of 
49.  And  the  withdrawal  could  be  covered  by  the  fire 
of  the  other  company  in  position  in  the  northern  edge 
of  the  wood  on  the  spur  just  south  of  49.  On  reach- 
ing the  southern  bank  of  Bee  creek,  the  company  last 
to  withdraw  may  reform  under  cover  of  the  wood  and 
assist  the  other  company  in  such  manner  as  the  situa- 
tion at  that  time  may  demand.  It  is  entirely  too  early 
to  decide  how  such  assistance  can  best  be  rendered. 
When  the  latter  company  has  to  fall  back  from  its 
position  on  the  spur  south  of  49,  the  wood  will  cover 
its  withdrawal  until  it  passes  over  the  crest  of  the  hill 
near  the  Todd  house  (  at  E ) . 

The  information  indicates  that  Major  A  has  two 
troops  of  cavalry  to  the  enemy's  one,  and  this  superior- 
ity should  enable  the  cavalry  to  reach  the  enemy's 
flank,  where  it  can  do  most  to  annoy  the  hostile  col- 
umn and  delay  its  advance.  For  several  reasons,  it 
appears  that  the  cavalry  should  operate  on  the  ene- 
my's left  flank.  (1.)  It  would  be  difficult  for  the  cav- 
alry to  reach  the  hostile  right  flank  at  the  beginning 
of  the  march,  and  it  would  be  confined  within  the  re- 
stricted area  between  the  Missouri  river  and  the  23 — 


A  REAR  GUARD  193 

Weston  road.  (2.)  Should  it  go  by  the  G — Weston 
road  to  reach  the  enemy's  right  flank,  it  would  have  to 
proceed  with  great  caution,  for  this  road  is  in  a  defile 
between  the  Missouri  river  and  the  bluffs.  (3.)  For 
similar  reasons,  the  enemy  probably  will  not  march 
over  the  Weston — G  road  with  either  infantry  or  cav- 
alry in  force.  Consequently,  Major  A's  cavalry  most 
probably  will  meet  the  hostile  cavalry  on  the  enemy's 
left  flank.  (4.)  On  the  left  on  the  enemy's  line  of 
march,  the  ground  favors  cavalry  operations,  and,  on 
this  flank,  Major  A's  cavalry  will  be  in  a  good  posi- 
tion to  cover  the  15 — D — 50  road  later  on. 

Accordingly,  the  bulk  of  the  cavalry  will  be  ordered 
to  advance  to  the  north  of  the  23 — Weston  road  and 
delay  the  enemy  by  attacking  his  left  flank,  and  de- 
tachments for  secondary  tasks,  such  as  reconnaissance 
on  the  enemy's  right  flank,  will  be  made  the  minimum 
in  number  and  strength. 

Major  A's  decision  is  to  make  his  first  stand  to  the 
north  of  Bee  creek  with  one  company,  covering  its 
withdrawal  with  the  other  company  in  position  south 
of  the  creek,  and  to  have  the  cavalry  delay  the  enemy 
by  operating  on  his  left  flank. 

In  the  positions  at  the  Hall  house,  and  on  the  spur 
south  of  49,  Major  A  should  be  able  to  delay  the  ene- 
my at  least  one  hour,  and  maybe  much  longer  if  the 
cavalry  meets  with  the  success  that  may  reasonably 
be  expected.  The  rear  guard  still  will  be  five  miles 
from  48,  and  in  that  distance  it  should  be  able  to  de- 
lay the  enemy  the  additional  necessary  time.  The 
rolling  country  affords  many  excellent  positions  for 
short  rear  guard  actions,  but  just  what  positions  will 
be  selected,  how  they  will  be  occupied,  and  how  the 


194       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

withdrawal  from  them  will  be  effected,  can  not  be 
determined  long  before  the  event.  One  of  these  po- 
sitions is  the  hill  1300  yards  south  of  E  (just  south  of 
the  Ode  house).  After  a  short  delay  here  by  one 
company,  it  might  be  able  to  fall  back  by  the  right 
flank  into  the  wooded  ravine  to  the  south,  thence  un- 
der cover  up  the  ravine  between  the  Tomlin  and  Storm 
houses.  The  withdrawal  from  this  position  probably 
could  be  covered  by  the  fire  of  the  other  company  in 
position  near  the  1020  foot  hill,  600  yards  northwest 
of  10.  This  company,  in  its  turn,  could  withdraw  down 
the  ravine  just  west  of  the  10 — 12  road,  covered  by 
the  fire  of  the  first  company  considered,  which  by  this 
time  probably  will  have  withdrawn  to  some  posi- 
tion in  rear,  such  as  the  hill  at  the  Alexander  house 
(east  of  12). 

The  rear  guard  would  be  similarly  conducted, 
should  the  enemy  pursue  along  the  D — 48  road  and, 
should  he  pursue  in  two  columns  along  both  roads, 
the  rear  guard  might  have  to  be  divided,  or  the  cavalry 
ordered  to  watch  one  road,  provided  Colonel  A  should 
not  come  to  the  assistance  of  Major  A  by  forming  an 
additional  rear  guard  to  cover  one  of  the  roads.  Of 
course,  these  are  contingencies  that  will  not  be  provid- 
ed for  until  they  arise  in  the  course  of  the  retreat. 

Since  the  plan  is  to  make  the  first  stand  in  the  imme- 
diate vicinity  of  the  outpost  line,  the  division  of  the 
rear  guard  into  rear  party  and  support  is  not  essen- 
tial ;  but,  if  this  division  be  made,  one  company  should 
be  placed  in  each,  for  this  is  the  only  division  that 
will  fit  in  with  the  plan  to  leave  one  company  in  posi- 
tion just  south  of  23  while  moving  the  other  to  a  posi- 
tion on  the  spur  south  of  49.  Major  A's  dispositions 


A  REAR  GUARD  195 

are  based  on  the  supposition  that  the  enemy  will  con- 
tinue his  pursuit,  but  if  he  should  not,  the  rear  guard 
may  be  placed  on  the  road  in  the  usual  formation,  at 
the  proper  time. 

Company  A,  which  is  furnishing  the  front  line  of 
the  outposts,  will  occupy  the  position  south  of  23,  and 
Company  B  at  the  same  time  will  occupy  the  spur 
south  of  49.  The  cavalry  will  assemble  at  21  at  5 :30 
a.  m.  and  advance  against  the  enemy's  left  flank.  The 
cavalry  platoon  at  G  will  cover  the  left  flank,  and 
furnish  Major  A  with  any  additional  messengers  he 
may  need ;  orders  are  given  for  the  platoon  with  Com- 
panies A  and  B  to  assemble  at  21  by  4:30  a.  m.,  in 
order  that  patrols  may  be  sent  out  at  daybreak.  The 
company  wagons  will  be  sent  back  in  time  to  join  the 
field  train  at  49  at  4  a.  m. 

Major  A  will  not  issue  his  orders  (except  those  for 
the  wagons)  until  morning,  for  the  situation  may 
change  in  the  meantime;  but  the  company  command- 
ers and  the  senior  troop  commander  are  directed  to  re- 
port at  21  for  orders  at  4 :30  a.  m.  At  that  hour  Ma- 
jor A  issues  the  following  verbal  orders: 

"There  is  no  additional  information  of  the  enemy.  The  re- 
mainder of  our  brigade  will  reach  Farley  at  noon  to-day.  Our 
detachment  will  march  from  49  at  5 :30  this  morning  and  fall 
back  via  the  E — 12 — 50 — Farley  road  to  join  the  remainder  of 
the  brigade. 

"The  outposts,  reinforced  by  the  remainder  of  the  cavalry, 
will  form  the  rear  guard  under  my  command  and,  without  be- 
coming seriously  engaged,  will  hold  the  enemy  north  of  the  30 — 
48 — 60  road  until  noon.  The  main  body  of  the  detachment  will 
remain  within  supporting  distance  of  the  rear  guard. 

"Company  A  will  be  in  position  by  daybreak  north  of  the 
woods  near  the  Hall  house,  and  delay  the  hostile  advance  on  the 


196       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

29 — 25 — 23  road,  without  becoming  seriously  engaged,  subse- 
quently retiring  to  the  south  side  of  Bee  creek,  keeping  west  of 
the  21 — 49  road.  The  front  line  of  the  outposts  will  not  be 
withdrawn  until  the  enemy  begins  his  advance. 

"Company  B  will  march  at  5:30  a.  m.  and  occupy  a  position 
on  the  spur  just  south  of  49,  from  which  to  cover  the  withdrawal 
of  Company  A,  and  cause  the  enemy  additional  delay. 

"Company  B  will  loosen  the  planking  of  the  bridges  over 
Bee  creek  at  49  and  north  of  45,  and  Company  A  will  remove 
them  when  it  withdraws  to  the  south  of  the  creek. 

"The  cavalry  will  start  at  5:30  a.  m.  from  21,  where  it  will 
be  joined  by  one  platoon  of  the  outpost  cavalry,  and  will  advance 
north  of  the  21 — Weston  road  and  delay  the  enemy's  advance 
by  operating  against  the  left  flank  of  his  column.  The  hostile 
cavalry  will  be  driven  back  if  found  on  that  flank.  The  platoon 
of  cavalry  now  at  G  will  receive  orders  from  me  to  reconnoiter 
on  our  left  flank.  Patrols  will  be  sent  out  at  once  from  the 
platoon  now  here. 

"Messages  will  reach  me  at  23." 

COMMENTS. 

It  may  be  well  to  point  out  the  essential  difference 
between  this  situation  and  the  one  given  in  the  preced- 
ing chapter.  In  the  latter  the  pursuing  force  had 
two  troops  of  cavalry  and  the  retreating  force  but 
one,  and,  as  a  consequence,  the  single  retreating  troop 
was  given  a  defensive  mission  and  ordered  to  prevent 
the  two  pursuing  troops  from  reaching  the  flank  of 
the  retreating  column,  and  delaying  its  retreat.  In 
this  problem  the  conditions  are  reversed.  Major  A 
has  twice  as  much  cavalry  as  the  pursuing  enemy,  and 
he  gives  it  an  offensive  mission,  directing  it  to  oper- 
ate against  the  flank  of  the  pursuing  force  and  delay 
its  pursuit.  In  doing  this  he  may  permit  the  hostile 
troop  to  reach  Colonel  A's  flank,  for,  if  it  is  operating 
on  the  right  of  the  enemy's  column,  Major  A  will 


A  REAR  GUARD  197 

have  but  one  platoon  of  cavalry  in  its  front.  Still  he 
is  warranted  in  taking  this  chance,  for  the  reasons 
stated  in  the  solution,  and  for  the  additional  reason 
that  a  stronger  cavalry  force,  by  taking  the  initiative, 
probably  will  compel  the  weaker  force  to  play  to  its 
lead.  That  Major  A  cannot  disregard  the  hostile 
troop,  need  scarcely  be  stated,  but  much  less  may  the 
enemy  disregard  Major  A's  two  troops,  and  certainly 
we  will  take  the  law  from  the  enemy  and  play  his  own 
game,  if  we  permit  our  two  troops  of  cavalry  to  be 
diverted  from  their  chief  mission  by  the  enemy's  sin- 
gle troop. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  the  rear  guard  made  its 
first  stand  some  distance  in  front  of  the  outpost  line, 
for  the  terrain  and  other  conditions  specially  favored 
this  action.  In  this  situation  the  first  stand  is  made  in 
rear  and  to  one  side  of  the  outpost  line,  and  the  front 
line  of  outposts  is  left  in  position  only  for  the  purpose 
of  keeping  the  enemy  in  doubt  as  to  whether  the  re- 
treat is  to  be  resumed,  and  it  is  withdrawn  before  it 
becomes  engaged.  Had  the  rear  guard  occupied  a 
position  across  the  29 — 23  road  it  would  have  had  to 
withdraw  by  the  flank — a  dangerous  operation. 

In  this  situation  Major  A  is  called  upon  to  do  more 
with  two  companies  of  infantry  than  Lieutenant- Col- 
onel B  was  expected  to  do  with  a  battalion  in  the  pre- 
ceding chapter,  but  the  difference  in  the  cavalry  situ- 
ation in  the  two  problems  is  equivalent  to  giving  Ma- 
jor A  two  troops  more  than  Lieutenant-Colonel  B 
had. 

It  may  be  well  to  consider  briefly  the  withdrawal  of 
the  rear  guard  from  action,  and  this  may  be  illus- 
trated by  following  the  action  of  Company  A,  that  is 


198       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

to  occupy  a  position  in  the  wood  south  of  23.  One  pla- 
toon of  this  company  will  be  deployed  in  the  northern 
edge  of  the  wood  with  its  left  near  the  Hall  house,  on 
a  front  of  about  250  yards.  This  will  make  the  inter- 
val between  skirmishers  about  4  yards,  but  this  un- 
usually large  interval  is  allowable  since  it  is  not  in- 
tended to  make  a  stubborn  resistance  and  the  broad 
front  may  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  the  force  holding 
it.  The  remaining  platoon  will  be  held  in  support 
under  cover  of  the  slope  at  the  southern  edge  of  the 
wood.  Under  the  circumstances  one  platoon  will  se- 
cure about  as  much  delay  as  two,  and  the  danger  of 
the  company  becoming  seriously  engaged  is  not  near- 
ly so  great  as  it  would  be  if  both  platoons  were  put 
in  the  firing  line. 

Constant  observation  must  be  maintained  on  each 
flank,  and  particularly  on  the  left  flank,  by  well  led 
patrols,  for  it  is  absolutely  essential  to  the  safe  with- 
drawal of  the  company  that  it  should  begin  to  fall 
back  before  the  enemy  is  on  its  flank.  The  following 
movements  are  intended  but  to  illustrate  one  way  in 
which  the  withdrawal  might  be  made,  and  presuppose 
movements  by  the  enemy  which  he  may  not  make.  In 
that  case,  the  withdrawal  would  take  some  other  form. 
When  the  development  of  the  situation  shows  that 
the  time  has  arrived  to  begin  the  withdrawal,  the  1st 
Platoon  (in  support)  will  fall  back  in  column  of 
squads  and  occupy  a  position  with  one  section,  on  a 
front  of  about  100  yards,  in  the  northern  edge  of  the 
next  strip  of  wood  to  the  south  (northwest  of  49), 
and  with  the  other  section  in  support.  Just  where  this 
line  will  be  along  the  edge  of  the  wood  will  depend  on 
the  direction  of  the  enemy's  advance  up  to  this  time. 


A  REAR  GUARD  199 

The  2d  Platoon  (in  the  firing  line  along  the  north- 
ern edge  of  the  wood  just  south  of  23)  will  withdraw 
by  sections.  The  right  section  will  fall  back  deployed 
to  the  southern  edge  of  the  wood,  where  it  will  form 
column  of  squads  and  move  quickly  to  the  south  bank 
of  Bee  creek,  via  the  little  ravine  just  west  of  49.  The 
platoon  commander  will  withdraw  his  left  section  in  a 
similar  manner,  as  soon  as  the  right  is  formed  and 
marching  off,  and  will  follow  the  latter  to  the  south  of 
Bee  creek. 

The  1st  Platoon,  from  its  position  in  the  strip  of 
wood  northwest  of  49,  will  offer  only  such  resist- 
ance as  is  necessary  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  2d 
Platoon,  and  it  will  then  withdraw,  also  by  sections  if 
necessary,  to  the  south  of  Bee  creek.  Its  withdrawal 
will  be  covered  by  Company  B  in  position  on  the  spur 
south  of  49,  and  possibly  also  by  the  2d  Platoon  of 
Company  A. 

It  is  highly  desirable  that  the  withdrawal  be  made 
in  the  orderly  manner  here  described,  for  the  rear 
guard  may  have  to  withdraw  from  many  positions  be- 
fore its  morning's  work  is  over,  and  should  it  become 
thoroughly  disorganized  at  the  outset,  its  delaying 
power  is  at  once  impaired,  and  may  be  wholly  de- 
stroyed, if  the  enemy's  pursuit  is  so  vigorous  as  to  ren- 
der subsequent  reorganization  impossible.  At  the 
best,  there  is  bound  to  be  some  disorder  and  confusion, 
and  if  the  platoons  and  companies  are  to  be  kept  in 
hand,  the  most  careful  leadership  must  be  exercised. 
Accordingly,  the  withdrawal  should  be  started  before 
the  enemy  has  crossed  to  the  south  of  the  25 — 23  road 
in  force,  and  certainly  it  should  begin  before  the  ene- 
my has  moved  a  force  down  the  ravine  east  of  25. 


200       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

As  soon  as  the  entire  company  is  on  the  south  bank 
of  Bee  creek,  it  will  reform  under  cover  of  the  wood, 
with  squads,  sections  and  platoons  in  their  normal  po- 
sitions, provided  the  situation  permits  this,  and  will 
then  proceed  in  column  of  squads  to  some  suitable  po- 
sition to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  Company  B.  The 
withdrawal  probably  will  not  be  made  in  precisely  this 
manner,  but  the  main  object  in  this,  as  well  as  in  sub- 
sequent withdrawals,  will  be  to  get  away  with  the  least 
loss  and  disorder  consistent  with  delaying  the  ene- 
my. 

It  is  plain  that  the  conditions  make  it  impracticable 
for  the  rear  guard  to  form  in  column,  with  the  usual 
subdivisions  and  distances,  and  march  off  after  the 
main  body;  but  the  leading  of  the  rear  guard  would 
be  very  different  if  it  were  not  necessary  to  delay  the 
enemy.  In  that  case  the  rear  guard  would  take  the 
road  after  the  main  body  with  say  a  company  and  a 
half  in  the  support,  and  a  half  company  in  the  rear 
party  and,  using  its  cavalry  to  hold  the  enemy  at  a 
distance,  would  attempt  to  avoid  any  fighting  with 
its  infantry. 

m 

Should  the  enemy  not  resume  the  pursuit  the  morn- 
ing of  May  2,  and  should  the  situation  continue  un- 
changed in  other  respects,  the  rear  guard  should  re- 
main in  the  first  positions  occupied,  without  disturb- 
ing the  front  line  of  the  outposts,  until  the  necessary 
delay  of  two  and  one-half  hours  had  been  secured ;  at 
the  end  of  that  time  it  would  form  column  on  the  road, 
with  the  usual  subdivisions  and  distances,  and  follow 
the  main  body  which,  during  this  delay,  should  have 
remained  within  supporting  distance. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

; :        -i 

A  PURSUIT. 

SITUATION. 

(See  2  and  4-inch  maps). 

A  Red  detachment,  in  friendly  country,  consist- 
ing of 

1st  and  2d  Infantry, 

1st  Squadron,  3d  Cavalry,  (less  Troops  C  and  D), 
and 

Company  A,  1st  Battalion  Engineers, 
commanded  by  Colonel  Z,  is  being  pushed  forward 
from  the  south  to  Leavenworth,  to  assist  in  guard- 
ing the  Missouri  Pacific  Railroad  (along  the  west 
bank  of  the  Missouri  river)  for  the  movement  north 
of  a  strong  Red  force.  On  reaching  Kansas  City, 
during  the  forenoon  of  July  15,  Colonel  Z  was  in- 
formed by  a  spy  that  a  Blue  force  of  a  regiment  of  in- 
fantry and  a  troop  of  cavalry  reached  Kickapoo  by 
train,  the  afternoon  of  July  14,  where  it  detrained  and 
bivouacked  for  the  night,  and  that  more  Blue  troops 
are  expected  there  July  16.  He  further  stated  that  the 
citizens  of  Leavenworth  had  blown  up  the  important 
steel  bridge  at  the  mouth  of  Salt  creek  (on  the  M.  P. 
R.  R.  between  Leavenworth  and  Kickapoo). 

A  little  before  noon,  when  about  15  miles  south  of 
Leavenworth,  Colonel  Z  learned  that  the  enemy's  cav- 
alry had  blown  up  a  number  of  bridges  arid  culverts 
along  the  railroad  south  of  Leavenworth.  Conse- 
quently, he  detrained  all  his  command  except  the  3d 


202       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Battalion  of  the  2d  Infantry,  and  the  engineers 
(which  were  sent  to  repair  the  bridges) ,  and  continued 
to  advance  by  marching. 

Late  in  the  afternoon,  the  enemy  was  encountered 
five  miles  south  of  Leavenworth  but  withdrew  in  good 
order  after  a  very  feeble  resistance.  As  nearly  as  Col- 
onel Z  could  determine,  the  hostile  force  appeared  to 
be  a  regiment  of  infantry  and  a  troop  of  cavalry.  A 
little  before  dark,  the  detachment  bivouacked  at  190 
and  established  outposts  (1st  Bn,  2d  Inf.,  and  V*  Tr. 
A,  3d  Cav.)  along  Five  Mile  creek,  from  the  road 
junction  one  mile  west  of  228  to  230,  with  one  platoon 
of  the  outpost  cavalry  watching  the  left  flank  at  148. 
The  detached  battalion  and  the  engineers  remained  ab- 
sent and  reported  that  they  can  have  the  railroad 
opened  to  Five  Mile  creek  by  10  a.  m.  to-morrow. 

During  the  evening,  patrols  from  the  outposts  are 
driven  back  from  the  210 — Pilot  Knob  ridge;  hostile 
cavalry  patrols  were  seen  in  the  southern  outskirts  of 
Leavenworth,  and  a  cavalry  patrol  sent  to  the  west 
was  driven  back  from  138  by  hostile  cavalry. 

Colonel  Z  reported  the  situation  to  superior  head- 
quarters, and  at  10  p.  m.,  received  the  following  orders 
in  reply:  "Your  information  of  the  enemy  is  con- 
firmed by  other  reports  received  at  these  headquarters. 
The  commanding  general  desires  you  to  advance 
(with  all  troops  not  required  to  repair  the  railroad) 
early  to-morrow  morning,  against  the  enemy  in  your 
front,  and  inflict  all  possible  damage  on  him  before 
he  can  be  reinforced.  The  3d  Infantry  and  2  bat- 
teries will  join  you  to-morrow  and  can  reach  Leav- 
enworth by  10  a.  m.,  if  the  railroad  is  open.  You 
will  keep  this  force  informed  of  the  situation  as  it 
approaches  Leavenworth." 


A  PURSUIT  203 

Required : 

.  Colonel  Z's  estimate  of  the  situation,  and  his  orders 
for  July  16,  on  the  supposition  that  no  additional  in- 
formation is  received  during  the  night. 

SOLUTION  AND  DISCUSSION. 

We  recognize  in  this  situation  the  opposing  side  of 
that  given  in  Chapter  X,  and  a  study  of  it  will  serve 
as  a  test  of  the  dispositions  made  in  that  chapter.  Let 
us  first  get  a  clearer  understanding  of  Colonel  Z's 
mission.  He  was  originally  sent  ahead  for  the  pur- 
pose of  opening  up  the  Missouri  Pacific  railroad  for 
the  movement  of  the  remainder  of  the  Red  force  to 
Leavenworth.  The  orders  received  at  10  p.  m.  change 
his  mission  by  making  it  more  comprehensive.  He  is 
still  charged  with  opening  up  the  railroad  as  far  as 
Leavenworth,  in  time,  if  possible,  to  permit  his  rein- 
forcing troops  to  join  him  at  that  place  in  the  morn- 
ing, and  in  addition  to  this,  he  is  to  inflict  all  possible 
damage  on  the  hostile  force  in  his  front  before  it  can 
join  with  reinforcements. 

The  first  part  of  this  mission  he  might  accomplish 
without  fighting,  for,  should  the  enemy  continue  to 
fall  back  on  Kickapoo,  the  morning  of  July  16th, 
showing  a  desire  to  avoid  a  fight,  Colonel  Z  has  but 
to  follow  sufficiently  far  to  secure  protection  for  the 
troop  trains  as  they  enter  Leavenworth,  and  his  pur- 
suit need  not  be  so  vigorous  as  to  compel  the  enemy  to 
make  a  stand.  But  the  full  execution  of  the  second 
part  of  his  mission  requires  not  only  fighting,  but  of- 
fensive fighting  of  the  most  vigorous  kind.  Only  by 
taking  the  initiative  can  Colonel  Z  hope  to  inflict  loss 
upon  the  enemy  before  he  is  reinforced. 


204       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Our  colonel's  information  of  the  enemy  is  quite  com- 
plete. The  report  of  the  spy  as  to  the  enemy's 
strength  was  corroborated  by  the  information  ob- 
tained after  the  enemy  was  encountered  during  the 
afternoon,  and  again  by  information  received  through 
other  sources  at  superior  headquarters.  Considerable 
dependence  may  therefore  be  placed  in  the  further 
report  of  the  spy,  that  more  Blue  troops  are  expect- 
ed to  reach  Kickapoo  July  16.  The  fact  that  the  Red 
patrols  have  been  driven  back  all  along  the  front  138 
— 210 — Pilot  Knob — southern  outskirts  of  Leaven- 
worth,  indicates  that  the  enemy  has  halted  and  estab- 
lished outposts.  He  must  have  left  Kickapoo  some 
time  to-day  and  when  he  reached  the  outskirts  of  Leav- 
enworth,  as  night  was  coming  on,  he  had  marched  near- 
ly 20  miles.  His  command  certainly  is  greatly  fatig- 
ued, and  he  no  doubt  gladly  seized  the  opportunity  for 
rest  afforded  him  when  the  Red  pursuit  did  not  pro- 
ceed beyond  Five  Mile  creek.  Even  if  he  contem- 
plated continuing  his  retreat  during  the  night,  he 
probably  would  allow  his  tired  command  to  rest  for 
some  hours.  So  the  indications  are  that  he  has  biv- 
ouacked for  the  night  along  the  66a — 68  road,  with 
an  infantry  outpost  along  the  210 — Pilot  Knob  ridge, 
and  cavalry  on  the  two  flanks  at  138  and  226. 

In  deliberating  on  the  situation,  Colonel  Z  thinks 
mainly  of  how  he  can  overtake  the  enemy,  tie  him 
down  to  a  position  and  compel  him  to  fight,  for  if  any 
serious  loss  is  inflicted  upon  him  it  must  be  in  a  de- 
cisive action  and  the  disorganized  retreat  which  fol- 
lows it.  There  is  no  reason  to  believe  he  is  demoral- 
ized ;  the  fighting  south  of  Leaven  worth  was  in  no  re- 
spect decisive,  and  his  withdrawal  was  made  in  good 


A  PURSUIT  205 

order.  Under  these  circumstances,  there  will  be  lit- 
tle chance  for  a  simple  stern  chase  to  run  over  the  ene- 
my's rear  guard  (if  it  be  properly  led)  and  reach  his 
main  body.  When  a  pursuing  force  encounters  the 
hostile  rear  guard  in  position,  its  advance  is  checked. 
The  position  must  be  reconnoitered,  for  it  is  seldom 
possible  to  state  with  certainty  that  it  is  held  only  by 
a  weak  rear  guard.  Troops  have  to  be  deployed  for 
the  attack  and,  unless  the  situation  is  one  which  war- 
rants or  demands  that  risks  be  taken,  we  are  liable  to 
be  on  the  safe  side  and  deploy  too  many  rather  than 
too  few  to  make  the  attack  a  success.  The  pursuit  is 
stopped,  but  time  goes  on,  and  the  hostile  main  body 
steadily  draws  away  from  us.  Finally,  we  get  de- 
ployed into  position  and  deliver  our  attack,  only  to 
discover  that  the  rear  guard  has  slipped  out  at  the  last 
moment  and,  with  the  possible  exception  of  a  very 
few  casualties  and  stragglers,  has  completely  eluded 
us.  To  advance  across  country  deployed  would  so  re- 
duce our  marching  rate  that  we  would  thereby  play 
the  enemy's  game  for  him,  so  we  are  compelled  again 
to  form  column  on  the  road  (which  also  means  delay) , 
only  to  repeat  the  whole  exasperating  procedure  in 
front  of  the  next  position  occupied  by  the  rear  guard. 
How  then  is  the  pursuing  force  to  make  its  super- 
ior numbers  and  morale  felt?  It  is  usually  by  man- 
euvering on  the  flanks  of  the  retreating  enemy,  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  bring  him  to  a  stand  and  hold  him 
in  position  long  enough  to  strike  him  a  decisive  blow. 
A  large  force  of  all  arms,  conducting  a  pursuit  that 
may  continue  through  several  days,  may  do  this  by 
so  directing  its  march  as  to  intercept  the  retreating 
force  at  some  critical  point,  such  as  a  defile.  Or,  while 


206       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

a  part  of  the  force  pursues  directly,  the  remainder 
may  make  a  forced  march  along  parallel  roads  and 
strike  the  enemy  in  flank.  Or,  cavalry  and  horse  ar- 
tillery may  make  a  wide  detour  and  block  the  enemy's 
retreat  by  reaching  his  rear.  These  and  other  com- 
binations, made  possible  by  the  large  numbers  of  the 
pursuing  force  and  the  long  duration  of  the  pursuit, 
may  be  quite  impracticable  with  a  command  the  size 
of  Colonel  Z's,  that  can,  because  of  the  situation,  pur- 
sue but  a  few  miles;  and  so  small  a  command  often 
will  be  unable  to  do  little  more  than  compel  the  ene- 
my to  hasten  his  retreat. 

It  may  be  well  to  point  out  just  here  that  there 
are  two  kinds  of  pursuit :  that  of  a  force  which  avoids 
a  fight  and  voluntarily  retires  on  the  approach  of  the 
enemy;  and  that  of  a  force  which  is  compelled  to  re- 
treat after  being  defeated  in  battle.  In  reality  it  is 
the  second  case  only  which  permits  the  execution  of 
that  impassioned  offensive  act  called  a  pursuit — that 
relentless  and  uninterrupted  pressing  after  the  enemy 
until  the  limit  of  our  strength  is  reached.  It  is  then 
we  gather  the  fruits  of  victory.  In  the  fighting  inci- 
dent to  gaining  a  tactical  decision,  we  inflict  some 
loss  upon  the  enemy,  but  it  may  be  no  greater  than 
that  we  ourselves  have  suffered.  If  we  would  turn 
the  balance  greatly  in  our  favor,  we  must  make  him 
feel  the  full  weight  of  his  defeat  in  the  loss  and  de- 
moralization caused  him  by  the  pursuit. 

But  it  is  not  always  as  easy  as  our  critics  would 
have  us  believe,  for  a  victorious  force  to  undertake  the 
immediate  pursuit  of  its  beaten  foe.  Pursuit  will  al- 
ways depend  upon  conditions  on  both  sides,  after  the 
decision  has  come.  The  degree  of  dissolution  on  the 


A  PURSUIT  207 

side  of  the  victor  is  taken  into  account  as  much  as  on 
the  side  of  the  vanquished,  and  except  the  defeat  de- 
generate into  a  rout,  the  one  who  has  been  beaten  will 
always  be  able  to  offer  resistance  in  various  positions. 
It  takes  time  to  restore  order  among  pursuers,  and 
all  this  accrues  to  the  benefit  of  the  vanquished.  Aft- 
er we  have  driven  the  enemy  out  of  his  position  by 
employing  our  entire  strength,  and  so  brought  about 
a  decision,  we  will  not  always  be  in  condition  to  un- 
dertake new  and  costly  partial  attacks  with  our  tired 
and  intermingled  forces,  against  the  positions  which 
the  enemy  has  occupied  during  his  retreat. 

But  the  situation  before  us  is  an  example  of  the 
first  of  the  two  kinds  of  pursuit  mentioned.  The  ene- 
my was  not  defeated,  but  voluntarily  withdrew  on  the 
approach  of  Colonel  Z,  who  followed  rather  than  pur- 
sued him.  Although  the  enemy's  morale  may  have 
been  impaired  by  his  retreat,  nevertheless  his  with- 
drawal was  made  in  good  order  and  his  troops  were  in 
hand  and  covered  by  a  rear  guard.  Unless  Colonel  Z 
can  in  some  way  break  up  this  orderly  retreat,  he  will 
have  little  chance  even  to  inflict  loss  on  the  enemy's 
rear  guard,  to  say  nothing  of  overtaking  his  main 
body.  If  unmolested,  the  enemy  can  march  as  fast  as 
his  pursuers,  and  the  latter  have  practically  no  chance 
of  overtaking  him  unless  his  march  be  delayed. 

In  his  cavalry,  Colonel  Z  may  find  the  means  of 
doing  this.  The  situation  presents  an  opportunity  to 
illustrate  the  important  role  of  cavalry  pursuing  a 
retreating  force,  especially  a  force  such  as  the  Blue 
detachment  which  is  in  no  wise  demoralized.  The 
great  mission  of  the  cavalry  is  to  get  on  the  flank  or 
rear  of  the  retreating  enemy  and,  by  worrying  him, 


208       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

delay  his  march  sufficiently  to  permit  the  pursuing  in- 
fantry to  overtake  him.  It  is  Colonel  Z's  long  arm, 
with  which  he  can  reach  out  and  hold  his  prey  until 
his  more  slowly  moving  infantry  can  come  up  and 
strike  the  decisive  blow.  Before  discussing  how  it 
will  proceed  to  accomplish  this  task,  let  us  examine  the 
situation  more  carefully  and  discover  what  we  can 
of  the  enemy's  probable  intentions. 

Why  did  the  enemy  march  to  the  south  on  reaching 
Kickapoo?  Why  did  he  fall  back  without  showing 
fight  on  meeting  Colonel  Z  this  afternoon?  What 
does  his  present  stand  indicate?  These  are  a  few  of 
the  questions  we  should  attempt  to  answer  before 
reaching  a  decision  as  to  our  own  actions,  and  if  we 
place  ourselves  in  the  enemy's  position,  we  will  be  able 
to  arrive  at  fairly  satisfactory  answers.  The  informa- 
tion in  Colonel  Z's  possession  indicates  that  the  enemy 
intends  collecting  a  hostile  force  at  Kickapoo.  The 
first  detachment  to  reach  that  place  consisted  of  but 
a  regiment  of  infantry  and  a  troop  of  cavalry.  Its 
weakness  and  the  fact  that  its  reinforcements  are 
more  than  a  day  behind  it  might  be  explained  in  many 
ways,  were  it  important  to  speculate  on  these  points. 
Most  probably,  the  enemy  has  knowledge  of  the  pro- 
posed advance  of  Red  troops  from  the  south,  and 
naturally  will  be  very  anxious  about  the  safety  of  his 
little  command.  His  mission  very  probably  is  the 
protection  of  the  rail  head  at  Kickapoo  until  the  ar- 
rival of  his  reinforcements;  consequently,  we  would 
expect  him  to  do  everything  he  could  to  delay  the  Red 
advance  without  seriously  involving  his  command. 
Manifestly,  his  easiest  way  of  doing  this  was  to  in- 
terrupt the  Missouri  Pacific  railway  south  of  Leav- 


A  PURSUIT  209 

enworth,  and,  since  his  single  troop  of  cavalry  was 
too  weak  for  such  a  mission,  he  marched  to  the  south 
with  his  entire  command. 

He  probably  fought  only  long  enough  this  after- 
noon to  determine  that  Colonel  Z  was  much  the  strong- 
er, and  then  began  his  retreat  to  save  his  command 
from  serious  loss.  We  can  reach  no  definite  conclus- 
ion as  to  what  his  later  actions  are  to  be.  He  may 
continue  his  retreat  to  Kickapoo  to-night  after  giving 
his  troops  a  rest;  he  may  remain  where  he  is  for  the 
night  and  continue  his  retreat  in  the  morning;  or, 
should  reinforcements  reach  him  early  in  the  morning, 
he  may  stand  and  fight  or  even  take  the  offensive. 

It  will  be  useless  for  Colonel  Z  to  resume  the  pur- 
suit to-night,  should  the  enemy  continue  his  retreat, 
for  even  should  he  overtake  the  enemy,  an  attack  in 
the  darkness  would  be  impracticable.  True,  daybreak 
would  find  Colonel  Z  before  Kickapoo,  but  his  com- 
mand would  be  so  exhausted  it  would  be  in  no  condi- 
tion to  attack.  Colonel  Z's  best  plan  is  to  remain 
where  he  is  for  the  night  and  be  ready  to  resume  the 
pursuit  at  an  early  hour  next  morning.  He  can  then 
act  according  to  the  situation  at  that  time. 

Our  colonel  may  advance  in  the  usual  manner,  in 
column  on  the  road  preceded  by  an  advance  guard,  or 
he  may  act  on  the  supposition  that  he  will  find  the  ene- 
my in  position  in  his  front,  and  deploy  his  command 
for  an  attack  at  the  outset.  Not  much  can  be  said  in 
favor  of  the  latter,  and  the  only  good  reason  for  so 
acting  is  the  slight  probability  that  the  enemy  will  be 
reinforced  during  the  night,  for  unless  he  be  rein- 
forced, it  is  not  at  all  likely  he  will  make  a  determined 
stand  in  the  face  of  what  he  apparently  knows  to  be 


210       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

superior  numbers.  The  chances  are  Colonel  Z  will 
find  only  a  small  rear  guard  on  Pilot  Knob  ridge,  but 
even  if  he  should  find  the  enemy  there  in  greater  force, 
no  time  will  be  lost  and  he  will  be  in  no  wise  compro- 
mised because  of  his  being  in  column  on  the  road.  On 
the  other  hand,  to  deploy  the  command  directly  from 
bivouac  would  be  a  waste  of  time  and  energy  should 
it  turn  out  that  the  enemy  had  withdrawn  during  the 
night,  or  is  holding  the  position  so  lightly  that  the  de- 
ployment of  the  entire  command  is  unnecessary.  It 
is  probable  the  situation  to-morrow  morning  can  best 
be  met  with  the  command  in  the  usual  column  of 
march  on  the  road. 

There  is  little  choice  of  routes  for  the  main  column. 
Since  the  enemy  must  be  overtaken  before  he  can  be 
injured,  the  most  direct  route  is  the  best.  This  is  via 
the  190 — 228 — 226 — 224  road.  To  move  over  less  di- 
rect routes  farther  to  the  west,  in  the  hope  of  getting 
on  the  enemy's  right  flank,  probably  would  permit 
him  to  get  away  untouched.  In  a  pursuit  such  as  this, 
where  the  enemy  is  falling  straight  back  on  his  base 
and  can  reach  it  in  less  than  three  hours,  the  pursuers 
will  do  well  to  follow  immediately  on  his  heels  with 
their  infantry  column.  The  roads  do  not  favor  pur- 
suing in  two  columns,  even  were  this  advisable  for 
other  reasons,  which  is  far  from  being  the  case.  If  a 
command  the  size  of  Colonel  Z's  be  split  into  two 
parts,  separated  by  a  mile  or  more  of  close  country,  it 
will  be  in  danger  of  being  defeated  in  detail.  The 
enemy  will  be  given  an  opportunity  to  hold  one  part 
of  the  divided  force  at  a  distance,  by  the  defensive 
action  of  inferior  numbers,  while  he  falls  upon  the 
other  part  of  the  divided  force  with  the  bulk  of  his 


A  PURSUIT  211 

command.  Such  a  division  would  be  particularly  haz- 
ardous, should  the  enemy  be  reinforced  during  the 
night,  or  while  the  pursuit  in  two  columns  is  in  pro- 
gress. No  advantage  commensurate  with  the  risk  in- 
volved, is  to  be  derived  by  Colonel  Z  from  thus  divid- 
ing his  little  command. 

In  discussing  an  advance,  (*)  it  was  pointed  out 
that  the  outposts  may  form  the  advance  guard  for 
the  following  day's  march,  although  the  usual  pro- 
cedure is  to  detail  the  advance  guard  from  troops  that 
have  had  a  good  night's  rest,  and  have  the  outposts 
assemble  and  join  the  main  body  as  it  passes.  The  lat- 
ter appears  to  be  the  better  plan  in  this  situation,  since 
there  is  no  good  reason  why  the  outposts  should  be 
given  the  most  arduous  and  dangerous  duty  during 
the  day  after  their  fatiguing  work  of  the  night.  Con- 
sidering the  possibility  of  the  enemy  taking  the  of- 
fensive in  the  morning,  this  will  also  be  the  safer  plan, 
for  the  outpost  will  be  in  position  to  cover  the  main 
body  of  the  command  at  the  beginning  of  the  march. 

In  determining  the  strength  of  the  advance  guard, 
we  must  bear  in  mind  that  it  probably  will  have  to 
fight  before  it  has  proceeded  far.  If  the  enemy  con- 
tinues his  retreat,  it  will  encounter  the  hostile  rear 
guard  and  should  be  at  least  as  strong,  if  not  stronger, 
than  this  rear  guard.  On  the  other  hand,  by  keeping 
the  advance  guard  small,  Colonel  Z  holds  a  larger 
part  of  his  command  under  his  immediate  control,  and 
thereby  preserves  greater  freedom  of  action  for  him- 
self in  case  he  has  to  put  his  whole  force  into  the  fight 
to  meet  a  determined  stand  of  the  enemy. 

Were  his  six  battalions  present,  he  might  place  two 

*  See  Chapter  V. 


212       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

battalions  in  the  advance  guard,  and  make  certain  of 
its  not  being  definitely  stopped  by  the  hostile  rear 
guard.  But  he  has  but  five  battalions,  and,  if  he 
places  two  of  them  in  the  advance  guard,  he  will  have 
but  three-fifths  of  his  infantry  command  in  hand,  and 
possibly  less  than  that  if  his  outposts  become  engaged. 
It  is  not  desirable  to  place  six  companies  in  the  ad- 
vance guard,  for  that  would  break  up  a  battalion.  The 
hostile  rear  guard  probably  will  not  be  stronger  than 
a  battalion,  and  the  chances  are  it  will  be  considerably 
weaker  than  that,  if  the  enemy  wishes  to  delay  the  pur- 
suit only  sufficiently  to  cover  his  own  retreat.  Conse- 
quently, it  appears  that  the  advance  guard  should  have 
but  one  battalion,  especially  if  it  is  strengthened  by 
the  addition  of  a  machine  gun  platoon  and  receives 
the  support  of  the  cavalry.  The  situation  will  be 
much  clearer  after  the  enemy's  intentions  for  to-mor- 
row become  known,  and  until  that  time  Colonel  Z  does 
well  to  keep  the  advance  guard  small  and  the  main 
body  strong.  If  it  develops  that  the  enemy  has  re- 
sumed his  retreat,  the  advance  guard  may  be  strength- 
ened without  inconvenience,  if  it  appear  desirable  to 
do  so  in  order  that  it  may  keep  the  hostile  rear  guard 
on  the  move  without  calling  on  the  main  body  for  as- 
sistance. 

The  cavalry  may  be  placed  in  the  advance  guard, 
or  it  may  be  employed  independently.  In  its  effort 
to  get  on  the  flank  of  the  hostile  column  and  delay  its 
retreat,  it  and  the  advance  guard  may  become  separ- 
ated by  some  miles,  but,  in  the  end,  they  will  be  co- 
operating tactically,  and  both  ordinarily  should  be 
under  the  same  commander.  In  other  words,  it  is 
not  clear  that  the  situation  will  give  the  cavalry  a  mis- 


A  PURSUIT  213 

sion  separate  and  distinct  as  to  time  and  place  from 
that  of  the  advance  guard;  consequently,  there  is  no 
clear  tactical  reason  why  it  should  be  employed  inde- 
pendently. There  is  one  good  reason,  however,  why 
Colonel  Z  might  not  part  with  direct  control  of  his 
cavalry,  viz. — a  lack  of  confidence  in  the  ability  of  his 
advance  guard  commander  to  make  the  proper  use  of 
it.  We  have  already  hinted  at  the  important  part  the 
cavalry  has  to  play  in  to-morrow's  operations.  In 
fact,  the  whole  success  of  the  pursuit  may  depend  on 
the  cavalry  being  properly  employed,  and  our  colonel 
should  take  no  chances  in  this  matter.  The  exigen- 
cies of  war  often  place  inexperienced  officers  in  posi- 
tions of  great  responsibility.  We  will  assume  that 
such  is  the  case  in  the  situation  before  us;  that  our 
advance  guard  commander  is  an  able  leader  of  infan- 
try, but  that  he  has  shown  himself  fairly  incompetent 
to  comprehend  the  proper  employment  of  cavalry  and 
infantry  combined.  Our  coronei  would  make  a  mis- 
take, should  he  entrust  this  officer  with  the  control  of 
his  cavalry,  merely  because  there  is  some  doubt  as  to 
whether  its  task  is  tactically  independent  of  that  of 
the  advance  guard.  It  is  but  another  illustration  of 
the  fact  that  there  is  no  rule  of  tactics  that  is  not  sub- 
ject to  exceptions. 

Some  cavalry,  however,  should  be  with  the  advance 
guard  for  reconnaissance  in  its  immediate  vicinity. 
This  constitutes  the  cavalry's  secondary  task  and,  con- 
sequently, the  number  of  men  detached  from  the  main 
cavalry  force  for  this  purpose  should  be  as  small  as 
possible.  A  platoon  will  be  ample  and  a  smaller  force 
might  be  sufficient. 

The  remainder  of  the  cavalry  is  to  be  employed 


214       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

against  one  or  the  other  of  the  hostile  flanks.  If  the 
enemy  continues  his  retreat,  it  probably  will  be  via  the 
14 — 16 — G — H — 17  road,  which  is  his  most  direct 
route  to  Kickapoo,  and  the  cavalry  will  find  the  ter- 
rain to  the  west  of  this  road  the  most  favorable  for 
its  operations.  To  the  east  of  the  road,  the  nearness 
of  the  Missouri  river  would  so  restrict  its  movements 
as  to  make  its  commander  anxious  and  possibly  timid, 
and  it  might  be  seriously  delayed  in  passing  through 
Leavenworth.  If  the  hostile  cavalry  were  encounter- 
ed on  this  flank,  it  probably  would  have  to  be  defeated 
before  our  cavalry  could  continue  its  advance  and 
reach  the  hostile  infantry  column,  which  is  its  true  ob- 
jective. On  the  other  flank,  it  may  be  possible  to 
avoid  the  hostile  cavalry,  wholly  or  in  part,  and  strike 
straight  at  the  hostile  infantry.  It  is  unfortunate 
that  there  is  no  direct  road  leading  to  the  enemy's 
right,  and  this  condition  must  be  met  by  starting  the 
cavalry  somewhat  earlier  than  otherwise  would  be 
necessary. 

At  this  season  of  the  year,  in  this  latitude,  the  sun 
rises  at  4:30  a.  m.,  and  it  is  light  enough  for  troops  to 
move  without  difficulty  a  half  hour  earlier.  We  may 
expect  the  enemy  to  make  an  early  start,  and  we  must 
also  start  at  the  earliest  practicable  hour.  In  this  sit- 
uation, we  find  an  exception  to  another  general  rule. 
In  an  earlier  solution  (*)  it  was  pointed  out  that  it 
is  not  usual  to  start  the  march  before  an  hour  after 
daybreak,  but  Colonel  Z  would  make  a  serious  mis- 
take were  he  to  delay  starting  until  that  time. 

The  enemy  probably  will  have  his  outposts  in  posi- 
tion to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  his  main  body,  and  Col- 

*  See  Chapter  V. 


A  PURSUIT  215 

onel  Z  will  have  to  drive  them  in  before  he  can  continue 
his  pursuit.  Since  this  attack  can  not  be  made  with 
any  certainty  in  the  darkness,  it  will  be  useless  for  the 
advance  guard  to  advance  much  beyond  228  before 
daylight.  The  possibility  that  the  enemy  may  have 
received  reinforcements  during  the  night  should 
make  Colonel  Z  proceed  cautiously  until  the  situation 
becomes  clearer.  At  a  very  early  hour,  patrols  should 
be  sent  from  the  outpost  to  gain  the  210 — Pilot  Knob 
ridge,  and  some  information  may  be  secured  from 
them  by  daylight.  If  the  ridge  is  occupied,  they  will 
not  be  able  to  report  much  more  than  the  fact  that  they 
were  driven  back  by  hostile  fire.  Our  colonel  will  still 
be  ignorant  of  the  strength  of  the  force  occupying  it, 
and  this  important  point  may  not  be  cleared  up  until 
he  or  the  enemy  has  been  driven  back  from  the  posi- 
tion. The  conditions  under  which  modern  war  is 
waged  make  it  extremely  difficult  to  get  accurate  in- 
formation of  the  enemy's  numbers,  and  often  we  will 
not  know  the  exact  strength  of  the  force  we  have  been 
fighting  even  after  the  engagement  is  over.  Once 
Colonel  Z  gains  possession  of  Pilot  Knob,  most  of  the 
perplexing  features  of  the  situation  will  disappear, 
and  he  may  be  able  to  continue  the  pursuit  from  that 
point  with  less  caution  and  greater  vigor,  but  the  sit- 
uation before  that  time  will  be  so  full  of  uncertainties 
and  possibilities  that  we  cannot  expect  him  to  advance 
blindly  beyond  228  before  daylight.  If  the  point  of 
the  advance  guard  is  to  reach  228  by  4  a.  m.,  it  should 
start  from  190  at  about  3:40  a.  m.,  and  if  we  allow 
for  delays  in  the  darkness,  it  should  start  at  3 :30  a.  m. 
Colonel  Z's  decision,  as  finally  reached,  is  to  resume 
the  pursuit  at  3 :30  a.  m.  to-morrow ;  to  march  the  in- 


216       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

fantry  in  one  column  via  the  190 — 228 — 224  road  at 
the  outset,  preceded  by  an  advance  guard  of  one  bat- 
talion with  a  machine  gun  platoon  and  one  platoon  of 
cavalry;  to  have  the  cavalry  (less  1  platoon)  operate 
against  the  enemy's  right  flank  and  delay  his  march, 
and  to  have  the  outposts  remain  in  position  until  the 
column  has  passed  and  then  join  its  rear. 

The  orders  may  be  issued  in  several  ways  which  ap- 
pear to  be  equally  good,  Colonel  Z  may  have  his  ad- 
jutant prepare  sufficient  copies  of  the  orders  in  writ- 
ing to  furnish  each  officer  concerned  with  one,  he  may 
assemble  his  officers  yet  to-night  or  to-morrow  morn- 
ing and  give  them  verbal  orders,  or  he  may  assemble 
part  of  them  to-night  and  the  others  in  the  morning. 
Possibly  the  latter  method  will  be  the  simplest  and 
least  disturb  the  command.  The  advance  guard  and 
cavalry  commanders  should  receive  their  orders  at 
once,  for  they  will  want  to  think  over  the  situation  be- 
fore giving  orders  to  their  subordinates.  According- 
ly, Colonel  Z  sends  for  these  officers  and,  when  they 
have  reported,  addresses  them  as  follows : 

"The  information  given  us  to-day  by  our  spy  (*)  has  been 
confirmed  by  our  reconnaissance  and  by  reports  from  superior 
headquarters.  Apparently,  the  enemy  bivouacked  for  the  night 
and  established  outposts  on  the  line  through  138 — 210 — Pilot 
Knob  and  the  southern  outskirts  of  Leavenworth.  One  of  our 
cavalry  patrols  was  driven  back  from  188  by  hostile  cavalry. 
Our  engineers  will  have  the  railroad  repaired  as  far  as  Five 
Mile  creek  by  10  a.  m.  to-morrow,  and  our  3d  Infantry  and  two 
batteries  will  reach  there  at  that  hour. 

"In  obedience  to  orders  received  from  General  — ,  we  will 
continue  our  pursuit  of  the  enemy  to-morrow  morning  and  in- 
flict all  possible  loss  on  him  before  he  can  be  reinforced. 

*  This  information  was  given  these  officers  when  the  command  de- 
trained. 


A  PURSUIT  217 

"Major  A,  your  battalion  and  the  machine  gun  platoon  of  the 
1st  Infantry,  and  one  platoon  of  the  outpost  cavalry  will  form 
the  advance  guard  under  your  command.  You  will  start  from 
here  (190)  at  3:30  a.  m.  and  follow  the  228 — 224  road.  You 
will  halt  when  your  support  reaches  228  and  await  further  or- 
ders, as  it  is  my  intention  not  to  advance  much  beyond  that  point 
until  after  daybreak.  I  will  direct  the  outpost  commander  to 
have  one  platoon  of  his  cavalry  report  to  you  on  the  road  just 
south  of  228  at  3:45  a.  m.,  and  you  will  at  that  time  send  a 
strong  cavalry  patrol  through  Leavenworth. 

"Major  B  (in  command  of  the  cavalry),  you  will  start  from 
here  at  3:30  a.  m.  and  proceed  with  your  two  troops,  less  the 
platoon  with  the  advance  guard,  via  the  148 — 150 — 144  road, 
and  operate  against  the  enemy's  right  flank.  If  you  discover 
that  the  enemy  is  retreating,  you  will  delay  him  sufficiently  to 
permit  our  infantry  to  overtake  and  engage  him.  You  will  rec- 
onnoiter  well  towards  Kickapoo,  and  send  me  early  information 
of  any  hostile  troops  that  may  advance  to  reinforce  the  enemy 
now  in  our  front.  One  platoon  of  the  outpost  cavalry  will  be 
directed  to  join  you  as  you  pass  148. 

"The  main  body  will  follow  the  advance  guard  at  a  distance 
of  500  yards. 

"The  field  train  will  remain  here  until  further  orders. 

"I  will  join  the  support  of  the  advance  guard  before  it  reach- 
es 228." 

/ 

These  orders  require  some  explanation.  We  notice 
that  Colonel  Z  makes  no  attenipt  to  prescribe  the  man- 
ner in  which  Major  A  shall  conduct  his  advance 
guard,  but  leaves  this  entirely  to  the  judgment  of  the 
latter.  This  is  in  accordance  with  the  general  rule  of 
non-interference  with  subordinates  explained  in  a  pre- 
vious solution.  (*)  Nor  does  he  indulge  in  specula- 
tions as  to  where  the  enemy  may  be  encountered,  the 
probability  of  his  withdrawing  during  the  night,  or  of 
his  being  reinforced,  for  they  will  serve  no  useful  pur- 

*  See  page  76  et  seq. 


218       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

pose.  These  are  matters  about  which  Major  A  can 
and  should  form  his  own  opinion,  and  concerning 
which  it  is  best  that  Colonel  Z  should  not  state  his 
opinion.  If  a  commander  states  in  his  orders  that  he 
presumes  this  or  that  will  happen,  while  later  on  the 
events  will  prove  his  assumption  to  be  incorrect,  his 
subordinates  will  be  quick  to  see  his  mistake  and  grad- 
ually their  confidence  in  him  will  be  shaken. 

As  pointed  out  in  a  previous  chapter,  (*)  an  ad- 
vance guard  commander  usually  should  be  given  a 
perfectly  clear  idea  of  the  intentions  of  his  command- 
ing officer,  for  without  this  there  will  be  no  certainty 
of  cooperation  between  the  two.  Colonel  Z  states 
that  his  intention  is  to  inflict  all  possible  loss  on  the 
enemy  before  he  can  be  reinforced,  and  the  order  in 
its  entirety  shows  he  proposes  to  do  this  by  pursuing 
with  the  infantry  directly  in  the  enemy's  rear,  while 
sending  the  cavalry  to  delay  him  on  his  flanks.  It 
may  be  thought  that  Major  A  should  be  told  some- 
thing of  the  vigor  with  which  he  should  attack  when 
encountered,  and  it  might  be  well  to  do  so  were  Col- 
onel Z  himself  perfectly  sure  on  that  point.  The  or- 
der makes  it  clear  that  the  pursuit  is  to  be  energetic, 
and  more  specific  orders  on  this  point  had  best  be 
postponed  until  to-morrow  morning  when  something 
definite  is  learned  of  the  enemy.  It  may  be  possible 
to  give  Major  A  these  orders  before  he  leaves  228. 

The  above  remarks  apply  equally  well  to  the  orders 
given  Major  B,  commanding  the  cavalry.  He  is  told 
the  part  he  is  to  take  in  the  pursuit,  but  is  left  with 
perfect  freedom  to  carry  out  his  orders  in  the  way  he 
thinks  best.  This  is  even  more  necessary  with  the  cav- 

*  See  page   75. 


A  PURSUIT  219 

airy  than  with  the  advance  guard,  for  Colonel  Z  can 
not  possibly  foretell  the  situations  that  may  develop 
in  front  of  the  former  in  the  course  of  the  day.  Ma- 
jor B  must  be  trusted  to  meet  these  situations  in  that 
manner  which  will  assist  most  in  inflicting  loss  on  the 
enemy.  He  is  not  even  told  whether  he  shall  direct 
his  operations  against  the  hostile  main  body  or  rear 
guard,  for  under  one  set  of  conditions  the  former 
might  be  advisable,  while  under  different  circumstan- 
ces the  latter  would  be  preferable. 

The  cavalry  is  left  to  choose  its  own  route  beyond 
144.  Beginning  its  march  from  190  at  3:30  a.  m.,  it 
can  reach  144  by  about  4  a.  m.,  as  it  is  beginning  to 
grow  light.  From  here,  it  may  proceed  via  142  or  152, 
depending  on  the  situation  and  the  judgment  of  Ma- 
jor B,  to  the  Lecompton  road.  This  movement  prob- 
ably will  be  anticipated  by  the  enemy,  who  may  be 
expected  to  cover  his  right  flank  with  his  troop  of  cav- 
alry, and  Major  B  may  meet  this  troop  almost  any 
time  after  daylight.  Two  courses  probably  then  will 
be  open  to  him.  He  may  attack  the  hostile  troop  and 
attempt  to  destroy  its  power  to  delay  him,  or  he  may 
avoid  a  fight  and  seek  to  ride  around  it.  In  either 
case,  his  ultimate  object  is  to  reach  the  hostile  infantry 
column,  and  he  should  choose  that  course  which  prom- 
ises to  bring  him  most  speedily  within  striking  dis- 
tance of  the  hostile  infantry. 

The  cavalry  commander  will  understand  from  his 
orders  that  he  is  to  shape  his  actions  to  conform  to  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  and  Colonel  Z's  infantry. 
Should  the  enemy  make  a  stand  on  the  Pilot  Knob 
ridge,  the  cavalry  probably  will  join  in  the  attack,  on 
his  right  and  rear.  Should  the  enemy  take  the  of- 


220       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

fensive,  a  different  course  of  action  may  be  followed 
by  the  cavalry.  Should  the  enemy  have  withdrawn 
during  the  night,  it  probably  will  seek  to  regain  touch 
with  him  towards  Kickapoo.  In  order  that  the  caval- 
ry may  properly  meet  any  of  the  many  situations  that 
may  arise,  Colonel  Z  very  wisely  gives  it  wide  discre- 
tion, merely  emphasizing  the  one  essential  point  as  to 
what  it  shall  do  in  case  the  enemy  resumes  his  retreat 
in  the  morning. 

After  giving  the  cavalry  and  advance  guard  com- 
manders their  orders,  Colonel  Z  sends  the  following 
message  to  the  outpost  commander: 

Blue  Detachment, 
190,  two  miles  south  of  Leaven  worth, 

15  July  — ,  10:45  P.  M. 

Major  C, 

Commanding  Outpost. 

We  will  advance  against  the  enemy  to-morrow  and  endeavor  to 
strike  him  before  he  can  be  reinforced.  The  advance  guard  un- 
der Major  A  will  leave  here  at  3:30  a.  m.  and  march  via  the  228 
— 224  road.  The  cavalry  will  leave  here  at  the  same  hour,  and 
march  via  the  148 — 150 — 144  road,  to  reach  the  enemy's  right 
flank.  Have  one  platoon  of  the  outpost  cavalry  report  to  Major 
A  on  the  road  south  of  228  at  3 :45  a.  m.,  and  the  remaining  pla- 
toon to  Major  B  as  he  passes  148.  The  outpost  will  remain  in 
position  until  further  orders,  and  will  send  out  patrols  at  3  a.  m. 
to  reconnoiter  the  210 — PILOT  KNOB  ridge. 

Z. 
Colonel,  Commanding. 

Colonel-  Z  cannot  tell  at  this  time  just  where  and 
when  he  will  have  the  outpost  join  the  column.  Should 
the  enemy  take  the  offensive  at  an  early  hour,  the 
outpost  may  form  a  first  line  behind  which  the  rest  of 
the  command  may  deploy.  Should  the  enemy  make 


A  PURSUIT  221 

a  determined  stand  on  the  Pilot  Knob  ridge,  it  may 
be  advisable  to  have  the  outpost  join  in  the  attack 
from  its  present  position.  There  will  be  plenty  of 
time  to  give  it  its  orders  to-morrow  morning,  after  the 
situation  has  been  cleared  up. 

Our  colonel  has  still  to  give  the  necessary  orders 
for  having  the  command  under  arms  and  ready  to 
march  at  3 :3Q  a.  m.  This  he  does  by  at  once  sending 
a  brief  written  order  to  that  effect  by  an  orderly,  or 
a  verbal  order  by  a  staff  officer,  to  the  regimental 
commanders. 

At  3:15  a.  m.,  he  assembles  his  staff  and  all  the 
field  officers,  except  Majors  A,  B  and  C,  and  address- 
es them  as  follows: 

"The  hostile  force  we  encountered  yesterday  apparently  con- 
sisted of  the  regiment  of  infantry  and  troop  of  cavalry  that 
reached  Kickapoo  the  afternoon  of  July  14.  This  force  estab- 
lished outposts  last  evening,  with  infantry  on  the  210 — Pilot 
Knob  ridge,  and  cavalry  at  138  and  in  the  southern  outskirts  of 
Leavenworth.  Our  outpost  has  not  yet  determined  whether  the 
enemy  still  occupies  that  line.  The  report  of  our  spy  that  more 
hostile  troops  are  expected  at  Kickapoo  to-day,  has  been  con- 
firmed by  information  received  by  General from  other  sour- 
ces. The  engineers  will  have  the  railroad  open  to  the  mouth  of 
Five  Mile  creek  by  10  a.  m.,  and  our  3d  Infantry  and  2  bat- 
teries will  reach  there  by  that  time. 

"In  obedience  to  orders  received  from  General  ,  we  will 

advance  against  the  force  in  our  front. 

"Major  A  will  command  the  advance  guard,  consisting  of  his 
battalion  (the  1st  Bn.,  1st  Inf.)  and  one  platoon  of  cavalry.  He 
will  start  from  here  at  3:30  a.  m.,  and  follow  the  228 — 226 — 
224  road. 

"The  cavalry,  less  one  platoon,  will  operate  on  the  enemy's 
right  flank.  It  will  start  from  here  at  3:30  a.  m.  and  follow 
the  148 — 150 — 144  road. 

"The  main  body  will  follow  the  advance  guard  at  500  yards 


222       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 


in  the  following  order  of  march:  2d  Battalion,  1st  Infantry;  3d 
1$  alia  lion.  1st  Infantry;  2d  Battalion,  2d  Infantry;  1st  Bat- 
talion, 2d  Infantry.  The  outpost  infantry  will  take  its  place  at 
the  tail  of  the  main  body  as  the  column  passes  the  outpost  posi- 
tion. 

"The  field  train  will  assemble  here,  ready  to  take  the  road, 
and  will  then  await  further  orders. 

"I  will  now  join  the  outpost,  and  later  will  be  with  the  ad- 
vance guard." 

Had  Colonel  Z  issued  his  orders  in  writing,  the 
night  of  July  15,  they  would  have  been  as  follows: 


Field  Orders 

No. 

Troops 

(a)  Independent  Cavalry: 

Major  B. 

Troops  A  &  B,  3d  Cav. 
(less  1  plat.) 

(b)  Advance  Guard: 

Major  A. 
1  plat.  3d  Cav. 
1st  Bn.   1st  Inf. 
Machine  Gun  Plat. 


(c)     Main  Body — in  order 

of  march: 
2d  Bn.  1st  Inf. 
3d  Bn.  1st  Inf. 
2d  Bn.  2d  Inf. 
1st  Bn.  2d  Inf. 


Blue  Detachment, 
190,  two  miles  south  of  Leavenworth, 

15  July  — ,  10:45  P.  M. 

1.  The  hostile  force  encountered 
to-day,  apparently  consisting  of 
the  regiment  of  infantry  and 
troop  of  cavalry  that  reached 
KICKAPOO  July  14,  established 
outposts  this  evening  with  infan- 
try on  the  210— PILOT  KNOB 
ridge  and  cavalry  at  138  and  in 
the  southern  outskirts  of  LEAV- 
ENWORTH. Our  information, 
that  more  hostile  troops  will  reach 
KICKAPOO  to-morrow,  has  been 
corroborated  by  reports  received 
by  General from  other  sour- 
ces. The  railroad  will  be  open 


as  far  as  FIVE  MILE  creek  by 
10  a.   m.  to-morrow  and  our  3d 
Infantry    and    2    batteries    will 
reach  there  at  that  hour. 
In  compliance  with  orders   just  received   from  General 

we  will  advance  against  the  enemy  to-morrow  morning. 

3.      (a)     The  independent  cavalry  will  start  from  its  bivouac 
at  3:30  a.  m.,  via  the  148 — 150 — 144  road,  and  operate  against 


2. 


A  PURSUIT  223 

the  enemy's  right  flank.  Should  it  discover  that  the  enemy  is 
retreating,  it  will  delay  him  sufficiently  to  permit  our  infantry 
to  overtake  and  engage  him.  A  careful  reconnaissance  will  be 
made  for  hostile  reinforcements  that  may  be  approaching  from 
KICKAPOO. 

(b)  The  advance  guard  will  start  from  here  at  3:30  a.  m., 
and  march  via  the  190 — 228 — 224  road,  sending  a  strong  cav- 
alry patrol  through  LEAVENWORTH.     It  will  halt  when  its 
support  reaches  228  and  await  further  orders. 

(c)  The  main  body  will  follow  the  advance  guard  at  500 
yards  distance. 

(d)  One  platoon  of  the  outpost  cavalry  will  report  to  the 
advance  guard  commander  just  south  of  228  at  3:45  a.  m.,  and 
the  remaining  platoon  will  join  the  independent  cavalry  as  it 
passes  148.     The  outpost  infantry  will  remain  in  position  until 
further  orders.    Patrols  will  be  sent  out  at  3  a.  m.,  to  reconnoiter 
the  210— PILOT  KNOB  ridge. 

4.  The  field  train  will  assemble  here  at  4  a.  m.,  ready  to  take 
the  road,  and  will  then  await  further  orders. 

5.  The  detachment  commander  will  join  the  outpost  com- 
mander at  3:30  a.  m. 

By  order  of  Colonel  Z: 

X. 
Capt.  &  Adjt.,  1st  Infantry,  Adjutant. 

Copies  to  commanders  1st  Inf.,  2d  Inf.,  independent  cavalry, 
advance  guard  and  outpost,  and  to  staff.  Brief  message  to  Gen- 
eral   .  (*) 

*  The  orders  sent  the  troops  repairing  the  railroad  are  not  dis- 
cussed, since  they  do  not  affect  the  immediate  tactical  situation. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

A  PURSUIT. 

PROBLEM. 

(See  2-inch  map). 

The  Missouri  river  is  the  boundary  between  hos- 
tile states.  Leavenworth  and  Fort  Leavenworth  are 
believed  to  be  garrisoned  by  a  small  Red  force  of  in- 
fantry and  cavalry.  A  strong  Blue  force  of  all  arms 
is  assembling  at  Kansas  City  (25  miles  southeast  of 
Leavenworth)  and  will  begin  its  northward  advance 
June  9. 

Learning  that  a  Red  raiding  force  of  1  regiment  of 
infantry  with  cavalry  had  marched  to  the  east  through 
Platte  City,  the  morning  of  June  8,  the  Blue  com- 
mander ordered  Colonel  A  to  march  north  with  the 
1st  and  2d  Infantry  and  the  1st  Squadron,  13th  Cav- 
alry (less  Troop  D),  to  give  protection  to  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Platte  City  and  vicinity. 

The  morning  of  June  9,  as  Colonel  A  approached 
58,  on  the  64 — 62 — 58  road,  his  cavalry  became  en- 
gaged with  hostile  cavalry  in  position  on  the  spur  1000 
yards  northeast  of  58.  His  advance  guard  deployed 
and  went  to  the  assistance  of  his  cavalry  and,  after  a 
brief  engagement  in  which  a  number  of  men  were 
wounded,  the  hostile  cavalry,  apparently  a  squadron, 
withdrew  in  good  order  via  56  on  Platte  City,  fol- 
lowed by  the  Blue  cavalry. 

During  this  engagement  Colonel  A  received  a  mes- 
sage from  an  officer's  patrol,  saying  that  a  regiment  of 


A  PURSUIT  225 

hostile  infantry,  marching  west  on  the  Platte  City 
road,  was  6  miles  east  of  that  town  at  8  a.  m.  Pa- 
trols have  reported  the  bridges  over  the  Platte  near 
60  and  54  unguarded  by  the  enemy,  and  have  seen  no 
hostile  forces  between  the  Platte  and  Missouri  rivers. 

At  9  a.  m.,  when  the  enemy  retires,  Colonel  A's 
command  is  disposed  as  follows :  The  cavalry  has  dis- 
appeared to  the  north  on  the  58 — 56 — Platte  City 
road;  the  advance  guard  (1st  Battalion,  1st  Infantry, 
and  1  platoon  of  cavalry)  is  assembling  on  both  sides 
of  the  road,  1000  yards  northeast  of  58;  the  main 
body  is  assembled  in  mass  in  the  open  woods  south  of 
58 ;  and  the  field  train  is  halted  at  64. 
Required : 

Colonel  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

His  orders. 

SOLUTION. 

Apparently  the  enemy  is  attempting  to  withdraw 
to  the  west  bank  of  the  Missouri  river.  He  probably 
has  information  of  Colonel  A's  march  to  the  north  and 
has  sent  his  cavalry  to  the  south  to  delay  the  advance 
of  the  Blue  column.  Colonel  A  has  been  given  the 
broad  mission  of  protecting  the  inhabitants  of  Platte 
City  and  vicinity,  but  the  present  situation  affords  him 
a  favorable  opportunity  to  cut  off  and  destroy  the  hos- 
tile force,  and  to  do  this  becomes  his  immediate  mis- 
sion. 

The  hostile  infantry  was  6  miles  east  of  Platte  City 
at  8  a.  m.,  and  should  be  within  about  three  miles  of 
that  town  at  9  a.m.,  when  Colonel  A,  at  58,  is  about 
3l/2  miles  from  the  town,  with  a  squadron  of  hostile 
cavalry  in  his  front  to  delay  his  advance.  Conse- 
quently he  has  little  chance  of  reaching  Platte  City 


226       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

ahead  of  the  hostile  infantry,  and  blocking  its  retreat 
across  the  Platte  river  bridge  at  A.  In  the  southern 
outskirts  of  Platte  City,  the  hostile  cavalry  could 
make  a  very  stubborn  fight  and  gain  much  valuable 
time  for  its  infantry.  Nor  is  it  reasonable  to  suppose 
the  Blue  cavalry  could  move  to  the  east  and  strike  the 
flank  of  the  hostile  column  before  it  reached  Platte 
City,  for  the  hostile  cavalry,  if  ably  led,  will  remain 
between  its  infantry  and  the  Blue  cavalry.  Moreover, 
should  Colonel  A  take  this  route  and  fail  to  stop  the 
enemy  at  Platte  City,  he  will  be  at  a  disadvantage, 
for,  before  he  can  continue  the  pursuit,  he  will  have 
to  cross  the  Platte  river  bridge  at  A  in  the  face  of  fire 
from  the  hostile  rear  guard. 

The  other  routes  open  to  Colonel  A  are  via  the 
Platte  river  bridges  near  54  and  60,  and  thence  north 
towards  the  A— B— C— D— E— F— G — H  road, 
which  is  the  enemy's  most  probable  line  of  retreat.  The 
distance  to  E  from  58  is  a  little  more  than  7  miles  by 
the  southern  bridge,  and  about  8  miles  by  the  north- 
ern, while  the  enemy,  at  9  a.  m.,  is  about  6  miles  from 
the  same  point.  Again  the  enemy  will  escape,  unless 
he  can  be  delayed  in  his  march  to  E,  and  to  accomplish 
this  delay  will  be  the  chief  mission  of  the  cavalry. 

As  has  already  been  pointed  out,  the  cavalry  has 
little  chance  of  delaying  the  hostile  infantry  east  of 
the  Platte  river.  If  it  operates  on  the  east  bank  of 
the  Platte,  it  will  have  to  attack  the  hostile  cavalry, 
which  is  stronger  by  one  troop,  and  drive  it  back  be- 
fore it  can  get  in  front  or  on  the  flank  of  the  hostile 
infantry  column.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  makes  a 
quick  move  to  the  west  of  the  Platte,  via  the  bridge  at 
54,  and  gets  in  front  of  the  enemy,  the  conditions  will 


A  PURSUIT  227 

be  reversed,  and  the  hostile  cavalry  will  have  to  attack 
it.  The  Blue  cavalry  will  have  a  fair  chance  to  beat 
in  this  race  (to  the  A — B — C — D — E  road)  not- 
withstanding it  may  have  farther  to  go,  for  its  march 
to  the  west  of  the  river  may  not  be  discovered  at  once 
by  the  hostile  cavalry,  which  probably  will  not  leave 
the  56 — Platte  City  road  unguarded  while  in  doubt  as 
to  whether  the  Blue  force  is  advancing  along  it.  That 
the  enemy  may  the  longer  remain  in  doubt  as  to  the 
real  intention  of  the  Blue  force,  the  original  advance 
guard  battalion  (now  assembling  1000  yards  north- 
east of  58)  will  be  ordered  to  march  via  the  56 — 54 
road.  This  movement  may  so  deceive  the  hostile  cav- 
alry commander  that  he  will  hold  his  cavalry  east  of 
the  Platte  until  Colonel  A's  cavalry  has  reached  the 
vicinity  of  B.  This  battalion  will  be  in  no  great  dan- 
ger from  the  hostile  cavalry — if  it  can  draw  this  caval- 
ry upon  itself  so  much  the  better — and  it  can  rejoin 
the  column  as  it  passes  50.  The  best  arrangement 
then  will  be  to  let  the  cavalry  and  the  original  advance 
guard  battalion  use  the  56 — 54  road,  and  move  the  re- 
mainder of  the  infantry  over  the  58 — 60  road. 

After  passing  Platte  City,  the  enemy  might  fol- 
low the  13 — 15  road,  but  this  is  not  probable,  for  he 
has  nothing  to  gain  by  taking  this  longer  route.  How- 
ever, it  will  be  the  duty  of  the  cavalry  commander  to 
locate  the  enemy's  main  column,  and  inform  Colonel 
A  of  the  road  it  is  on. 

In  crossing  the  Platte  and  moving  towards  Leav- 
enworth  and  Fort  Leavenworth,  Colonel  A  runs  the 
risk  of  encountering  hostile  reinforcements  from  west 
of  the  Missouri,  and  becoming  engaged  with  superior 
numbers  with  the  Platte  river  at  his  back.  This  dan- 


228       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

ger  must  not  deter  him  from  making  the  move,  but 
it  should  cause  him  to  make  a  most  thorough  recon- 
naissance of  the  roads  to  the  west.  This  reconnais- 
sance will  be  made  by  the  cavalry  commander  and  by 
patrols  from  the  platoon  of  advance  guard  cavalry  as 
well.  The  bluffs  along  the  G — 14—28  road  afford  a 
good  view  of  the  roads  across  the  Missouri  flats,  and 
make  the  task  of  these  patrols  much  easier  than  it 
otherwise  might  be. 

A  new  advance  guard  must  be  provided  to  cover 
the  column  during  its  further  advance.  Accordingly, 
the  2d  Infantry  will  now  be  placed  at  the  head  of  the 
column,  and,  since  the  intention  is  to  fight  as  soon  as 
the  enemy  is  encountered,  two  battalions  of  this  regi- 
ment will  be  placed  in  the  advance  guard.  Also  the 
platoon  of  advance  guard  cavalry  will  now  be  trans- 
ferred from  the  old  to  the  new  advance  guard. 

The  field  train  had  best  be  left  where  it  now  is  un- 
til the  outcome  of  the  movement  is  known.  The 
wounded  will  be  sent  back  to  join  it,  the  ambulances 
then  returning  to  the  column.  In  this  position,  the 
train  is  in  little  danger,  and  the  present  guard,  togeth- 
er with  the  few  men  attending  the  wounded,  will  be 
sufficient  to  protect  it  against  such  small  parties  of 
hostile  cavalry  as  may  happen  to  find  it. 

Colonel  A's  decision  is  to  march  at  once  to  the  west 
of  the  Platte  to  intercept  the  hostile  column,  sending 
his  cavalry  via  the  bridge  near  54  to  delay  the  enemy's 
retreat,  and  marching  via  the  56 — 54  road  with  the 
original  advance  guard  and  via  the  60 — 48 — 50  road 
with  the  remainder  of  the  infantry.  He  received  the 
message  from  the  officer's  patrol  while  the  engage- 
ment was  in  progress,  and  reached  his  decision  as  soon 


A  PURSUIT  229 

as  he  knew  the  result  of  the  fight.  The  field  officers 
of  the  main  body  had  been  assembled  at  58,  and  at  9 
a.  m.  he  issues  the  following  verbal  orders: 

"The  hostile  force  in  our  front  is  about  a  squadron  of  cav- 
alry, and  it  is  now  falling  back  on  Platte  City  followe'd  by  our 
cavalry.  Lieutenant  A  (of  the  officer's  patrol)  reports  that  a 
regiment  of  hostile  infantry  was  6  miles  east  of  Platte  City  an 
hour  ago  and  was  marching  toward  that  town.  The  bridges  near 
54  and  60  are  not  guarded  by  the  enemy,  and  no  hostile  force 
has  been  seen  between  the  Missouri  and  Platte  rivers. 

"We  will  march  at  once  to  the  west  of  the  Platte  river  and 
then  north  to  intercept  the  enemy. 

"The  cavalry  will  cross  the  Platte  on  the  bridge  near  54  and 
march  north  to  delay  the  enemy's  retreat.  It  will  reconnoiter  to- 
wards Leavenworth  and  Fort  Leavenworth. 

"Two  battalions  of  the  2d  Infantry  and  the  platoon  of  ad- 
vance guard  cavalry  will  form  a  new  advance  guard,  under  com- 
mand of  Colonel  B,  and  will  follow  the  60 — 48 — 50  road.  Pa- 
trols will  be  sent  to  Watch  the  roads  from  the  direction  of  Leav- 
enworth and  Fort  Leavenworth. 

"The  main  body  will  follow  the  advance  guard  at  600  yards, 
in  the  following  order  of  march:  1  battalion,  2d  Infantry,  2d 
and  3d  Battalions,  1st  Infantry. 

"The  1st  Battalion,  1st  Infantry,  will  march  via  the  56 — 54 
road  and  join  the  tail  of  the  column  at  50. 

"The  field  train  will  remain  in  its  present  position  near  64 
until  further  orders. 

"I  will  be  with  the  advance  guard." 

The  following  order  is  then  sent  the  cavalry  by  a 
staff  officer  and  escort  of  mounted  scouts : 

Blue  Detachment, 

Near  58, 

To  9  June  — ,  9:10  A.  M. 

Commanding  Officer, 

1st  Squadron,  13th  Cavalry. 

Lieutenant  A  reports  a  regiment  of  hostile  infantry  6  miles 
east  of  PLATTE  CITY,  and  marching  towards  that  town,  at  8 


230       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

This  detachment  will  march  at  once  to  the  west  of  the 
PLATTE  river  and  then  north  to  intercept  the  enemy. 

The  1st  Battalion,  1st  Infantry,  will  march  via  the  56 — 54 
road;  the  remainder  of  the  infantry  is  now  marching  via  the 
58 — 60 — 48 — 50  road. 

You  will  march  at  once  to  the  west  bank  of  the  PLATTE,  via 
the  bridge  near  54,  and  thence  north  to  delay  the  enemy's  re- 
treat until  the  infantry  can  get  to  your  assistance.  Send  pa- 
trols towards  LEAVENWORTH  and  FORT  LEAVEN- 
WORTH. 

The  field  train  will  remain  near  64. 

A. 
Colonel,  1st  Infantry,  Commanding. 

Colonel  A  then  rides  towards  56  and  gives  the  com- 
mander of  the  1st  Battalion,  1st  Infantry,  his  orders, 
directs  the  advance  guard  cavalry  to  join  the  new  ad- 
vance guard,  and  gives  the  surgeon,  1st  Infantry,  the 
necessary  instructions  for  disposing  of  the  wounded. 
He  then  joins  the  advance  guard. 

COMMENTS. 

The  important  points  in  this  situation  for  Colonel 
A  quickly  to  discover  are:  First,  that  he  is  on  the 
flank  of  a  retreating  enemy  but  little  more  than  half 
his  strength,  which,  in  view  of  his  mission,  he  should 
attempt  to  destroy.  Second,  that  the  hostile  column 
must  be  delayed,  if  he  is  to  strike  it  with  his  infantry, 
and  to  cause  this  delay  becomes  the  mission  of  the 
cavalry.  Third,  that  he  will  have  .a  better  opportuni- 
ty to  intercept  the  enemy  to  the  west  of  the  Platte 
than  to  the  east  of  that  river.  The  remaining  points 
in  the  solution  are  of  minor  importance. 

In  favor  of  marching  north  on  the  east  bank  of  the 
Platte,  it  may  be  said  that  this  route  keeps  that  river 


A  PURSUIT  231 

between  Colonel  A's  command  and  any  force  the  ene- 
my may  have  between  the  Missouri  and  the  Platte 
rivers.  This  is  a  safer  and  more  conservative  plan 
than  that  adopted  in  the  solution,  but  it  does  not  offer 
as  good  chances  for  a  decisive  success.  Still  it  might 
succeed,  for  the  margin  of  time  in  the  enemy's  favor  is 
very  small,  and  a  slight  delay  to  the  hostile  column, 
or  anything  less  than  the  most  stubborn  fighting  by 
the  hostile  squadron,  may  permit  Colonel  A  to  estab- 
lish his  infantry  within  range  of  the  bridge  at  A  be- 
fore the  enemy  has  crossed.  However,  if  this  plan  be 
adopted,  it  must  be  executed  with  the  greatest  vigor. 

Another  condition  in  favor  of  this  plan  to  remain 
east  of  the  Platte  is  the  present  location  of  the  Blue 
cavalry.  It  will  be  about  15  minutes  before  its  orders 
can  be  gotten  to  it,  and  at  the  end  of  that  time  its  situ- 
ation may  be  such  that  its  withdrawal  can  not  be  ac- 
complished in  the  simple  manner  contemplated  in  Col- 
onel A's  orders.  For  this  reason,  to  continue  the  march 
to  the  north  is  simpler  than  crossing  the  river,  and  sim- 
plicity in  tactical  combinations  is  always  to  be  com- 
mended. 

A  combination  of  the  two  plans,  sending  the  caval- 
ry west  of  the  Platte  and  moving  the  infantry  to  the 
north  on  the  east  bank,  is  not  so  good,  for  the  distan- 
ces are  such  that  the  cavalry  cannot  delay  the  hostile 
column  until  after  it  crosses  the  Platte  ( presupposing 
that  the  hostile  cavalry  is  properly  led),  whereas  in 
this  case  it  must  be  delayed  east  of  that  river  if  the 
Blue  infantry  is  to  overtake  it. 

No  matter  in  what  direction  we  march,  an  attempt 
to  continue  with  the  old  advance  guard  in  the  lead  will 
result  in  delay.  It  takes  time  to  assemble  *Mid  reor- 


232       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

ganize  a  command  into  company  units  after  it  has 
been  engaged,  the  time  required  depending  on  the 
character  and  severity  of  the  engagement. 

At  9  a.  m.,  when  Colonel  A  is  at  58,  he  is  nearer 
than  the  enemy  to  the  bridge  over  the  Missouri  river 
at  Leavenworth,  and  he  is  no  farther  than  the  enemy 
from  the  bridge  at  Fort  Leavenworth.  So  far  as 
distance  alone  is  concerned,  his  best  chance  is  to  inter- 
cept the  enemy  at  one  of  these  bridges,  but  the  danger 
incident  to  going  so  near  the  Leavenworth  and  Fort 
Leavenworth  garrisons  is  too  great  to  justify  this 
move,  except  as  a  last  resort.  Later  developments 
may  make  it  appear  wise  to  do  this,  but  it  is  not  nec- 
essary to  decide  that  point  now.  In  the  hour  or  more 
that  it  will  take  the  column  to  march  from  58  to  50, 
Colonel  A  should  receive  reports  from  his  cavalry 
which  will  assist  him  in  deciding  on  what  route  he  will 
take  beyond  50. 

The  plan  decided  upon  in  the  solution  was  selected 
because  it  makes  good  use  of  the  available  roads,  keeps 
the  command  together  on  one  side  of  the  river,  and 
may  mystify  the  enemy.  The  stratagem  of  leaving 
one  battalion  temporarily  east  of  the  Platte  may  gain 
for  the  Blue  cavalry  the  few  minutes  that  are  neces- 
sary to  turn  the  situation  in  Colonel  A's  favor.  It  is 
not  only  good  leadership  and  valiant  fighting  on  our 
own  side  which  contribute  to  our  victories,  but  also  the 
mistakes,  failures,  lack  of  information,  and  even  min- 
or incidents  on  the  side  of  the  enemy.  If  you  imag- 
ine yourself  in  the  place  of  the  commander  of  the 
hostile  squadron,  when  his  patrols  report  that  Colonel 
A's  infantry  has  resumed  its  advance  via  56,  while 
the  Blue  cavalry  has  disappeared,  for  all  he  knows 


A  PURSUIT  233 

only  to  appear  again  to  the  east  on  the  flank  of  the  Red 
regiment,  you  may  better  understand  how  easy  it  will 
be  for  him  to  make  a  misstep  that  will  give  the  Blue 
cavalry  the  chance  it  needs. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

INFANTRY  ATTACK. 

SITUATION. 
(See  4-inch  map). 

A  Red  force,  in  hostile  territory,  has  but  recently 
gained  possession  of  the  M.  P.  R.  R.  and  is  using  it 
as  a  line  of  supply ;  the  road  is  guarded  against  hostile 
raids  by  small  detachments  at  important  points.  One 
of  these  detachments  is  at  Leavenworth,  with  a  de- 
tached post  at  Fort  Leavenworth. 

On  September  3,  a  Blue  force  of  all  arms,  under 
Colonel  A,  has  pushed  forward  from  the  west,  on  the 
Millwood  road,  to  destroy  the  railroad  between  Leav- 
enworth and  Kickapoo.  The  Blue  commander  has 
reliable  information  from  the  inhabitants  that  there 
are  two  companies  of  infantry  at  Fort  Leavenworth ; 
that  there  is  less  than  one  regiment  of  infantry  with 
some  artillery  at  Leavenworth;  and  that  there  are  no 
Red  troops  between  Fort  Leavenworth  and  Kickapoo 
or  at  the  latter  place.  When  the  Blue  column  reached 
the  cross  roads  at  17,  the  1st  Battalion,  4th  Infantry, 
with  a  machine  gun  platoon,  was  detached  with  orders 
to  proceed  via  15  to  the  mouth  of  Salt  creek  and  de- 
stroy the  railroad  bridge  at  that  point,  and  then  to 
move  south  on  the  railroad,  destroying  it  on  the  way. 
The  remainder  of  the  Blue  force  continued  its  march 
via  Frenchman,  towards  Fort  Leavenworth  and 
Leavenworth. 

At  8  a.  m.,  when  Major  A  (commanding  the  1st 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  235 

Battalion)  reaches  the  Kern  house  with  the  head  of  his 
column,  a  farmer,  who  lives  on  North  hill,  informs 
him  that  about  250  Red  infantrymen  marched  by  his 
house  at  7:15  a.  m.,  and,  after  sending  a  few  men  to 
the  railroad  bridge  over  Salt  creek,  proceeded  to  Salt 
Creek  hill  and  began  to  dig  trenches.  At  the  same 
time,  Major  A's  flanking  groups  send  him  informa- 
tion that  hostile  infantrymen  have  been  seen  to  the 
north  on  Hill  900,  at  the  Schaf  er  house. 

Note. — Salt  creek  is  fordable  with  difficulty  for  infantry, 
and  the  woods  along  its  banks  have  dense  underbrush. 

Required : 

1.  Major  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

2.  His  orders. 

SOLUTION  AND  DISCUSSION. 

Major  A's  task  is  to  destroy  the  railroad  bridge 
over  Salt  creek,  as  well  as  the  track  from  that  point 
towards  Fort  Leavenworth.  (*)  To  do  this  he  must 
drive  away  the  troops  now  entrenching  on  Salt  Creek 
hill,  for  their  presence  in  that  position  will  prevent 
the  accomplishment  of  his  mission. 

Before  he  can  make  his  plans  for  the  attack,  how- 
ever, he  must  reconnoiter  the  position.  Directing  the 
battalion  to  assemble  under  shelter  near  the  Kern 
house,  and  to  cover  itself  with  patrols,  he  rides  to- 
ward hill  900  at  the  S  chafer  house,  taking  the  farmer 
with  him,  the  hostile  outpost  or  patrol  on  this  hill  fall- 
ing back  before  Major  A's  left  flanking  detachment. 

It  may  be  well  to  point  out  here  the  evil  consequen- 
ces flowing  from  the  Red  commander's  neglect  to 

*  It  is  not  within  our  province  to  question  the  tactical  correctness 
of  detaching  this  battalion  from  the  main  force  marching  toward 
Leavenworth,  or  of  any  of  the  other  dispositions  made  by  Colonel  A. 


236       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

take  proper  precautions  to  prevent  the  Albrecht  and 
Schafer  households  from  giving  Major  A  valuable 
information.  Both  houses  are  so  near  Salt  Creek  hill 
that  the  Red  strength  and  dispositions  must  be  known 
to  their  occupants.  The  Red  commander  should  have 
placed  both  families  under  a  small  guard  in  the  first 
instance,  with  the  threat  that  if  any  of  them  left,  their 
buildings  and  stock  would  be  destroyed.  Later,  when 
the  Blues  were  discovered,  the  families  should  have 
been  all  withdrawn  to  a  sheltered  place  northwest  of 
Salt  Creek  hill.  Due  to  the  enemy's  neglect  to  take 
these  precautions,  Major  A  is  reasonably  certain  of 
the  strength  of  the  force  opposed  to  him  and  he  knows 
that  he  is  in  no  great  danger  of  interference  by  other 
forces  of  the  enemy,  as  they  are  to  be  engaged  by 
other  detachments  of  the  Blues. 

The  enemy  is  digging  his  trenches  on  Salt  Creek 
hill,  which  commands  the  bridge  at  a  range  of  about 
300  yards.  At  the  foot  of  this  hill,  on  the  west,  flows 
Salt  creek,  difficult  to  cross  and  thickly  timbered;  on 
the  north,  about  300  yards  away,  is  the  Missouri  river, 
with  the  railroad  between  the  hill  and  the  river.  About 
700  yards  east  and  a  little  south  lies  North  hill,  which 
is  about  the  same  height  as  Salt  Creek  hill.  To  the 
southeast  from  Salt  Creek  hill  there  extends  an  open 
ridge  for  a  considerable  distance.  If  given  time,  the 
enemy  will  no  doubt  construct  his  trenches  so  that  they 
will  confront  an  attacking  force  coming  from  any  di- 
rection, and  the  space  to  be  defended  is  so  small  that 
he  will  have  no  difficulty  in  moving  his  reserves  to 
meet  the  attack  wherever  it  falls.  The  two  hostile 
companies  reached  Salt  Creek  hill  about  the  time  the 
Blue  column  was  passing  17,  and  in  all  probability  the 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  237 

advance  of  the  battalion  from  17  was  observed  by  the 
Red  scouts.  They  surely  could  see  the  battalion  as  it 
passed  15,  and  therefore  the  enemy  would  be  likely  to 
concentrate  his  efforts  in  entrenching  the  south  and 
east  faces  of  the  position. 

The  position  may  be  attacked  in  a  number  of  ways 
with  excellent  chances  of  success.  In  this  respect,  the 
situation  does  not  differ  from  military  situations  in 
general.  The  major  now  has  his  battalion  in  a  posi- 
tion that  favors  an  attack  from  the  south.  An  ad- 
vance from  this  direction  will  corner  the  enemy  in  the 
angle  between  Salt  creek  and  the  Missouri  river.  In 
such  a  critical  situation,  the  enemy's  morale  will  be 
greatly  shaken  and  it  will  be  remarkable  indeed  if  he 
does  not  early  withdraw  across  Salt  creek.  It  is  sub- 
mitting the  courage  of  men  to  a  severe  test  when  they 
are  thus  caught  like  rats  in  a  trap,  if  they  are  ordered 
to  fight  double  their  numbers  to  the  last  ditch.  And 
if  they  should  make  so  determined  a  stand,  Major  A 
is  given  a  splendid  chance  to  capture  the  two  hostile 
companies  outright.  The  effect  that  an  advance  from 
this  direction  will  have  on  the  morale  of  the  enemy,  as 
well  as  on  the  audacity  with  which  his  own  men  wit! 
attack,  cannot  fail  to  impress  the  major. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  major  attacks  from  the 
north  or  west,  he  leaves  open  a  wide  door  to  the  south 
through  which  the  enemy  may  escape  and  unite  his 
force  with  that  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  or  remain  in 
the  vicinity  further  to  annoy  the  Blue  battalion.  For 
these  reasons  alone,  all  plans  for  attacking  from  the 
west  and  north  may  be  discarded  as  ill  advised.  How- 
ever, let  us  examine  a  little  more  minutely  the  relative 
advantages  and  disadvantages  of  attacks  from  the 
different  directions  open  to  the  battalion. 


238       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

To  attack  from  the  north  or  west  would  necessi- 
tate a  circuitous  movement  to  the  north  until  opposite 
the  position.  This  would  take  time  and  the  attack 
would  be  hard  to  make,  since  the  battalion  would 
have  either  to  effect  a  difficult  crossing  of  Salt  creek 
under  fire  at  short  range,  or  to  traverse  the  tangled 
undergrowth  of  the  woods  along  the  east  bank  of  the 
creek;  the  enemy  certainly  will  not  passively  remain 
within  his  trenches  and  permit  the  battalion  to  make 
its  advance  unmolested.  Having  arrived  in  front  of 
the  position,  the  battalion  would  have  to  attack  up  a 
very  steep  slope  if  the  attack  were  made  at  the  north 
end  of  the  hill,  or  a  fairly  gentle  slope  swept  by  hos- 
tile fire,  if  the  battalion  moved  up  the  nose  of  the  hill 
projecting  into  the  bend  of  Salt  creek.  Moreover,  it 
would  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  find  a  position 
to  the  north  or  west  of  the  hill  from  which  the  fire  of 
the  machine  guns  might  be  directed  effectively  against 
the  enemy.  We  do  not  wish  to  say  that  the  steepness 
of  the  slopes  is  an  absolute  disadvantage,  for  such 
ground  nearly  always  affords  many  dead  spaces  that 
furnish  shelter  and  the  enemy  is  apt  to  overshoot. 

The  terrain  favors  many  good  combinations  for  a 
successful  attack  from  the  south,  and  we  will  consider 
a  few  of  those  which  most  probably  occurred  to  the 
major,  as  he  made  his  hasty  reconnaissance  of  the  ene- 
my's position. 

A  simultaneous  advance  along  the  top  of  the  ridge 
and  up  the  nose  of  the  hill  projecting  into  the  deep 
bend  of  the  creek,  against  the  front  and  right  flank 
of  the  position,  is  undoubtedly  a  good  plan,  and  prom- 
ises the  special  advantage  of  threatening  to  cut  off  the 
enemy's  retreat  to  the  north  across  Salt  creek  as  well 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  239 

as  to  the  south  towards  Fort  Leavenworth.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  force  sent  to  the  flank  would  have  to 
pass  through  the  woods  and  underbrush  along  Salt 
creek  to  find  cover,  and  the  enemy  might  avoid  the  at- 
tack and  get  away  along  the  railroad  towards  Fort 
Leavenworth. 

The  top  of  the  ridge  is  too  narrow  for  the  entire 
force  to  advance  along  it  and  develop  its  full  fire  pow- 
er, even  were  a  frontal  attack  of  the  position  advisa- 
ble for  other  reasons.  By  measuring  on  the  map,  we 
find  that  the  top  of  the  ridge  is  less  than  100  yards 
wide,  and  consequently  does  not  furnish  space  suffi- 
cient to  deploy  more  than  one  full  company.  Nev- 
ertheless, an  attack  made  in  this  way  might  succeed, 
despite  the  poor  field  of  fire  of  the  portions  of  the 
line  advancing  along  the  sides  of  the  ridge,  since  the 
slopes  would  probably  furnish  fair  cover  to  the  attack- 
ers and  permit  them  to  draw  near  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion with  small  loss.  If  they  could  do  this,  they  would 
have  a  splendid  chance  of  capturing  the  position  in  one 
final  assault.  It  appears  preferable,  however,  to  ad- 
vance along  lines  that  will  enable  Major  A  to  place 
his  main  attack  nearer  the  position  before  the  attack- 
ing troops  come  under  fire. 

A  plan  that  will  enable  him  to  do  this,  and  one  which 
makes  the  best  use  of  the  available  cover  and  secures 
the  advantages  of  combined  front  and  flank  attacks, 
is  to  move  by  the  wood  road  to  13,  where  one  company 
and  the  machine  gun  platoon  will  be  detached  to  make 
the  secondary  attack,  and  to  proceed  with  the  remain- 
der of  the  battalion  to  the  vicinity  of  North  hill,  to 
make  the  main  attack. 

The  force  detached  at  13  will  move  to  the  west  un- 


240       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

der  cover  of  the  ravine  south  of  the  Schaf  er  house,  and 
deploy  on  the  890  hill  about  200  yards  northwest  of 
the  Schafer  house  and  the  little  890  foot  ridge  200 
yards  west  of  Schafer's.  The  machine  gun  platoon 
will  occupy  a  position  on  the  hill,  which  with  the 
little  ridge  forms  a  position  long  enough  to  accom- 
modate this  part  of  the  force,  and  all  will  open  fire 
on  the  enemy  at  a  range  of  about  500  to  650 
yards.  Meanwhile,  the  remaining  companies  of  the 
battalion  will  be  moving  towards  their  position  and, 
at  the  proper  time,  they  will  advance  from  the  vicin- 
ity of  Albrecht  against  the  southeast  face  of  the  ene- 
my's position. 

The  strength  and  position  of  the  enemy  are  so  def- 
initely known,  there  is  so  little  probability  of  any  oth- 
er enemy  appearing,  and  both  flanks  of  the  attack  are 
so  admirably  protected  by  natural  obstacles,  that  the 
major  will  hold  but  one  company  in  reserve.  This  will 
enable  him  to  put  two  companies  on  the  firing  line  of 
the  main  attack  at  the  outset,  and  their  fire,  together 
with  that  of  the  machine  guns  and  the  company  in 
the  secondary  attack,  will  thus  be  superior  to  that  of 
the  enemy  from  the  very  commencement  of  the  at- 
tack. When  troops  are  advancing  over  fire-swept 
ground,  their  losses  are  reduced  to  the  minimum  by 
putting  enough  men  on  the  line  to  secure  and  keep  fire 
superiority.  The  single  company  held  in  reserve  will 
be  ample  to  meet  all  probable  contingencies  and,  if 
not  needed  to  push  the  attack  home,  the  major  will 
have  it  at  hand  to  pursue  the  enemy  or  otherwise  reap 
the  rewards  of  victory.  In  order  that  the  reserve  com- 
pany may  be  in  the  best  position  for  this  purpose,  it 
will  follow  on  the  inner  flank  of  the  main  attack ;  this 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  241 

will  take  it  along  the  southern  edge  of  the  woods  a 
little  northwest  of  the  Schafer  house. 

The  machine  guns  might  be  placed  on  the  small 
ridge  about  200  yards  west  of  the  Schafer  house,  but, 
in  the  other  position,  their  fire  will  probably  be  masked 
less  by  the  advancing  infantry  and  they  can  still  en- 
filade that  face  of  the  enemy's  position  that  will  be  as- 
saulted by  the  main  attack.  Were  it  not  for  the  dense 
woods  on  North  hill,  in  full  leaf  at  this  season  of  the 
year,  the  guns  might  be  taken  to  the  vicinity  of  Al- 
brecht. 

There  is  little  likelihood  that  reinforcements  for  the 
enemy  will  reach  the  vicinity  during  the  continuance 
of  the  engagement,  for  it  should  be  quickly  decided 
one  way  or  the  other;  still,  as  a  matter  of  course,  the 
major  will  cover  his  right  and  rear  by  small  patrols 
on  the  railroad  and  wood  trails.  As  a  general  rule, 
the  flanks  of  an  attack  should  be  covered  by  small  de- 
tached forces,  although  they  be  no  larger  than  a  pa- 
trol. 

The  disadvantage  of  this  plan  of  attack  is  the 
ground  the  battalion  must  pass  over — the  primary  at- 
tack having  a  steep  ascent  to  make  with  but  a  poor 
field  of  fire,  and  the  secondary  having  some  very  open 
ground  to  cross.  The  advantages  are  the  cover  of  the 
woods  for  the  primary  attack  up  to  short  range,  a 
good  position  for  the  machine  guns  where  they  can 
fire  over  the  advancing  infantry  until  it  arrives  with- 
in a  short  distance  of  the  enemy,  and  a  fairly  good 
field  of  fire  for  the  secondary  attack;  moreover,  the 
troops  are  well  in  hand,  and  this  method  of  attack 
probably  will  take  the  least  time. 

It  would  not  be  advisable  to  make  the  main  at- 


242       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

tack  with  the  three  companies  along  the  ridge,  for,  as 
already  pointed  out,  they  would  be  exposed  to  the  ene- 
my's fire  without  being  able  effectively  to  return  it. 
On  the  other  hand,  by  making  the  main  attack  against 
the  southeast  face  of  the  hill,  the  three  companies  com- 
posing it  will  advance  under  cover  of  the  cross-fire 
from  the  secondary  attack  and  machine  guns. 

The  battalion  is  still  assembled  near  the  Kern  house. 
Having  completed  his  reconnaissance  and  reached  his 
decision,  the  major  sends  his  adjutant  to  find  the  pa- 
trols on  Hancock  hill  and  the  11 — 9 — 5  road  and  di- 
rect them  to  keep  a  sharp  lookout  to  the  rear  during 
the  fight.  The  command  is  then  moved  towards  13, 
preceded  by  an  advance  guard  to  protect  the  march 
and  to  drive  in  any  patrols  or  scouts  of  the  enemy. 
Soon  after  the  advance  guard  passed  13,  it  encoun- 
tered hostile  patrols  in  the  woods,  but  they  offered 
very  little  resistance  and  the  column  continued  its  ad- 
vance. As  the  head  of  the  main  body  approached  13, 
Major  A  directed  the  senior  lieutenant  of  each  com- 
pany to  issue  half  the  ammunition  from  the  battalion 
wagons,  while  he  assembles  the  captains  at  the  edge  of 
the  woods  near  13  and  gives  them  the  following  or- 
ders: 

"Two  companies  of  hostile  infantry  occupied  that  hill  (point- 
ing out  Salt  Creek  hill)  about  7 :30  a.  m.,  and  they  have  been  en- 
trenching a  position  there  ever  since.  A  few  men  from  those 
companies  were  sent  to  the  railroad  bridge  at  the  mouth  of  Salt 
creek.  (*) 

"We  will  attack  the  position  at  once,  enveloping  its  left  flank. 

*  No  mention  is  made  of  the  Blue  main  body  which  is  advancing 
on  Fort  Leavenworth,  since  the  intended  movements  of  that  portion 
of  the  Blue  force  were  made  known  to  the  officers  of  the  battalion 
when  it  was  detached  at  17. 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  243 

"Captain  D,  take  your  company  (D — now  at  the  rear  of  the 
column)  and  the  machine  gun  platoon  along  this  ravine  (pointing 
to  the  watercourse  south  of  the  Schafer  house)  deploy  on  that 
little  ridge  (pointing  to  the  ridge  200  yards  west  of  Schafer's) 
and  that  hill  (indicating  hill  890  northwest  of  Schafer's),  open  a 
heavy  fire  on  the  enemy  and  support  the  attack  to  be  made 
against  the  left  of  the  position  by  the  remainder  of  the  battalion. 
The  patrols  now  out  on  that  hill  and  road  (pointing  to  Hancock 
hill  and  the  15—- 11  road)  have  been  told  to  watch  in  your  rear. 
Establish  your  machine  guns  in  position  on  that  hill  (hill  890) 
and  have  them  open  fire  at  once. 

"I  will  take  the  remainder  of  the  command  along  this  trail 
to  that  hill  (pointing  to  North  hill)  and  attack  the  southeast  face 
of  the  enemy's  position." 

When  North  hill  is  reached,  Major  A  assembles  the 
captains  of  Companies  A,  B  and  C,  the  advance  guard 
with  reduced  distances  still  watching  the  front,  points 
out  the  position  of  the  enemy,  and  gives  them  the  fol- 
lowing orders: 

"Captain  A,  advance  down  the  hill  through  the  woods  with 
your  company  (A  from  which  the  advance  guard  is  taken)  and 
Company  B,  and  attack  the  southeast  face  of  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion on  the  hill  in  front.  If  practicable,  put  both  companies  in 
the  firing  line  from  the  start.  I  will  send  out  patrols  to  watch 
your  rear. 

"Captain  C,  your  company  (C)  will  form  the  reserve,  and 
will  move  along  the  south  edge  of  this  woods  (woods  north  of  the 
Schafer  house)  in  rear  of  the  left  flank  of  the  main  attack. 

"I  will  be  with  the  reserve." 

The  reserve  is  under  the  immediate  control  of  Ma- 
jor A  and  will  not  be  put  into  the  fight  except  in  obe- 
dience to  his  orders.  At  13,  Major  A  sent  a  patrol 
along  the  wood  trail  to  the  east,  and  at  North  hill  he 
sent  another  to  move  south  along  the  railroad.  Such 
transportation  as  is  with  the  battalion  (ammunition 
wagons  and  wagon  containing  material  for  wrecking 


244       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  railroad)  he  left  at  13,  with  a  guard  of  one  squad. 

Major  A  was  not  able  to  issue  all  his  orders  at  one 
time  and  place,  and  generally  this  will  be  the  case 
when  issuing  orders  to  attack.  Only  when  the  infor- 
mation is  exceptionally  complete  and  accurate  as  to  lo- 
cation, strength  and  distribution  of  the  hostile  forces 
will  it  be  practicable  to  issue  a  single  combined  order 
for  the  attack.  As  a  rule,  most  of  this  information  is 
obtained  after  the  fight  is  begun,  and  then  it  comes  in 
bit  by  bit  as  scouts,  patrols  and  the  fighting  itself  de- 
velop the  situation.  As  a  consequence,  the  command- 
er will  try  to  delay  issuing  his  orders,  especially  for 
that  part  of  his  force  that  is  to  make  the  principal  at- 
tack, until  his  information  is  sufficient  to  show  the 
manner  in  which  the  attack  should  be  made. 

It  is  always  extremely  desirable,  especially  in  very 
small  commands,  to  assemble  the  subordinate  com- 
manders at  some  point  where  they  can  overlook  the 
enemy's  position  and  the  ground  to  be  fought  over, 
and  there  issue  the  orders,  for  this  will  do  much  to- 
wards securing  cooperation  during  the  fight,  among 
the  different  parts  of  the  command.  Each  subordi- 
nate will  then  know  not  only  what  is  expected  of  him, 
but  also  what  cooperation  and  assistance  are  to  be  giv- 
en him  by  the  others.  Moreover,  questions  may  be 
asked  and  doubtful  points  cleared  up. 

When  this  is  not  possible,  as  generally  is  the  case, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  commander  to  secure  cooperation 
among  his  subordinates  by  keeping  each  informed  of 
the  orders  given  the  others.  Where  the  command  is 
small,  as  here,  he  may  do  this  by  riding  from  one  sub- 
ordinate to  another  and  giving  this  information  per- 
sonally by  word  of  mouth ;  but  where  this  is  not  possi- 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  245 

ble,  he  will  have  to  convey  this  information  to  them 
by  messages,  preferably  written,  or  delivered  by  an 
officer,  if  verbal. 

In  this  situation,  Major  A's  information  was  so 
complete,  that  he  was  able  to  decide  on  his  general  plan 
before  leaving  13,  and  Captain  D  there  heard  what 
the  remainder  of  the  command  was  to  do.  But  there 
was,  in  the  order  given  on  North  hill,  one  important 
bit  of  information  that  Major  A  should  have  sent 
Captain  D  without  delay;  viz.,  the  location  of  the  re- 
serve near  the  southern  edge  of  the  wood  north  of  the 
Schafer  house.  Captains  A  and  C  might  have  been 
given  their  orders  also  at  13,  but  the  woods  cut  off  the 
view  of  North  hill  and  Major  A  followed  the  wiser 
plan  in  waiting  until  he  had  reached  the  hill  and  had 
the  ground  before  him. 

It  may  be  well  to  repeat  here  what  has  been  said 
in  other  chapters  concerning  undue  interference  with 
subordinates,  not  only  in  the  wording  of  the  order,  but 
also  after  the  order  is  issued  and  is  being  executed. 
Once  the  commander  has  reached  his  decision,  made 
his  dispositions,  and  put  his  troops  into  the  fight,  his 
proper  task  is  to  retain  supervision  and  control  over 
the  whole  command.  This  he  cannot  do  if  he  bothers 
himself  with  details  that  should  be  regulated  by  his 
subordinates.  Each  of  them  must  be  allowed  to  lead 
his  command  in  his  own  way,  so  long  as  he  does  not 
jeopardize  the  success  of  the  attack;  not  because  his 
way  may  be  the  best  or  even  good,  but  because  it  is 
better  for  him  to  do  it  although  it  may  be  done  badly, 
than  for  the  commander  to  do  the  work  of  a  subordi- 
nate and  neglect  his  proper  work  which  is  vastly  more 
important. 


For  example,  Captain  D  was  told  to  "open  a  heavy 
fire  and  support  the  attack"  to  be  made  by  the  rest  of 
the  battalion.  At  the  time  the  order  was  given,  Ma- 
jor A  could  not  tell  whether  Captain  D  should  give 
this  support  by  fire  alone  from  his  position  near  Schaf- 
er's  (as  will  be  explained  later),  or  should  advance 
against  the  enemy's  position,  so  he  permitted  Captain 
D  to  exercise  his  own  discretion.  Had  he  not  had 
this  confidence  in  his  subordinate,  he  could  have  told 
him  not  to  advance  until  he  was  ordered.  Even  as  the 
order  reads,  there  is  no  reason  why  he  should  not  stop 
Captain  D,  should  he  attempt  an  advance,  if  in  his 
(Major  A's)  opinion  the  advance  is  not  wise.  But  it 
would  be  different  if  he  should  approve  of  the  ad- 
vance, but  not  of  the  way  in  which  it  is  being  executed, 
and  should  abandon  his  supervision  of  the  whole  fight 
to  take  personal  command  of  Captain  D's  force. 

The  study  of  this  problem  illustrates  the  main  prin- 
ciples of  an  attack  by  a  small  infantry  command.  The 
major's  plan  of  attack  embraces  little  more  than  a  de- 
cision as  to  which  flank  is  to  be  attacked  and  the  divis- 
ion of  the  force  for  this  purpose ;  and  in  general,  when 
dealing  with  small  forces,  the  commander's  plan  of  at- 
tack usually  will  cover  only  these  two  main  points. 

We  might  have  attacked  the  enemy's  front  with  our 
entire  force ;  even  so  we  would  stand  a  good  chance  of 
succeeding  because  we  are  two  to  the  enemy's  one  and 
the  slopes  on  either  side  of  the  narrow  ridge  furnish 
fair  cover  for  the  attack.  Still,  a  purely  frontal  at- 
tack is  a  costly  operation,  and  we  probably  would  pay 
more  dearly  for  our  victory  than  if  we  had  negotiated 
it  in  another  way.  By  advancing  with  our  whole  force 
along  one  line,  we  would  leave  the  enemy  in  no  doubt 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  247 

as  to  where  the  decisive  attack  is  to  be  made ;  we  would 
permit  him  to  concentrate  his  fire  on  a  narrow  front; 
and  we  would  fail  to  make  the  most  advantageous  use 
of  our  own  fire  power.  The  tendency  of  all  attacks, 
whether  made  by  small  or  large  forces,  should  be  to 
envelop  a  flank,  and  even  if  this  form  of  attack  is  not 
planned  in  the  beginning,  it  probably  will  be  forced 
upon  us  in  the  course  of  the  fight,  when  the  prolonged 
resistance  of  the  enemy  in  front  compels  us  to  find  a 
more  vulnerable  point.  Formerly,  the  flanks  were  re- 
garded as  the  weak  points.  Now,  they  are  something 
more  than  the  weak  points — they  may  be  looked  upon 
as  almost  the  only  vulnerable  points.  Frontal  attacks 
may  at  times  be  necessary,  as  when  time  and  the 
ground  will  permit  nothing  else,  but  such  cases  are 
exceptional,  especially  with  small  forces  which  require 
but  little  time  and  space  for  making  enveloping  move- 
ments. 

By  enveloping  the  enemy,  whether  this  be  done  by 
advancing  simultaneously  against  his  front  and  flank, 
or  by  deploying  the  attacking  force  on  a  front  broad 
enough  to  envelop  one  or  both  of  the  hostile  flanks, 
we  compel  him  to  bend  back  the  assailed  flank  and 
form  a  new  line  with  a  part  of  his  force  at  an  angle  to 
his  original  front;  his  fire  is  then  delivered  in  two  di- 
rections and  dispersed  over  a  broad  front,  while  ours  is 
converging  and  concentrated  and  becomes  enfilading 
and  reverse. 

Let  us  illustrate  this  by  referring  to  our  problem. 
The  company  and  machine  guns  sent  to  the  little  ridge 
and  hill  near  the  Schaf  er  house  will  be  in  position  and 
firing  before  the  main  attacking  force  begins  its  at- 
tack from  North  hill.  The  enemy  probably  will  re- 


248        TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

ply  to  this  fire  from  an  east  and  west  line  about  150 
yards  long  and  a  little  south  of  the  word  "Salt"  in 
"Salt  Cr.  hill."  The  two  forces  will  be  directly  facing 
each  other  and,  man  for  man,  the  fire  of  neither  will 
have  any  material  advantage  over  that  of  the  other, 
except  that  the  enemy  probably  is  entrenched.  As 
the  main  attack  from  North  hill  develops,  the  enemy 
will  meet  it  with  a  new  line  in  a  general  north  and 
south  direction  from  the  left  of  the  original  line.  So 
far  as  fire  is  concerned,  we  now  have  a  marked  advan- 
tage over  the  enemy.  His  fire  is  purely  frontal  and 
divergent  in  two  directions  at  almost  a  right  angle 
with  each  other;  our  fire  is  convergent  and  enfilading. 
An  attacking  force,  equal  or  but  little  superior  to  its 
enemy,  often  will  be  compelled  by  its  weakness  to  en- 
velop a  hostile  flank,  if  its  attack  is  to  have  any  chance 
of  succeeding ;  and  if  it  is  much  stronger  than  the  ene- 
my, it  should  envelop  in  order  to  get  full  advantage  of 
its  superiority  of  numbers.  Only  when  greatly  super- 
ior to  the  enemy,  should  we  attempt  to  attack  in  front 
and  on  both  flanks,  for  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the 
danger  of  too  great  extension  in  this  effort  to  em- 
brace both  the  enemy's  flanks.  The  entire  battalion 
was  operating  within  a  radius  of  a  few  hundred  yards 
and,  consequently,  was  in  little  or  no  such  danger,  for 
should  the  enemy  attempt  a  counter  attack,  it  is  not  at 
all  probable  that  he  could  overthrow  and  drive  back 
one  part  of  Major  A's  divided  force  before  the  oth- 
er could  come  to  its  assistance.  But  in  other  situa- 
tions the  conditions  may  be  very  different ;  there  may 
be  no  convenient  woods  to  conceal  our  movement  to 
the  hostile  flank ;  no  ravines  that  will  furnish  us  cover 
unless  we  go  far  out  of  our  way ;  the  roads  may  not 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  249 

run  as  we  would  have  them;  or  a  stream  or  other  nat- 
ural obstacle  may  separate  our  enveloping  column 
from  the  remainder  of  our  force.  We  will  be  inclined 
to  say  that  such  a  situation  certainly  constitutes  an 
exception  to  the  general  rule  and  that  we  must  take  the 
risk  of  being  beaten  in  detail.  It  is  well  to  sound  a 
warning  against  doing  so,  for  it  is  well  known  that 
dispersion  and  scattering  of  forces  is  the  mistake 
most  frequently  made  by  those  beginning  the  study  of 
tactics. 

It  is  important  to  have  a  clear  conception  of  what 
constitutes  a  combined  front  and  flank  attack.  Un- 
less our  flank  attack  is  a  complete  surprise  against  a 
very  stupid  enemy,  we  cannot  hope  to  reach  a  point  on 
his  flank  from  which  we  can  deliver  enfilading  fire  on 
the  unsuspecting  enemy;  of  course,  our  flank  fire  will 
tend  to  enfilade  a  part  of  the  enemy's  line  and  shake 
his  morale,  and  that  is  what  we  intend  it  shall  do ;  but 
our  flank  attack,  as  a  rule,  will  find  a  new  line  of  the 
enemy  deployed  in  its  front  to  meet  it,  and  locally  the 
attack  will  be  purely  frontal.  Our  opponent  on  Salt 
Creek  hill,  while  replying  to  the  fire  of  our  secondary 
attack,  certainly  will  be  watching  with  patrols  for  our 
appearance  in  other  directions,  and  will  be  prepared  to 
meet  our  main  attack  with  his  reserve  or  with  troops 
drawn  from  other  parts  of  his  line. 

Still,  we  should  endeavor  to  keep  our  enemy  in  the 
dark  as  to  which  flank  we  propose  to  attack,  and  as  to 
whether  we  propose  to  make  our  main 'effort  on  his 
flank  or  elsewhere  along  his  line.  Being  the  aggres- 
sors, we  are  able  to  do  this;  the  lead  is  in  our  hand, 
and  our  opponent  has  to  follow  suit ;  so  long  as  we  do 
not  disclose  our  hand,  we  are  in  a  position  to  deceive 


250       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

him  by  false  plays.  To  a  certain  extent,  surprise  is 
essential  to  the  success  of  a  flank  attack,  and  the 
troops  holding  the  enemy  fast  in  front  must  therefore 
attack  with  such  spirit  as  to  leave  the  enemy  in  uncer- 
tainty as  to  the  true  point  selected  for  assault,  and  en- 
gage his  attention  so  that  he  cannot  keep  large  re- 
serves in  hand  for  the  defense  of  his  flanks.  This 
does  not  mean  that  these  troops  in  the  enemy's  front 
necessarily  must  assault  the  enemy  simultaneously 
with  the  flank  attack,  and  take  part  in  the  actual  bay- 
onet charge,  for  if  they  can  bring  an  effective  and  en- 
filading fire  to  bear  on  the  point  selected  for  assault, 
they  will  do  more  good  by  continuing  to  fire  than  by 
joining  in  the  assault.  Which  procedure  our  company 
west  of  Schaf er's  should  follow,  we  will  discuss  a  lit- 
tle farther  on. 

It  will  not  always  be  as  easy  as  in  this  problem  to 
determine  which  flank  shall  be  attacked.  If  we  found 
any  difficulty  at  all  in  deciding  on  the  enemy's  left 
flank,  it  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  terrain  also  fav- 
ored an  attack  against  his  right  flank.  More  fre- 
quently we  will  find  the  question  difficult  because  the 
ground  does  not  suit  us  on  either  flank,  or  because  it 
least  favors  the  attack  on  that  flank  which,  for  other 
reasons,  we  think  should  be  attacked.  Major  A  fin- 
ally decided  to  attack  the  enemy's  left  flank — all  oth- 
er conditions  being  as  good  or  better  on  this  flank  than 
on  the  other — because  on  this  flank  he  could  place  his 
battalion  across  the  enemy's  only  practicable  line  of  re- 
treat. But  what  could  he  have  done  had  there  been  no 
woods  or  other  features  on  this  flank  to  conceal  his 
movements?  Preventing  the  enemy's  escape  would 
have  appeared  no  less  desirable,  but  in  attempting 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  251 

this  he  might  have  sacrificed  a  victory,  and,  after  all, 
a  tactical  victory  is  what  he  is  seeking.  Many  things 
are  to  be  considered  in  deciding  the  question,  and  sel- 
dom will  we  find  one  flank  meeting  all  the  conditions 
as  we  would  like;  in  this  dilemma,  we  can  but  select 
that  flank  which  appears  to  satisfy  most  of  the  require- 
ments, and  which  above  all  things  promises  a  tactical 
victory.  If  the  infantry  succeeds  in  carrying  the  ene- 
my's position,  victory  is  won.  All  other  measures 
adopted  in  the  attack  are  of  importance  only  in  so  far 
as  they  make  it  possible  for  the  infantry  to  assault  the 
position.  If  tactical  considerations  favor  an  attack  on 
one  flank,  but  other  considerations  do  not,  in  the  ma- 
jority of  cases  the  former  outweigh  all  others,  for  the 
most  important  thing  is  to  defeat  the  enemy.  Every- 
thing else  is  secondary. 

Having  chosen  the  flank  he  proposed  to  envelop, 
our  major  had  next  to  decide  on  the  proper  division  of 
his  force  for  the  attack.  Although  he  proposed  to 
make  his  main  effort  against  the  enemy's  left,  still  he 
must  occupy  the  attention  of  the  enemy  in  front  with  a 
part  of  his  battalion.  Suppose  he  should  have  moved 
the  whole  battalion  to  the  vicinity  of  North  hill,  think- 
ing to  throw  the  entire  force  against  the  enemy's  flank ; 
the  enemy,  unmolested  in  front,  would  have  been  free 
to  meet  the  flank  attack  with  his  full  strength,  and 
Major  A  would  have  been  making  a  pure  frontal  at- 
tack, only  from  the  east  instead  of  from  the  south. 
This  necessity  for  engaging  the  enemy  so  vigorously 
in  front  that  he  will  be  compelled  to  put  a  part  or  all 
of  his  reserves  into  this  part  of  the  line,  thus  leaving 
him  little  or  nothing  with  which  to  protect  his  threat- 
ened flank,  gives  rise  to  the  employment  of  a  second- 
ary attack  in  most  cases. 


252       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

In  the  situation  before  us,  it  is  not  to  be  supposed 
that  our  opponent,  with  his  splendid  view  of  the  ter- 
rain, will  be  so  deceived  as  not  to  keep  a  reserve  with 
which  to  meet  a  blow  against  one  of  his  flanks ;  but  this 
reserve  will  be  the  minimum,  if  the  major's  secondary 
attack  is  made  adequately  strong  and  is  properly  hand- 
led. 

The  secondary  attack  was  extremely  fortunate  in 
being  able  to  reach,  without  fighting,  so  advantageous 
a  position  (on  the  little  ridge  and  hill  west  and  north- 
west of  Schafer's)  within  500  to  650  yards  of  the  ene- 
my. Ordinarily,  it  will  suffer  considerable  loss  while 
approaching  such  effective  range,  and  we  must  not  be 
deceived  by  the  mild  name  given  this  attack  (the  "sec- 
ondary" attack)  into  believing  that  it  is  to  be  pushed 
with  any  less  impetuosity  and  disregard  for  losses  than 
the  main  attack.  (*)  If  it  were  a  mere  bluff,  the 
enemy  would  be  very  quick  to  learn  that  fact  and 
would  conserve  his  strength  to  meet  the  main  attack 
when  it  should  fall.  But,  as  we  have  already  pointed 
out,  it  may  accomplish  more,  after  reaching  a  decisive 
range  (i.  e.  600  to  650  yards),  by  attempting  to  gain 
fire  superiority  over  the  enemy  and  assisting  the  main 
attack  in  this  manner  than  by  advancing  to  the  as- 
sault and  taking  part  in  the  bayonet  charge.  Which 
plan  is  to  be  followed  is  a  matter  to  be  decided  by  the 
commander  according  to  the  merits  of  each  individual 
case. 

The  purpose  of  carrying  out  any  plan  of  attack 
should  be  to  close  with  the  enemy.  A  well  posted 

*  While  this  term  ' '  secondary  attack ' '  may  be  freely  used  in  tacti- 
cal discussions,  for  convenience  of  designation,  still  it  is  not  'wise 
ever  to  employ  it  when  issuing  orders. 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  258 

enemy  cannot  be  shot  out  of  a  position;  he  must  be 
driven  out.  This  does  not  mean  that  bayonets  nec- 
essarily will  be  crossed;  ordinarily,  one  side  or  the 
other  will  break  before  the  crisis,  but  if  both  sides  are 
equally  determined,  the  bayonet  combat  will  be  un- 
avoidable. In  approaching  the  line  ( 200  to  400  yards 
from  the  enemy)  from  which  the  charge  is  to  be 
made,  much  open,  fire  swept  ground  usually  has  to  be 
crossed,  and  it  is  in  this  stage  of  the  attack  that  the 
value  of  fire  is  appreciated.  We  are  making  such 
an  advance,  we  will  say  with  a  battalion.  We  come 
under  the  enemy's  fire,  deploy  a  company  in  the  fir- 
ing line  and  reply  to  it.  The  enemy's  fire  is  heavy, 
sustained  and  accurate ;  bullets  are  cutting  the  ground 
all  along  our  line ;  a  few  of  our  men  are  wounded  and 
all  are  closely  hugging  the  ground;  here  and  there 
along  the  line  we  see  a  man  fire  into  the  air  without 
any  attempt  at  aiming;  our  coolest  men  and  best 
shots  are  firing  with  extreme  difficulty.  What  is  the 
trouble?  The  enemy's  fire  is  more  effective  than 
ours,  it  may  be  because  of  the  greater  number  of  men 
in  his  firing  line,  or  it  may  be  because  they  are  doing 
better  shooting  than  we;  but,  whatever  the  reason, 
we  must  decrease  the  effectiveness  of  his  fire,  and 
thereby  increase  the  effectiveness  of  our  fire.  This 
we  may  be  able  to  do  by  continuing  the  fire  of  the 
company  already  deployed,  but  it  may  be  necessary  to 
put  more  rifles  on  our  firing  line.  We  will  suppose 
the  latter  to  be  the  case,  that  we  deploy  a  second 
company,  and  that  the  results  soon  become  apparent 
in  the  decreased  volume  and  accuracy  of  the  ene- 
my's fire;  but  still  the  bullets  are  clipping  the  rocks 
and  other  cover  behind  which  our  men  have  taken  ref- 


254       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

uge,  and  we  know  that  an  attempt  to  advance  from 
behind  this  cover,  while  the  enemy's  fire  is  so  accu- 
rate, will  result  in  unbearable  losses.  There  is  nothing 
for  us  to  do  but  deploy  another  platoon,  or  company, 
and  increase  our  fire.  Finally,  the  enemy's  bullets  do 
not  strike  so  frequently  in  our  line,  and  we  know  he  is 
shooting  wild ;  our  own  men,  no  longer  so  bothered  by 
the  enemy's  fire,  are  aiming  and  firing  with  delibera- 
tion and  care.  At  last  we  have  gained  fire  superiority 
and  can  continue  our  advance.  Superiority  of  fire 
must  be  attained  before  there  can  be  great  proba- 
bility of  the  attack  succeeding;  any  failure  to  appre- 
ciate this  principle  will  lead  to  such  losses  that  even  if 
the  attacker  were  to  succeed  in  closing  with  the  ene- 
my, he  probably  would  be  too  weak  to  obtain  the 
victory. 

To  return  to  our  problem.  As  already  observed, 
the  secondary  attack  was  extremely  fortunate  in 
reaching  a  position  near  Schafer's  without  exposure  to 
hostile  fire.  Here  Captain  D  deployed  the  entire 
company  and  put  the  machine  guns  in  position  and, 
after  carefully  estimating  the  range,  opened  fire  with 
all.  His  men  found  great  difficulty  in  firing,  for 
the  enemy's  fire  was  superior  to  their  own,  until  the 
opening  shots  of  the  main  attack  were  heard  in  the 
woods  to  the  north.  Immediately  thereafter  the  fire 
on  his  line  so  diminished  that  his  men  for  the  first 
time  in  about  fifteen  minutes  were  able  to  take  care- 
ful aim.  Up  to  this  time  Captain  D  was  not  able 
to  advance,  for  an  advance  while  the  enemy's  fire 
was  superior  to  his  own  was  bound  to  result  in  seri- 
ous loss  and  could  not  long  continue.  Although  his 
fire  was  not  effective  at  the  start,  he  might  be  sure 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  255 

that  it  would  be  so,  as  soon  as  the  main  attack  ap- 
peared on  the  enemy's  left  flank,  and  it  would  then  be 
possible  for  him  to  advance  in  support  of  the  flank 
attack  and  be  on  hand  to  join  in  the  final  assault. 

Just  how  the  attack  will  proceed  from  now  on  will 
depend  largely  on  the  action  of  the  enemy.  Suppos- 
ing the  situation  is  what  we  believe  it  to  be,  and  that 
the  enemy  continues  to  make  a  passive  defense,  we 
may  expect  the  attack  to  develop  about  as  follows: 
The  first  rush  may  be  made  by  that  part  of  the  com- 
pany which  is  on  the  little  ridge  and  may  be  made 
under  the  protection  of  the  fire  of  the  remainder  of 
the  company  and  the  machine  guns  on  hill  890.  The 
ground  favors  this  rush,  for  the  advancing  line  will 
find  considerable  cover  almost  immediately  in  the  ra- 
vine just  north  of  the  little  ridge.  When  it  again 
reaches  high  and  exposed  ground,  it  will  be  within 
about  400  yards  of  the  hostile  position.  It  may  then 
open  fire  and  assist  in  covering  the  advance  of  the  re- 
mainder of  the  company  from  hill  890.  Another  rush 
or  two  will  place  the  company  in  a  position  from  which 
it  can  make  the  final  assault.  The  machine  guns  will 
remain  in  their  position,  and  continue  their  fire  at 
intervals,  when  a  favorable  target  is  presented,  as 
long  as  their  fire  is  not  masked  by  the  advancing  in- 
fantry. 

In  the  meantime,  the  main  attack  will  have  ad- 
vanced to  the  edge  of  the  woods  at  the  foot  of  North 
hill,  and  will  be  within  about  200  yards  of  the  hostile 
position,  assisting  with  its  fire  and  awaiting  the  mo- 
ment for  the  assault.  When  the  two  portions  of  the 
force  have  reached  these  positions  and  have  thor- 
oughly shaken  the  enemy  with  their  fire,  Major  A 


256       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

will  order  the  assault  by  the  whole  line,  and  will  put 
in  a  part  or  all  of  his  reserve  if  necessary  to  carry  it 
through. 

We  have  observed  that  our  secondary  attack  was 
too  weak  to  obtain  fire  superiority  until  the  enemy  was 
forced  to  withdraw  men  to  meet  the  main  attack.  The 
major  might  easily  have  foreseen  this.  Why  then 
did  he  not  make  the  secondary  attack  stronger?  Two 
companies  with  the  machine  gun  platoon  should  have 
been  able  to  establish  fire  superiority  at  the  outset.  But 
this  would  have  left  but  two  companies  to  furnish  the 
main  attack  and  reserve,  and  our  major  would  have 
been  weak  at  the  point  where  he  proposed  to  make  his 
main  effort.  No  absolute  ratios  exist  between  the 
strengths  of  the  secondary  attack,  main  attack  and 
reserve,  but  half  measures  that  contemplate  being 
equally  strong  at  all  points  are  poorly  suited  to  strik- 
ing a  powerful  blow  at  a  decisive  point.  Far  from 
making  this  mistake,  Major  A  showed  his  appreciation 
of  the  value  of  superior  numbers  by  making  his  main 
attack  strong  from  the  start,  and  for  fear  Captain  A 
(commanding  the  main  attack)  might  have  overlooked 
this  point,  he  suggested,  when  giving  his  orders,  that 
he  put  both  companies  in  the  firing  line  from  the  start. 
( This  would  not  prevent  Captain  A  from  holding  out 
local  supports,  as  well  as  a  small  force,  say  a  section,  in 
rear  of  his  right  flank  for  its  protection ) .  There  could 
hardly  be  a  greater  mistake  than  the  one  committed  in 
so  many  of  the  early  engagements,  large  and  small,  of 
our  Civil  War — detailing  an  insufficient  force  for  the 
main  attack  and  then  reinforcing  it  by  driblets;  the 
driblets  are  defeated  and  driven  back  as  fast  as  they 
are  fed  into  the  fight  and,  although  outnumbering  the 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  257 

enemy,  maybe  two  to  one,  he  is  never  met  at  any  one 
time  with  superior  numbers. 

If  it  was  so  important  to  make  this  blow  powerful, 
why  did  not  the  major  put  into  the  main  attack  all 
three  of  the  companies  sent  to  North  hill,  and  hold 
nothing  in  reserve?  Seldom  or  never  may  we  dare  to 
dispense  entirely  with  a  reserve.  We  pointed  out  in 
the  solution  that  it  was  not  at  all  probable  that  other 
hostile  forces  would  appear  during  the  progress  of  the 
fight,  but  we  may  never  feel  quite  certain  on  this  score ; 
nor  is  this  by  any  means  the  only  reason  why  a  reserve 
is  necessary.  A  commander  can  only  exercise  a  direct 
influence  on  his  command  so  long  as  he  retains  at  his 
disposal  a  portion  of  his  force  with  which  to  meet  the 
varying  contingencies  of  an  engagement.  With  a  re- 
serve at  his  disposal,  he  can  take  advantage  of  the  ene- 
my's mistakes ;  he  can  repulse  a  counter  attack ;  he  can 
reinforce  the  front  line  if  it  should  be  checked,  thus 
giving  it  a  fresh  impetus  to  the  front ;  and  he  can  reap 
the  fruits  of  victory.  We  should  always  keep  a  re- 
serve under  our  own  control,  but  we  should  not  fall 
into  the  error  of  holding  it  out  of  the  fight  in  order 
that  we  may  employ  it  defensively  to  cover  our  re- 
treat. The  reserves  are  meant  to  be  used,  and  no  part 
of  the  attacking  force  should  stand  inactive  at  the  de- 
cisive moment.  If  the  enemy  gives  way  before  the  re- 
serve is  employed,  so  much  the  better;  if  he  does  not 
give  way,  the  last  available  man  must  be  employed, 
unless  victory  is  seen  to  be  hopeless.  The  main  thing 
is  to  gain  the  victory,  and  no  doubts  or  qualms  must 
stand  in  the  way.  A  commander  who  accepts  defeat 
and  quits  the  scene  of  action,  while  a  portion  of  his 
infantry  has  not  yet  fired  a  round,  has  not  made  full 


258       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

use  of  the  force  at  his  disposal,  that  is  to  say,  if  the 
situation  was  such  that  the  intervention  of  the  reserve 
could  have  gained  the  victory. 

We  will  add  a  few  ideas  which  may  be  of  assist- 
ance in  the  solution  of  the  next  problem.  In  the  prob- 
lem we  have  just  discussed,  we  had  to  attack  a  force  in 
a  definitely  located  position  prepared  for  defense ;  and 
there  was  every  reason  to  believe  it  had  no  idea  of  as- 
suming the  offensive  of  its  own  volition.  No  consid- 
erable part  of  our  command  was  under  fire,  and  we 
were  able  to  proceed  in  a  deliberate  manner  to  recon- 
noiter  the  position  and  to  plan  a  systematic  attack. 
More  often  we  will  not  know  the  enemy's  exact  posi- 
tion and  strength  with  such  certainty,  and  we  will  have 
to  make  our  plan  for  attack  while  the  fog  of  war  hangs 
dense  over  the  battlefield.  Or,  we  may  unexpectedly 
encounter  a  hostile  column  also  on  the  march;  every 
minute  will  decrease  the  distance  that  separates  us 
from  the  head  of  the  enemy's  column  and,  to  add  to 
our  worries,  we  will  now  have  to  make  our  plans  in  a 
very  few  minutes,  despite  the  fact  that  we  may  be  ig- 
norant of  the  enemy's  strength  and  intentions.  It  is  a 
trying  position ;  but,  if  we  form  an  estimate  of  the  sit- 
uation before  our  opponent,  take  the  offensive,  and 
succeed  in  throwing  him  on  the  defensive,  we  gain  a 
great  advantage.  In  this  discussion  we  have  but 
scratched  the  surface  of  the  subject  of  infantry  com- 
bat, and  the  solution  of  this  problem  is  not  a  model 
that  will  fit  other  attack  problems.  The  truth  of  this 
will  be  more  apparent  after  we  have  solved  the  next 
problem. 


CHAPTER  XVIJ. 

AN  ATTACK  BY  INFANTRY  AND 
CAVALRY. 

PROBLEM. 

(See  4-inch  map). 

June  1,  the  24th  Infantry  and  the  1st  Squadron,  8th 
Cavalry,  less  Troops  C  and  D,  the  advance  troops  of  a 
Blue  reinforced  brigade,  reached  Leavenworth  by  rail 
from  Missouri.  Here  Colonel  A,  commanding  the 
detachment,  learned  that  a  small  hostile  detachment  of 
infantry  and  cavalry  reached  Easton  the  previous  day, 
and  a  stronger  hostile  detachment  of  about  two  regi- 
ments of  infantry  without  cavalry  is  approaching 
Kickapoo  from  the  northwest. 

On  telegraphing  this  information  to  brigade  head- 
quarters, Colonel  A  received  orders  to  protect  the  Ter- 
minal bridge,  and  endeavor  to  hold  the  enemy  off  the 
heights  west  of  Leavenworth,  until  the  arrival  of  the 
remainder  of  the  brigade  about  noon.  Accordingly, 
he  left  Company  A  to  guard  the  bridge  and  marched 
to  the  west  with  the  remainder  of  his  command. 

By  8  a.  m.,  he  has  had  information  from  his  cavalry 
commander  as  follows:  At  7:20  a.  m.,  he  encounter- 
ed on  the  58 — 56 — Dakota  street  road  a  troop  of  hos- 
tile cavalry  which  fell  back  towards  24  without  fight- 
ing. He  followed,  but  on  coming  under  fire  from 
the  Haug  spur  (north  of  54)  he  moved  to  the  north 
to  the  cover  of  the  woods  and  spur  north  of  the  56 — 


260       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

60  road.  At  7 :45  a.  m.,  he  was  moving  towards  22  to 
attack  the  hostile  cavalry  from  near  there. 

An  officer's  patrol,  sent  to  reconnoiter  through 
Kickapoo,  reported  from  Hancock  hill  that  no  enemy 
was  visible  on  the  Millwood  road  or  roads  south  from 
Kickapoo,  at  7 :20  a.  m.  No  report  has  been  received 
from  patrols  on  the  Atchison  pike  and  the  Barnes 
road. 

Firing  has  been  heard  in  the  direction  of  22,  since 
7 :50  a.  m.  At  8  a.  m.,  when  the  advance  party  ( Com- 
pany B,  less  1  platoon)  is  passing  60,  the  support  (Vz 
Company  B,  and  Companies  C  and  D)  is  crossing  the 
ravine  on  Dakota  street  500  yards  east  of  60,  and  the 
head  of  the  main  body  is  about  600  yards  farther  to 
the  rear,  between  the  railroad  and  stream  crossing  on 
Kiowa  street,  the  advance  guard  is  fired  on  with  ma- 
chine guns,  apparently  from  the  Haug  spur.  The  ad- 
vance party  seeks  cover  in  the  ravine  just  west  of  60, 
and  the  support  in  the  ravine  south  of  "A"  in  "Aven- 
ue Hill."  Colonel  A  is  with  the  support. 

Note. — The  country  is  friendly  to  the  Blues. 
Required : 

Colonel  A's  estimate  of  the  situation  and  orders. 

SOLUTION. 

Colonel  A  is  making  his  advance  to  the  west  for  the 
purpose  of  holding  the  enemy  off  the  high  ground 
about  Leavenworth,  until  the  arrival  of  the  remainder 
of  his  brigade,  and  now  it  appears  the  enemy  has  beat- 
en him  to  the  hills,  and  for  the  time  being  has  possess- 
ion of  one  of  the  roads  over  them. 

The  force  in  his  front  probably  is  the  small  detach- 
ment of  hostile  infantry  and  cavalry  reported  in  East- 


AN  ATTACK  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY    261 

on  yesterday.  Colonel  A's  cavalry  commander  reports 
seeing  cavalry  only,  but  the  presence  of  the  machine 
guns  suggests  that  the  hostile  infantry  is  up,  unless 
there  is  more  hostile  cavalry  than  has  been  seen,  for 
it  is  not  probable  a  single  troop  would  be  accompan- 
ied by  machine  guns. 

Even  if  the  hostile  force  advancing  from  the  north- 
west were  concealed  by  Kickapoo,  at  7 :20  a.  m.,  when 
the  officer's  patrol  reported  from  Hancock  hill,  it 
would  still  be  about  an  hour's  march  from  16  at  8  a. 
m.  Colonel  A's  best,  if  not  his  only  chance  for  ac- 
complishing his  mission,  will  be  to  defeat  the  detach- 
ment in  his  front  and  prevent  it  from  joining  the  oth- 
er hostile  detachment,  and  then  oppose  the  advance  of 
the  latter.  The  situation  does  not  warrant  his  aban- 
doning his  mission. 

Accordingly,  he  decides  to  continue  his  advance  and 
attack  the  enemy  in  his  immediate  front,  unless  later 
information  should  show  an  attack  to  be  unwise,  in 
which  case  he  will  act  according  to  the  situation. 

But  the  advance  can  not  be  continued  in  column 
along  the  Dakota  street — 60 — 56  road,  nor  along  the 
next  road  (Ottawa  street)  to  the  south.  Colonel  A 
rides  to  the  top  of  Avenue  hill,  and  from  there  he  finds 
that  Metropolitan  avenue  between  64  and  62  is  con- 
cealed from  the  hostile  machine  guns  on  Haug  spur, 
by  the  wooded  spur  north  of  the  60 — 56  road,  and  that 
troops  can  move  along  the  railroad  from  where  the 
head  of  the  main  body  now  is  to  64,  concealed  from 
the  machine  guns  by  trees,  cuts,  and  fills,  and  Avenue 
hill.  The  advance  party  can  move  north  from  its  po- 
sition near  60,  under  cover  of  the  ravine  just  west  of 
the  60 — 62  road,  and  the  support  may  move  north  un- 


262       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

der  cover  of  the  ravine  south  of  "A"  in  "Avenue  Hill" 
and  the  wooded  spur  southeast  of  22.  The  support 
may  be  exposed  for  a  few  yards,  as  it  crosses  the  south- 
west spur  of  Avenue  hill,  but  the  range  is  extreme 
(1800  yards)  and  there  should  be  little  or  no  loss. 
Should  it  appear  that  the  support  would  suffer  heav- 
ily in  crossing  Avenue  hill,  it  could  be  withdrawn 
down  the  ravine  and  Three  Mile  creek,  to  follow  the 
main  body. 

Colonel  A  then  gives  the  following  orders  to  the 
advance  guard  commander,  who  is  with  him  on  Ave- 
nue hill  and  has  previously  been  given  all  information 
of  the  enemy: 

"The  regiment  will  move  north  to  this  road  (Metropolitan 
avenue)  and  then  continue  the  advance. 

"Move  your  advance  guard  by  the  right  flank  to  this  road  and 
await  orders  from  me  to  continue  the  advance.  The  main  body 
will  follow  the  railroad  to  the  point  where  it  crosses  this  road 
(indicating)  and  then  take  this  road. 

"I  will  remain  here." 

To  his  adjutant  he  then  says: 

"Ride  to  the  main  body  and  direct  it  to  move  to  this  point  via 
the  railroad." 

Continuation  of  the  Problem. 
Just  after  Colonel  A  issued  the  above  orders,  he 
received  a  message  from  his  cavalry  commander,  sent 
from  the  cemetery  east  of  22  at  8:05  a.  m.,  stating 
that  just  as  he  was  about  to  attack  the  hostile  cavalry, 
it  was  joined  near  24  by  a  company  of  hostile  infan- 
try, and  machine  guns  opened  fire  from  the  Haug 
spur.  He  therefore  suspended  his  proposed  attack 
and  would  remain  in  observation  near  the  cemetery. 
Thereupon,  Colonel  A  sent  the  cavalry  commander 


AN  ATTACK  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALEY    263 

a  brief  written  order,  directing  him  to  hold  his  posi- 
tion near  22  until  the  arrival  of  the  Blue  infantry. 

At  8:20  a.  m.,  the  command  was  on  Metropolitan 
avenue  and  resumed  its  advance  via  62,  thence  across 
country  and  via  the  northern  trail  through  the  woods 
towards  22,  to  the  vicinity  of  the  cemetery.  While 
advancing,  Colonel  A  had  messages  as  follows: 

1.  From  a  cavalry  patrol  at  50,  saying  that  it  had 
observed,  from  near  40,  a  battalion  of  hostile  infan- 
try in  advance  guard  formation  advancing  on  the  30 
— 28 — 24  road,  with  the  head  of  the  column  near  24 
at  7:50  a.  m.    The  patrol  was  driven  back  to  50  by 
infantry  and  cavalry  patrols,  before  it  could  discover 
whether  the  battalion  was  followed  by  other  hostile 
troops. 

2.  From  a  cavalry  patrol    four    miles    west    of 
Frenchman,  reporting  no  enemy  oh  the  Atchison  pike 
up  to  that  point  at  7:45  a.  m. 

3.  From  the  officer's  patrol,  on  Crook  point,  re- 
porting a  hostile  column  advancing  from  the  west  on 
Kickapoo,  with  the  head  of  the  column  2  miles  west 
of  43  at  8:10  a.  m.    No  hostile  cavalry  was  seen  with 
this  column. 

At  8:40  a.  m.,  the  advance  party  of  the  Blue  ad- 
vance guard  has  reached  the  cemetery,  and  Colonel 
A  and  the  advance  guard  commander  have  joined  the 
cavalry,  which  is  dismounted  and  deployed  in  the 
cemetery  and  along  the  edge  of  the  woods.  The  cav- 
alry commander  points  out  the  enemy's  position 
across  the  road  at  24  and  on  the  Haug  spur,  but  he 
does  not  know  how  strongly  it  is  occupied ;  he  has  seen 
no  hostile  infantry  but  the  one  company  already  re- 


264       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

ported.    The  cavalry  is  exchanging  an  occasional  shot 
with  the  enemy. 
Required : 

Colonel  A's  estimate  of  the  situation  and  his  orders. 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 

It  is  not  probable  that  further  reconnaissance  will 
give  Colonel  A  any  additional  information  of  the 
strength  of  the  enemy  confronting  him.  Such  re- 
connaissance would  have  to  be  made  from  points  on 
the  enemy's  flanks  and  rear,  and  it  is  not  to  be  sup- 
posed that  the  enemy,  now  warned  of  Colonel  A's 
presence,  has  not  taken  the  usual  precautions  to  hold 
the  Blue  patrols  at  a  distance.  Further  informa- 
tion of  importance  cannot  be  expected  of  the  patrol 
at  50,  for  it  has  been  driven  back  by  the  enemy's  pa- 
trols. Colonel  A  might  send  his  entire  cavalry  force 
to  the  enemy's  flank  to  learn  more  of  his  strength, 
but  this  would  take  too  much  time  when  time  is  of 
vital  importance.  If  Colonel  A  is  to  attack,  it  must 
be  on  the  information  he  now  possesses. 

The  only  other  hostile  force  reported  in  the  neigh- 
borhood is  that  approaching  via  Kickapoo,  and  it  can- 
not reach  G  before  10:30  a.  m.  The  fight  near  24 
should  be  decided  one  way  or  the  other  before  that 
hour,  and  Colonel  A,  if  successful,  may  still  have  suf- 
ficient time  remaining  to  reorganize  his  force  and 
reach  16  to  block  the  way  of  the  other  hostile  column 
until  he  is  supported  by  his  brigade,  which  is  due 
about  noon.  If  he  remains  on  the  defensive  where  he 
now  is,  the  enemy  will  be  on  his  front  and  flank,  prob- 
ably in  greatly  superior  force,  before  the  brigade  is 
up.  Accordingly,  Colonel  A  at  once  decides  to  at- 
tack. 


AN  ATTACK  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY    265 

The  different  portions  of  the  column  now  occupy 
the  following  positions:  The  advance  party  is  near 
the  cemetery;  the  support  is  about  350  yards  back  on 
the  trail;  and  the  main  body  is  on  Metropolitan  av- 
enue, with  its  head  at  62,  a  suitable  position  from 
which  to  move  it  against  whichever  hostile  flank  Col- 
onel A  decides  to  attack. 

Although  the  hostile  machine  guns  are  on  the 
Haug  spur,  it  is  not  at  all  probable  the  enemy  has  a 
continuous  line  from  there  through  24,  for  the  length 
of  the  line  would  be  out  of  all  proportion  to  his  sup- 
posed strength.  The  spur  northeast  from  24  is  about 
20  feet  higher,  at  its  top,  than  the  ridge  just  south  of 
the  22 — 24  road,  and  on  this  spur,  on  both  sides  of 
the  24 — 26  road,  the  enemy  probably  has  his  main  po- 
sition, with  his  reserve  behind  his  left  flank,  where  it 
can  extend  his  line  to  the  left,  towards  the  orchard  on 
Eleven  Hundred  Foot  hill,  to  meet  an  attempt  to 
envelop  his  left  flank. 

The  enemy's  best  field  of  fire  is  in  front  of  his 
right  flank,  which  is  posted  on  the  commanding,  bas- 
tion-like Haug  spur,  overlooking  the  valley  of  Three 
Mile  creek.  An  attack  on  this  flank  would  have  to  go 
south  of  Three  Mile  creek  to  find  even  fair  cover,  the 
movement  would  be  seen  by  the  enemy,  and  in  the 
end  the  attack  would  have  to  be  made  up  the  steep 
and  uniform  slope  of  Haug  spur.  Besides,  there 
would  be  danger  of  the  flank  attack  becoming  widely 
separated  from  the  frontal  attack.  An  attack  against 
this  flank,  but  north  of  the  60 — 56 — 54  road  is  lit- 
tle better. 

The  conditions  are  more  favorable  in  front  of  the 
enemy's  left.  Here  his  field  of  fire  is  not  so  broad, 


266       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

and  is  broken  by  the  rolling  ground  and  the  trees  in 
the  ravines  just  west  of  South  West  hill.  The  main 
body  can  be  brought  up  on  this  flank  without  being 
seen  by  the  enemy,  and  can  be  assembled  under  cover 
behind  the  crest  of  South  West  hill  and  formed  in 
safety  for  the  attack.  The  attack  will  suffer  when  it 
crosses  the  ridge  of  South  West  hill,  but  as  soon  as 
it  reaches  the  cover  of  the  ravines  it  may  be  reorgan- 
ized for  its  further  advance.  An  attack  on  this  flank 
not  only  offers  more  chances  for  a  tactical  victory, 
but  it  promises  as  well  to  drive  the  enemy  away  from 
his  approaching  reinforcements,  whereas  an  attack 
on  the  enemy's  right  flank  would  drive  him  towards 
his  reinforcements.  Moreover,  an  attack  on  the  ene- 
my's left  will  also  place  Colonel  A's  reserve  in  a  good 
position  to  move  to  the  north.  The  enemy  in  his  front 
may  retire  before  Colonel  A  has  to  put  in  his  last  re- 
serve, and,  in  this  case,  the  reserve  could,  if  neces- 
sary, be  promptly  sent  towards  16  to  hold  back  the 
enemy  advancing  via  Kickapoo  till  the  rest  of  Colonel 
A's  command  could  be  reassembled,  reorganized  and 
brought  up. 

The  natural  line  of  advance  for  the  frontal  attack 
is  along  the  22 — 24  road,  with  the  left  of  the  line  not 
extending  south  of  the  crest  of  the  ridge  which  is  just 
south  of  the  road.  This  will  keep  the  force  out  of  the 
defile  that  the  58 — 24  road  passes  through,  where  it 
could  be  subjected  to  a  very  severe  cross  fire,  and 
will  protect  the  left  flank  from  the  fire  of  the  hostile 
machine  guns  on  Haug  spur.  Colonel  A  will  assign 
his  machine  gun  platoon  to  the  force  making  the 
frontal  attack.  They  probably  will  assist  the  attack' 
most  by  their  fire  from  a  position  in  the  edge  of  the 


AN  ATTACK  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY    267 

woods  between  the  cemetery  and  South  West  hill, 
where  they  can  fire  over  the  heads  of  the  advancing 
infantry. 

The  cavalry  will  now  be  withdrawn  from  the  posi- 
tion it  has  been  holding  and  sent  to  operate  on  the 
enemy's  right  and  rear.  The  terrain  does  not  favor 
its  operations  on  the  hostile  left  flank,  but  it  can  reach 
the  hostile  right  and  rear  via  the  68 — 50 — 40  road.  Its 
task  will  be  to  determine  what  it  can  of  the  enemy's 
strength  and  whether  he  is  followed  by  other  forces, 
and  to  cooperate  in  the  attack.  It  probably  will  be 
opposed  by  the  hostile  cavalry.  An  additional  patrol 
will  be  sent  towards  Kickapoo  to  observe  the  ap- 
proaching enemy. 

A  division  of  the  force  for  the  attack  that  will  pre- 
serve unity  of  command  and  give  each  part  a  strength 
in  proportion  to  its  task,  will  be  to  designate  the  ad- 
vance guard  (3  companies)  and  machine  gun  platoon 
for  the  frontal  attack,  one  battalion  for  the  flank  at- 
tack, and  the  remaining  battalion  for  the  reserve. 

Colonel  A's  final  decision  is  to  attack  the  enemy, 
enveloping  his  left  flank  and  sending  the  cavalry  to 
operate  against  his  right  and  rear. 

As  soon  as  Colonel  A  reached  the  cemetery,  he  sent 
for  the  battalion  commanders  from  the  main  body, 
and  when  he  had  reached  his  decision,  he  sent  a  staff 
officer  to  bring  up  the  machine  guns,  and  to  direct  the 
main  body  to  continue  its  advance,  and  to  close  up 
and  assemble  on  the  support  at  the  foot  of  the  hill.  He 
now  issues  the  following  verbal  orders: 

"A  hostile  force  of  at  least  one  troop  of  cavalry  and  one  bat- 
talion of  infantry  occupies  a  position  across  the  road  about  800 
yards  to  our  front  where  you  see  the  fork  of  the  road  (indi- 


268       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

eating  24)  ;  his  machine  guns  are  on  that  spur  (pointing  out  the 
Haug  spur).  A  hostile  column,  without  cavalry,  approaching 
from  the  north,  was  two  miles  west  of  Kickapoo  at  8  a.  m. 

"We  will  attack  the  enemy  in  our  front  at  once,  enveloping  his 
left  flank. 

"Major  A  (commanding  the  advance  guard),  you  will  make 
the  frontal  attack  along  this  road  (the  22 — 24  road)  with  your 
battalion  and  the  machine  gun  platoon,  in  support  of  the  attack 
against  the  enemy's  flank.  The  machine  guns  have  been  ordered 
to  join  you. 

"Major  B  (commanding  the  2d  Battalion),  move  your  battal- 
ion around  the  north  end  of  this  quarry  to  attack  the  enemy's  left 
flank. 

"The  3d  Battalion  will  form  the  reserve  and  will  be  brought 
up  to  the  top  of  the  hill  about  400  yards  north  of  here  and  held 
behind  its  crest  for  further  orders. 

"The  cavalry  will  move  at  once  to  the  enemy's  right  and  rear 
where  it  will  cooperate  in  the  attack  and  reconnoiter  to  the  west 
on  the  Barnes  and  Zimmerman  roads.  A  patrol  will  be  sent  to 
reconnoiter  towards  Kickapoo. 

"Half  of  the  ammunition  in  the  ammunition  wagons  will  be 
distributed  at  once.  A  first  aid  station  will  be  established  about 
200  yards  north  of  here,  just  behind  the  ridge. 

"I  will  remain  here  for  the  present." 

COMMENTS. 

In  this  problem,  we  have  attempted  to  illustrate 
what  was  said  in  the  closing  paragraph  of  the  last 
chapter,  and  in  doing  so  it  was  necessary  to  make  the 
statement  of  the  situation  longer  and  more  complicat- 
ed than  usual.  If  in  our  solution  for  the  first  part  of 
the  problem,  we  had  issued  an  order  for  an  attack,  we 
would  have  acted  prematurely,  for  the  situation  was 
far  from  clear;  the  principal  part  of  the  command 
was  still  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  enemy's  supposed 
position  (a  considerable  distance  when  dealing  with 
small  commands  unaccompanied  by  artillery) ;  by 


AN  ATTACK  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALBY    269 

making  a  simple  shift  of  the  column  to  a  road  but  a 
few  hundred  yards  further  north  it  could  continue  its 
advance  under  perfect  cover ;  the  cavalry  was  in  a  po- 
sition to  protect  this  advance,  and  to  block  the  ene- 
my's advance  should  he  act  on  the  offensive;  there 
was  reason  to  believe  that  our  information  would  be 
added  to  by  the  time  the  head  of  our  column  reached 
the  cemetery,  and  the  main  body  still  would  be  far 
enough  away  at  that  time  to  move  towards  either  of 
the  hostile  flanks. 

The  longer  we  can  delay  dividing  the  force  into  its 
subdivisions  (frontal  and  flank  attacks,  and  reserve) 
the  better  it  will  be,  for  once  this  division  is  made  and 
the  subdivisions  are  started  in  the  direction  they  are 
to  take  for  the  attack,  time  may  be  lost  and  confusion 
may  result,  if  any  considerable  change  has  to  be  made 
in  the  direction  of  their  march  to  meet  some  new  de- 
velopment of  the  situation.  The  commander  should 
not  surrender  direct  control  of  his  command  until  nec- 
essary, for  only  while  it  is  together  and  subject  to  his 
immediate  orders  may  it  be  quickly  and  easily  moved 
in  any  direction. 

Consequently,  Colonel  A's  decision,  in  the  first 
situation,  properly  was  limited  to  a  determination  to 
continue  his  advance,  with  the  idea  of  attacking  the 
enemy,  should  the  situation  warrant  an  attack  when 
he  got  within  striking  distance.  This  advance  would 
not  restrict  his  choice  of  plan  of  attack  later  on,  for 
he  could  see  from  the  ground  that  the  head  of  his 
main  body  would  not  be  beyond  62  when  his  advance 
guard  should  reach  the  position  of  his  cavalry  at  the 
cemetery.  Even  should  the  main  body  have  contin- 
ued its  march  beyond  62,  his  later  action  would  not 


270       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

have  been  compromised,  for  he  could  observe  from 
both  ground  and  map  that,  if  he  attacked,  it  would  be 
by  his  right  flank  for  the  reasons  stated  in  the  solu- 
tion. In  this  situation,  then,  Colonel  A  could  deter- 
mine at  the  outset  the  general  direction  his  attack 
would  take,  if  made,  for  where  detachments  are  con- 
cerned, the  plan  of  attack  usually  is  merely  a  ques- 
tion as  to  whether  the  right  or  left  flank  of  the  ene- 
my is  to  be  attacked. 

In  the  second  situation,  the  colonel  reached  his  de- 
cision to  attack  on  far  less  information  than  was  pos- 
sessed by  Major  A  in  the  preceding  chapter,  yet  his 
information  probably  was  more  definite  and  complete 
than  that  on  which  attacks  generally  will  be  initiated 
by  self-reliant  commanders.  He  knew  he  would  not 
be  molested  by  the  northern  hostile  force  before  10 :30 
a.  m.,  and  that  the  fight  with  the  enemy  in  his  front 
probably  could  be  decided  before  that  hour.  If  there 
were  but  a  single  battalion  of  infantry  opposed  to 
him,  he  could  feel  confident  of  success,  and  if  the  ene- 
my should  prove  strong  enough  to  repulse  him,  he 
could  fall  back  to  Leavenworth  feeling  he  had  done 
his  best,  and  there  concentrate  his  efforts  on  carrying 
out  the  second  part  of  his  mission — the  defense  of  the 
Terminal  bridge. 

It  should  be  observed,  however,  that  the  colonel, 
having  made  up  his  mind  to  attack,  went  about  the 
task  as  though  he  expected  to  win.  The  attack  was 
to  be  made  without  reservation.  No  energy  was  to 
be  wasted  uselessly  by  attacking  the  enemy  here  and 
there  with  a  company  or  a  platoon,  in  a  vain  effort  to 
discover  more  of  his  strength.  There  is  no  talk  about 
a  possible  retreat,  and  nothing  is  to  be  held  out  of  the 


AN  ATTACK  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY    271 

fight  for  the  express  purpose  of  covering  a  retreat. 
Whether  the  enemy  has  a  battalion  or  a  brigade,  he  is 
to  be  attacked  with  every  pound  of  energy  in  the  lit- 
tle detachment  until  the  fight  is  won  or  lost.  "If  you 
have  decided  to  attack,  all  your  arrangements  must 
be  made  to  utilize  the  full  strength  of  the  detachment, 
for  in  the  employment  of  such  weak  bodies  as  detach- 
ments nothing  is  more  reprehensible  than  half  meas- 
ures." (*)  Of  course  this  does  not  mean  that  the 
detachment  commander  will  not  consider  in  his  own 
mind  the  possibilities  of  retreat  and  tentatively  de- 
cide on  what  he  will  do  in  the  event  that  retreat  be- 
comes necessary,  but  he  should  not  spread  a  feeling 
of  unrest  among  his  command  by  making  any  men- 
tion of  retreat  in  his  orders,  nor  will  he,  as  a  matter 
of  course,  hold  a  part  of  his  command  from  the  fight 
to  cover  a  retreat.  The  last  platoon  or  section  put 
into  the  fight  may  be  the  small  mite  that  turns  the 
scales  of  fortune  in  his  favor. 

As  pointed  out  in  the  solution,  the  serious  objec- 
tion, aside  from  the  disadvantages  of  the  terrain,  to 
combining  a  flank  attack  south  of  Three  Mile  creek 
with  a  frontal  attack  along  the  22 — 24  road,  is  the 
distance  (about  1000  yards)  that  separates  the  two 
attacking  forces.  The  frontal  attack  might  be  over- 
whelmed by  the  enemy  before  the  flank  attack  could 
come  to  its  assistance.  It  would  take  the  flank  attack 
some  time  to  learn  that  the  frontal  attack  was  being 
assailed,  and  it  would  have  to  cross  the  fire-swept 
ground  between  the  54 — 60  and  24 — 22  roads  before 
it  could  give  the  frontal  attack  its  support.  A  regi- 
ment should  not  fight  on  so  broad  a  front  as  this,  even 

*  General  Griepenkerl  in  Letters  on  Applied  Tactics. 


272       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

when  its  opponent  is  known  to  be  inferior,  much  less 
when  the  strength  of  its  opponent  is  unknown.  It  is 
scarcely  necessary  to  point  out  that  a  wide  turning 
movement  with  a  part  of  the  force  via  the  68 — 50 
— 40  road  is  wholly  to  be  condemned,  because  of  the 
disaster  invited  by  such  wide  dispersion,  to  say  noth- 
ing of  its  other  objectionable  features. 

The  disposition  of  the  cavalry  probably  gave  you 
some  trouble,  but  the  problem  will  become  more  sim- 
ple when  it  is  recalled  that  the  true  role  of  a  weak 
cavalry  force  with  a  small  detachment  does  not 
change  with  the  situation.  Its  proper  tasks  are  re- 
connaissance and  security  whether  the  command  is  on 
the  march  or  engaged  with  the  enemy.  During  the 
march  the  cavalry's  field  of  operations  is  in  front  and 
on  the  flanks  of  the  column,  but  during  combat  there 
is  no  room  nor  necessity  for  it  between  the  contending 
forces.  It  then  withdraws  to  the  flanks,  the  protec- 
tion of  which  becomes  its  principal  task  while  the  en- 
gagement lasts. 

Up  to  the  time  the  enemy  was  encountered,  the 
cavalry  was  employed  in  accordance  with  the  princi- 
ples stated  in  previous  chapters  of  this  book ;  the  bulk 
of  the  force  was  kept  concentrated  and  the  recon- 
naissance was  made  by  patrols  on  the  principal  roads. 
The  advantage  of  this  disposition  was  seen  when  the 
hostile  cavalry  was  encountered  and  driven  back. 
This  same  principle  of  concentration  should  be  ob- 
served during  the  engagement.  Even  if  the  detach- 
ments are  limited  to  those  that  appear  to  be  absolute- 
ly necessary,  still  the  small  cavalry  force  that  accom- 
panies a  detachment  will  be  considerably  scattered 
and  the  main  cavalry  nucleus  will  be  weak.  Sending 


AN  ATTACK  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY    273 

out  an  occasional  patrol  soon  uses  up  a  full  platoon, 
and  once  a  patrol  is  sent  on  a  reconnaissance  of  some 
miles  it  may  not  get  back  to  the  command  before 
night.  If  the  cavalry  commander  has  exercised  the 
strictest  economy  in  this  matter,  he  probably  has  with 
him  at  the  cemetery  about  a  troop  and  a  half,  and  if 
this  is  to  give  the  attack  full  power  of  its  support, 
further  subdivision  must  be  avoided  if  possible.  This 
appears  difficult,  for  the  need  of  protection  on  both 
flanks  of  the  attack  is  felt.  On  the  right  flank,  the 
enemy  approaching  from  the  north  must  be  kept  un- 
der constant  observation,  while  on  the  left  flank,  re- 
connaissance is  even  more  important,  to  determine 
whether  other  hostile  forces  are  following  the  battal- 
ion already  seen. 

In  general,  in  distributing  the  cavalry  between  the 
two  flanks,  the  bulk  of  it  should  be  sent  to  that  flank 
where  it  will  be  of  greatest  assistance  to  the  infantry 
in  the  accomplishment  of  the  general  mission.  Con- 
sidering the  good  view  to  be  had  from  Sheridan's 
Drive,  of  the  roads  from  Kickapoo,  and  the  absence 
of  cavalry  with  the  hostile  column  approaching  from 
the  north,  a  single  additional  patrol  to  assist  the  of- 
ficer's patrol  will  make  sufficient  cavalry  on  the  right 
flank.  On  the  other  flank,  reconnaissance  will  be  more 
difficult  because  of  the  hostile  cavalry,  and  it  is  more 
necessary  because  of  the  uncertainty  as  to  the  enemy's 
strength.  Moreover,  on  that  flank,  the  cavalry  may 
play  a  part  in  the  main  fight,  either  by  securing  the 
decision,  by  blocking  the  enemy's  retreat,  if  he  is  re- 
pulsed, or  by  checking  his  pursuit,  if  he  is  victorious. 

To  send  the  bulk  of  the  cavalry  towards  Kickapoo 
to  delay  the  hostile  column  approaching  from  that  di- 


274       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

rection  is  not  a  good  plan,  under  the  circumstances, 
for  this  column  probably  will  be  some  miles  from  24 
when  the  fight  is  decided,  and  the  essential  thing  now 
is  to  concentrate  the  full  strength  of  the  detachment 
on  winning  the  fight  at  24.  When  about  to  give  bat- 
tle to  the  enemy,  all  available  detachments  should  be 
called  in,  and  not  a  single  man  should  be  detached  un- 
necessarily from  the  main  fighting  force. 

Nothing  is  said  of  the  field  train  in  the  orders,  for 
it  is  assumed  it  would  remain  in  Leavenworth,  if  in- 
deed it  has  reached  that  town.  The  regiment  is  ac- 
companied by  its  light  train  (ammunition  wagons 
and  led  horses),  and  ambulances.  Half  of  the  am- 
munition wagons  should  be  emptied  and  the  ammuni- 
tion distributed  to  the  men  before  they  enter  the  fight. 
Some  minutes  might  have  been  saved  had  Colonel  A 
directed  the  main  body  to  begin  this  distribution  as 
soon  as  it  closed  up  on  the  support  at  the  foot  of  the 
hill.  The  empty  wagons  should  then  be  sent  back 
to  Leavenworth  to  refill  and  return,  if  there  is  addi- 
tional ammunition  in  the  field  train,  or  if  ammunition 
can  be  obtained  in  Leavenworth.  Troops  on  the  fir- 
ing line  will  replenish  their  ammunition  from  the 
belts  of  the  dead  and  wounded,  and  from  extra  am- 
munition carried  to  the  firing  line  by  reinforcing 
troops. 

When  possible,  the  first  aid  station  should  be  locat- 
ed near  water  in  a  sheltered  position  in  rear  of  the 
line,  but  it  is  more  important  to  have  it  near  the  firing 
line  than  near  water.  The  stream  which  flows  by  the 
road  junction  at  64  is  the  nearest  available  water,  but 
its  distance  in  rear  of  the  line  is  so  objectionable  that 
the  station  is  established  as  near  the  firing  line  as 


AN  ATTACK  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALBY    275 

possible,  under  the  shelter  of  the  ridge.  The  slight- 
ly wounded  can  reach  this  point  unassisted,  but  the 
more  severely  wounded  will  have  to  be  assisted  by 
company  bearers.  Of  the  wounded,  those  unable  to 
move  themselves  probably  will  have  to  remain  near 
where  they  fall  until  the  end  of  the  fight,  taking  ad- 
vantage of  such  shelter  as  they  can  find.  The  wound- 
ed that  collect  at  the  first  aid  station  should  be  re- 
moved as  fast  as  possible  to  Leavenworth,  or  even  to 
the  east  of  the  Missouri  river,  those  not  able  to  walk 
being  transported  in  the  three  regimental  ambulan- 
ces. (*) 

Colonel  A  probably  will  take  position  near  20, 
where  he  can  overlook  the  whole  field  and  observe  the 
progress  of  both  frontal  and  flank  attacks.  A  posi- 
tion a  little  further  removed  from  the  troops  engaged, 
where  he  would  be  less  influenced  by  minor  events  of 
the  fight  and  less  liable  to  lose  general  supervision  of 
the  whole  field,  would  be  better  did  the  terrain  but 
afford  it.  Near  20,  however,  he  will  have  the  reserve 
battalion  close  at  hand,  and  should  be  able  to  prevent 
its  entering  the  fight  before  the  moment  for  its  proper 
employment.  Experience  proves  that  the  reserve  eas- 
ily escapes  the  commander's  control — either  through 
accident  or  misunderstanding. 

In  the  order,  Colonel  A  designates  only  the  first 
position  of  the  reserve,  for  it  is  unnecessary  at  that 
time  to  look  further  into  the  future  and  attempt  to 
prescribe  the  later  movements  of  this  battalion.  From 
this  position,  it  may  readily  reinforce  either  attack, 
and  may  speedily  be  moved  to  the  outer  flank  of  the 

*  If  a  regiment  operates  alone,  it  is  accompanied  by  three  ambu- 
lances. P.  S.  R. 


276       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

battalion  making  the  flank  attack.  In  a  small  detach- 
ment, fighting  on  a  narrow  front,  the  reserve  will  as 
a  rule  follow  a  few  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  the  outer 
flank  of  the  flank  attack,  so  that  it  may  assist  in  the 
envelopment,  but  if  the  detachment  were  extended  on 
a  very  broad  front,  the  reserve  may  have  to  follow  in 
rear  of  the  gap  between  the  frontal  and  flank  attacks, 
where  it  may  protect  both  from  a  counter  attack. 

If  Colonel  A  has  to  put  his  reserve  battalion  into 
the  fight,  it  probably  will  be  on  the  outer  flank  of  the 
battalion  making  the  flank  attack,  not  only  for  the 
purpose  of  assisting  in  the  envelopment,  but  also  be- 
cause there  will  not  be  room  for  it  to  fight  effectively 
between  the  1st  and  2d  Battalions.  These  two  bat- 
talions, after  making  a  liberal  allowance  for  wound- 
ed, and  local  supports  will  require  about  500  yards  of 
front  for  effective  fighting.  If  we  measure  this  on 
the  map,  we  will  find  that  the  right  of  the  line,  when 
it  reaches  the  ravine  west  of  South  West  hill,  will 
be  about  on  the  910  contour.  From  here,  south  to 
the  top  of  the  ridge  near  22  (500  yards),  there  will 
be  a  man  per  yard  of  front,  in  addition  to  strong  local 
supports.  No  more  men  can  fight  effectively  on  this 
front,  and  the  reserve,  if  used,  probably  will  be  em- 
ployed to  extend  the  right  of  the  line. 

In  closing  this  chapter,  it  may  be  well  to  recapitu- 
late and  call  attention  to  the  principal  points  to  be 
covered  when  considering  an  attack  by  a  small  detach- 
ment of  infantry  and  cavalry. 

Considering  the  situation  from  both  our  own  and 
the  enemy's  point  of  view,  is  an  attack  necessary  and 
proper  for  the  execution  of  our  mission? 


AN  ATTACK  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY    277 

If  so,  has  the  time  arrived  when  the  attack  order 
should  be  issued? 

What  shall  be  the  plan  of  attack,  i.  e.  shall  it  be 
purely  frontal,  against  the  hostile  right  flank,  or 
against  the  hostile  left? 

At  what  point  must  the  deployment  be  begun  to 
insure  the  most  effective  execution  of  the  plan  of  at- 
tack decided  on? 

Considering  the  enemy's  probable  strength,  the  size 
of  our  detachment,  the  nature  of  the  terrain,  and  oth- 
er important  factors  that  enter  the  question,  what 
breadth  of  front  can  safely  be  covered  by  the  attack? 

In  subdividing  the  force,  what  is  the  smallest  force 
that  will  serve  for  the  frontal  attack,  and  how  should 
the  remainder  of  the  force  be  divided  between  flank 
attack  and  reserve,  giving  proper  importance  to  the 
preservation  of  tactical  unity? 

What  shall  be  the  position  of  the  reserve? 

What  is  the  situation  on  the  flanks  and  to  the  rear? 

To  which  flank  should  the  bulk  of  the  cavalry  be 
sent  in  order  that  it  may  best  cooperate  with  the  in- 
fantry? 

What  provision  will  be  made  for  supplying  ammu- 
nition and  caring  for  the  wounded? 

What  will  be  the  position  of  the  detachment  com- 
mander? 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

INFANTRY  DEFENSE. 

SITUATION. 
(See  4-inch  map). 

July  10th,  the  5th  Blue  Infantry  (less  3d  Battal- 
ion), in  friendly  country,  is  covering  the  shipment  of 
valuable  supplies  from  Leavenworth  to  the  south. 
On  hearing,  early  in  the  morning,  that  a  hostile  regi- 
ment was  approaching  on  the  Atchison  pike,  Colonel 
A  (the  regimental  commander)  marched  to  the  west 
with  his  entire  command  to  delay  the  enemy  until  the 
last  of  the  supplies  can  be  shipped,  about  5  p.  m. 

The  column  left  Leavenworth  on  the  64 — 14 — 16 
road  in  the  following  formation:  Advance  party 
(Co.  A,  less  1  platoon) — 400  yards  distance — sup- 
port (1  platoon  Co.  A  and  Company  B) — 600  yards 
distance — main  body  (Cos.  C  and  D,  and  the  2d  Bn.) . 

At  7  a.  m.,  Colonel  A,  who  has  ridden  ahead  to  the 
top  of  the  ridge,  sees  a  hostile  column  of  infantry  ap- 
proaching on  the  Atchison  pike — H — G — road  as 
follows:  (*)  About  10  men  are  at  the  lane  leading 
to  the  Baker  house;  what  appears  to  be  a  platoon  is 
passing  the  lane  leading  to  the  Gauss  house ;  the  head 
of  a  column  of  squads  is  about  100  yards  west  of  the 
lane  to  the  Flint  house,  and  the  tail  of  the  column  is 
hidden  by  the  grove  at  the  Mottin  house.  The  road 
from  the  Flint  house  lane  to  the  bend  just  east  of 
Salt  creek  bridge,  is  concealed  by  the  orchard  north 
of  the  Baker  house  and  the  trees  along  Salt  creek. 

*  These  positions  should  be  marked  on  the  map  with  ping  or  pencil. 


INFANTRY  DEFENSE  279 

Until  7:05  a.  m.  (i.  e.  for  5  minutes),  Colonel  A 
deliberates  on  the  situation  and  continues  to  observe 
the  enemy's  advance.  At  this  time,  the  fractions  of 
the  hostile  column  are  in  the  following  positions :  The 
10  men  have  disappeared  in  the  Duffin  orchard;  the 
platoon  is  passing  the  store;  a  column  of  a  company 
and  a  half  or  two  companies  has  come  around  the 
bend  in  the  road  just  east  of  Salt  creek,  and  its  head 
is  now  at  the  lane  leading  to  the  Gauss  house;  the 
column  on  the  Atchison  pike  has  continued  its  ad- 
vance, and  Colonel  A  has  counted  10  companies;  the 
larger  part  of  it  is  now  concealed  east  of  the  Flint 
house  lane,  but  its  tail  can  still  be  seen  300  yards  east 
of  the  Mottin  grove.  A  patrol  of  6  men  has  emerged 
from  the  woods  at  G  and  is  crossing  the  railroad 
tracks  on  the  G — 16  road.  Colonel  A's  advance  par- 
ty has  just  reached  16. 

Note. — Salt  creek  is  fordable  for  infantry. 

Required : 

Colonel  A's  estimate  of  the  situation  and  orders. 

SOLUTION  AND  DISCUSSION. 

Colonel  A  has  marched  out  of  Leavenworth  for 
the  purpose  of  delaying  the  enemy  sufficiently  to  per- 
mit of  the  withdrawal  of  all  the  supplies ;  and  if  he  is 
to  succeed  in  this,  the  enemy  must  be  held  out  of  the 
town  until  5  p.  m.  The  hostile  column  is  too  near  for 
our  colonel  to  hope  to  secure  this  delay  by  falling 
back  from  position  to  position,  fighting  a  delaying  ac- 
tion. Acting  in  this  manner  he  probably  could  not 
obtain  more  than  four  or  five  of  the  necessary  ten 
hours  delay.  So  it  appears  that  the  enemy  must  be 


280       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

definitely  stopped  somewhere  between  his  present  po- 
sition and  Leavenworth,  if  the  Blue  force  is  not  to 
fail  in  its  mission  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  sup- 
plies. 

We  may  undertake  to  do  this  with  either  off ensive 
or  defensive  action.  Considering  the  apparent  supe- 
riority of  the  enemy,  and  the  defensive  character  of 
Colonel  A's  mission,  offensive  action  is  not  wise. 
From  his  commanding  position  200  feet  above  the 
hostile  column,  Colonel  A  has  been  able  to  determine 
its  strength  accurately.  In  the  main  body  on  the 
Atchison  pike  are  ten  companies,  and  two  compan- 
ies are  in  the  advance  guard — in  all  a  full  regiment. 
This  agrees  with  the  report  received  by  him  earlier  in 
the  morning.  To  attack  a  force  a  half  stronger  than 
our  own  is  too  doubtful  an  enterprise  to  undertake  if 
unnecessary.  Defensive  action  is  better,  when  the 
odds  are  so  against  us,  if  it  promises  to  accomplish  our 
purpose;  and  that  is  the  case  in  the  present  situation. 

But  the  defense  must  be  undertaken  with  the  idea 
of  putting  a  stop  to  the  enemy's  advance.  It  must  be 
active — not  passive.  The  purely  passive  defense  seeks 
to  avoid  a  decision ;  it  is  made  for  some  other  purpose, 
such  as  to  gain  time;  the  temporary  stand  made  by  a 
rear  guard,  when  it  compels  the  pursuing  enemy  to 
deploy,  and  then  withdraws  before  fighting  at  close 
quarters  begins,  is  such  a  defense.  The  active  defense 
seeks  to  bring  about  a  decision;  it  is  not  satisfied  by 
merely  delaying  or  stopping  the  enemy,  but  its  ob- 
ject is  to  defeat  him;  this  it  endeavors  to  accomplish 
by  a  combination  of  the  offensive  with  the  defensive; 
it  does  not  limit  itself  to  the  pure  defensive,  for  this 
never  accomplishes  decisive  results. 


INFANTRY  DEFENSE  281 

In  this  situation,  Colonel  A  is  not  seeking  a  decisive 
victory  over  the  enemy,  except  as  that  may  be  nec- 
essary to  the  accomplishment  of  his  real  mission, 
which  is  to  insure  the  withdrawal  of  the  supplies. 
Should  the  enemy  refuse  to  attack  and  remain  inac- 
tive in  front  of  the  Blue  force,  our  colonel  should  con- 
sider himself  exceedingly  fortunate  to  get  off  with- 
out fighting.  But  there  is  no  good  reason  for  suppos- 
ing the  enemy  will  do  this.  He  is  marching  on  Leav- 
enworth  for  a  purpose,  presumably  to  prevent  the 
withdrawal  of  the  supplies,  and,  if  he  can  help  it,  it 
is  not  to  be  supposed  that  he  will  permit  his  advance 
to  be  stopped.  Two  battalions  might  stop  the  attack 
of  a  full  regiment,  with  a  purely  passive  defense,  if 
they  could  make  their  stand  on  a  narrow  front  in  a  po- 
sition with  both  flanks  perfectly  protected  by  obsta- 
cles, or  in  some  other  manner.  But,  in  a  position 
without  such  protection  on  the  flanks,  a  judicious  com- 
bination of  offensive  and  defensive  will  give  them 
their  best  chance  of  success  against  a  determined  at- 
tack by  superior  numbers. 

A  position  somewhere  along  the  ridge  passing 
through  South  West  hill,  Government  hill  and  Atch- 
ison  hill  seems  better  suited  for  Colonel  A's  purpose 
than  a  position  somewhere  between  this  ridge  and 
Leavenworth.  In  the  first  place,  the  enemy  should  be 
compelled  to  attack  or  abandon  his  direct  line  of  ad- 
vance. The  strongest  possible  position  imaginable 
will  be  of  little  or  no  value,  if  the  enemy  can  easily 
march  around  it  and  continue  his  advance  unopposed, 
or  compel  the  defender  to  quit  his  position  and  move 
to  other  less  defensible  ground. 

Accordingly,  the  very  first  condition  a  defensive 


282       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

position  should  fulfill  is  that  it  should  be  so  located 
that  the  enemy  will  be  forced  to  attack  or  greatly  to 
delay  his  advance  in  avoiding  an  attack.  A  position 
on  the  ridge  meets  this  condition.  To  move  around 
the  position,  keeping  to  the  road,  the  enemy  would 
have  to  move  north  to  17  and  then  east,  or  west  to  I 
(see  2-inch  map)  and  then  south — a  detour  of  4  or 
more  miles.  A  movement  off  the  roads,  across  the 
wooded  and  broken  country,  would  be  about  equally 
inconvenient.  The  enemy  knows  we  can  meet  him 
somewhere  on  the  ridge,  no  matter  how  he  moves, 
maybe  in  a  stronger  position  than  the  one  near  16.  If 
we  hold  our  fire,  his  point  may  be  near  G  before  his 
patrol  on  the  railroad  tracks  discovers  our  presence. 
He  will  then  be  so  far  committed  to  this  line  of  ad- 
vance that  he  may  not  risk  a  withdrawal.  In  all  prob- 
ability, our  position  on  the  ridge  will  be  attacked.  If 
we  examine  positions  nearer  Leavenworth,  for  exam- 
ple a  position  just  west  of  the  Penitentiary  or  one  on 
Avenue  hill,  we  will  find  that  they  may  all  be  avoid- 
ed with  much  less  difficulty. 

From  the  position  on  the  ridge,  we  look  down  on 
the  enemy,  while  keeping  our  own  movements  con- 
cealed; whereas,  if  we  surrender  this  commanding 
ground  to  him,  the  conditions  are  reversed.  He  will 
then  have  a  splendid  view  of  all  the  low  ground  east 
of  the  ridge,  and  can  make  his  initial  dispositions  for 
attack  under  cover,  and  with  full  knowledge  of  our 
whereabouts. 

A  good  view  to  the  front  and  flanks  adds  greatly  to 
the  value  of  a  defensive  position.  A  force  on  the  de- 
fensive has  temporarily  lost  its  initiative,  and  its 
moves  must  be  made  to  meet  those  of  the  attacker.  It 


INFANTRY  DEFENSE  283 

will  be  difficult  to  do  this,  if  the  view  from  a  posi- 
tion is  so  poor  that  the  attacker  has  no  difficulty  in 
concealing  his  intentions.  From  Atchison  hill,  the 
view  between  Sentinel  hill  and  Sheridan's  Drive  is 
practically  unlimited  for  about  one  mile,  and  troops 
moving  in  any  force  towards  Sheridan's  Drive  could 
not  find  cover  south  of  the  ravine  heading  between 
Wagner  and  Bell  points.  The  view  to  the  north- 
west is  obstructed  by  Sentinel  hill  and  the  enemy 
could  reach  the  top  of  this  hill  under  cover  through 
the  woods  on  its  northern  spur.  From  the  western 
slope  of  Sentinel  hill  to  the  ravine  running  north- 
west from  18,  there  is  very  little  to  obstruct  the  view 
from  the  top  of  the  ridge;  but  to  the  west  of  this  ra1- 
vine,  the  movements  of  troops  could  easily  be  con- 
cealed. 

To  get  the  full  benefit  of  the  range  and  accuracy 
of  modern  fire  arms,  a  position  should  afford  a  clear 
field  of  fire  for  a  thousand  or  more  yards  in  all  direc- 
tions from  which  we  may  expect  an  attack,  and  if  the 
fire  can  be  delivered  from  commanding  ground  down 
a  gentle  and  uniform  slope,  so  much  the  better.  A 
little  thought  and  a  simple  diagram  will  make  clear 
that  a  grazing  fire  over  uniformly  sloping  ground  is 
much  more  effective  than  a  plunging  fire  from  the 
top  of  a  steep  slope  against  troops  some  distance  from 
the  base  of  the  slope.  The  position  we  are  examining, 
like  positions  in  general,  meets  these  requirements 
only  fairly  well.  To  the  north  and  northwest  the 
field  of  fire  is  excellent,  and  a  very  heavy  fire  could  be 
delivered  from  the  position  against  an  advance  east 
of  Sentinel  hill  or  along  the  H — G  road.  To  the  west 
of  16,  the  field  of  fire  is  poor,  for  the  view  from  the 


284       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

top  of  the  ridge  is  cut  off  by  the  strip  of  woods  just 
west  of  16  on  the  slope  of  the  hill,  and  a  firing  line 
along  the  lower  (western)  edge  of  the  woods  would 
have  its  field  of  fire  limited  by  the  fringe  of  trees 
along  the  ravine  400  yards  to  the  west.  Accordingly, 
on  this  flank,  the  enemy  may  be  able  to  approach  with- 
in 400  or  500  yards  of  the  position,  without  coming 
under  fire. 

This  constitutes  a  defect  in  the  position,  but  it  is 
not  sufficient  to  warrant  abandoning  it.  A  great 
many  conditions  go  to  make  up  the  ideal  defensive 
position,  and  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  find 
them  all  present  in  one  place,  especially,  in  the  par- 
ticular place  where  we  wish  to  fight;  so  we  are  com- 
pelled to  content  ourselves  with  the  ground  as  we  find 
it,  making  the  most  of  its  desirable  features,  and  not 
rejecting  it  because  of  its  weak  ones. 

For  example,  a  position  is  greatly  strengthened  by 
having  in  its  front,  ground  such  as  a  swamp  that  will 
impede  the  progress  of  the  attackers  without  afford- 
ing them  cover  against  fire;  or  by  having  the  flanks 
protected  by  some  natural  or  artificial  obstacle;  but 
we  certainly  cannot  reject  any  position  as  untenable 
simply  because  it  has  not  a  marsh  in  its  front  and  a 
lake  on  each  flank.  The  position  under  consideration 
has  no  strong  natural  protection  for  its  flanks,  but,  in- 
stead of  rejecting  it  on  this  account,  we  must  occupy 
the  position  in  such  manner  that  our  dispositions  will 
of  themselves  afford  protection  for  the  flanks. 

In  the  position  itself,  we  find  the  conditions  admir- 
able. The  troops  can  be  assembled  close  behind  (east 
of)  the  ridge  under  perfect  cover  from  view  and  fire, 
and  held  there  within  easy  reach  until  they  are  need- 


INFANTRY  DEFENSE  285 

ed  in  the  fight.  This  is  a  valuable  asset,  for  it  en- 
ables the  supports  to  move  into  the  front  line  without 
loss  or  delay,  and  the  reserve  to  enter  the  fight  as  a 
surprise.  Behind  the  perfect  protection  of  the  ridge, 
reserves  may  be  fearlessly  and  rapidly  moved  from 
one  flank  of  the  position  to  the  other.  Such  good  lat- 
eral communications  immediately  in  rear  of  the  posi- 
tion greatly  adds  to  its  strength.  Very  often  the 
supports  and  reserve  will  have  to  be  held  back  at 
greater  distances  out  of  range. 

In  rear  of  the  position,  the  conditions  are  favora- 
ble. If  the  decision  is  against  us  and  we  are  com- 
pelled to  retreat,  the  woods  on  the  eastern  slope  of 
the  ridge  will  disorganize  the  enemy's  pursuit  and 
give  us  cover  from  his  fire  for  a  brief  period,  while 
we  are  breaking  away  from  close  contact  with  him. 
We  may  suffer  some  while  crossing  the  open  ground 
between  the  eastern  edge  of  the  woods  and  Leaven- 
worth,  but,  under  the  shelter  of  the  town,  we  should 
be  able  to  organize  a  rear  guard  and  begin  an  or- 
derly retreat  before  the  enemy  can  begin  a  syste- 
matic pursuit. 

It  is  well,  before  deciding  on  how  the  position  is 
to  be  occupied,  to  consider  the  whole  situation  from 
the  enemy's  point  of  view.  The  more  completely  you 
can  put  yourself  in  the  enemy's  position  and  view  the 
situation  through  his  eyes,  the  more  perfect  will  be 
your  arrangements  for  meeting  his  attack,  for  he 
probably  will  attack  as  you  would,  were  you  in  his 
place.  In  a  few  minutes  our  presence  will  be  discov- 
ered and  the  opening  shots  of  the  engagement  will 
be  fired.  The  hostile  advance  guard  (two  compan- 
ies) will  then  be  east  of  Salt  creek,  stretched  out 


286       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

along  the  road  from  between  the  Gauss  and  Baker 
lanes  to  near  G,  and  the  head  of  the  main  body  (10 
companies)  will  be  crossing  the  Salt  creek  bridge. 

The  Red  commander  will  ride  to  some  command- 
ing point,  probably  Sentinel  hill,  estimate  the  situa- 
tion and  make  his  decision  as  to  how  he  will  attack, 
while  his  advance  guard  is  developing  the  strength 
and  location  of  our  position.  From  Sentinel  hill,  he 
can  see  that  an  attack  against  the  right  flank  of  our 
position  will  have  to  cross  the  open  ground  north  of 
Atchison  hill,  fully  exposed  to  our  view  and  fire,  and 
that  an  attack  made  in  this  manner  will  place  Sentinel 
hill  between  his  advance  guard  and  the  remainder  of 
his  command.  It  would  be  very  much  to  our  advan- 
tage if  the  attack  were  made  in  this  manner  and,  for 
this  reason,  we  may  be  fairly  sure  the  enemy  will  not 
adopt  this  plan,  if  he  can  find  a  better. 

On  the  other  flank,  he  finds  conditions  better.  The 
fringe  of  trees  along  the  ravine  running  northwest 
from  18,  or  the  ravine  itself,  and  the  woods  on  the 
slopes  of  Eleven  Hundred  Foot  hill  give  his  com- 
mand a  covered  approach  to  within  400  or  500  yards 
of  our  left  flank,  where  he  can  mass  the  bulk  of  his 
force  for  a  decisive  blow  over  a  comparatively  narrow 
strip  of  fire-swept  ground.  It  is  not  probable  he  will 
overlook  the  great  advantage  the  ground  gives  him 
on  this  flank.  According  to  our  own  estimate  of  the 
strength  of  the  position,  this  is  the  weaker  flank,  and 
the  point  where  we  most  fear  an  attack.  It  is  al- 
ways well  to  consider  that  the  enemy  most  probably 
will  do  the  very  thing  that  promises  to  be  the  most 
embarrassing  for  us.  In  attacking  our  left  flank,  the 
enemy  has  the  additional  advantage  of  threatening 


INFANTRY  DEFENSE  287 

our  line  of  retreat  and,  moreover,  he  does  not  place  an 
obstacle  between  the  parts  of  his  force.  Accordingly, 
we  will  do  well  to  make  our  arrangements  for  occupy- 
ing the  position  on  the  supposition  that  the  principal 
attack  will  come  against  our  left  flank. 

But  we  must  not,  at  the  outset,  wholly  commit  our 
command  to  a  plan  of  defense  shaped  on  this  precon- 
ceived notion  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  enemy 
may  attack,  for  there  may  be  reasons,  not  apparent 
to  us,  why  the  enemy  should  do  the  unexpected,  or  he 
may  not  have  the  tactical  acumen  with  which  we  have 
credited  him.  A  command  fighting  on  the  defensive 
must  be  on  the  lookout,  if  it  is  to  avoid  surprise. 
However  certain  we  may  be  that  the  enemy  is  to  make 
his  attack  against  one  of  our  flanks,  that  does  not  ex- 
cuse us  from  keeping  a  sharp  lookout  towards  the  oth- 
er. In  the  situation  before  us,  observation  on  the 
right  flank  is  made  so  easy,  by  the  good  view  to  the 
north  from  Atchison  hill,  that  there  is  very  little  to 
fear  from  this  direction.  On  the  left  flank,  the  condi- 
tions are  different.  Here,  the  view  is  so  obstructed 
that  the  arrangements  for  reconnaissance  must  be 
made  with  extra  care,  if  timely  information  is  to  be 
secured  of  a  hostile  advance  in  this  section. 

Having  reached  our  conclusion  as  to  the  way  in 
which  the  enemy  probably  will  make  his  attack,  we 
are  now  ready  to  consider  the  manner  in  which  the 
position  should  be  occupied  to  meet  this  attack.  In 
making  these  dispositions,  the  serious  error  is  fre- 
quently made  of  placing  too  large  a  fraction  of  the 
command  in  the  front  line  before  the  enemy's  inten- 
tions are  known.  Attention  is  again  called  to  the  fact 
that  the  initiative  is  in  the  hands  of  the  attacker  in 


288       TACTICAL  PKINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

this  opening  stage  of  the  engagement,  while  the  role 
of  the  defender  compels  him  to  meet  the  moves  of  his 
adversary.  If  the  defender  commits  his  command  to 
the  fight  prematurely,  he  will  have  few  or  no  formed 
bodies  of  troops  with  which  to  meet  the  attacker's 
main  effort  when  it  is  made.  Accordingly,  troops 
should  be  fed  into  the  fight  very  sparingly  at  the  out- 
set, and  the  reserve  must  be  kept  unusually  large  to 
meet  the  developments  of  the  fight. 

So  long  as  we  are  ignorant  of  the  direction  from 
which  the  enemy's  attack  will  come,  we  should  do  no 
more  than  outline  the  framework  of  the  position  by 
occupying  points  here  and  there  with  the  smallest" 
practicable  number  of  men.  If  the  enemy  deploys  a 
small  part  of  his  command  to  begin  a  secondary  at- 
tack or  a  containing  fire,  while  his  main  attack  is 
reaching  the  position  from  which  it  intends  to  ad- 
vance, we  must  deploy  enough  men  to  stop  the  ad- 
vance of  this  secondary  attack,  and  no  more.  By 
such  weak  attacks,  the  enemy  will  endeavor  to  induce 
us  to  commit  the  bulk  of  our  force  to  a  fight  in  a 
portion  of  the  position  which  he  has  no  intention  of 
attacking  seriously,  thus  weakening  the  resistance  we 
can  make  in  that  part  of  the  position  against  which  he 
will  make  his  main  attack.  We  must  resist  the  ten- 
dency to  fall  into  this  trap,  for  it  is  a  very  difficult 
task  to  withdraw  troops  fighting  in  the  first  line,  for 
the  purpose  of  employing  them  elsewhere. 

While  it  generally  is  a  mistake  to  occupy  the  po- 
sition in  strength  so  long  as  the  direction  of  the  ene- 
my's attack  is  not  known,  yet  it  would  be  quite  as  seri- 
ous a  mistake  to  delay  occupying  it  after  the  enemy's 
intentions  have  become  apparent.  We  must  then 


INFANTRY  DEFENSE  289 

stop  the  attacker's  advance — the  real  purpose  of  the 
defense;  we  must  make  him  pay  so  dearly  for  every 
foot  of  ground  he  gains  to  the  front,  that  he  will  be 
compelled  eventually  to  turn  his  back  to  the  position. 
This  we  can  do  only  by  so  powerful  a  development  of 
fire  that  we  prevent  his  obtaining  a  fire  superiority, 
and  inflict  losses  on  him  beyond  his  breaking  point. 

This  does  not  mean  that  we  must  employ  more  men 
than  the  enemy  in  the  firing  line;  were  this  true  there 
would  be  no  advantage  in  the  defense.  Our  men  re- 
main behind  cover,  while  the  attacker's  must  pass  over 
open  ground.  If  time  permits,  we  can  measure  the 
ranges  beforehand,  and  fire  from  a  rest.  Our  losses, 
so  long  as  we  are  not  driven  from  the  position,  should 
be  small  compared  with  those  of  the  enemy;  our  am- 
munition is  more  easily  replenished;  and  our  men  are 
under  better  control.  All  these  advantages  combined 
should  make  the  fire  of  the  defense,  man  for  man, 
more  powerful  than  that  of  the  attack,  and  may  en- 
able us,  not  only  to  check  the  enemy's  advance  with  a 
firing  line  numerically  weaker  than  his  own,  but  also 
to  hold  out  a  part  of  our  inferior  force  with  which  to 
make  a  counter  attack. 

The  situation  before  us  will  serve  to  illustrate  these 
principles.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  enemy  reinforces 
the  two  companies  in  his  advance  guard  with  the  re- 
maining companies  of  the  battalion,  and  deploys  the 
force  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Baker  house  to  make  a 
secondary  attack  against  our  position.  We  must  at 
once  deploy  enough  men  to  stop  this  advance,  and  the 
best  line  for  them  to  occupy  will  be  along  the  crest  of 
the  ridge  from  about  the  northern  end  of  the  road  cut 
to  Atchison  hill,  and  in  the  lower  (western)  edge  of 


290       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  woods  on  the  spur  just  northwest  of  16.  The 
ranges  will  be  from  1000  to  1300  yards,  but  these  are 
not  excessive  under  the  circumstances.  On  the  sup- 
position that  the  enemy's  movements  are  open  to  our 
view  and  that  he  is  making  this  advance  with  a  full 
battalion,  it  will  be  well  for  us  immediately  to  put  two 
companies  in  position,  one  in  the  edge  of  the  woods 
and  one  along  the  crest  of  the  ridge. 

The  company  in  the  salient  at  the  edge  of  the  woods 
will  have  a  specially  favorable  position,  under  cover 
from  view  and  fire,  from  which  it  can  fire,  not  only  on 
the  advance  from  the  direction  of  Baker,  but  also 
against  the  enemy's  main  attack,  should  it  come  from 
the  ravine  against  the  left  of  the  position.  The  com- 
pany on  the  ridge  is  not  so  favorably  located,  for  it 
must  change  its  position  to  direct  its  fire  against  an 
attack  on  the  left.  These  companies  may  be  able  to 
check  the  advance  of  the  hostile  battalion  until  it  re- 
ceives support,  either  directly,  or  indirectly  by  the  ad- 
vance of  the  remainder  of  the  hostile  force  from  an- 
other quarter ;  more  probably,  however,  they  will  have 
to  be  reinforced.  Nevertheless,  until  more  is  known 
of  the  temper  of  this  attack,  it  is  well  to  put  no  more 
than  two  companies  and  the  machine  guns  in  posi- 
tion. 

While  seeking  information  of  the  direction  from 
which  the  enemy  will  make  his  main  attack,  that  por- 
tion of  the  force  not  needed  for  holding  in  check  the 
enemy's  secondary  efforts,  should  be  held  at  some 
point  from  which  it  may  be  quickly  moved  to  meet 
the  attack  wherever  it  should  fall.  We  may  have  very 
strong  reasons  for  believing  the  enemy  will  attack  our 
left  flank,  but  they  do  not  warrant  our  deploying  the 


INFANTRY  DEFENSE  291 

force  in  the  edge  of  the  woods  west  of  16  before  we 
know  positively  that  he  is  headed  in  that  direction. 
Should  we  do  this  and  then  discover  the  enemy  com- 
ing around  the  north  end  of  Sentinel  hill  against  our 
right  flank,  the  deployed  line  would  have  to  be  assem- 
bled and  marched  more  than  half  a  mile  to  the  north- 
ern slope  of  Atchison  hill  and  again  be  deployed  be- 
fore it  could  begin  to  oppose  the  enemy's  advance. 
Such  a  procedure  introduces  disorder  and  confusion 
among  our  troops,  and  shakes  their  confidence  in  us  as 
leaders,  to  say  nothing  of  the  advantage  it  gives  the 
enemy. 

The  strength  of  that  part  of  the  defending  force 
which  stands  fast  and  of  the  general  reserve,  respec- 
tively, should  be  fixed  in  accordance  with  the  princi- 
ple that  the  former  should  be  as  weak  as  possible,  the 
latter  as  strong  as  possible.  This  is  especially  true 
when  the  defense  is  active  and  contemplates  making  a 
powerful  counter-stroke,  for  the  outcome  of  the  fight 
will  depend  on  the  success  or  failure  of  the  counter  at- 
tack. Still  no  fixed  rule  can  be  prescribed,  for  the 
relative  strengths  will  depend  on  many  conditions, 
such  as  the  natural  strength  of  the  position,  and  must 
be  determined  anew  to  meet  each  situation. 

In  any  case,  however,  our  aim  should  be  to  have  the 
force  that  is  to  make  the  passive  defense  strong 
enough  to  meet  the  enemy's  entire  force  and  hold  it  in 
check  long  enough  to  permit  the  counter  attack  to 
be  made,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  latter  must  be 
strong  enough  to  insure  its  success.  If  Colonel  A  had 
a  full  regiment,  he  might  detail  two  battalions  for  the 
passive  defense,  and  hold  one  battalion  in  reserve  for 
the  counter  stroke  and  to  reinforce  the  firing  line; 


292       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

but  with  only  two  battalions  his  task  is  more  difficult. 
Even  so,  it  is  best  to  keep  a  full  battalion  in  reserve 
and  charge  the  other  battalion  with  holding  the  enemy 
in  front,  for  it  is  an  easy  matter  to  reinforce  the  lat- 
ter with  a  part  of  the  reserve,  when  that  becomes  nec- 
essary, while  it  is  very  difficult  to  withdraw  troops 
from  the  front  line  to  strengthen  the  reserve. 

We  must  now  consider  where  the  reserve  battalion 
should  be  held  awaiting  the  proper  occasion,  or  occas- 
ions, for  putting  it  into  the  fight.  Envelopment  of  a 
flank  is  the  greatest  single  danger  that  threatens  a 
force  on  the  defensive,  and  the  best  plan  for  avoid- 
ing it,  in  general,  is  to  strike  the  flank  of  the  envelop- 
ing force  with  all  or  a  part  of  the  general  reserve. 
Still,  for  reasons  already  stated,  it  would  not  be  wise 
to  move  the  reserve  far  to  one  flank  or  the  other,  be- 
fore we  have  discovered  the  direction  from  which  the 
enemy  will  make  his  main  attack.  Situations  will  arise, 
especially  with  large  commands  extended  on  a  broad 
front,  which  make  it  advisable  to  place  the  reserve  be- 
hind a  flank  at  the  outset,  or  to  move  it  to  a  flank  on 
scant  information  as  to  the  enemy's  intentions;  but, 
in  the  situation  before  us,  the  front  of  the  position  is 
so  narrow  and  the  protection  immediately  in  its  rear 
so  good,  the  reserve  may  be  held  in  rear  of  the  center 
of  the  position,  until  more  is  known  of  the  enemy's 
movements.  ( * )  The  best  place  for  it  is  in  the  woods 
on  the  slope  of  the  ravine  just  to  the  right  of  the  road 
at  16;  here  it  will  find  perfect  cover  from  fire  and  be 
quite  near  the  flanks  of  the  position. 

*  The  disadvantages  of  such  a  position  for  the  reserve,  in  most 
cases,  are  that  fire  aimed  at  the  front  line  will  reach  the  reserve,  and 
valuable  time  will  be  lost  in  moving  it  to  a  flank. 


INFANTRY  DEFENSE  293 

Should  the  enemy  do  the  unexpected  and  attack  the 
right  of  the  position,  the  passive  defense  may  have  to 
be  made  in  another  position,  as,  for  example,  on  the 
north  slope  of  Atchison  hill,  and  the  reserve  may  have 
to  be  moved  to  a  position  behind  the  right  flank. 
Should  the  enemy  move  up  the  ravine  from  French- 
man towards  18,  a  part  or  all  of  the  reserve  probably 
will  be  moved  to  the  vicinity  of  18  and  held  under  cover 
in  the  woods  awaiting  the  development  of  the  enemy's 
attack.  Just  what  its  movements  will  be,  and  just 
how  it  will  be  employed  in  the  fight,  will  depend  on 
the  manner  in  which  the  enemy  attacks,  and  these  mat- 
ters cannot  be  decided  at  the  time  the  position  is  first 
occupied. 

While  awaiting  the  proper  occasions  for  putting  the 
reserve  into  the  fight,  Colonel  A  should  hold  it  in  one 
body  and  cover  its  position  by  sending  patrols  to  the 
edge  of  the  woods  to  keep  watch  towards  the  enemy 
and  along  the  trail  from  20  to  22,  and  prevent  hostile 
patrols  from  locating  its  position. 

When  the  counter  attack  should  be  made,  is  a  ques- 
tion the  colonel  cannot  decide  long  in  advance  of  the 
event,  but  he  should  endeavor  to  start  it  when  the  de- 
velopment of  the  attack  presents  a  favorable  oppor- 
tunity; generally  this  will  be  when  the  enemy  has  ad- 
vanced to  within  close  range  of  the  position,  has  em- 
ployed most  of  his  reserve,  and  is  about  to  make  his 
final  assault.  If  it  is  made  before  the  attacker  has  put 
all,  or  practically  all  his  reserves  into  the  front  line  of 
his  attack  against  the  position,  the  enemy  will  be  able 
to  form  a  new  line  with  his  reserve  to  meet  the  counter 
attack  and  hold  it  in  check,  and  most  likely  it  will  not 
produce  the  decisive  effect  expected  of  it.  From  this, 


294       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

we  may  understand  how  important  it  is  that  the  por- 
tion of  the  force  fighting  the  passive  defense  should 
stubbornly  hold  its  position,  and  should  receive 
enough  assistance  from  the  reserve  to  enable  it  to  de- 
velop fire  power  sufficient  to  compel  the  enemy  to  put 
his  whole  force  in  the  firing  line  before  making  his 
final  assault.  But  this  is  easier  said  than  done.  It  is 
exceedingly  difficult  to  pass  from  the  defensive  to  the 
offensive.  As  a  general  rule  we  are  on  the  defensive 
because  we  are  weaker,  or  at  least  imagine  ourselves 
weaker  than  the  enemy,  yet  we  expect  a  part  of  our 
inferior  force  to  hold  in  check  all  of  the  superior  hos- 
tile force  until  what  is  left  of  our  reserve  can  strike  its 
blow.  The  stronger  we  keep  the  reserve,  the  weaker 
will  be  the  force  making  the  passive  defense,  and  the 
more  frequent  and  insistent  will  be  the  demands  of 
the  latter  for  support  from  the  former.  All  of  these 
demands  cannot  be  refused,  else  the  force  making  the 
passive  defense  will  be  overpowered;  yet  half  meas- 
ures, at  this  critical  juncture,  may  mean  the  loss  of  the 
fight.  It  will  require  great  strength  of  character  to 
refuse  continually  these  calls  for  assistance  from  hard 
pressed  points  of  the  line,  and  composedly  hold  even  a 
small  part  of  the  reserve  intact  for  the  counter  at- 
tack, which  necessarily  comes  at  the  very  end  of  the 
fight.  Besides,  it  is  no  easy  matter  to  tell  just  when 
the  enemy  has  all  his  reserves  in  the  firing  line,  or 
when  the  opportune  moment  for  making  the  counter 
attack  has  arrived.  These  difficulties  partially  disap- 
pear, if  the  portion  of  the  reserve  intended  to  make 
the  counter  attack  be  held  in  rear  of  the  position  and 
advance  through  the  position  to  make  its  counter  at- 
tack; such  a  procedure,  however,  is  objectionable  since 


INFANTRY  DEFENSE  295 

it  has  not  the  moral  effect  of  an  advance  against  the 
enemy's  flank,  deprives  the  counter  attack  of  the  fire 
support  from  the  defender's  line,  and  draws  upon  it 
the  concentrated  fire  of  the  attacker. 

In  making  our  arrangements  for  the  occupation  of 
the  position,  we  should  pay  special  attention  to  the  ex- 
tent of  the  front  over  which  we  propose  to  fight.  The 
narrower  the  front  held  at  the  beginning  of  an  action 
the  better j  for  bringing  up  the  reserves  during  the  ac- 
tion is  bound  to  increase  the  front.  No  fixed  rules  can 
be  prescribed  for  determining  the  frontage  to  be  oc- 
cupied by  different  sized  commands  fighting  on  the 
defensive,  but  you  are  warned  studiously  to  avoid  the 
tendency  to  disperse  your  command  over  too  broad  a 
front ;  in  a  situation  such  as  this,  where  there  is  no  nat- 
ural feature  to  limit  the  flank  or  flanks  of  the  position, 
you  should  especially  seek  for  the  greatest  possible 
distribution  in  depth. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  engagement  we  will  occupy 
a  line  about  100  to  200  yards  long  on  the  ridge  to  the 
right  of  the  sunken  road  at  16  and  another  line  about 
100  yards  long  in  the  lower  edge  of  the  woods  on  the 
spur  northwest  of  16.  Hence,  the  total  extent  of  the 
front  at  the  outset  is  between  200  and  300  yards,  meas- 
ured on  a  north  and  south  line.  As  the  enemy  devel- 
ops his  attack  and  reaches  out  to  envelop  a  flank,  as 
he  probably  will  do,  the  defensive  line  will  be  extend- 
ed to  meet  the  attack,  the  final  extent  of  the  line  and 
its  direction  depending  on  the  front  on  which  the  ene- 
my advances.  But  we  should  bear  in  mind  that  this 
extreme  extension  is  not  reached  until  about  the  last 
stage  of  the  fight.  If  the  enemy  extends  towards  our 
left,  it  may  be  possible  to  withdraw  a  part  or  all  of 


296       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  troops  from  the  right  of  the  high  road,  and  move 
them  into  the  line  at  other  points  where  they  will  be  of 
more  use;  but  this  withdrawal  will  not  be  possible,  if 
the  troops  to  be  withdrawn  are  being  hard  pressed. 

One  battalion  and  the  machine  gun  platoon  will  be 
given  the  task  of  defending  this  1'Tie  at  the  outset,  but, 
as  already  pointed  out,  this  battalion  will  be  assisted 
from  time  to  time,  as  necessary,  by  troops  from  the  re- 
serve battalion.  The  machine  guns  will  be  placed 
where  the  greatest  possible  advantage  will  be  derived 
from  their  fire.  The  best  position  available  appears 
to  be  in  the  lower  edge  of  the  woods  on  the  spur  north- 
west of  16,  for  from  this  point  they  can  deliver  their 
fire  over  a  wide  area.  Their  consumption  of  ammuni- 
tion is  so  rapid  that  they  can  not  ordinarily  enter  into 
a  prolonged  fire  fight,  but  will  deliver  their  fire  only 
when  the  enemy  presents  a  specially  favorable  target, 
or  at  critical  moments  of  the  fight.  Such  a  moment 
will  be  when  the  enemy  is  advancing  to  the  final  as- 
sault, and  our  counter  attack  is  attempting  ta  sweep 
down  his  line. 

Colonel  A  estimated  the  situation  in  the  five  min- 
utes that  he  was  on  the  ridge  observing  the  enemy's 
advance.  His  decision  is  to  occupy  a  defensive  posi- 
tion on  the  ridge  across  the  high  road,  employing  one 
battalion  and  the  machine  gun  platoon  in  the  position 
proper,  and  one  battalion  in  reserve.  He  now  issues 
the  following  orders  to  the  battalion  commanders, 
who  were  sent  for  when  the  enemy  was  first  seen,  and 
have  joined  the  party  on  the  ridge: 

"You  see  the  enemy  on  the  road  (pointing).  I  have  ob- 
served him  advancing  for  the  last  five  minutes  and  have  seen  a 


INFANTRY  DEFENSE  297 

regiment.  That  is  the  tail  of  his  main  body  that  you  see  over  the 
tops  of  the  trees  (pointing  towards  the  Flint  house). 

"We  will  occupy  a  position  across  the  road  at  this  point  for 
the  purpose  of  defeating  the  enemy  and  driving  him  back. 

"Major  A,  (commanding  the  leading  battalion),  your  battal- 
ion and  the  machine  gun  platoon  will  meet  the  enemy's  attack 
wherever  made  and  hold  it  in  check.  Send  a  strong  patrol  at  once 
to  determine  whether  the  enemy  moves  along  that  ravine  (point- 
ing to  the  ravine  just  west  of  the  Baker  house)  against  our  left 
flank,  and  to  delay  his  advance.  Observe  carefully  from  Atch- 
ison  hill  to  the  north,  and  send  a  patrol  along  Sheridan's  Drive 
towards  Wagner  point. 

"Major  B,  your  battalion  will  form  the  reserve.  Assemble  it 
under  cover  of  the  ridge  and  woods  where  the  trail  turns  to  the 
left  from  the  main  road  at  the  road  cut,  and  hold  it  there  await- 
ing further  orders.  Send  a  patrol  along  the  trail  on  top  of  the 
ridge,  and  cover  your  position  with  small  patrols  towards  the  ene- 
my. 

"The  battalion  ammunition  wagons  will  be  emptied  at  once  and 
sent  to  Leavenworth  to  refill  and  return.  A  first  aid  station  will 
be  established  in  that  ravine  (pointing  to  the  ravine  east  of  16). 

"I  will  remain  near  here  (Atchison  hill)  for  the  present." 

Should  the  commander  of  the  rear  battalion  (with 
the  main  body)  not  have  reached  the  ridge  when  Col- 
onel A  comes  to  his  decision,  the  latter  should  not  de- 
lay issuing  the  orders  on  that  account,  for  his  advance 
party  is  now  up,  and  the  enemy  is  so  near  that  seconds 
are  important.  The  advance  party,  and  maybe  a  part 
of  the  support,  should  be  deployed  at  once,  so  Major 
A  should  have  his  orders  without  delay.  Major  B 
could  be  given  his  orders  when  he  arrives.  It  is  sug- 
gested that  you  write  the  orders  that  you  would  give 
in  that  case.  Do  not  forget  that  each  major  must  be 
told  the  situation,  your  plan,  his  orders,  and  the  part 
to  be  taken  in  the  fight  by  the  other  major's  battalion. 

Frequently,  in  orders  for  occupying  a  defensive  po- 


298       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

sition,  you  will  be  able  to  define  the  extent  of  the  posi- 
tion much  more  precisely  than  is  possible  here ;  for  ex- 
ample, you  may  be  able  to  say,  "We  will  occupy  a  po- 
sition from to ,  etc."  But  in  this  situation,  as 

we  already  know,  it  is  too  early  to  prescribe  the  lim- 
its of  the  position. 

If  Major  A  were  an  inexperienced  officer,  or  one  in 
whom  the  commander  has  but  little  confidence,  Col- 
onel A  could  not  afford  to  allow  him  so  much  liberty, 
but  would  do  better  to  prescribe  more  precisely  the 
manner  in  which  the  position  is  to  be  occupied  at  the 
outset.  For  example,  Major  A  might  be  told  to  "de- 
ploy at  least  a  part  of  the  advance  guard,  and  open 
fire  at  once."  In  any  case,  Colonel  A  will  observe  the 
manner  in  which  Major  A  executes  the  order  and, 
while  avoiding  unnecessary  interference  with  Major 
A's  arrangements,  will  permit  him  to  do  nothing  that 
will  jeopardize  the  general  plan. 

You  may  think  that  the  order  does  not  explain  the 
colonel's  plan  clearly  enough,  and  perhaps  it  does  not 
were  his  subordinates  poorly  instructed.  Orders  must 
always  be  suited  to  the  ability,  experience,  and  instruc- 
tion of  the  officer  receiving  them.  As  the  situation 
clears  up  and  the  colonel  becomes  more  confident  of 
the  course  the  defense  will  take,  he  will  further  ex- 
plain his  plans  to  his  subordinates.  You  must  bear  in 
mind  that  the  orders  given  at  the  beginning  of  any 
operation  are  but  intended  to  provide  for  the  initial 
dispositions  of  the  command,  and  that  they  will  be 
supplemented  from  time  to  time  by  other  orders  and 
information  as  the  situation  develops. 

The  reserve  is  under  the  immediate  command  of 
Major  B,  but  Colonel  A,  only,  should  dedde  when  it  is 


INFANTRY  DEFENSE  299 

to  enter  the  fight.  If  there  is  any  doubt  about  Major 
B  knowing  this,  it  should  be  explained  to  him  in  un- 
mistakable terms,  for  the  reserve  must  not  be  permit- 
ted to  slip  from  the  hands  of  the  highest  commander. 

The  defense  must  make  up  for  its  inferior  numbers 
by  a  powerful  development  of  fire,  which  calls  for  lib- 
eral expenditure  of  ammunition.  Consequently,  the 
ammunition  in  the  battalion  wagons  should  be  distrib- 
uted to  the  troops  before  they  enter  the  fight.  The 
wagons  are  sent  back  for  more  ammunition,  since  the 
distance  is  so  short  they  may  be  able  to  return  before 
the  termination  of  the  fight.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
Colonel  A  should  have  taken  along  an  additional  sup- 
ply of  ammunition  on  requisitioned  wagons. 

Colonel  A  chooses  for  himself  a  position  on  Atch- 
ison  hill  from  which  he  can  observe  the  enemy's  move- 
ments, and  yet  remain  as  far  as  possible  from  the  fir- 
ing line.  During  a  fight,  the  most  powerful  means  a 
leader  has  for  influencing  the  course  of  the  action  is 
the  proper  employment  of  the  reserve;  consequent- 
ly, his  station  should  be  some  good  observation  point 
near  the  reserve.  The  occasions  are  rare  when  the 
commander  should  join  the  firing  line  before  his  last 
reserve  is  put  into  the  fight,  for  there  a  comprehensive 
survey  of  the  whole  engagement  is  generally  impossi- 
ble, and  decisions  can  not  be  based  on  calm  delibera- 
tion. 

As  already  stated,  Major  A  is  given  no  instructions 
as  to  when  he  should  open  fire.  He  has  an  opportuni- 
ty to  deploy  the  platoon  in  the  advance  party  and 
open  fire  before  the  patrol  near  the  railroad  crossing 
can  warn  the  column,  thus  surprising  the  enemy  while 
in  column  on  the  road.  Since  the  defender  is  not  so 


300       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

exposed  as  the  attacker,  since  he  often  is  able  to  meas- 
ure the  ranges  to  prominent  objects  that  the  attacker 
will  pass,  since  he  can  fire  from  a  rest,  and  finally, 
since  he  can  easily  replenish  his  ammunition,  it  is  per- 
missible for  him  to  open  fire  at  long  ranges  in  order  to 
stop  the  attacker's  advance.  Major  A  should  open 
fire  on  the  enemy,  if  the  latter  attempts  to  advance 
over  the  open  between  the  position  and  the  Baker 
house  lane,  although  the  extreme  range  from  the  top 
of  the  ridge  is  about  1400  yards  and  from  the  edge  of 
the  woods  on  the  spur  about  1100  yards.  The  whole 
object  of  the  attacker  is  to  close  with  the  defender, 
and  the  former  will  try  to  reach  the  short  ranges  with- 
out losses  and  without  firing.  The  defender  should 
endeavor  to  prevent  the  attacker  from  doing  this  and, 
in  the  absence  of  artillery,  he  must  employ  long  range 
infantry  fire  for  this  purpose. 

Colonel  A's  order  in  written  form,  composed  on 
the  supposition  that  it  was  issued  from  the  map,  might 
be  as  follows : 

Field  Orders  5th  Infantry, 

No. Atchison  Hill,  near  Leavenworth, 

10  July—,  7:07  A.  M. 

1.  A  regiment  of  hostile  infantry  is  advancing  on  the  ATCH 
ISON  pike,  head  of  the  column  at  the  DUFFIN  orchard  and 
tail  300  yards  east  of  the  MOTTIN  grove.    A  hostile  patrol  is  at 
the  railroad  crossing  near  G. 

2.  This  command  will  occupy  a  position  across  the  high  road 
at  this  point  for  the  purpose  of  defeating  the  enemy  and  driving 
him  back. 

3.  (a)      The  1st  Battalion  and  machine  gun  platoon,  under 
command  of  Major  A,  will  meet  the  enemy's  attack  wherever 
made  and  hold  it  in  check.     A  strong  patrol  will  be  sent  along 
the  ravine  just  west  of  the  highway  to  report  and  delay  an  ad- 


INFANTRY  DEFENSE  301 

vance  of  the  enemy  from  that  direction.  The  open  country  north 
of  ATCHISON  hill  will  be  watched,  and  a  patrol  will  be  sent 
along  SHERIDAN'S  DRIVE  towards  WAGNER  point. 

(b)  The  2d  Battalion  will  form  the  reserve,  and  will  be  as- 
sembled under  cover  near  16  awaiting  further  orders.  Its  posi- 
tion will  be  covered  by  small  patrols  towards  the  enemy  and  along 
the  18 — 20 — 22  trail. 

4.  The  battalion  ammunition  wagons  will  be  emptied  at  once 
and  sent  to  LEAVEN  WORTH  to  refill  and  return.    The  surgeon 
will  establish  a  first  aid  station  in  the  ravine  east  of  16. 

5.  The  regimental  commander  will  remain  on  ATCHISON 
hill  for  the  present. 

By  order  of  Colonel  A: 

X. 
Captain,  5th  Infantry,  Adjutant. 

Verbally  to  Majors  A  and  B,  and  staff. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

A  DEFENSE  BY  INFANTRY  AND 
CAVALRY. 

PROBLEM. 

(See  4-inch  map). 

A  Blue  reinforced  brigade  in  friendly  country  is 
detraining  north  of  Kickapoo,  April  5,  preparatory 
to  marching  to  the  south.  Leavenworth  is  known  to 
be  occupied  by  a  hostile  force  of  infantry  and  cavalry 
without  artillery.  The  23d  Infantry  and  Troops  L 
and  M,  12th  Cavalry  (Blue),  under  the  command  of 
Colonel  A,  have  been  sent  forward  to  secure  the 
bridge  over  Plum  creek  on  the  47 — 17  road  and  hold 
the  enemy  south  of  Plum  creek  until  the  arrival  of  the 
remainder  of  the  brigade,  which  expects  to  reach 
Kickapoo  at  11 :30  a.  m. 

As  Colonel  A  advanced  south  of  Kickapoo,  he 
heard  firing  towards  Frenchman  and  had  reports  as 
follows  from  his  cavalry: 

1.  From  an  officer's  patrol  at  J.  E.  Daniels  at 
8 :50  a.  m.,  saying  that  it  had  encountered  a  platoon  of 
hostile  cavalry  near  Wagner  point  and  had  been  driv- 
en back  on  the  15 — 17  road  across  Salt  creek.     The 
hostile  cavalry  did  not  pursue  beyond  15. 

2.  From  the  cavalry  commander  at  the  Taylor 
house   (800  yards  south  of  17),  saying  that  he  had 
checked  the  advance  of  about  two  troops  of  hostile 
cavalry  at  Frenchman,  but  was  forced  back  by  hostile 
infantry  advancing  via  Frenchman    from    Leaven- 


A  DEFENSE  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY     303 

worth  at  8 :30  a.  m.  At  8 :50  a.  m.,  he  was  occupying 
a  position  at  the  Taylor  house,  and  the  hostile  infan- 
try was  advancing  over  the  spur  1100  yards  to  the 
south. 

When  the  last  of  the  above  messages  is  received  at 
9  a.  m.  by  Colonel  A,  who,  with  his  battalion  com- 
manders and  staff,  has  ridden  forward  to  the  support 
of  his  advance  guard,  his  column  is  disposed  as  fol- 
lows: The  advance  party  (Co.  A,  less  1  platoon)  is  at 
the  Moss  lane;  the  support  (Vz  Co.  A,  and  Co.  B)  is 
at  17;  the  reserve  (Cos.  C  and  D  and  machine  guns) 
is  passing  the  J.  Aaron  house;  and  the  head  of  the 
main  body  (2d  Battalion  leading)  is  200  yards  north 
of  Plum  creek  bridge. 

At  9  a.  m.,  firing  can  be  heard  towards  the  Taylor 
house. 

Recent  rains  have  made  Salt  creek  unfordable  for 
infantry  below  Frenchman,  and  Plum  creek  unford- 
able for  five  miles  from  its  mouth.     The  bridge  on 
the  21 — 23  road  is  impassable. 
Required : 

Colonel  A's  estimate  of  the  situation  and  orders. 

SOLUTION. 

Colonel  A's  mission  is  to  hold  the  enemy  south  of 
Plum  creek  and  keep  open  the  bridge  on  the  47 — 17 
road  until  the  arrival  of  the  remainder  of  the  brigade. 

The  information  of  the  enemy  is  far  from  com- 
plete. It  is  known  that  he  has  no  artillery,  and  two 
troops  of  his  cavalry  have  been  seen,  but  the  strength 
of  his  infantry  column  marching  by  Frenchman  is 
not  known  and  may  only  be  estimated  between  wide 
limits.  The  absence  of  artillery  and  the  presence  of 


304       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

two  troops  of  cavalry  indicate  his  total  infantry 
strength  to  be  something  between  a  brigade  and  a  reg- 
iment, a  part  or  all  of  which  may  be  in  the  advancing 
column.  After  driving  the  Blue  cavalry  from  its  po- 
sition near  Frenchman,  the  enemy  continued  his  for- 
ward movement,  and  from  the  firing  at  the  Taylor 
house,  it  may  be  inferred  that  he  is  pushing  his  ad- 
vance and  intends  to  attack.  The  presence  of  his  cav- 
alry on  Sheridan's  Drive,  where  it  can  observe  the 
Blue  column,  considered  in  connection  with  the  offen- 
sive attitude  of  his  infantry,  suggests  that  he  is  equal 
or  superior  to  Colonel  A. 

It  appears  that  Colonel  A  will  have  to  fight  unless 
he  abandons  his  mission,  and  he  must  decide  at  once 
whether  he  will  fight  offensively  or  defensively.  The 
situation  is  too  full  of  uncertainties  for  him  to  take  the 
offensive,  if  he  can  do  what  is  expected  of  him  by  act- 
ing on  the  defensive.  A  successful  defense  south  of 
Plum  creek,  in  a  position  that  covers  the  bridge,  will 
accomplish  his  mission.  Accordingly,  his  initial  decis- 
ion is  to  act  on  the  defensive. 

The  terrain  shows  three  possible  positions :  Across 
the  road  near  the  Taylor  house;  near  17;  and  near  the 
J.  Aaron  house.  The  first  of  these  positions,  on  the 
spur  running  from  the  Moss  to  the  Taylor  house,  has 
about  the  right  frontage  for  a  command  of  the  size 
of  Colonel  A's.  On  the  left  of  the  position,  the  field 
of  fire  to  the  south  and  southeast  is  so  broad  and  clear 
that  he  might  feel  quite  sure,  from  the  outset,  that  the 
principal  attack  would  fall  against  the  right  flank. 
In  that  event,  the  900  hill  about  400  yards  northwest 
of  the  Moss  house  would  form  a  splendid  supporting 
point  for  his  right  flank.  The  position,  however,  is 


A  DEFENSE  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY      305 

too  far  to  the  front  to  be  occupied  with  due  delibera- 
tion, and  this  is  its  serious  defect.  The  firing  indicates 
that  the  enemy  is  now  attacking  the  cavalry  at  the 
Taylor  house,  and,  although  Colonel  A  might  push  his 
infantry  forward  and  reinforce  the  cavalry  before  the 
latter  is  pushed  back,  still,  the  lack  of  a  general  plan 
with  which  to  begin  the  fight  is  liable  to  continue 
throughout  the  engagement  and  might  lead  to  defeat 
in  the  end.  The  engagement  would  be  a  rencontre, 
pure  and  simple. 

The  position  across  the  Frenchman — 17  road  just 
south  of  the  Millwood  road  tends  to  extend  the  regi- 
ment on  too  broad  a  front  at  the  outset,  for  it  would 
have  to  embrace  the  hill  just  southeast  of  17  and  the 
900  hill  about  600  yards  southwest  of  17;  this  is  a 
front  of  about  800  yards  which  is  liable  to  be  further 
extended  as  the  fight  progresses.  This  is  the  defect  of 
this  position,  but  aside  from  that,  the  position  is  a  fair- 
ly good  one.  In  front  of  its  left,  the  field  of  fire  var- 
ies in  width  between  500  and  600  yards,  and  is  limited 
by  the  Moss — Taylor  spur,  the  Taylor  orchard,  and 
the  trees  along  the  ravine  running  northeast  from  the 
eastern  end  of  the  orchard.  In  front  of  its  right,  the 
field  of  fire  is  broader  and  the  fire  will  be  more  effect- 
ive. Troops  on  hill  900  can  command  the  Moss — 
Taylor  spur,  the  ravine  southwest  of  this  spur,  and  the 
high  ground  to  the  south  and  southwest  of  this  ra- 
vine, at  ranges  varying  between  600  and  1000  yards. 
This  hill  adds  great  strength  to  the  right  flank,  and 
the  left  flank  secures  a  certain  amount  of  protection 
from  its  nearness  to  Salt  creek.  The  numerous  ra- 
vines in  rear  of  the  position  furnish  splendid  cover 
near  the  position  for  the  reserve  and  local  supports, 


306       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  line  of  retreat  is  perpendicular  to  the  front  of  the 
position,  and  the  high  ground  just  south  of  Plum 
creek  forms  a  good  rallying  position,  in  case  the  regi- 
ment is  driven  back.  Finally,  the  position  can  be  occu- 
pied with  due  deliberation,  especially  if  the  cavalry  is 
able  to  hold  on  for  some  minutes  near  the  Taylor 
house. 

The  nearness  of  the  position  on  the  ridge  just  south 
of  Plum  creek  to  the  creek  itself  is  a  defect  in  this  po- 
sition that  so  outweighs  its  good  points  as  to  make  fur- 
ther consideration  of  it  unnecessary.  There  is  not 
sufficient  room  between  the  position  and  the  creek 
for  the  free  deployment  of  the  remainder  of  the  bri- 
gade, when  the  latter  reaches  the  field,  and  if  the  reg- 
iment were  defeated  with  the  unfordable  Plum  creek 
in  its  immediate  rear,  it  probably  would  meet  disas- 
ter in  attempting  to  withdraw  across  the  single  bridge 
and  the  open  flat  to  the  north. 

After  this  consideration  of  the  terrain,  Colonel  A 
makes  the  further  decision  to  occupy  the  position  near 
17. 

It  is  not  possible  to  say  with  any  certainty  which 
flank  of  the  position  the  enemy  will  attack.  He  can 
approach  to  within  about  600  yards  of  the  left  of  the 
position  under  cover  of  the  Taylor  orchard  and  the 
ravine  running  northeast  from  the  orchard,  and  at- 
tack up  the  slope  from  there,  but  this  movement  may 
be  interfered  with  by  water  backed  into  the  ravine 
from  Salt  creek.  He  can  get  within  about  700  yards 
of  the  right  of  the  position  under  cover  of  the  spur 
running  east  from  the  900  hill  1000  yards  south  of 
19,  and  can  find  cover  again  in  the  dry  ravine  along 
the  wire  fence  about  200  yards  north  of  the  spur. 


A  DEFENSE  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY     307 

From  the  enemy's  point  of  view,  the  advantages  of 
the  terrain  are  about  the  same  on  the  two  flanks,  but 
an  attack  against  the  right  flank,  if  successful,  may 
drive  Colonel  A  into  the  angle  between  the  unf orda- 
ble  creeks,  while  a  successful  attack  against  the  left 
flank  will  leave  him  considerable  opportunity  to  es- 
cape to  the  west.  The  enemy  may  take  advantage  of 
the  opportunity  for  an  attack  against  the  center  of 
Colonel  A's  extended  line. 

This  uncertainty  as  to  where  the  enemy  will  make 
his  principal  attack,  combined  with  the  other  uncer- 
tainties of  the  situation,  makes  it  necessary  to  hold  a 
strong  reserve  in  the  beginning  of  the  fight.  Unless 
the  enemy  is  in  overwhelming  numbers,  there  will  be 
few  troops  needed  on  the  900  hill  and  many  on  the 
hill  southeast  of  17,  if  he  attacks  the  left  flank;  and, 
vice  versa,  if  he  attacks  the  right  flank ;  while  if  he  at- 
tacks the  center,  the  bulk  of  the  regiment  should  be 
between  the  two  hills.  Yet,  the  whole  line  must  be 
occupied  at  once,  and  there  must  be  no  delay  in  put- 
ting infantry  in  position  on  hill  900,  for  the  hostile 
cavalry  may  seize  this  commanding  point  while  the 
Blue  cavalry  is  engaged  at  the  Taylor  house. 

This  makes  it  necessary  to  place  parts  of  the  ad- 
vance guard  battalion  along  the  entire  front.  Al- 
though this  will  result  in  an  undesirable  mixing  of 
units  at  a  later  stage  of  the  fight  and  will  also  take 
part  of  this  battalion  from  its  commander,  still  it  ap- 
pears that  this  should  be  done,  for  it  is  not  wise  to 
delay  occupying  hill  900  until  the  main  body  has 
marched  a  mile,  nor  can  the  cavalry  be  called  upon  to 
hold  this  hill,  for  it  has  important  work  elsewhere.  A 
single  company  with  the  machine  guns  should  be  able 


308       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

to  hold  the  hill  (900)  until  the  arrival  of  the  main 
body,  and  Company  B,  now  at  17,  will  be  given  this 
task.  The  remaining  three  companies  of  this  battal- 
ion will  occupy  the  hill  southeast  of  17  and  the  sad- 
dle just  south  of  17.  The  half  of  Company  A  in  the 
advance  party  may  have  gone  to  the  assistance  of  the 
cavalry  at  the  Taylor  house;  even  so,  it  will  be  re- 
called to  17  as  soon  as  a  line  can  be  put  in  position  to 
cover  its  withdrawal.  When  the  2d  Battalion  (at  the 
head  of  the  main  body)  reaches  17,  it  will  be  placed 
behind  the  right  of  the  line  from  the  saddle  south  of 
17  to  include  hill  900;  Company  B  will  then  be  under 
the  orders  of  the  commander  of  this  battalion.  The 
3d  Battalion  will  form  the  reserve  and  will  form  in 
mass  in  the  ravine  just  north  of  17. 

The  cavalry  should  cover  the  flanks  and  endeavor  to 
get  more  information  of  the  enemy's  strength  and 
plan  of  attack.  It  probably  will  be  opposed  by  the 
hostile  cavalry,  which  may  be  expected  on  Colonel  A's 
right  flank,  for  the  nearness  of  the  swollen  creek  will 
interfere  with  its  operations  on  his  left.  The  offi- 
cer's patrol  at  J.  E.  Daniels  can  prevent  the  hostile 
cavalry  platoon  east  of  Salt  creek  from  crossing  the 
bridge  west  of  15,  but  another  patrol  will  be  sent  to 
this  flank  to  give  warning  should  this  platoon  swim 
the  creek  north  of  the  bridge  and  try  to  reach  Plum 
creek  bridge.  The  remainder  of  the  cavalry  will  be  re- 
called from  the  Taylor  house  at  once  and  sent  to  the 
right  flank. 

The  ammunition  will  be  distributed  as  fast  as  the 
battalions  come  up  to  17,  and  the  empty  wagons  will 
be  sent  back  to  refill  and  rejoin.  The  first  aid  station 
will  be  established  in  the  ravine  400  yards  north  of  17, 


A  DEFENSE  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY      309 

if  it  has  water ;  otherwise,  at  the  J.  Aaron  house ;  the 
wounded  will  be  removed  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the 
north  of  Plum  creek,  preferably  to  Kickapoo.  The 
field  train  will  be  sent  back  to  Kickapoo,  if  it  has 
passed  that  village. 

Colonel  A's  full  decision  is  to  occupy  a  defensive 
position  extending  from  hill  880  southeast  of  17  to 
hill  900  southwest  of  17,  with  two  battalions  in  posi- 
tion and  one  battalion  in  reserve,  and  his  cavalry  on 
the  right  flank.  This  decision  is  reached  very  soon 
after  receiving  the  message  from  the  cavalry  com- 
mander at  9  a.  m.,  for  the  firing  had  warned  Colonel 
A  half  an  hour  before  this  of  the  near  presence  of  the 
enemy.  Before  9:05  a.  m.,  he  issues  the  following 
verbal  orders  from  the  hill  southeast  of  17,  to  the  offi- 
cers who  have  accompanied  him  to  this  point  (see 
problem ) . 

"Our  cavalry  is  in  position  at  that  house  (indicating  the  Tay- 
lor house)  delaying  the  advance  on  this  (17 — Frenchman)  road 
of  hostile  infantry  and  about  two  troops  of  hostile  cavalry.  Lieu- 
tenant A's  cavalry  patrol  has  been  driven  back  from  that  wooded 
ridge  (indicating  Sheridan's  Drive  ridge)  by  a  platoon  of  hos- 
tile cavalry,  and  he  is  now  guarding  the  bridge  over  Salt  creek 
about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  east  of  here  on  that  (17 — 15)  road. 
The  remainder  of  our  brigade  will  be  here  by  noon. 

"We  will  defend  a  position  extending  from  here  to  that  hill 
(indicating  hill  900). 

"The  1st  Battalion  (less  Company  B)  will  occupy  the  section 
from  this  hill,  inclusive,  to  the  head  of  that  ravine  just  south  of 
the  schoolhouse,  inclusive.  The  2d  Battalion,  Company  B,  and 
the  machine  guns  Avill  occupy  the  section  from  the  head  of  that  ra- 
vine, exclusive,  to  that  hill  (.900),  inclusive.  Company  B  and  the 
machine  guns  will  be  put  in  position  on  that  hill  (900)  at  once. 

"As  far  as  possible,  both  sections  will  be  prepared  for  de- 
fense. 


810       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

"The  3d  Battalion  will  form  in  mass  in  that  ravine  (indicat- 
ing the  ravine  just  north  of  17)  and  act  as  reserve. 

"The  cavalry  will  cover  the  right  flank  and  rear,  sending  an 
additional  patrol  to  watch  on  our  left  and  rear. 

"Extra  ammunition  will  be  distributed  near  here  and  the  wag- 
ons will  be  sent  to  the  rear  to  refill  and  rejoin.  A  first  aid  station 
will  be  established  by  the  side  of  this  (17 — *7)  road  on  the  small 
brook  400  yards  in  our  rear. 

"I  will  remain  near  here  for  the  present." 

A  staff  officer  is  then  sent  to  the  cavalry  and  ad- 
vance party  with  verbal  orders  for  them  to  fall  hack 
at  once  to  17.  When  they  reach  17,  the  cavalry  com- 
mander is  given  his  orders  by  Colonel  A  in  person.  A 
message  is  sent  to  the  cavalry  patrol  at  J.  E.  Daniels, 
acquainting  its  commander  with  Colonel  A's  inten- 
tions and  directing  the  commander  to  continue  to 
guard  the  bridge  over  Salt  creek  and  observe  on  the 
left  flank. 

COMMENTS. 

In  this  problem,  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  pre- 
sent a  situation  much  less  clear  and  definite  than  that 
given  in  the  preceding  chapter,  the  idea  being  to  make 
the  situation  similar  to  those  that  are  most  liable  to 
arise  in  actual  service,  where  ignorance  of  the  ene- 
my's strength,  dispositions  and  intentions  is  the  rule, 
and  such  accurate  information  as  frequently  is  fur- 
nished in  map  problems  is  the  exception. 

Yet  enough  information  was  given  to  demand  a  de- 
cision to  occupy  a  defensive  position,  since  the  position 
could  be  so  selected  that  the  enemy  would  be  com- 
pelled to  attack  or  abandon  his  advance.  Frequently, 
a  commander's  information  of  the  enemy  will  be  suffi- 
cient to  warrant  a  decision  to  act  on  the  defensive  al- 
though not  sufficient  to  justify  selecting  the  position 


A  DEFENSE  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY     311 

where  the  defense  is  to  be  made,  and  the  temptation 
will  be  great  to  occupy  the  position  too  soon.  This 
mistake  he  should  not  make,  for,  once  he  is  in  posi- 
tion, he  will  be  reluctant  to  acknowledge  his  error  and 
correct  his  faulty  position,  and  the  change  will  lessen 
the  confidence  he  inspires  in  his  command. 

For  example,  we  will  have  such  a  situation  if  we 
imagine  Salt  creek  an  insignificant  stream  throughout 
its  course,  and  the  information  of  the  enemy  such  that 
we  know  he  is  advancing  but  are  not  certain  whether 
his  advance  is  via  the  Frenchman — 17  or  the  15 — 17 
road.  A  suitable  position  for  meeting  his  advance 
should  he  come  via  Frenchman  may  not  be  at  all  suit- 
able should  he  come  via  15,  and  no  position  should  be 
occupied  until  more  definite  information  has  been  re- 
ceived. While  awaiting  this  information,  the  com- 
mand should  be  assembled  at  some  such  central  point 
as  17  from  which  it  may  be  quickly  moved  into  what- 
ever position  it  is  to  occupy.  (*) 

As  the  situation  is  presented  in  this  problem,  there 
is  no  uncertainty  as  to  the  road  along  which  the  ene- 
my is  advancing,  but  there  is  doubt  as  to  which  flank 
he  will  attack,  and  there  can  be  little  or  no  criticism 
of  your  plan  if,  because  of  this  doubt,  you  have  de- 
cided to  keep  two  battalions  in  reserve  and  to  place 
only  one  company  and  the  machine  guns  on  hill  900, 
until  you  have  more  information  of  how  the  enemy 
intends  to  attack.  This  plan  is  especially  good  if  the 
regimental  commander  has  little  confidence  in  the 
judgment  of  his  battalion  commanders,  for  much  will 
depend  on  the  manner  in  which  they  occupy  their  sec- 

*  When  a  command  is  assembled  in  this  manner  it  is  said  to  occupy 
a  position  in  readiness,  for  the  definition  of  which  see  F.  S.  R. 


312       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

tions.  If  efficient,  they  will  understand  that  they 
should  hold  strong  local  supports  and  reserves  out  of 
the  firing  line  until  something  definite  is  known  of 
the  direction  of  the  attack,  but  if  not  efficient  the  regi- 
mental commander  may  have  to  interfere  to  prevent 
them  from  deploying  at  the  outset  too  large  a  propor- 
tion of  their  troops  and  thereby  possibly  causing  his 
defeat. 

The  proper  occupation  of  a  defensive  position  is  a 
matter  so  little  understood,  that  it  may  be  well  to  ex- 
amine the  dispositions  the  battalion  commanders 
should  make  of  the  troops  assigned  to  their  sections. 
Of  the  three  companies  assigned  to  the  left  section, 
one  is  placed  in  the  first  line  (firing  line  and  sup- 
ports) and  two  in  the  local  reserve.  Until  the  ene- 
my appears,  the  company  in  the  first  line  will  deploy 
a  platoon  on  the  southern  crest  of  the  hill  southeast 
of  17,  and  the  remaining  platoon  will  form  a  support 
under  cover  on  the  northern  slope  of  the  hill.  The  lo- 
cal reserve  companies  will  be  in  the  ravine  about  200 
yards  east  of  the  crossroads  at  17- 

Of  the  five  companies  assigned  to  the  right  section, 
Company  B  with  the  machine  guns  will  be  first  to 
reach  hill  900,  and  one  platoon  and  the  machine  guns 
are  immediately  placed  in  position,  and  one  platoon  is 
held  in  support.  When  the  2d  Battalion  comes  up,  a 
part  of  it  may  or  may  not  be  deployed,  depending  on 
the  situation  at  that  time.  In  any  case,  the  remain- 
ing platoon  of  Company  B  probably  will  be  placed  in 
position  before  calling  on  the  2d  Battalion  for  assist- 
ance. The  remaining  companies  of  this  battalion  are 
held  near  at  hand  under  cover  behind  the  center  of  the 
position  as  local  reserve. 


A  DEFENSE  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY     313 

With  this  disposition,  at  the  outset  there  will  be 
along  the  entire  front  in  the  firing  line,  at  least  one 
platoon  from  each  of  two  companies,  and,  possibly 
both  platoons  of  each  of  these  two  companies — in  all 
between  one  and  two  companies;  in  the  supports,  the 
remainder  of  these  two  companies,  if  their  entire 
strength  is  not  in  the  firing  line;  and  in  the  local  re- 
serves, six  companies,  unless  it  is  necessary  to  put  a 
part  of  the  2d  Battalion  in  position  as  soon  as  it  comes 
up.  In  other  words,  of  the  eight  companies  assigned 
to  these  two  sections,  probably  but  two  companies  at 
the  most  are  deployed  and  six  companies  are  assem- 
bled ready  to  move  to  any  part  of  the  field  at  a  mo- 
ment's notice.  Placing  a  larger  proportion  of  the 
command  in  the  firing  line  before  being  certain  that 
troops  will  be  needed  in  that  particular  place,  is  lia- 
ble to  bring  about  difficulties  later  on,  when  it  is  de- 
sired to  establish  a  line  quickly  to  meet  an  unexpected 
attack.  The  firing  line  should  be  kept  weak  until  fair- 
ly certain  of  where  it  will  be  needed. 

But  it  is  different  when  the  attack  so  develops  that 
we  know  something  definite  of  the  manner  in  which 
it  will  be  made.  Then  the  firing  line  should  be  made 
as  dense  as  possible  along  those  parts  of  the  line 
against  which  the  enemy  appears  to  be  advancing,  for 
the  most  effective  means  for  stopping  the  enemy's  ad- 
vance is  the  well  directed  fire  of  as  many  guns  as  can 
be  brought  to  bear  on  him,  and  no  opportunity  to  fire 
on  him  at  effective  ranges  should  be  lost.  It  is  at  this 
period  of  the  fight  that  the  advantage  of  having 
strong  supports  and  local  reserves  close  at  hand  may 
be  fully  appreciated,  for  they  may  be  quickly  moved 
to  the  proper  point  and  deployed  in  the  firing  line, 


814       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

whereas,  had  they  been  wrongly  placed  in  the  firing 
line  at  the  outset,  it  would  take  many  precious  min- 
utes to  move  the  deployed  line  to  the  point  where  it  is 
needed.  Choosing  the  important  points  of  the  line  to 
be  held  from  the  beginning,  making  a  judicious  as- 
signment of  troops  to  these  points,  selecting  the  prop- 
er moment  for  employing  supports  and  reserves,  and 
practicing  wise  economy  in  their  employment,  are  the 
most  difficult  problems  of  the  defense. 

Concerning  the  number  of  men  per  yard  on  the  fir- 
ing line,  no  absolute  rule  can  be  prescribed.  In  that 
part  of  the  position  against  which  the  enemy  is  mak- 
ing his  principal  attack,  the  firing  line  generally  will 
be  as  dense  as  it  can  be  made — about  one  man  per 
yard,  and  will  be  kept  at  this  density  by  feeding  in 
the  supports  and  reserves  from  the  rear.  The  object 
is  to  stop  the  attacker's  advance  and  this  can  be  done 
only  by  gaining  and  keeping  fire  superiority.  Em- 
ploying an  insufficient  force  and  reinforcing  it  by 
driblets  is  equivalent  to  voluntarily  permitting  the  ene- 
my to  have  his  own  way  at  the  decisive  point.  If  we  can 
prevent  the  attacker  reaching  the  short  ranges,  the 
success  of  the  defense  is  assured.  So  long  as  the  de- 
fender enjoys  the  advantage  of  superiority  of  fire, 
he  has  perfect  freedom  of  action,  but  as  soon  as  the 
fire  of  the  attacker  makes  itself  felt  at  short  ranges, 
the  situation  is  different. 

In  the  portion  of  the  position  we  have  just  been 
considering,  effectiveness  of  fire  is  the  main  consider- 
ation and  cover  is  of  minor  importance.  Unless  there 
is  good  natural  cover  or  unless  trenches  have  been  dug, 
the  troops  will  get  their  best  cover  from  keeping  their 
fire  superior  to  the  enemy's.  In  those  parts  of  the  po- 


A  DEFENSE  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY     315 

sition  not  being  vigorously  attacked,  the  conditions  are 
different  and  more  thought  may  be  given  to  cover, 
but  proper  fire  control  ordinarily  will  be  the  controll- 
ing factor,  when  making  the  deployment.  Such  parts 
of  the  position  may  be  held  by  comparatively  weak 
forces ;  generally,  they  will  be  deployed  with  small  in- 
tervals, but  in  very  exceptional  cases  they  may  be  de- 
ployed with  wide  intervals  between  individual  skir- 
mishers, who  thus  secure  some  protection  from  their 
extended  formation,  and  are  given  an  opportunity  to 
take  advantage  of  all  the  cover  the  ground  affords. 

At  the  time  Colonel  A  issues  his  order,  he  cannot 
decide  whether  he  will  make  an  active  or  passive  de- 
fense, for  that  will  depend  largely  on  the  strength 
of  the  enemy,  then  unknown.  The  remainder  of  his 
brigade  cannot  support  him  for  three  hours,  and  the 
engagement  should  be  fought  to  a  finish  before  the 
end  of  that  time.  If  the  enemy  is  equal  or  but  little 
superior  to  the  defenders,  Colonel  A's  best  plan  for 
securing  a  favorable  decision  probably  will  be  to  make 
an  active  defense;  but,  should  the  enemy  be  consider- 
ably superior,  he  may  be  compelled  to  fight  a  passive 
defense,  or  even  fall  back  and  make  a  second  stand  in 
the  position  just  south  of  Plum  creek. 

Nothing  was  said  in  the  preceding  chapter  about 
dividing  the  position  into  sections,  for  in  the  situation 
there  discussed  such  a  division  was  not  necessary  since 
the  command  fought  on  a  narrow  front.  But,  in  this 
case,  the  troops  are  extended  on  too  broad  a  front  to 
be  controlled  efficiently  by  a  single  person,  and  the 
line  is  divided  between  the  two  battalion  commanders. 
But  the  breadth  of  front  alone  does  not  determine 
when  a  position  should  be  divided  into  sections,  or  the 


316       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

number  of  sections,  for  it  may  be  necessary  to  divide 
a  very  narrow  front  into  sections,  if  the  view  along  it 
is  much  obstructed,  as  in  woods,  or  if  inter-communi- 
cation is  difficult.  No  single  commander  should  be 
assigned  more  front  than  he  can  efficiently  supervise. 

In  the  defense,  as  in  the  attack,  the  cavalry  is  with- 
drawn to  the  flanks  before  the  opposing  infantry  com- 
mands are  in  close  contact,  and  remains  in  charge  of 
the  service  of  security  and  information  while  the  com- 
bat continues.  That  the  infantry  should  not  occupy 
the  position  in  strength  until  something  definite  is 
known  of  the  enemy's  plan  of  attack  constitutes  a  dis- 
advantage of  the  defense  that  may  become  very  seri- 
ous, if  the  cavalry  fails  in  the  service  of  reconnais- 
sance. There  must  be  some  cavalry  on  each  flank,  but 
the  bulk  of  it  should  be  sent  to  that  flank  where  it  is 
most  needed  and  a  few  patrols  only  should  be  sent  to 
the  other  flank.  Seldom  should  the  cavalry  be  divided 
nearly  equally  between  the  two  flanks,  for  the  cavalry 
with  a  small  infantry  detachment  is  weak  at  best  and 
should  not  be  further  weakened  by  dispersion. 

In  the  solution,  the  cavalry  was  sent  to  the  right 
flank  for  several  reasons.  There  is  more  room  for  its 
operations  and  more  probability  of  encountering  the 
hostile  cavalry ;  if  the  enemy  attempts  a  wide  turning 
movement,  it  will  be  on  this  flank  and  the  cavalry 
should  get  early  information  of  it;  the  chances  are 
best  for  observing  the  enemy's  strength  and  disposi- 
tions; and  there  will  be  more  opportunity  for  taking 
an  active  part  in  the  fight  by  striking  the  hostile  flank. 
On  the  left  flank,  the  unfordable  creek  is  so  near  that 
two  patrols  may  be  depended  upon  to  watch  its  banks. 
To  send  one  troop  to  each  flank  would  be  a  mistake. 


A  DEFENSE  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY      317 

It  is  known  that  the  enemy  has  about  two  troops  and 
not  only  will  they  have  to  be  kept  from  Colonel  A's 
flank  and  rear,  especially  from  the  bridge,  but  they 
probably  will  have  to  be  driven  back  before  the  Blue 
troops  can  make  efficient  reconnaissance.  If  this  is  to 
be  done,  not  a  single  trooper  should  be  detached  un- 
necessarily from  the  main  cavalry  force  on  the  right 
flank. 

You  may  have  held  the  position  at  the  Taylor  house 
with  the  cavalry  or  the  platoon  of  infantry  in  the  ad- 
vance party,  hoping  to  delay  the  enemy's  advance  in 
this  manner.  If  so,  you  may  deceive  the  enemy  tem- 
porarily as  to  the  location  of  your  main  position,  and 
delay  his  advance  somewhat  by  inducing  him  to  make 
an  early  deployment,  but  this  small  success  may  not 
be  unmixed  with  disaster,  for  the  withdrawal  of  the 
troops  holding  this  advanced  position  will  be  a  difficult 
task.  Advanced  positions,  as  a  rule,  are  not  desirable. 
Their  employment  is  apt  to  lead  to  the  defeat  of  the 
troops  holding  them,  and  to  masking  the  fire  from  the 
main  position.  There  is  also  danger  of  the  battle  be- 
ing decided  in  the  advanced  position.  Our  Field  Ser- 
vice Regulations  recognize  that  advance  posts  may 
be  useful  at  times,  but  they  warn  those  that  employ 
them  that  the  retreat  from  them  must  not  mask  the 
fire  of  the  main  position. 

Attention  is  again  called  to  the  length  of  the  posi- 
tion, which  is  in  excess  of  what  it  should  be  for  a  sin- 
gle regiment.  A  regiment  acting  alone,  with  neither 
flank  protected,  ordinarily  will  endeavor  to  keep  its 
front  within  500  yards  at  the  beginning  of  a  defensive 
action  that  must  be  fought  to  a  decision.  If  one  of 
its  flanks  is  partially  or  wholly  protected,  this  front 


318       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

may  be  slightly  extended,  and  if  both  flanks  are  pro- 
tected, the  extension  may  be  a  trifle  greater.  Only 
in  exceptional  cases  will  a  regiment  make  its  initial 
deployment  on  a  front  of  800  yards.  This  situation 
is  such  an  exceptional  case ;  the  left  flank  is  only  par- 
tially protected  by  Salt  creek,  and  the  right  flank  has 
only  such  protection  as  the  cavalry  can  give  it ;  yet  the 
regiment  is  extended  on  a  front  of  nearly  800  yards. 
This  is  because  a  position  on  either  the  hill  southeast 
of  17  or  hill  900  probably  would  soon  become  untena- 
ble, if  the  enemy  were  allowed  to  occupy  the  other  hill. 
If  we  confine  the  command  to  hill  900,  the  enemy  will 
have  our  position  turned  and  be  on  our  line  of  retreat 
when  he  gets  possession  of  the  hill  southeast  of  17; 
and  if  we  occupy  only  the  hill  southeast  of  17,  our  line 
of  retreat  will  be  threatened  and  we  will  be  in  great 
danger  of  being  crowded  into  the  angle  between  the 
two  unfordable  streams  when  the  enemy  establishes 
himself  on  hill  900. 

But,  while  it  is  necessary  here  to  risk  the  dangers 
of  overextension,  in  order  to  occupy  both  hills,  this 
should  be  done  with  a  full  understanding  of  what 
these  dangers  are  and  they  should  be  reduced  to  the 
minimum  by  occupying  the  firing  line  and  employing 
the  supports  and  reserves  in  a  judicious  manner.  It 
is  not  probable  the  enemy  will  make  a  determined  at- 
tack against  both  hills,  and  if  they  are  occupied  in  the 
manner  already  described  there  will  be  at  least  ten 
companies  in  supports,  local  reserves  and  general  re- 
serve, the  larger  part  of  which  will  be  available  to 
meet  the  enemy's  principal  attack. 

Hill  900  is  the  best  position  for  the  machine  guns, 
for  here  they  will  have  an  excellent  field  of  fire.  They 


A  DEFENSE  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY     319 

can  cover  the  southern  slope  of  the  hill  southeast  of 
17,  the  Moss — Taylor  spur,  the  ravines  on  each  side  of 
this  spur,  and  the  approaches  to  hill  900  on  the  south 
and  southwest.  We  might  have  left  a  platoon  of  in- 
fantry at  the  bridge  over  Plum  creek.  The  objection 
to  this  is  that  this  platoon  may  be  badly  needed  in  the 
fight.  The  bridge  is  in  no  danger  except  from  the 
hostile  cavalry,  which  should  be  held  at  a  distance  by 
the  Blue  cavalry.  Should  it  become  necessary,  for  the 
protection  of  the  bridge,  a  part  of  the  reserve  may  be 
sent  back  to  it  in  less  than  ten  minutes. 

It  was  pointed  out  in  the  solution,  that  the  mixing 
of  battalions  is  undesirable.  Possibly  this  might  have 
been  avoided,  by  assigning  all  of  the  1st  Battalion  to 
the  right  section  of  the  line,  and  the  2d  Battalion  to 
the  left  section.  The  2d  Battalion  (at  the  head  of  the 
main  body)  will  be  up  in  about  fifteen  minutes,  and, 
until  it  gets  up,  a  company  of  the  1st  Battalion  may 
be  deployed  and  held  behind  the  crest  of  the  hill  south- 
east of  17,  ready  to  occupy  the  hill  should  this  become 
necessary  before  the  2d  Battalion  reaches  the  hill.  As 
soon  as  relieved  by  the  2d  Battalion,  this  company 
may  move  to  the  right  section.  However,  this  ar- 
rangement probably  would  complicate  the  withdrawal 
of  the  platoon  of  Company  A  from  the  Taylor  house. 

We  will  now  endeavor  to  summarize  this  and  the 
preceding  chapter,  and  state  briefly  the  principal  ques- 
tions to  be  answered  before  reaching  a  decision  to  oc- 
cupy a  defensive  position. 

Is  it  necessary  to  fight  at  all  to  accomplish  your 
mission,  and  if  so,  should  you  fight  on  the  defensive? 

Is  the  fight  to  be  to  a  decision,  or  will  it  be  merely  a 


320       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

delaying  action,  falling  back  from  position  to  posi- 
tion? 

If  the  fight  is  to  be  decisive,  shall  the  defense  be 
active  or  passive?  Should  this  question  be  answered 
now  or  should  this  be  deferred  while  awaiting  devel- 
opments? 

Has  the  time  come  to  occupy  a  position,  or  should 
you  assemble  the  command  in  a  position  in  readiness 
while  waiting  for  more  information? 

Must  the  enemy  attack  the  position,  or  can  he  march 
around  it  and  maneuver  you  out  of  it? 

Is  the  front  of  the  position  suited  to  the  size  of  the 
command?  Exercise  special  care  not  to  occupy  too 
broad  a  front  unnecessarily. 

Does  the  position  afford  a  good  view  to  the  front 
and  flanks? 

Has  it  a  clear  and  broad  field  of  fire? 

Are  there  desirable  locations  for  the  supports  and 
reserves,  preferably  under  cover  close  in  rear  of  the 
position? 

Are  the  lateral  communications  good? 

What  is  the  character  of  the  terrain  in  rear?  Does 
it  favor  withdrawal?  Is  there  a  rallying  position  in 
rear? 

What  protection  is  there  for  the  flanks? 

What  is  the  direction  of  the  position  with  reference 
to  the  line  of  retreat?  What  is  the  situation  from  the 
enemy's  point  of  view?  How  does  the  terrain  favor 
his  attack?  How  will  he  probably  attack?  Where 
may  his  cavalry  be  expected? 

Having  decided  how  the  enemy  may  attack,  how 
may  the  attack  best  be  met? 


A  DEFENSE  BY  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY     321 

Into  what  sections  should  the  front  be  divided,  and 
what  troops  will  be  assigned  to  these  sections? 

What  should  be  the  size  of  the  reserve  and  what  will 
be  its  position? 

What  use  will  be  made  of  the  cavalry? 

What  is  the  best  position  for  the  machine  guns? 

Where  will  the  first  aid  station  be  located? 

What  will  be  done  with  the  field  train? 


CHAPTER  XX. 

CAVALRY  COMBAT  MOUNTED. 

SITUATION. 

(See  2-inch  map). 

A  Blue  army  is  marching  through  eastern  Kan- 
sas on  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  and  expects  to  cross  the  Mis- 
souri river  at  Leavenworth  and  Fort  Leavenworth. 
A  Red  army  is  marching  through  Missouri  towards 
Leavenworth.  Its  cavalry  is  well  in  advance.  There 
is  no  bridge  over  the  Missouri  between  Leavenworth 
and  Kansas  City. 

The  cavalry  division  of  the  Blue  army  expects  to 
camp  on  the  line  of  the  Big  Stranger  the  night  of  Oc- 
tober 11-12.  One  squadron,  without  wheel  transpor- 
tation, under  Major  A,  has  been  sent  to  cross  the  Mis- 
souri river  at  Leavenworth  and  determine  whether  the 
enemy's  cavalry  has  reached  the  line  of  the  Platte  riv- 
er. It  crosses  the  Terminal  bridge  during  the  fore- 
noon of  October  11,  and  proceeds  eastward  via  the  18 
— 22 — 28 — 30 — 48  road.  On  encountering  the  ene- 
my's cavalry  in  considerable  force  in  the  vicinity  of  58, 
at  2 :30  p.  m.,  the  squadron  turns  back  without  becom- 
ing engaged,  but  is  followed  closely  by  the  enemy. 

At  3  p.  m.,  when  the  squadron  is  approaching  30, 
on  the  60 — 48 — 30  road,  Major  A  receives  the  follow- 
ing message  from  a  patrol  near  30: — "Column  of  hos- 
tile cavalry  to  the  southwest  moving  north  across  the 
flats  on  road  about  one  mile  west  of  here."  Major  A 
sends  his  adjutant  to  direct  the  column  to  close  up, 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  MOUNTED  323 

and,  with  his  staff  and  orderlies  and  the  advance  guard 
commander,  hastens  to  the  heights  east  of  30  overlook- 
ing the  flats.  From  here  he  sees  a  squadron  of  Red 
cavalry,  in  column  of  twos,  moving  north  at  a  walk  on 
the  36 — 24  road;  the  point  of  its  advance  guard  is 
about  400  yards  south  of  24,  the  head  of  the  main 
body  about  1500  yards  south  of  24,  and  the  tail  of  the 
main  body  is  about  to  pass  the  road  junction  at  34. 
There  appears  to  be  a  platoon  in  the  advance  party, 
which  is  about  400  yards  ahead  of  the  support.  The 
support  has  approximately  two  platoons,  and  is  about 
500  yards  ahead  of  the  main  body. 

At  this  moment,  Major  A's  squadron  is  practically 
assembled  in  column  of  fours  just  east  of  30,  on  the 
road,  with  the  troops  in  the  following  order  from  the 
head  to  the  tail  of  the  column : 

Troop  A     (advance  guard),  assembled. 

No  distance. 
Troop  B. 
Troop  C. 
Troop  D     (less  about  3  platoons). 

300  yards  distance. 
About  1  platoon  Troop  D  (rear  guard). 

About  40  troopers,  mostly  from  Troop  D,  are  ab- 
sent patrolling.  Two  of  these  patrols,  of  five  men 
each,  are  absent  from  the  advance  guard,  one  on  the 
48 — 50 — 12 — 16  road,  and  one  on  the  48 — 46 — Far- 
ley road. 

Note. — The  road  up  the  bluff  at  30  is  lined  with  trees  which 
afford  perfect  cover  from  view.  The  railroad  embankment  fur- 
nishes breast  cover.  The  flats  are  wheat  stubble,  free  from  fen- 
ces or  other  obstacles,  excepting  such  as  are  shown  on  the  map. 

Required : 

Major  A's  estimate  of  the  situation  and  his  orders. 


324       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

SOLUTION  AND  DISCUSSION. 

The  hostile  squadron  will  soon  be  directly  between 
Major  A  and  the  bridges  over  the  Missouri  river  at 
Leavenworth  and  Fort  Leavenworth,  and  he  is  be- 
ing pursued  by  other  hostile  cavalry  in  force,  which  is 
close  upon  him.  If  the  advance  of  the  enemy  on  the 
flats  be  not  immediately  stopped,  he  will  get  posses- 
sion of  the  Terminal  bridge  and  effectually  cut  off  the 
retreat  of  the  Blue  squadron  by  that  route.  For  Ma- 
jor A  to  reach  the  bridge  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  he 
must  pass  over  the  30 — 28  or  the  48 — 50  road.  On  the 
first  of  these,  he  will  be  in  full  view  of  the  enemy  on 
the  flats,  who,  thus  warned  of  the  whereabouts  of  the 
Blue  squadron,  should  have  no  difficulty  in  preventing 
its  escape  over  either  bridge.  He  dare  not  turn  back 
to  take  the  second  road,  for,  even  though  he  escape  the 
enemy  that  is  pursuing  him,  which  is  exceedingly 
improbable,  he  may  meet  other  forces  which  have 
crossed  the  Platte  river  farther  to  the  north;  and  the 
time  required  to  make  the  detour  via  50  may  enable 
the  hostile  squadron  to  the  southwest  to  block  Major 
A's  retreat  via  the  Leavenworth  or  Fort  Leavenworth 
bridge. 

The  pursuing  cavalry  is  too  near  for  Major  A  to 
risk  lying  in  concealment  until  the  squadron  in  his 
rear  on  the  flats  has  passed  by,  even  were  this  advisa- 
ble for  other  reasons,  which  is  far  from  being  the  case. 
The  line  of  march  of  the  squadron  which  has  gained 
his  rear  indicates  the  Terminal  bridge  as  its  objective; 
besides,  Major  A  does  not  know  but  that  his  eastward 
march  across  the  flats  was  observed  by  the  enemy's  pa- 
trols from  the  direction  of  Farley,  and  that  the  Red 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  MOUNTED  325 

squadron  has  been  sent  for  the  express  purpose  of 
cutting  off  the  Blue  squadron's  retreat. 

Major  A  concludes  he  must  reach  one  of  the  bridg- 
es before  the  Red  squadron  can  get  into  a  position 
to  prevent  his  crossing.  To  make  a  dash  for  one  of 
them  is  out  of  the  question,  for  the  race  apparently  can 
be  won  by  the  enemy.  If  the  Blue  squadron  is  to 
escape,  the  advance  of  the  Red  squadron  must  be 
temporarily  checked.  This  cannot  be  done  by  fire 
from  the  top  of  the  bluffs,  because  of  the  extreme 
range;  besides,  if  the  fire  were  effective,  it  would 
merely  drive  the  enemy  from  the  road  and  nearer  to 
the  bridge.  Moreover,  it  would  be  wholly  wrong  for 
the  squadron,  in  its  critical  position,  to  engage  in  a 
dismounted  fire  action  which  would  keep  it  tied  to  one 
position  for  any  length  of  time. 

Consequently,  Major  A  decides  upon  the  only  prac- 
ticable course  to  follow — to  charge  the  Red  squadron, 
throw  it  into  confusion,  and  escape  across  the  bridge 
before  it  can  recover  from  its  disorder.  That  the 
ground  is  practicable  to  charge  over,  Major  A  knows 
from  his  inspection  of  it  when  he  passed  along  it  ear- 
lier in  the  day.  If  Major  A  but  acts  with  promptness 
and  decision,  the  main  body  of  the  hostile  column  will 
be  about  due  west  of  30  by  the  time  the  charge  is  be- 
gun. The  distance  to  be  covered  is  about  2000  yards 
and  can  be  passed  over  in  from  five  to  seven  minutes. 
The  Blue  squadron  will  be  under  cover  until  it  reach- 
es the  railroad  at  30  and,  although  improbable,  may 
not  be  observed  until  it  has  passed  some  distance  be- 
yond it.  The  enemy  probably  has  patrols  reconnoiter- 
ing  the  rough  country  north  of  Farley,  but  it  appears 
that  they  have  not  yet  reported  Major  A's  presence. 


326       TACTICAL  PBINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

If  Major  A  can  begin  his  charge  before  the  enemy's 
patrols  are  able  to  report,  the  surprise  of  the  Red 
squadron  should  be  complete. 

A  moment's  reconnaissance  from  the  top  of  the 
ridge  is  sufficient  for  Major  A  to  reach  his  decision. 
He  turns  to  Captain  A,  who  is  with  him,  and  says : 

"Our  squadron  will  attack  that  column  and  then  withdraw 
over  the  Terminal  bridge.  Charge  the  enemy's  advance  guard 
with  your  troop.  The  remainder  of  the  squadron  will  attack  his 
main  body.  I  will  tell  you  when  to  move  out." 

He  then  gallops  back  to  the  road,  tells  his  adju- 
tant to  call  in  the  rear  guard,  and  summons  Captains 
B,  C,  and  D,  to  whom  he  says : 

"A  squadron  of  the  enemy  is  moving  north,  in  column  of 
twos,  on  a  road  through  the  flats  about  one  mile  and  a  half  west 
of  here. 

"Our  squadron  will  attack  the  hostile  squadron  at  once  and 
then  withdraw  over  the  Terminal  bridge. 

"Captain  A  will  charge  the  enemy's  advance  guard  with  his 
troop. 

"Captain  B,  your  troop  will  charge  the  head  of  the  enemy's 
main  body. 

"Captain  C,  your  troop  will  be  the  support,  and  will  follow 
in  rear  of  the  left  of  Troop  B. 

"I  will  go  with  Troop  D,  which  will  form  the  reserve." 

He  then  seeks  Captain  A  and  directs  him  to  move 
out,  waits  until  Troops  B  and  C  have  passed,  and 
joins  Troop  D  as  the  rear  guard  rejoins. 


In  this  solution,  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  limit 
the  estimate  of  the  situation  to  a  discussion  of  only 
those  points  which  would  be  considered  by  Major  A 
in  reaching  his  decision.  It  takes  four  or  five  minutes 
to  read  the  solution,  and  because  of  this  we  are  liable 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  MOUNTED  327 

to  fall  into  the  error  of  concluding  that  it  took  Ma- 
jor A  as  long  as  this,  or  longer,  to  decide  upon  his 
course  of  action,  whereas  the  truth  of  the  matter  is 
quite  the  contrary. 

If  Major  A  is  worthy  of  his  command,  he  should 
be  familiar  with  the  ground  he  passed  over  during 
his  forward  march ;  he  has  had  days  to  study  his  map, 
arid  reference  to  it  now  should  be  unnecessary;  the 
principal  military  features,  such  as  roads,  streams, 
bridges,  lakes,  etc.,  should  be  firmly  fixed  in  his  mind ; 
a  half  hour's  study  and  work  with  pencil  and  paper, 
before  starting  on  his  mission,  combined  with  keen 
observation  while  on  the  march,  would  accomplish  this. 
He  has  had  half  an  hour  since  encountering  a  consid- 
erable force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  the  vicinity  of 
58,  in  which  to  draw  inferences  from  that  fact ;  in  that 
time  he  should  have  reached  the  conclusion  that  the 
enemy  probably  has  cavalry  on  the  56 — 54  and  the 
Platte  City — Beverly  roads  moving  about  level  with 
that  on  the  58 — 60  road.  This  would  not  be  faulty 
dispersion  when  we  consider  that  the  enemy  probably 
has  a  cavalry  division. 

If  we  assume  that  Major  A  is  an  able  cavalry  offi- 
cer, and  that  he  has  kept  thus  well  in  touch  with  the 
changing  situation,  he  should  be  able,  when  standing 
on  the  heights  at  30  confronted  by  a  hostile  squadron, 
to  reach  his  decision  in  a  fraction  of  a  minute — in  fact 
almost  at  a  glance.  The  mind  is  capable  of  receiv- 
ing and  considering  many  conflicting  propositions  in 
the  same  instant,  and  of  rejecting  all  but  one  which  it 
considers  best.  It  is  by  such  an  instantaneous  process 
that  a  cavalry  commander  often  must  reach  his  decis- 
ion. 


328       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

The  course  of  reasoning  followed  by  Major  A, 
probably  unconsciously,  while  he  was  riding  to  the 
heights  at  30,  and  as  he  saw  the  hostile  squadron  from 
that  point,  might  be  stated  as  follows:  "The  enemy 
is  behind  me — I  can't  turn  back.  No  doubt  he  is  on 
the  roads  crossing  the  two  bridges  over  the  Platte 
further  to  the  north  and  I  would  run  into  him,  if  I 
turned  north.  If  I  turn  south  I  can't  cross  the  Mis- 
souri. The  enemy  will  see  me  if  I  move  along  the 
road  at  the  foot  of  the  bluff,  and  he  probably  can  beat 
me  to  either  bridge.  Even  if  the  squadron  I  see  can't 
beat  me  to  the  Fort  Leavenworth  bridge,  still  I  am 
liable  to  be  cut  off  by  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  roads 
to  the  north.  There  is  nothing  left  me  but  to  dash 
for  the  Terminal  bridge  and,  since  the  enemy  is  be- 
tween me  and  the  bridge,  I  will  charge  him,  throw 
him  into  confusion,  and  then  escape." 

On  the  ground,  confronted  by  the  enemy,  there  is 
no  time  in  this  situation  for  studying  the  map  and  for 
making  careful  calculations  with  the  assistance  of  di- 
viders. As  a  map  problem,  however,  we  not  only  can 
but  should  estimate  the  situation  in  this  deliberate 
manner,  and  we  will  now  consider  for  a  moment  what 
probably  would  have  happened  had  Major  A  made  a 
dash  for  the  Fort  Leavenworth  bridge. 

Of  course,  the  route  via  48 — 50  is  out  of  the  ques- 
tion. The  only  remaining  practicable  route  is  via  14, 
and  from  there  via  G  and  H,  or  16  and  H,  or  across 
the  flats.  In  all  probability,  the  enemy  will  discover 
the  squadron  before  it  has  passed  30,  and  he  can  equal 
its  gait.  Going  via  24  and  22,  he  can  be  at  18  before 
the  Blue  squadron  is  at  14.  Now,  suppose  the  Blue 
squadron  gets  safely  by  14  and  continues  via  G,  and 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  MOUNTED  329 

that  it  gets  safely  by  G  and  takes  the  road  to  H.  It 
is  plain  that  the  hostile  squadron  can  cross  the  flat 
from  18  to  the  southeast  corner  of  the  Timber  Re- 
serve, take  the  wood  road  at  that  point  and  beat  the 
Blue  squadron  to  H  by  some  minutes. 

Suppose  the  Blue  squadron  turns  off  onto  the  flats 
between  14  and  G  and  passes  north  of  Duck  lake. 
Whatever  route  it  takes  it  will  have  more  flat  to  cross 
than  has  the  Red  squadron  and,  at  the  best,  nearly  a 
mile  further  to  go  before  reaching  the  bridge.  Or, 
suppose  it  follows  the  road  south  of  Duck  lake  from 
14.  In  that  case,  the  hostile  squadron  can  come  up 
with  it  somewhere  on  the  south  bank  of  the  lake  and  a 
combat  will  take  place  there. 

So  it  appears  that,  if  the  hostile  squadron  is  prop- 
erly handled,  Major  A  will  have  to  fight  no  matter 
what  route  he  takes  to  either  bridge.  This  being  the 
case,  he  should  choose  to  fight  under  those  conditions 
which  are  most  favorable  to  him.  He  has  his  com- 
mand well  in  hand  and  concealed  near  30,  while  the 
enemy  is  strung  out  in  column  of  twos  with  an  ad- 
vance guard,  and  apparently  suspects  no  danger.  A 
charge  from  30  gives  Major  A  the  tremendous  moral 
support  that  comes  from  taking  the  enemy  by  sur- 
prise when  he  is  in  a  faulty  formation. 

If  Major  A  throws  away  this  opportunity,  and 
chooses  to  run  for  it  and  fight  when  the  enemy  over- 
takes him,  he  gives  the  enemy  opportunity  to  recover 
from  his  amazement  (not  surprise),  his  command 
gets  out  of  hand,  its  morale  suffers  because  the  troop- 
ers are  showing  their  heels  to  the  enemy,  and  when 
the  two  squadrons  finally  meet,  the  enemy  should 
have  the  advantage.  Of  course,  luck  and  chance, 


330       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

quantities  that  can  never  be  measured,  might  favor 
the  Blue  squadron  to  such  an  extent  that  it  would 
escape  in  any  of  the  cases  mentioned,  but  the  course 
of  action  taken  by  Major  A  is  the  one  that  gives  most 
promise  of  success. 

As  to  the  manner  in  which  the  charge  should  be 
made,  opinions  may  differ  without  any  necessarily 
being  wrong.  In  considering  this  phase  of  the  fight, 
we  open  up  the  whole  subject  of  mounted  action  of 
cavalry  against  cavalry,  only  the  salient  features  of 
which  can  be  discussed  here. 

The  distinctive  cavalry  weapons  are  the  horse,  and 
the  saber  and  the  charge  is  the  means  devised  for 
making  the  maximum  use  of  these  weapons  on  the 
battle  field.  That  the  blow  or  shock  of  the  horse  may 
be  as  great  as  possible,  the  charge  is  usually  delivered 
in  line,  in  close  order,  boot  to  boot,  with  gradually 
increasing  gait  terminating  at  full  speed.  The  charge 
is  followed  immediately  by  the  melee,  the  result  of 
which  depends  on  the  weapons  of  the  trooper  and  the 
skill  with  which  he  uses  them.  The  effect  of  the 
shock  and  melee  is  to  throw  the  charging  line 
into  great  disorder,  the  extent  and  duration  of  the 
disorder  depending  largely  on  the  size  of  the  com- 
mands. So  long  as  this  disorder  lasts,  the  force  is 
peculiarly  defenseless,  and  if,  while  in  this  helpless 
condition,  it  is  charged  by  a  fresh  body  of  the  enemy, 
it  may  easily  be  overthrown.  To  guard  against  such 
a  counter  charge,  the  first  line  should  be  followed  by  a 
second  line,  or  support.  Of  course,  the  enemy  prob- 
ably will  adopt  the  same  formation,  and  your  support 
is  almost  sure  to  be  drawn  into  the  combat  to  meet 
the  enemy's  support,  or  to  help  to  decide  the  fight  in 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  MOUNTED  331 

some  other  way,  and  a  third  line,  or  reserve,  should 
therefore  be  provided  to  meet  this  new  contingency. 
It  may  be  said  that  thus  we  might  go  on  indefinitely, 
and  to  a  certain  extent  this  is  true — so  true  that  it  has 
become  an  axiom  of  cavalry  combat,  that  the  side  that 
can  throw  into  the  action  the  last  formed  reserve  is 
almost  sure  to  win. 

But  this  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  side 
that  goes  into  the  fight  with  the  greater  number  of 
lines  will  win,  for  in  a  cavalry  combat,  as  always  on 
the  battle  field,  the  quality  of  the  troops  and  the  way 
they  are  handled  count  for  much.  For  example,  we 
go  into  the  fight  with  our  command  divided  into  a 
first  line,  support,  and  reserve,  and  meet  the  enemy's 
cavalry  in  a  similar  formation.  Because  our  com- 
mand is  the  better  trained  and  the  better  led,  our  op- 
ponent is  compelled  to  put  into  the  fight  all  three  of 
his  lines  to  check  the  course  of  our  first  two  lines,  and 
we  have  our  reserve  still  in  hand  with  which  to  decide 
the  action.  In  a  cavalry  combat  between  equal  for- 
ces, training  and  leading  are  everything.  Of  course 
numbers  count  and,  if  the  enemy  has  a  preponder- 
ance of  force,  it  may  be  impossible  for  us  to  be  the 
last  to  put  in  a  formed  reserve;  if  such  be  the  case, 
we  will,  in  all  probability,  be  driven  from  the  field. 

In  a  charge  in  line,  the  presumption  is  that  we 
should  have  at  least  an  attacking  line,  a  support  and 
a  reserve.  In  small  commands,  such  as  a  troop  or 
squadron,  the  support  and  reserve  may  be  combined 
in  a  single  body,  but,  as  a  rule,  all  of  it  should  not 
be  employed  at  the  same  moment;  instead,  a  portion 
of  it  should  be  kept  intact  and  well  in  hand  as  a  last 
reserve,  when  the  remainder  is  launched  into  the 


332       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

fight.  For  larger  commands,  the  three  lines  are  kept 
apart  and  distinct.  In  our  problem,  Major  A  charged 
in  three  lines;  had  all  of  Troop  D  been  present  (in- 
stead of  but  little  more  than  half  of  this  troop ) ,  the 
charge  might  have  been  made  in  two  lines,  with 
Troops  A,  B  and  C  in  the  attacking  line,  and  Troop 
D  in  the  second  line  as  support  and  reserve. 

Of  course,  there  is  always  the  danger,  in  thus  split- 
ting up  a  command,  of  making  some  or  all  of  its  parts 
ineffectually  small  and  weak;  but  this  has  been  tak- 
en into  consideration  in  the  development  of  the  prin- 
ciple that,  as  a  general  rule,  there  should  be  attacking 
line,  support,  and  reserve,  and  the  experience  of  cen- 
turies has  proven  that  this  is  the  formation  that  com- 
bines greatest  probability  of  success  with  least  risk. 
In  the  distribution  of  the  command  among  these 
three  lines,  care  should  be  taken  to  insure  the  suc- 
cess of  the  attacking  line  by  making  it  strong,  for  if 
it  should  fail  and  break  to  the  rear  before  help  reach- 
es it,  the  support  and  reserve  can  do  little  more  than 
prevent  a  complete  reverse.  Thus,  our  major  placed 
two  complete  troops,  more  than  one-half  his  force, 
in  his  attacking  line,  and  he  ordered  them  to  strike 
the  advance  guard  and  main  body  of  the  much  ex- 
tended hostile  column  at  the  same  time,  in  order  that 
the  hostile  advance  guard  troop  would  not  be  left  free 
to  recover  from  its  surprise,  and  to  assemble  and 
charge  with  effect. 

On  the  other  hand,  this  process  of  robbing  a  sup- 
port and  reserve  to  strengthen  the  attacking  line,  if 
carried  to  excess,  may  render  the  support  and  re- 
serve so  weak  that  they  cannot  give  the  attacking  line 
the  assistance  necessary  to  complete  the  initial  sue- 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  MOUNTED  333 

cess.  But  the  distribution  in  any  particular  case  must 
depend  on  the  situation  it  is  to  meet;  the  controlling 
principle  is  that  it  should  be  such  as  to  secure  the  suc- 
cess of  the  attacking  line.  In  making  this  distribu- 
tion, tactical  unity  should  be  preserved  as  far  as  prac- 
ticable ;  but  a  division  of  the  force  which  will  give  the 
attacking  line  the  desired  strength,  is  more  to  be  de- 
sired than  the  preservation  of  tactical  unity. 

The  relative  positions  during  the  advance  of  the 
attacking  line,  support  and  reserve  are  determined 
largely  by  the  well  established  fact  that  the  flanks  are 
the  peculiarly  weak  points  of  a  line  of  charging  cav- 
alry. If  the  attacking  line,  when  in  full  career, 
should  be  assailed  suddenly  in  flank  by  a  formed  body 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  the  force  of  its  charge  would 
be  broken,  if,  in  fact,  its  charge  were  not  brought  to  a 
full  stop.  For  this  first  line  to  advance  fearlessly 
and  devote  its  whole  attention  to  the  enemy  in  its 
front,  it  must  have  no  anxiety  concerning  its  flanks; 
it  must  know  that  the  support  and  reserve  in  its  rear 
are  so  placed  as  to  meet  any  such  unexpected  and 
sudden  attacks  of  the  enemy.  This  will  often  re- 
quire the  support  and  reserve  to  be  echeloned  on  the 
flanks  of  the  attacking  line, — one  being  placed  on 
each  flank,  if  both  flanks  are  in  danger.  If  on  the 
flanks  they  will  also  be  in  a  good  position  to  attack  the 
enemy  in  flank.  If  one  flank  is  protected  by  other 
troops  or  natural  obstacles,  or  if  for  some  other  rea- 
son it  may  be  left  unguarded,  both  may  be  echeloned 
on  the  opposite  flank.  In  the  problem  before  us,  the 
support  is  ordered  to  follow  the  left  flank  of  the  at- 
tacking line,  and  the  reserve  would  follow  the  same 
flank  at  the  outset,  since  it  is  from  that  direction  the 


334       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

greatest  danger  is  apprehended;  but  in  so  small  a 
force,  the  reserve  could  be  quickly  moved  to  the  other 
flank  if  conditions  demanded  its  presence  there. 

As  a  general  rule,  the  support  should  not  follow 
directly  in  rear  of  the  attacking  line  because  of  the 
danger  of  its  being  involved  in  any  disaster  to  the  lat- 
ter. Retreating  troopers  generally  break  straight  to 
the  rear,  and  they  certainly  would  cause  disorder  and 
confusion  in  any  advancing  line  they  should  meet.  If 
for  any  reason  it  is  advisable  to  have  the  support  fol- 
low in  rear  of  the  attacking  line,  it  should  be  in  line 
of  columns  with  wide  intervals.  The  distances  be- 
tween the  successive  lines  vary  with  the  strength  of 
the  command.  The  support  of  a  troop  acting  alone 
should  take  the  gait  of  the  attacking  line  at  the  dis- 
tance of  about  80  yards,  and  the  reserve  should  take 
the  gait  when  it  has  the  distance  of  about  150  yards 
from  the  support.  For  a  squadron,  these  distances 
would  ordinarily  be  but  slightly  increased;  the  con- 
trolling principle  is  to  have  the  2d  and  3d  lines  near 
enough  to  give  prompt  support  to  the  attacking  line. 

An  old  Prussian  regulation  says,  "Cavalry  will 
produce  the  greatest  effect  when  it  is  led  against  a 
decisive  point  of  the  enemy's  line,  by  the  shortest 
route,  and  employs  only  the  simplest  evolutions,  and 
moves  in  the  direction  promising  the  greatest  suc- 
cess." The  ideal  conditions  are  those  that  enable  us 
to  strike  the  enemy  simultaneously  in  front,  flank  and 
rear.  This  will  not  often  be  possible,  but  the  occas- 
ions on  which  it  can  be  done  (at  least  in  part)  are  in- 
creased if  cavalry  can  maneuver  while  rapidly  mov- 
ing forward  and  can  produce  the  shock  in  a  direction 
different  from  that  which  the  troops  took  on  moving 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  MOUNTED  335 

out.  Cavalry  that  can  not  maneuver  in  the  face  of 
an  enemy  that  can,  probably  will  be  defeated,  and  it 
deserves  to  be. 

This  brings  up  the  question  of  what  is  the  proper 
formation  for  maneuvering  cavalry  advancing  to  an 
attack.  The  line  is  unwieldy;  it  is  difficult  to  change 
its  direction;  it  cannot  pass  obstacles  with  ease;  it 
cannot  take  full  advantage  of  the  minor  sheltering 
features  of  the  ground;  it  may  present  the  maximum 
target.  The  column  has  not  these  disadvantages  in 
so  pronounced  a  form.  For  maneuvering  purposes, 
the  column  is  far  superior  to  the  line,  and,  in  general, 
a  formation  in  columns  or  lines  of  columns  should 
be  preserved  as  long  as  practicable.  The  moment 
when  the  formation  should  be  changed  from  column 
to  line  calls  for  quick  and  accurate  judgment  on  the 
part  of  the  leader.  The  quickly  shifting  scene  in 
front  may  demand  a  change  in  direction  at  the  last 
moment,  and  the  column  can  make  this  sudden 
change  of  direction  where  the  line  can  not.  Yet,  if 
the  change  of  formation  is  put  off  too  long,  the  at- 
tacking line  may  itself  be  attacked  before  it  is  in 
proper  formation.  Accordingly,  our  squadron 
should  move  out  from  30  with  the  troops  in  column  of 
fours,  each  troop  forming  line  at  the  proper  moment 
in  accordance  with  the  above  principles.  A  forma- 
tion quite  as  easily  maneuvered  and  more  quickly 
changed  to  line,  would  be  to  have  each  troop  in  line 
of  platoon  columns  of  fours;  this  formation  would 
be  specially  suited  for  Troop  A,  the  platoons  of 
which  probably  will  charge  separately.  To  take  full 
advantage  of  the  fleeting  opportunities  of  a  cavalry 
combat,  two  conditions  are  absolutely  necessary — the 


336       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

troops  must  have  the  ability  to  maneuver  and  the 
leader  must  be  possessed  of  coup  d'oeil  to  profit  by 
that  ability. 

The  necessity  for  advancing  to  the  attack  in  col- 
umn, or  line  of  columns,  is  greater  now  than  former- 
ly when  the  attacking  cavalry  did  not  have  to  remain 
so  far  in  rear  of  the  battle  line.  The  day  is  long 
past  when  cavalry  can  be  within  a  thousand  yards  of 
contending  infantry  and  artillery  and  composedly 
await  the  moment  for  its  attack.  Nowadays,  a  large 
body  of  cavalry  is  fortunate  if  it  can  find  shelter  at 
3000  yards  from  the  enemy;  more  often  it  will  be  at 
a  much  greater  distance  than  this,  and  it  is  generally 
recognized  now  that  cavalry  on  the  great  battlefields 
of  the  future  will  often  have  to  cover  some  miles  from 
its  rendezvous  position,  and  will  have  to  do  so  quick- 
ly, if  its  arrival  at  the  point  where  it  is  to  be  used  is  to 
be  opportune.  In  this  long  advance,  such  a  gait  must 
be  taken  as  will  bring  the  horse  over  the  ground  in 
the  minimum  time  consistent  with  having  sufficient 
remaining  energy  at  the  finish  to  engage  in  mount- 
ed combat,  and  to  deliver  the  charge  at  full  speed. 
Of  course,  just  what  this  gait  should  be  will  depend 
on  many  conditions,  such  as  the  terrain  and  the  con- 
dition of  the  horse;  but,  in  general,  the  greater  part 
of  the  distance  will  be  covered  at  the  trot  for,  while 
the  horse  can  trot  long  distances  without  great  fa- 
tigue, he  speedily  becomes  exhausted  at  the  gallop. 
Major  A's  opportunity  to  surprise  the  hostile  squad- 
ron and  to  strike  it  while  it  is  maneuvering,  may  lead 
him  to  move  at  a  gallop  over  a  large  part  of  the  dis- 
tance that  separates  him  from  the  enemy. 

On  broad,  fenceless  tracts  of  land,  entirely  free  of 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  MOUNTED  337 

difficult  obstacles,  and  sufficiently  rolling  to  afford 
good  cover  for  a  mounted  man,  without  presenting 
slopes  greater  than  five  degrees,  cavalry  can  maneuv- 
er and  charge  with  ease.  However,  such  a  combina- 
tion of  favorable  conditions  is  seldom  found  in  ordi- 
nary terrain.  This  is  especially  true  of  the  United 
States  and  other  countries  devoted  to  agriculture, 
where  farms  and  fields  are  fenced,  often  with  barbed 
wire.  In  many  such  sections  a  cavalry  charge  of  any 
magnitude  is  practically  impossible,  and  the  larger 
masses  of  cavalry  will  have  to  combine  mounted  ac- 
tion with  other  methods  of  fighting.  Nevertheless, 
as  will  be  pointed  out  further  on,  the  situations  in 
which  an  enterprising  cavalry  leader  may  find  oppor- 
tunities for  employing  at  least  a  part  of  his  command 
in  timely  mounted  action,  are  of  more  frequent  oc- 
currence than  we  are  led  to  think.  Here  again,  what 
the  cavalry  can  do  is  largely  a  question  of  training 
and  leading. 

We  have  stated  that  the  charge  in  line,  with  sup- 
port and  reserve,  is  the  formation  usually  sought,  es- 
pecially when  a  combined  attack  on  the  hostile  front 
and  flank  can  be  made.  Because  of  the  restricted  na- 
ture of  the  available  terrain,  or  many  other  reasons, 
such  a  formation  often  will  not  be  possible,  although 
it  will  be  practicable  to  charge  on  a  more  narrow 
front  in  a  column  of  subdivisions.  This  may  be  a  col- 
umn of  fours,  platoons,  troops  or  squadrons,  depend- 
ing on  the  situation.  Such  a  formation  gives  a  suc- 
cession of  shocks  that  may  sweep  the  enemy  from  the 
field,  but  it  does  not  possess  the  maneuvering  power 
of  the  formation  in  line  in  three  echelons,  the  rear 
elements  of  which  can  more  easily  change  their  direc- 


338       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

tion  to  meet  the  changing  position  of  the  enemy.  In 
this  formation,  the  flanks  are  unusually  weak,  since 
no  special  provision  is  made  for  their  protection,  and 
an  opportune  attack  by  the  enemy  striking  the  flank 
of  the  column  might  prove  disastrous.  The  subdi- 
visions should  follow  in  supporting  distance  of  each 
other,  but  they  should  not  be  so  close  upon  each  oth- 
er that  each  succeeding  line  is  liable  to  be  swallowed 
up  in  the  confusion  of  the  line  preceding  it,  and  the 
whole  force  thus  thrown  into  great  disorder.  The 
charge  in  column  of  fours  is  unusual  and  will  be  re- 
sorted to  only  in  extreme  situations,  such  as  when  a 
marching  column  is  surprised  and  has  no  choice  left 
it  but  to  charge  in  this  formation,  or  when  it  may  be 
possible  to  surprise  the  enemy  and  sweep  him  off 
his  feet  by  the  very  audacity  of  such  a  charge. 

It  may  be  advisable  to  charge  with  a  part  or  all 
of  the  command  as  foragers,  where  the  ground  is  of 
such  a  nature  that  the  charge  in  any  close  order  for- 
mation is  impracticable;  or  in  order  to  lessen  the  tar- 
get presented  to  infantry  or  artillery  fire;  or  where 
the  object  is  to  gain  time  by  annoying  the  enemy  and 
occupying  his  attention  or  where  the  force  to  be 
charged  is  widely  scattered,  as  is  often  the  case  with 
a  defeated  enemy.  Such  a  formation  has  not  the 
great  shock  effect  of  a  boot  to  boot  line,  and  as  a 
rule,  it  is  resorted  to  only  in  those  situations  where 
the  line  is  impracticable,  or  where  the  enemy  pre- 
sents no  reasonable  target  for  the  line  to  strike. 
Major  A's  orders  permit  his  captains  to  choose  that 
formation  which  they  deem  best  suited  to  the  situ- 
ation when  their  respective  troops  begin  the  charge, 
but  they  probably  will  deliver  the  charge  in  line,  since 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  MOUNTED  339 

it  apparently  will  meet  formed  bodies  of  the  enemy. 
Since  the  formation  may  be  speedily  changed  from 
line  or  column  to  foragers,  during  the  progress  of 
the  charge,  to  meet  any  unforseen  action  of  the  ene- 
my, while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  change  from  for- 
agers to  line  cannot  be  so  quickly  made,  it  is  well  to 
delay  ordering  the  charge  as  foragers,  until  convinced 
that  this  is  the  proper  formation. 

It  is  when  cavalry  is  operating  against  cavalry  that 
a  leader  is  put  to  the  most  severe  test.  In  an  attack 
against  the  less  mobile  arms,  infantry  and  artillery, 
an  initial  mistake  in  formation  and  direction  of  at- 
tack is  by  no  means  so  serious,  since  there  often  is  an 
appreciable  length  of  time  in  which  to  correct  the 
error.  But  against  cavalry,  such  errors  often  will 
receive  their  punishment  before  they  possibly  can  be 
corrected,  if  the  enemy  but  takes  advantage  of  them. 
Nevertheless,  the  fear  of  such  disastrous  consequences 
will  not  deter  any  true  cavalry  leader,  properly  im- 
bued with  the  cavalry  spirit  and  correctly  instructed 
in  the  employment  of  the  Arm,  from  seizing  every 
opportunity  for  delivering  a  timely  and  telling  blow 
against  the  hostile  cavalry.  There  is  no  lack  of  such 
opportunities;  the  trouble  is  that  the  leader's  eye  and 
mind  are  not  trained  to  see  and  appreciate  such  situa- 
tions in  the  few  brief  moments  that  they  last.  Or,  if 
they  happen  to  be  weighed  at  their  full  value,  there 
still  is  vacillation  and  indecision.  An  officer  in  com- 
mand of  cavalry  must  know  what  he  intends  doing, 
this  he  must  carry  out  with  energy  and  resolution,  for 
under  vacillating  commanders  no  cavalry,  however 
brave,  will  do  any  good  in  the  field.  The  situations 
in  which  cavalry  may  successfully  charge  cavalry 


340       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

usually  demand  instant  decision;  there  is  no  time  for 
deliberation;  the  action  of  the  mind  must  be  well 
nigh  instantaneous;  whatever  is  to  be  done  must  be 
done  at  once ;  deliberate  thought  and  careful  plans  are 
out  of  the  question. 

Opinions  are  so  divided  as  to  when  cavalry  should 
fight  mounted  and  when  dismounted,  that  we  pur- 
posely chose  a  situation  for  this  problem  so  plainly 
demanding  mounted  action  that  it  must  satisfy  all 
but  the  most  radical  advocates  of  dismounted  action. 
By  so  doing,  we  may  have  misled  some  of  our  read- 
ers into  believing  that  cavalry  will  fight  mounted  only 
when  it  is  cornered  and  no  other  form  of  action  is  left 
it.  Such  is  far  from  our  opinion,  nor  does  it  agree 
with  the  opinions  of  cavalry  leaders  who  are  well  fit- 
ted by  experience  to  speak  with  authority  on  this  sub- 
ject. 

The  rifle  may  be  called  the  cavalry's  defensive  arm, 
although  it  is  and  often  should  be  used  offensively, 
but  the  horse,  combined  with  the  saber  or  lance,  is  the 
cavalry's  great  offensive  arm.  The  horse  should  be 
looked  upon,  not  as  a  mere  means  of  locomotion,  but 
as  the  distinctive  cavalry  weapon.  For  cavalry  to 
resort  to  the  rifle  as  an  offensive  weapon,  and  to  dis- 
card the  horse  and  saber  in  a  situation  where  they  can 
be  used  to  advantage,  is  to  forget  the  very  first  prin- 
ciple of  cavalry  training.  Yet  how  often  this  is  done 
in  our  service !  Of  course,  we  do  not  mean  to  say  that 
it  is  unwise  to  combine  dismounted  fire  action  with 
mounted  action  or  in  some  situations  to  employ  only 
dismounted  action,  but  we  do  contend  that,  in  a  pure- 
ly offensive  cavalry  combat,  the  fighting  power  of  a 
cavalry  command  is  weakened  with  every  man  that  is 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  MOUNTED  341 

needlessly  taken  off  his  horse,  if  he  can  advantageous- 
ly get  into  the  fight  mounted.  Cavalry,  well  trained 
and  well  led,  whatever  the  size  of  the  command, 
should  never  voluntarily  resort  to  dismounted  of- 
fensive action  against  equal  opposing  cavalry,  if  the 
conditions  permit  mounted  action  to  be  employed  in- 
stead. 

Of  course,  the  mission  of  cavalry  with  any  com- 
mand varies  and  it  may  require  us  to  husband  our 
strength;  in  such  a  situation  higher  considerations 
than  mere  local  victory  may  make  it  unwise  for  us  to 
be  led  into  a  combat.  If  for  this  or  any  other  rea- 
son, such  as  inferior  numbers,  the  proper  play  is  the 
defensive,  we  naturally  make  use  of  our  defensive 
arm — the  rifle,  often  thus  placing  the  enemy  at  a  dis- 
advantage by  compelling  him  to  abandon  his  great 
offensive  arm — the  horse.  But  if  cavalry  decides  to 
take  the  offensive  against  hostile  cavalry,  where  the 
terrain  and  other  conditions  permit  mounted  combat, 
this  latter  method  of  fighting  should  be  invariably 
resorted  to  as  being  that  which  gives  most  promise  of 
success,  as  well  as  greatest  material  and  moral  re- 
sults in  case  of  success.  Even  when  cavalry  is  play- 
ing a  defensive  role,  its  leader  should  be  constantly 
on  the  watch  for  an  opportunity  to  assume  the  offen- 
sive, mounted,  with  a  part  or  all  of  his  force. 

It  may  be  said  in  objection  to  this,  that  the  terrain 
in  this  country  does  not  favor  the  maneuvering  of 
large  bodies  of  cavalry.  We  have  already  pointed 
out  that  to  a  certain  extent  this  is  true,  and  where 
large  cavalry  masses  come  together,  as  was  the  case 
at  Brandy  Station,  Virginia,  in  1863,  mounted  and 
dismounted  action  will  be  employed  at  different 


342       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

points  on  the  battle  field  at  the  same  moment,  in  ac- 
cordance with  whether  the  terrain  and  other  condi- 
tions do  or  do  not  favor  mounted  action.  Still,  in 
many  parts  of  our  country,  the  fields  are  so  large  and 
open  that  bodies  of  cavalry,  such  as  squadrons  and 
regiments,  will  find  no  difficulty  in  maneuvering  and 
delivering  a  charge. 

We  have  said  nothing  of  the  mounted  action  of 
cavalry  against  infantry,  but  have  left  that  subject 
to  be  discussed  in  a  later  problem.  (*)  This  dis- 
cussion is  limited  to  the  statement  of  a  single  propo- 
sition, supported  we  believe  by  the  bulk  of  reliable 
authority,  that  mounted  combat  on  favorable  terrain 
should  be  the  rule  for  the  side  that  takes  the  offensive, 
when  cavalry  meets  cavalry  under  conditions  de- 
manding that  both  shall  fight. 

*  See  Chapter  XXII. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

CAVALRY  COMBAT  DISMOUNTED. 

PROBLEM. 

(See  2-inch  map). 

A  Blue  brigade,  with  cavalry  and  artillery  at- 
tached, is  marching  from  the  west  in  friendly  coun- 
try, with  orders  to  occupy  Leavenworth  and  Fort 
Leavenworth.  Red  forces  are  known  to  be  advanc- 
ing on  the  same  points  from  the  east  and  south. 

The  Blue  brigade  bivouacked  the  night  of  October 
1-2  at  Easton,  and  resumed  its  advance  at  6:30  a.  m., 
October  2,  along  the  88 — 90 — 96 — 100 — Zimmerman 
road.  Its  cavalry  (1st  Squadron,  llth  Cavalry,  less 
1  platoon  with  the  advance  guard),  acting  independ- 
ently, trotted  out  from  Easton  at  the  same  hour,  with 
orders  to  seize  the  bridges  over  the  Missouri  river  at 
Leavenworth  and  Fort  Leavenworth,  and  reconnoi- 
ter  to  the  south  and  east. 

As  Major  A  (commanding  the  squadron)  advan- 
ces to  100,  he  receives  messages  as  follows: 

One  from  a  patrol  near  24,  stating  it  had  driven 
back  a  hostile  patrol  and  observed  two  troops  of  hos- 
tile cavalry  moving  west  on  Dakota  street,  with  the 
point  of  its  advance  guard  near  56  at  7:20  a.  m. 

One  sent  at  7:40  a.  m.,  by  a  patrol  on  Atchison 
hill,  saying  it  had  seen  no  enemy  except  a  small  cav- 
alry patrol  that  had  fallen  back  towards  Leaven- 
worth. 


344       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

And  one  from  an  officer's  patrol  at  210,  reporting 
hostile  cavalry,  apparently  two  troops,  moving  west 
from  Leavenworth  towards  56,  and  a  column  of  hos- 
tile infantry  and  artillery  marching  north  on  the  190 
—224  road,  with  the  point  of  its  advance  guard  at 
228  at  7:20  a.  m. 

At  8  a.  m.,  firing  is  heard  from  the  direction  of  30, 
and  at  8:05  a.  m.  the  squadron  is  in  the  following 
formation : 

The  advance  party  (1  platoon  Troop  A),  dis- 
mounted and  deployed  across  the  road  500  yards  east 
of  100,  is  returning  the  enemy's  fire  from  the  direc- 
tion of  38.  The  support  (Troop  A,  less  3  platoons) 
(*)  is  under  cover  of  the  trees  at  100.  The  main 
body  (Troops  B,  C  and  D)  is  at  the  bridge  500  yards 
west  of  100. 

Note. — Salt  creek  and  its  branches  in  this  vicinity  flow 
through  wide,  deep  cut  channels,  with  soft  bottoms  and  nearly 
perpendicular  banks.  All  the  cleared  land  is  under  cultivation, 
and  the  roads  and  fields  are  inclosed  with  barbed  wire  fences. 

Required : 

Major  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

His  orders. 

SOLUTION. 

The  information  of  the  enemy,  so  far  as  it  goes,  is 
quite  definite.  Most  probably  the  two  troops  of  hos- 
tile cavalry  seen  by  the  patrol  near  24  are  the  same 
troops  seen  by  the  officer's  patrol  at  210.  They  have 
had  time,  since  last  they  were  seen  at  7:20  a.  m.  ap- 
proaching 56,  to  advance  with  some  caution  to  38, 
and  occupy  a  position  to  block  the  further  advance  of 

*  One  platoon  of  this  troop  is  with  the  infantry  advance  guard, 
and  one  has  furnished  the  patrols  now  out. 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  DISMOUNTED  345 

the  squadron  along  the  Zimmerman  road.  The  nat- 
ural inference  is  that  they  belong  to  the  hostile  force 
advancing  from  the  south,  and  we  may  further  in- 
fer, from  the  report  of  the  patrol  on  Atchison  hill, 
that  the  enemy  reported  approaching  from  the  east 
had  not  crossed  the  Missouri  river  in  any  force  at 
7:40  a.  m.  Major  A  concludes,  therefore,  that  he  is 
opposed  at  38  by  but  two  troops. 

At  8:05  a.  m.,  the  squadron  is  five  miles  from  the 
Terminal  bridge,  and  at  7:20  a.  m.,  the  head  of  the 
hostile  column  (at  228)  was  three  miles  from  the 
bridge.  Even  if  the  squadron  were  unopposed  by  the 
hostile  cavalry,  it  could  not  reach  the  bridge  ahead  of 
the  hostile  infantry.  The  Rock  Island  bridge  is  five 
miles  from  228,  and,  if  its  possession  is  of  value  to  the 
enemy,  he  can  get  infantry  to  it  by  about  9:30  a.  m. 
The  squadron  is  six  miles  from  this  bridge,  and  it  is 
not  probable  it  can  cover  this  distance  in  the  face  of 
the  opposition  of  the  hostile  cavalry  and  reach  the 
bridge  ahead  of  the  hostile  infantry. 

But  the  situation  east  of  the  Missouri  river  has 
not  been  cleared  up.  The  enemy  appears  to  be  at- 
tempting to  unite  his  detachments  at  Leavenworth, 
and  the  hostile  force  marching  from  the  east,  espe- 
cially its  cavalry,  may  be  near.  At  this  moment 
(8:05  a.  m.)  it  may  have  possession  of  the  Missouri 
bridges. 

Consequently,  it  is  not  at  all  probable  that  Major 
A  can  seize  and  hold  either  of  the  bridges  over  the 
Missouri  without  a  fight  with  the  hostile  infantry, 
in  which  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  he  would  be 
greatly  outnumbered.  In  other  words,  the  immedi- 
ate full  execution  of  his  mission,  as  stated  in  the  prob- 


346       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

lem,  appears  well  nigh  impossible.  The  development 
of  the  situation  has  brought  about  a  change  in  the 
mission  of  the  squadron.  If  the  enemy  wishes  per- 
manently to  hold  the  bridges  over  the  Missouri,  he 
must  keep  the  Blue  brigade,  especially  the  Blue  ar- 
tillery, from  making  a  lodgment  on  the  surrounding 
high  ground  to  the  west  of  the  river.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  the  Blue  brigade  is  to  occupy  Leavenworth, 
and  Fort  Leavenworth,  it  must  first  gain  possession 
of  this  high  ground.  Also,  the  enemy  will  endeavor 
to  hold  the  Blue  brigade  at  a  distance  until  he  can 
be  joined  by  his  detachment  east  of  the  river,  and  the 
Blue  brigade  should  not  be  delayed  in  its  effort  to 
strike  the  enemy  before  he  can  unite  his  detachments. 
In  this  situation,  the  force  that  first  establishes  itself 
on  the  high  ground  about  28  will  have  a  great  advan- 
tage. Consequently,  Major  A's  immediate  mission 
is  to  drive  back  the  hostile  cavalry  in  his  front  and 
clear  the  way  for  the  unobstructed  advance  of  his 
brigade. 

The  head  of  the  brigade,  if  unopposed,  will  reach 
24  (9  miles  from  Easton),  about  10  a.  m.  The  head 
of  the  hostile  column,  unless  delayed,  can  reach  the 
same  point  (5  miles  from  228)  by  9:20  a.  m.  So  it 
appears  that  the  hostile  column  must  be  delayed  for 
about  half  an  hour,  if  it  is  to  be  prevented  from  reach- 
ing the  top  of  the  ridge  ahead  of  the  Blue  brigade. 
But,  between  the  squadron  and  the  hostile  column 
stands  the  hostile  cavalry,  and  the  quickest  and  most 
effective  way  of  disposing  of  it  will  be  to  attack  it 
and  force  it  back.  The  squadron  will  have  a  little 
over  an  hour  (from  8:05  to  9:20)  in  which  to  drive 
back  the  hostile  cavalry  and  get  in  front  of  the  hos- 
tile infantry  near  24. 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  DISMOUNTED  347 

If  all  the  terrain  about  the  enemy's  position  is  as 
poorly  suited  for  mounted  action  as  is  the  country 
open  to  Major  A's  view,  the  attack  probably  will 
have  to  be  made  dismounted;  however,  the  squadron 
will  not  be  committed  to  dismounted  action,  until  this 
becomes  necessary,  for  the  development  of  the  attack 
may  furnish  an  opportunity  for  mounted  action,  es- 
pecially on  the  high  ground  about  28. 

If  the  attack  were  made  north  of  the  100 — 30 
road,  against  the  enemy's  right  flank,  it  would  be  ex- 
posed to  view,  would  have  to  be  made  dismounted,  the 
led  horses  would  have  to  be  left  under  cover  near  Salt 
creek,  and  small  hostile  bodies  posted  along  the  brow 
of  Hund  hill  could  compel  the  attacking  column  to 
deploy  early.  Even  if  successful,  it  would  only 
drive  the  enemy  back  on  his  natural  line  of  retreat 
along  the  Zimmerman  road. 

The  terrain  is  more  favorable  for  an  attack  on  the 
enemy's  left  flank.  The  cover  afforded  by  the  trees 
along  the  branch  of  Salt  creek  just  west  of  the  100 — 
102  road,  and  the  woods  along  the  ridge  just  east  of 
that  road,  may  make  it  possible  for  the  attacking 
force  to  get  near  the  enemy's  flank  before  being  dis- 
covered. An  attack  on  this  flank  will  make  the  best 
possible  use,  under  the  circumstances,  of  the  caval- 
ry's mobility,  for  the  roads  and  trails  lead  towards 
the  enemy's  line  of  retreat  and,  if  the  troops  making 
this  mounted  turning  movement  can  reach  the  ene- 
my's rear,  he  may  be  compelled  to  make  a  precipitate 
withdrawal  in  order  to  avoid  being  cut  off.  More- 
over, a  turning  movement  towards  this  flank  will  take 
a  part  of  the  force  towards  the  more  favorable  open 
ground  on  top  of  the  ridge,  where  there  may  be  an 
opportunity  for  decisive  mounted  action. 


A  good  division  of  the  force  will  be  to  have  Troop 
B,  and  the  two  platoons  of  Troop  A  in  the  advance 
guard,  make  the  attack  along  the  100 — 30  road,  while 
the  remaining  two  troops  make  the  attack  against 
the  hostile  left  and  rear.  It  may  take  these  troops 
about  half  an  hour  to  make  this  turning  movement, 
for  a  few  minutes  will  be  spent  in  starting  them  off, 
they  have  two  miles  to  go,  and  at  least  a  part  of  this 
distance  they  will  have  to  proceed  cautiously.  The 
force  attacking  along  the  road  must  be  made  strong 
enough  to  hold  the  enemy  to  his  position  while  this 
movement  is  being  made,  and  for  this  reason  Troop 
B  is  sent  to  the  assistance  of  the  advance  guard. 

Troops  C  and  D  will  move  south  across  country 
along  the  west  bank  of  the  branch  of  Salt  creek, 
and  will  take  the  trail  to  the  east  at  102.  If  Major 
A's  reconnaissance  convinces  him  that  these  troops 
can  move  south  on  the  100 — 102  road  without  being 
seen  from  the  enemy's  position,  this  route  is  prefera- 
ble to  the  one  across  country.  The  march  must  be 
covered  by  a  new  advance  guard,  and  a  patrol  along 
the  ridge  east  of  the  100 — 102  road,  for  the  enemy 
certainly  will  be  watching  this  flank  with  a  patrol  or 
stronger  force.  Troop  D  will  form  the  reserve  and, 
whatever  the  nature  of  the  terrain,  it  will  be  kept 
mounted  as  long  as  practicable.  It  will  be  employed, 
if  necessary,  to  assist  the  other  three  troops  in  se- 
curing a  decision,  but  preferably  to  pursue  the  ene- 
my after  he  breaks. 

Major  A's  decision  is  to  attack  at  once,  with  a  troop 
and  a  half  along  the  100 — 30  road,  and  two  troops 
against  the  hostile  cavalry's  left  flank  and  rear. 

Having  reached  his  decision,  Major  A  issues  the 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  DISMOUNTED  349 

following  verbal  orders  to  the  commanders  of  Troops 
B,  C  and  D,  who  have  been  assembled  at  100: 

"Hostile  cavalry,  only  two  troops  strong,  is  in  our  front.  At 
least  part  of  it  is  being  employed  dismounted  against  our  ad- 
vance party  which  is  now  engaged  about  500  yards  east  of  here, 
down  this  road  (indicating  the  100 — 38  road).  A  column  of 
hostile  infantry  and  artillery  is  entering  Leavenworth  from 
the  south,  about  five  miles  from  here.  Our  brigade  is  about  an 
hour  behind  us. 

"We  will  attack  the  hostile  cavalry  at  once,  enveloping  its 
left  flank. 

"Captain  B  (commanding  Troop  B),  with  your  troop  and 
the  advance  guard,  you  will  attack  along  that  road  (100 — 30), 
keeping  your  left  flank  on  the  road.  Send  a  patrol  to  observe 
along  this  (100 — 74)  road. 

"Troops  C  and  D  will  move  south  under  cover  to  a  cross- 
road about  a  mile  south  of  here,  and  thence  to  the  east  to  attack 
the  enemy's  left  and  rear. 

"Captain  C  (commanding  Troop  C),  send  one  of  your  pla- 
toons rapidly  across  country  towards  the  cross-road  mentioned 
to  act  as  a  new  advance  guard.  Send  a  strong  patrol  to  ob- 
serve along  that  ridge  (indicating  the  ridge  east  of  the  100 — 
102  road). 

"The  remainder  of  Troops  C  and  D,  under  my  command, 
will  follow  closely  after  the  new  advance  guard." 

Because  time  is  valuable  and  because  Major  A  can 
point  out  on  the  ground  most  of  the  natural  features 
referred  to  in  his  orders,  he  dispenses  with  the  usual 
method  of  identifying  roads,  etc.,  by  reference  points 
on  the  map.  When  the  turning  troops  reach  the  vi- 
cinity of  the  enemy's  flank,  Major  A  will  give  them 
their  orders  to  attack,  the  character  of  the  attack  de- 
pending on  the  situation  then  existing,  and  will  des- 
ignate the  reserve  at  that  time. 


350       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

COMMENTS. 

The  solution  of  this  problem  hangs  on  discovering 
the  proper  immediate  mission  of  the  squadron.  Cav- 
alry frequently  will  find  it  impossible  to  carry  out  its 
orders  literally,  for  the  one  giving  them*  cannot  know 
what  changes  a  few  hours  may  make  in  the  situation. 
In  such  an  emergency,  the  cavalry  commander  should 
base  his  action  on  what  he  knows  to  be  the  general  ob- 
ject of  the  operation. 

When  Major  A  discovered  that  he  could  not  seize 
and  hold  the  bridges,  and  decided  to  abandon  his 
original  mission,  his  first  task  was  to  choose  a  new 
line  of  action  that  would  fit  in  with  the  general  plan 
of  his  superior  commander.  It  was  clear  to  him 
that  his  brigade  would  have  its  best  chance  for  ulti- 
mate success,  if  it  could  strike  and  defeat  the  hostile 
force  from  the  south  before  the  latter  could  be  joined 
by  the  force  marching  from  the  east,  and  to  assist  in 
making  this  possible  became  his  new  mission. 

It  is  but  a  step  from  this  first  decision  to  his  later 
decision  to  attack  the  two  hostile  troops.  He  might 
have  attempted  to  ride  around  the  hostile  cavalry  and 
get  on  the  flank  of  the  approaching  hostile  infantry. 
There  are  good  reasons  for  disapproving  this  plan. 
In  the  first  place,  other  hostile  cavalry  may  soon  ap- 
pear on  the  scene,  and  this  chance  to  rout  these  two 
hostile  troops  while  they  are  isolated  should  not  be 
thrown  away.  Then  we  must  presuppose  that  the 
enemy  will  act  intelligently,  and,  should  Major  A 
attempt  to  move  by  a  flank,  the  hostile  cavalry  proba- 
bly would  move  also  and  meet  him  elsewhere.  Time 
would  be  lost  and  a  fight  would  not  be  avoided. 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  DISMOUNTED  351 

Nor  can  approval  be  given  to  a  plan  that  contem- 
plates leaving  a  part  of  the  force  near  100,  in  front 
of  the  hostile  cavalry,  while  moving  with  the  remain- 
der to  delay  the  hostile  infantry.  The  chances  are 
not  good  for  accomplishing  much  with  either  force, 
and  the  division  of  the  squadron  makes  the  conditions 
more  favorable  for  the  two  hostile  troops.  Should 
they  be  joined  by  other  hostile  cavalry,  they  will  have 
a  marked  advantage  over  the  divided  squadron.  In 
general,  a  command  should  concentrate  on  encounter- 
ing the  enemy,  and  should  avoid  all  unnecessary  dis- 
persion of  its  energy. 

Attention  is  directed  to  the  distance  that  separates 
the  two  parts  of  the  squadron,  while  Troops  C  and 
D  are  making  their  detour  to  reach  the  enemy's  left 
and  rear,  and  it  is  to  be  noted  that  this  is  contrary 
to  principles  stated  in  Chapters  XVI  and  XVII, 
when  discussing  the  attack  by  infantry.  But  there 
we  were  dealing  with  infantry.  Had  Major  A  made 
this  attack  with  a  small  force  of  infantry,  he  would 
have  risked  defeat,  had  he  followed  the  same  plan 
and  placed  so  much  distance  between  the  slowly  mov- 
ing fractions  of  his  command;  but  division  of  force 
before  the  attack,  which  would  often  lead  to  disaster 
with  a  small  infantry  command,  is  quite  as  often  the 
best  plan  for  certain  and  speedy  victory  with  a  small 
cavalry  command.  The  superior  mobility  of  the  cav- 
alry gives  it  much  greater  license  in  this  respect,  and 
enables  it  to  make  wider  turning  movements  than 
would  be  permissible  with  infantry.  This  is  espe- 
cially true  when  cavalry  is  operating  against  infan- 
try, but  more  care  must  be  exercised  when  it  is  op- 
erating against  other  cavalry.  Then  it  should  be  kept 


352       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

well  in  hand  and  concentrated  to  a  far  greater  degree, 
else  the  hostile  cavalry  will  get  between  its  separat- 
ed parts  and  defeat  them  in  detail  before  they  can 
unite — a  maneuver  that  could  not  be  so  easily  accom- 
plished by  the  less  mobile  hostile  infantry. 

But  we  must  not  overlook  the  point  that  this  di- 
vision of  the  force  is  but  a  temporary  condition,  and 
the  attack  itself  will  be  made  with  a  united  command 
on  a  narrow  front.  The  perfectly  proper  desire  to 
utilize  the  speed  of  cavalry  to  carry  out  combinations 
that  would  not  be  possible  with  more  slowly  moving 
infantry,  should  not  be  allowed  to  degenerate  into  a 
mania  for  complicated  and  dangerous  maneuvers. 
For  example,  a  plan  to  make  a  frontal  attack  with  a 
portion  of  the  force  while  moving  to  the  enemy's  rear 
with  the  remainder,  by  some  such  roundabout  route 
as  the  Atchison  pike,  or  the  104 — 48 — 46 — 44 — 28 
road,  must  be  rejected  as  impracticable  and  danger- 
ous. It  would  involve  an  unnecessarily  long  detour 
(and  time  is  valuable),  would  make  cooperation  be- 
tween the  two  portions  of  the  attacking  force  very 
difficult  if  not  impossible,  and  would  so  disperse  the 
command  that  its  portions  might  be  destroyed  in  de- 
tail. The  probable  lack  of  cooperation,  the  difficulty 
of  correctly  timing  the  widely  separated  attacks,  and 
the  inability  of  the  commander  to  exercise  control 
over  his  whole  force  at  the  crucial  moment,  would 
be  very  likely  to  cause  such  an  attack  to  fail.  The 
smaller  the  force,  whether  cavalry  or  infantry,  the 
less  justifiable  is  undue  dispersion. 

Out  of  respect  for  the  principle  just  stated,  we 
might  have  kept  Troops  C  and  D  in  closer  support- 
ing distance  of  the  force  attacking  along  the  road. 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  DISMOUNTED  353 

This  might  be  done  by  sending  these  two  troops  to 
cross  the  southern  branch  of  Salt  creek  at  the  trail 
about  300  yards  south  of  100,  and  thence  up  the  slope 
of  the  wooded  ridge  to  the  east.  This  plan  is  more 
conservative  than  the  one  adopted  in  the  solution,  and 
can  not  be  disapproved,  but  it  offers  less  chance  for  a 
speedy  and  decisive  termination  of  the  fight.  A  still 
safer  plan,  and  one  which  probably  would  succeed  if 
executed  with  vigor,  would  be  to  attack  with  the 
whole  squadron  along,  and  south  of  the  100 — 30 
road.  Neither  of  these  plans,  however,  makes  the 
most  of  the  mobility  of  the  attacking  force. 

Cavalry  loses  its  superior  mobility  the  moment  it 
quits  its  horses,  and,  if  the  squadron  is  to  get  the  full 
benefit  of  this  characteristic  of  the  arm,  no  portion  of 
it  should  be  dismounted  until  it  appears  that  mounted 
action  is  impracticable;  and,  even  then,  it  should  not 
quit  its  horses  until  it  has  drawn  as  close  to  the  point 
of  attack  as  the  terrain,  hostile  fire,  and  other  condi- 
tions will  permit.  If  the  eastern  bridge  at  100  can 
be  crossed  without  coming  under  the  enemy's  fire,  the 
force  attacking  along  the  100 — 30  road  may  cross 
and  dismount  under  cover  of  the  wooded  spur  on 
which  the  advance  party  has  deployed;  otherwise  it 
may  dismount  west  of  100,  or,  it  may  remain  mount- 
ed and  reach  the  cover  of  the  spur,  by  moving  south 
under  cover  of  the  trees  to  the  trail  about  300  yards 
south  of  100,  and  then  east  to  the  spur. 

Just  where  and  how  the  two  troops  moving  against 
the  enemy's  left  will  enter  the  fight,  will  depend  on 
the  way  in  which  the  situation  develops,  and  more 
especially  on  the  care  and  energy  with  which  the  ene- 
my covers  his  left  flank.  By  the  time  they  get  to  the 


354       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

top  of  the  ridge  east  of  102,  Major  A  should  know 
the  enemy's  position  quite  definitely  from  the  sound 
of  the  firing,  his  own  observations,  and  information 
from  other  sources,  and  be  able  to  direct  his  further 
march  in  such  manner  as  to  enter  the  fight  at  the  de- 
cisive point. 

As  stated  in  the  solution,  the  reserve  troop  will 
be  the  last  to  dismount,  if  it  dismounts  at  all.  When 
cavalry  is  fighting  dismounted  against  other  cav- 
alry a  portion  or  all  of  the  reserve  should  be  kept 
mounted,  if  at  all  practicable,  until  the  moment  has 
come  for  putting  it  into  the  fight.  In  this  way  only 
will  it  be  possible  to  meet  unexpected  moves  of  the 
enemy,  or  to  make  sudden  attacks  against  the  weak 
points  of  his  line  when  they  develop.  (*)  More- 
over, there  may  be  a  chance  at  any  moment  to  em- 
ploy the  reserve  mounted,  and  the  opportunity  in  all 
probability  would  be  lost  if  the  reserve  were  dis- 
mounted and  separated  from  its  horses. 

The  number  of  men  left  with  the  led  horses,  when 
cavalry  fights  dismounted,  will  depend  on  whether  or 
not  they  are  to  be  kept  mobile,  (t)  If  mobile,  they 
are  under  the  complete  control  of  the  horse-holders 
and  may  be  maneuvered  in  column  of  fours  at  any  gait 

*  This  is  not  so  necessary  when  cavalry  is  fighting  a  dismounted 
action  with  infantry,  although  it  is  advisable  even  then  to  hold  a  part 
of  the  command  mounted,  for  we  cannot  tell  when  the  rapidly  chang- 
ing situation  may  give  it  an  opportunity  for  decisive  action  on  a  part 
of  the  field  that  could  not  be  reached  in  time  by  dismounted  men.  The 
cavalry  commander  who  needlessly  dismounts  his  entire  command  at 
the  beginning  of  an  attack  against  infantry,  voluntarily  surrenders  the 
only  material  advantage  he  has  over  the  infantry. 

f  The  horses  are  said  to  be  mobile  when  each  horse-holder  controls 
but  three  horses  besides  his  own;  when  he  has  to  control  a  greater 
number,  the  horses  become  immobile. 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  DISMOUNTED  355 

without  confusion.  If  immobile,  their  maneuvering 
gait  will  decrease,  and  the  confusion  and  difficulty  of 
leading  will  become  greater  as  the  number  of  led 
horses  per  horse-holder  is  increased.  If  the  troops 
attacking  along  the  road  leave  the  led  horses  west  of 
Salt  creek,  one  man  may  hold  8  or  even  12  horses, 
whereas  if  they  are  brought  across  the  creek  to  the 
cover  of  the  wooded  spur,  the  horses  should  be  mo- 
bile, so  as  to  permit  of  their  being  quickly  moved  to 
the  front  or  rear  in  an  emergency.  Whichever  plan 
is  followed,  the  number  of  men  on  the  firing  line  will 
be  about  the  same,  for  the  led  horses  when  west  of  the 
creek  and  farther  from  the  fighting  line  will  need  a 
stronger  guard  than  when  east  of  the  creek. 

If  the  portion  of  the  force  attacking  the  hostile  left 
flank  has  to  dismount,  its  led  horses  will  be  more  ex- 
posed than  those  of  the  force  attacking  along  the 
road,  and  their  line  of  retreat  is  more  obstructed. 
Consequently,  not  only  should  they  be  mobile,  but 
they  should  be  strongly  guarded  as  well.  The  guard 
may  be  taken  from  the  troop  to  which  the  horses  be- 
long, or  a  guard  may  be  assigned  by  the  reserve. 

If  it  develops  that  the  attack  on  this  position  will 
have  to  be  made  with  the  entire  force  dismounted,  the 
squadron  can  put  dismounted  men  on  the  firing  line 
as  follows,  supposing  each  troop  has  a  strength  of 
80  men  at  this  time:  The  advance  along  the  road 
would  be  made  by  about  80  dismounted  men  (120 
men  less  a  patrol  of  3  men  along  the  100 — 74  road,  25 
horse-holders  and  12  men  to  guard  the  led  horses), 
and  the  attack  on  the  enemy's  flank  by  about  60  men 
(Troop  C  less  20  horse-holders).  In  addition,  three 
platoons  of  the  reserve  would  be  available  to  enter 


356       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  fight,  wherever  needed,  either  mounted  or  dis- 
mounted. If  mounted,  60  men  would  be  engaged, 
and  if  dismounted,  about  45.  The  remaining  platoon 
of  this  reserve  troop  would  guard  the  led  horses  of 
Troop  C,  furnish  combat  patrols  for  the  right  flank, 
and  serve  as  a  last  reserve.  The  total  strength  of  the 
attacking  force  would  be  185  dismounted  men,  or  140 
dismounted  men  and  60  mounted. 

Were  the  squadron  accompanied  by  a  machine  gun 
platoon,  the  strength  of  its  attack  would  be  mater- 
ially increased,  notwithstanding  that  the  woods  might 
make  it  difficult  to  find  a  target  for  the  guns.  The 
platoon  could  accompany  the  two  troops  attacking 
the  enemy's  flank,  or,  better  still,  they  could  be  used 
in  the  attack  along  the  road,  thereby  making  it  pos- 
sible to  send  more  than  two  troops  against  the  hostile 
left. 

Attention  is  invited  to  Major  A's  orders.  The  first 
paragraph,  as  it  appears  in  the  solution,  probably 
differs  greatly  from  the  first  paragraph  as  written  by 
many  of  our  readers.  The  problem  states  messages 
sent  at  different  hours  by  three  widely  separated  pa- 
trols. These  messages  reached  Major  A  before  8  a. 
m.,  probably  one  at  a  time,  and,  consequently,  he  has 
had  an  opportunity  to  study  and  compare  them  with 
the  map  before  him,  and  to  draw  conclusions  from 
them.  These  conclusions,  and  not  the  messages  them- 
selves, should  be  stated  to  the  officers.  It  would  take 
time  to  read  the  messages,  more  time  to  find  the  points 
referred  to  on  the  map,  still  more  time  to  answer 
questions,  and,  in  the  end,  Major  A  would  see  to  it 
that  the  officers  receiving  the  orders  had  reached  the 
same  conclusions  as  had  he.  How  much  better  is  it 


CAVALRY  COMBAT  DISMOUNTED  357 

then,  to  state  these  conclusions  at  the  outset  and  save 
valuable  time. 

A  mistake  frequently  made  in  issuing  orders,  es- 
pecially orders  for  an  attack,  is  to  look  ahead  and 
state  what  shall  be  done  at  a  later  stage  of  the  fight. 
Definite  orders  should  be  issued  to  meet  only  the  im- 
mediate situation,  or  the  situation  as  far  as  it  can  be 
seen  with  certainty  at  the  time  the  order  is  issued,  and 
orders  to  meet  subsequent  situations  should  not  be  is- 
sued until  those  situations  arise.  At  the  time  Major 
A  issues  his  orders,  he  can  not  know  with  certainty 
what  the  situation  will  be  when  Troops  C  and  D 
reach  the  enemy's  left  flank,  and  it  is  a  mistake  to 
state,  in  the  orders  issued  at  100,  what  these  two 
troops  will  do  when  they  get  on  the  high  ground  east 
of  102.  Likewise,  with  cavalry,  it  is  always  a  mis- 
take to  order  dismounted  action  before  being  abso- 
lutely certain  that  such  action  is  advisable  or  neces- 
sary. For  this  reason,  Major  A's  orders  do  not  state 
whether  the  attack  will  be  made  mounted  or  dis- 
mounted. Considering  the  unfavorable  character  of 
the  terrain  in  Captain  A's  front,  there  might  be  some 
excuse  for  telling  him  to  fight  dismounted,  but  even 
he  is  permitted  to  choose  his  own  method  of  attack. 
No  one  can  state  with  certainty  that  a  fight,  even  on 
the  most  unfavorable  ground,  will  not,  at  some  stage 
of  its  development,  present  an  opportunity  for 
mounted  action. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY. 

PROBLEM. 
(See  2-inch  map). 

Two  Blue  battalions  garrison  the  friendly  towns 
of  Leavenworth  and  Fort  Leavenworth.  Valuable 
military  supplies  are  stored  at  Fort  Leavenworth.  A 
Blue  detachment  of  all  arms,  marching  from  the 
northwest  to  reinforce  these  two  battalions,  camped 
the  night  of  October  15-16  at  Millwood.  There  has 
been  no  contact  with  the  enemy  during  this  operation, 
but  it  is  believed  that  he  is  concentrating  a  small  force 
about  thirty  miles  south  of  Leavenworth. 

Shortly  after  sunrise,  October  16,  while  the  Blue 
detachment  is  preparing  to  resume  its  march,  Gen- 
eral B,  the  detachment  commander,  gives  Major  A, 
the  commander  of  the  cavalry  (1st  Squadron,  2d 
Cavalry),  the  following  verbal  order: 

"I  have  just  received  a  telegram  from  Colonel  C  (the  com- 
mander at  Leavenworth),  saying  a  hostile  force  of  about  a  regi- 
ment of  infantry  and  two  troops  of  cavalry,  that  detrained 
south  of  Leavenworth  during  the  night,  is  advancing  on  the  city, 
and  was  about  two  miles  south  of  its  southern  outskirts,  at  6 
a.  m.  Colonel  C  is  falling  back  and  concentrating  just  south 
of  Fort  Leavenworth  to  oppose  the  enemy. 

"With  your  squadron,  less  the  platoon  on  outpost,  march 
without  delay  to  Fort  Leavenworth  to  reinforce  Colonel  C. 

"I  will  follow  you  immediately  with  the  remainder  of  the 
detachment." 


CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY  359 

At  6:30  a.  m.,  Major  A  has  his  squadron  (less  1 
platoon,  Troop  A)  formed  ready  to  march. 

Required : 

Major  A's  estimate  of  the  situation  and  his  orders. 

SOLUTION. 

Under  the  orders  he  has  just  received,  Major  A  is 
temporarily  detached  from  the  remainder  of  General 
B's  force,  and  is  relieved  from  responsibility  in  con- 
nection with  the  march  of  the  detachment  from  Mill- 
wood to  Fort  Leavenworth.  While  this  does  not  jus- 
tify his  wholly  disregarding  the  fact  that  the  detach- 
ment is  following  him,  still  it  permits  him  to  concen- 
trate his  attention  on  his  true  mission,  which  is  to  hast- 
en to  the  assistance  of  Colonel  C,  at  Fort  Leaven- 
worth,  and  his  dispositions  should  be  made  with  the 
idea  of  reaching  Colonel  C  in  the  least  possible  time. 
The  secret  and  rapid  character  of  the  enemy's  move- 
ment from  the  south  indicates  that  he  intends  trying 
to  overpower  Colonel  C  and  destroy  the  supplies  at 
Fort  Leavenworth,  before  Colonel  C  can  be  rein- 
forced, and  it  appears,  from  Colonel  C's  statement, 
that  he  intends  to  oppose  the  enemy  somewhere  be- 
tween Leavenworth  and  Fort  Leavenworth. 

As  far  as  L,  the  squadron  will  take  the  direct  road 
through  Lowemont.  The  P — 80—78  road  is  more 
roundabout  and  nothing  will  be  gained  by  taking  it. 
Fort  Leavenworth  is  the  destination  of  the  squadron, 
and  any  road  south  of  the  Atchison  pike  will  take  it 
far  out  of  its  way,  and  place  the  enemy  between  it 
and  Colonel  C.  From  L,  the  squadron  may  continue 
its  march  via  the  Atchison  pike,  or  it  may  turn  north 
to  87  and  then  east  on  the  Millwood  road.  The  route 


360       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

via  the  Atchison  pike  is  more  than  a  mile  the  shorter, 
but  it  has  a  serious  disadvantage  that  more  than  off- 
sets the  advantage  of  shorter  distance. 

The  enemy  surely  will  be  observing  the  roads  to 
the  west  from  Leavenworth  and  Fort  Leavenworth, 
and,  if  he  is  informed  of  Major  A's  approach,  he 
may  be  expected  to  do  his  utmost  to  prevent  a  junc- 
tion of  Major  A's  squadron  with  the  two  battalions 
under  Colonel  C.  The  character  of  the  country  along 
the  Atchison  pike  east  of  Salt  creek  is  such  as  great- 
ly to  assist  the  enemy  in  this  attempt.  From  H  to 
G,  the  road  passes  through  a  defile  less  than  a  mile 
wide,  commanded  on  three  sides  by  high  hills,  and 
here  the  march  of  the  squadron  could  be  greatly  de- 
layed by  even  an  inferior  force.  The  two  troops  of 
hostile  cavalry  might  accomplish  this  delay,  unassist- 
ed, but  the  proximity  of  Atchison  hill  to  the  position 
in  which  the  enemy  probably  will  encounter  Colonel 
C,  favors  supporting  the  hostile  cavalry  by  a  com- 
pany or  so  of  hostile  infantry.  With  the  hostile  in- 
fantry blocking  the  eastern  exit  of  the  defile,  and  the 
hostile  cavalry  free  to  move  to  the  north  and  south, 
Major  A  would  find  this  a  very  difficult  point  to  pass. 

On  the  Millwood  road,  the  danger  of  the  squadron 
being  seriously  delayed  is  not  so  great.  It  may  en- 
counter the  hostile  cavalry,  but  the  latter  will  be  far 
from  the  support  of  its  infantry,  for  it  is  not  probable 
that  the  hostile  commander  will  send  a  part  of  his 
infantry  to  the  Millwood  road,  two  or  more  miles 
from  where  he  is  making  his  main  fight  south  of  Fort 
Leavenworth.  All  things  considered,  the  more  north- 
ern of  the  two  roads  appears  to  be  the  better.  Major 
A  will  not  decide  at  this  time  on  his  route  beyond  11. 


CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY  361 

Bearing  in  mind  the  mission  of  the  squadron,  Ma- 
jor A  should  limit  his  reconnaissance  to  such  as  is 
necessary  to  protect  his  march.  Until  he  approaches 
Fort  Leavenworth,  he  has  to  fear  only  the  hostile 
cavalry.  If  the  enemy  started  his  cavalry  to  the  west 
soon  after  6  a.  m.,  via  the  Atchison  pike,  it  can  be 
crossing  Salt  creek  at  H  about  the  time  the  squadron 
reaches  L.  Consequently,  as  far  as  L,  Major  A  will 
be  in  no  great  danger  of  meeting  the  hostile  cavalry; 
but,  from  there  to  Fort  Leavenworth,  he  may  expect 
to  meet  it  at  any  moment.  A  patrol,  led  by  an  offi- 
cer, will  be  sent  ahead  of  the  squadron,  with  instruc- 
tions to  continue  east  from  L  via  the  Atchison  pike. 
There  is  little  likelihood  of  the  hostile  cavalry  strik- 
ing the  right  flank  of  the  squadron  before  it  passes  L, 
nevertheless  the  P — 80 — 78 — 76  road  will  be  recon- 
noitered  by  a  patrol  sent  out  at  69,  with  instructions 
to  rejoin  at  L.  When  the  squadron  turns  north  at 
L,  a  patrol  will  be  sent  ahead  of  it  on  the  Millwood 
road.  These  patrols  will  be  sent  from  the  advance 
guard,  which  will  be  formed  by  Troop  A,  less  the  pla- 
toon remaining  with  the  detachment. 

Major  A's  decision  is  to  trot  out  for  Fort  Leaven- 
worth, via  the  Lowemont — L — 87 — 15  road,  with 
Troop  A  (less  1  platoon)  in  the  advance  guard,  from 
which  patrols  will  reconnoiter  well  to  the  front  on  the 
Atchison  pike  and  Millwood  road. 

At  6:30  a.  m.,  Major  A  assembles  his  troop  com- 
manders and  staff  and  issues  the  following  verbal 
orders : 

"A  hostile  force  of  about  a  regiment  of  infantry  and  two 
troops  of  cavalry  detrained  south  of  Leavenworth  during  the 
night.  At  6  a.  m.,  it  was  about  two  miles  south  of  Leaven- 


862       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

worth  and  advancing  on  that  city.  Colonel  C  is  concentrating 
just  south  of  Fort  Leavenworth  to  oppose  the  enemy.  General 
B  intends  to  march  immediately  on  Fort  Leavenworth. 

"The  squadron  will  start  at  once  and  trot  out  for  Fort  Leav- 
enworth to  reinforce  Colonel  C. 

"Captain  A,  your  troop,  less  the  platoon  on  outpost,  which 
is  to  accompany  the  infantry,  will  form  the  advance  guard.  You 
will  follow  the  Lowemont — N — M — L — 87 — 15  road.  Send  an 
officer's  patrol  ahead  on  the  Atchison  pike,  and  reconnoiter  the 
69— P— 80— 78— 76  road. 

"The  main  body  of  the  squadron  will  follow  you  at  700 
yards,  in  the  order  Troops  B,  C  and  D. 

"I  will  be  with  the  main  body." 

COMMENTS. 

It  may  be  well  to  point  out  that  Major  A's  disposi- 
tion and  leading  of  the  squadron,  from  Millwood  to 
Fort  Leavenworth,  are  very  different  from  what  they 
would  be,  were  he  charged  with  the  mission  of  locat- 
ing the  enemy  and  covering  the  march  of  the  detach- 
ment. But  Major  A's  mission  is  to  get  to  Fort  Leav- 
enworth without  delay,  to  reinforce  Colonel  C,  and  he 
is  interested  in  the  enemy's  whereabouts  only  to  the 
extent  necessary  to  insure  the  uninterrupted  march 
of  the  squadron.  Accordingly,  he  makes  no  exten- 
sive search  for  the  enemy,  and  limits  the  number  of 
patrols  sent  out  to  those  necessary  to  enable  the  squad- 
ron to  maneuver  and  fight  to  advantage  should  the 
enemy,  especially  the  enemy's  cavalry,  be  encoun- 
tered. 

Marching  cavalry  protects  itself  with  an  advance 
guard,  in  the  same  manner  as  does  marching  infan- 
try. A  cavalry  advance  guard  differs  in  no  essential 
point  of  formation  and  conduct  from  an  infantry  ad- 
vance guard,  except  that  the  distances  between  frac- 


CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY  363 

tions  of  the  column  are  greater  in  a  cavalry  advance 
guard  than  in  one  composed  of  infantry.  This  is  be- 
cause of  the  greater  mobility  of  the  cavalry  which,  on 
one  hand,  permits  greater  distances  to  be  preserved 
without  undue  risk,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  makes 
greater  distances  necessary  in  order  to  protect  the 
successive  bodies  in  rear  from  unexpected  attacks 
by  hostile  cavalry.  Since  the  squadron  will  march  at  a 
rapid  gait,  through  rolling  and  hilly  country,  condi- 
tions which  make  it  extremely  difficult  to  preserve  dis- 
tances accurately,  Major  A  designates  700  yards  as 
the  distance  at  which  the  main  body  will  follow  the 
advance  guard.  This  distance  probably  will  be  great- 
er at  times  and  less  at  others  as  the  march  progresses. 

Continuation  of  the  Problem. 

The  squadron  left  Millwood  (67)  with  Troop  A, 
less  2  platoons,  in  the  support  of  the  advance  guard, 
and  1  platoon  of  the  same  troop  in  the  advance  party 
400  yards  ahead  of  the  support.  From  this  troop,  the 
2d  lieutenant  and  5  troopers  were  sent  east  on  the 
Atchison  pike,  and  a  patrol  of  a  non-commissioned  of- 
ficer and  4  troopers  was  sent  in  advance  of  the  point 
on  the  Millwood  road.  The  1st  lieutenant  is  with  the 
advance  party,  and  Captain  A  is  with  the  support. 

As  the  support  is  walking  down  the  steep  hill  900 
yards  west  of  19  (see  4-inch  map),  at  7:47  a.  m.,  Ma- 
jor A  (who  has  ridden  forward  to  observe)  receives  a 
message  from  the  officer's  patrol,  sent  from  the  high 
ground  northwest  of  the  Burns  house  (west  of  the 
H — 17  road),  reporting  a  column  of  hostile  cavalry 
advancing  down  the  west  slope  of  Atchison  hill  on  the 
14 — G — H  road,  at  7:35  a.  m. 


364       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Major  A  continued  to  advance  with  the  support, 
and  was  passing  the  Sprong  house  at  7  '55  a.  m.  Here 
he  was  handed  a  message  from  the  non-commissioned 
officer's  patrol  on  the  Millwood  road,  sent  from  J.  E. 
Daniels  at  7:50  a.  m.,  saying  no  enemy  was  then  in 
sight  to  the  east  as  far  as  the  woods  east  of  15.  As 
the  support  passed  the  Sprong  house,  Captain  A  sent 
3  troopers  to  hill  900  (500  yards  southeast  of  19)  to 
reconnoiter  to  the  south. 

The  advance  continued,  and  soon  after  the  support 
passed  19,  the  2d  lieutenant  galloped  up  with  his  pa- 
trol from  the  direction  of  17,  and  reported  as  follows: 

"There  are  two  troops  of  the  hostile  cavalry,  and  they  turned 
north  about  a  mile  and  a  half  south  of  here  on  a  north  and  south 
road  just  beyond  that  schoolhouse  ("Taylor  S.  H."  on  the  map). 
I  was  driven  back  by  one  platoon  which  pursued  me  closely  as 
far  as  the  cross-roads  (17)  just  beyond  the  schoolhouse.  I 
don't  know  where  the  remainder  of  the  two  hostile  troops  went." 

As  the  2d  lieutenant  completes  this  report,  firing  is 
heard  in  the  direction  of  17,  the  advance  party  is  seen 
to  halt  under  cover  of  the  spur  at  the  schoolhouse,  and 
Captain  A  halts  the  support  400  yards  east  of  19. 
At  the  same  time,  one  of  the  3  troopers  on  hill  900 
(500  yards  southeast  of  19)  gallops  down  the  hill  and 
reports  a  column  of  hostile  cavalry  moving  north  to- 
wards hill  900,  with  the  head  of  the  column  about  700 
yards  south  of  the  top  of  the  hill.  The  main  body  of 
Major  A's  squadron  is  concealed  from  him  by  the 
ridge  between  the  position  of  the  support  and  19. 

The  roads  that  join  at  19  and  17  are  lined  with 
barbed  wire  fences,  except  where  hedge  fences  are 
shown  on  the  map.  The  fences  about  the  fields  are  of 
hedge  and  barbed  wire,  as  indicated  on  the  map. 


CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY  365 

Xorth  of  the  Millwood  road,  from  the  Duffin  house 
to  17,  are  fields  of  uncut  corn,  as  high  as  a  horse's 
back.  The  field  south  of  the  road  from  19  to  17  is 
wheat  stubble,  except  for  a  strip  of  uncut  corn,  300 
yards  wide,  extending  from  just  south  of  the  school- 
house  to  the  Moss  house.  The  fields  southwest  of  19 
are  all  wheat  stubble.  On  top  of  hill  900,  just  north 
of  the  last  "0"  in  900  is  a  large  straw  stack.  The 
hedges  are  about  three  feet  high.  The  contours  show 
the  limit  of  Major  A's  view  from  his  position  on  the 
road. 

Required : 

Major  A's  decision  and  orders. 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 

Major  A  decides  to  move  south,  over  hill  900,  with 
the  support  of  the  advance  guard  and  the  main  body 
of  the  squadron,  and  attack  the  hostile  cavalry.  The 
support  will  go  through  the  fence  at  its  present  posi- 
tion and  head  for  the  straw  stack,  and  the  main  body 
will  turn  south  through  the  fence  wherever  it  happens 
to  be  when  the  order  reaches  it.  The  advance  party 
will  cover  the  left  flank  from  an  attack  by  the  hostile 
force  at  17. 

Major  A's  orders  are  as  follows:  . 

To  Captain  A  (commanding  the  advance  guard) 
who  heard  the  reports  of  the  2d  lieutenant  and  of  the 
trooper  from  the  straw  stack: 

"We  will  move  south  and  attack. 

"Take  the  support  towards  that  straw  stack. 

"The  main  body  will  follow  you. 

"The  advance  party  will  protect  our  left  flank. 

"I  will  go  with  you." 


366       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 
To  his  squadron  adjutant: 

"Explain  the  situation  and  my  intentions  to  the  captains  of 
the  main  body,  and  turn  the  column  towards  that  straw  stack 
as  soon  as  you  meet  it." 

To  his  squadron  quartermaster: 

"Explain  the  situation  and  my  intentions  to  the  commander 
of  the  advance  party,  and  direct  him  to  cover  our  left  flank 
against  whatever  hostile  force  is  near  the  cross  roads." 

COMMENTS. 

Bearing  in  mind  that  his  mission  is  to  reach  Fort 
Leavenworth  without  delay,  Major  A  might  have 
made  a  dash  along  the  19 — 17 — 15  road,  in  an  effort 
to  get  by  the  cavalry  approaching  his  right  flank  be- 
fore it  could  do  him  serious  harm,  were  it  not  for 
the  platoon  of  hostile  cavalry  at  17.  The  filing  in- 
dicates that  this  platoon  is  dismounted  and  in  posi- 
tion, and  a  dash  down  the  straight  road  into  its  fire, 
with  the  squadron  hemmed  in  between  barbed  wire 
fences,  might  meet  with  disaster,  especially  if  the  ene- 
my has  had  time  and  been  resourceful  enough  to 
stretch  a  few  strands  of  wire  across  the  19 — 17  road, 
just  west  of  the  cross  roads.  The  squadron  would  be 
in  a  very  critical  situation,  should  it  be  checked  be- 
tween 19  and  17  while  the  enemy  is  in  possession  of 
hill  900,  but  400  yards  away.  The  desire  to  get  to 
Fort  Leavenworth  is  natural  and  correct,  but,  with 
the  enemy  so  near  on  two  sides,  the  best  plan  is  to 
strike  him,  drive  him  back,  and  then  go  on  with  the 
execution  of  the  original  mission. 

Throwing  out  a  flank  guard  of  a  troop  or  two  to 
the  south,  to  hold  the  enemy  off  until  the  platoon  has 
been  driven  from  17  and  the  remainder  of  the  squad- 
ron has  passed,  would  be  a  poorer  plan  still.  The  ene- 


CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY  367 

my  is  too  near  the  squadron's  flank  for  this  plan  to 
have  much  chance  of  success.  Having  decided  to 
fight,  it  is  better  to  attack  the  enemy's  main  force 
with  every  available  man. 

Defensive  action,  in  some  position  north  of  the  19 
— 17  road,  is  not  worthy  of  serious  consideration,  for 
that  would  be  playing  the  enemy's  game,  which  prob- 
ably is  to  delay  Major  A's  advance  on  Fort  Leaven- 
worth.  The  essential  point  in  Major  A's  decision  is  to 
attack  the  enemy  approaching  hill  900;  and,  in  de- 
ciding on  a  plan  for  making  this  attack,  the  main 
thing  is  to  get  at  least  a  part  of  the  squadron  to  the 
hill-top  before  the  enemy  has  had  an  opportunity  to 
establish  himself  there.  For  this  reason,  the  support 
is  sent  through  the  fence  towards  the  straw  stack  at 
once,  to  meet  the  head  of  the  hostile  column.  The  de- 
lay it  will  cause  the  enemy,  however  small,  may  se- 
cure the  time  necessary  to  get  the  main  body  of  the 
squadron  through  the  fence  and  in  proper  formation 
for  efficient  action. 

Some  provision  should  be  made  for  protecting  the 
left  flank  of  the  attack  against  whatever  force  of  the 
enemy  may  be  at  17,  and  this  task  naturally  falls  to 
the  advance  party,  since  it  is  already  in  a  good  posi- 
tion for  this  purpose.  No  serious  objection  can  be 
made  to  sending  a  platoon  to  the  assistance  of  the  ad- 
vance party,  provided  this  reinforcement  is  sent  from 
the  main  body  and  not  from  the  support,  for,  as  al- 
ready stated,  both  platoons  in  the  support  have  a  more 
important  task  elsewhere. 

But,  to  order  the  advance  party  alone,  or  the  ad- 
vance party  reinforced  from  the  support  or  main 
body,  to  attack  the  force  at  17,  is  objectionable.  If 


368       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Major  A  can  avoid  it,  he  should  not  engage  in  two 
fights  at  the  same  time.  He  should  concentrate  all 
his  available  strength  against  the  main  hostile  force, 
and,  while  deciding  this  combat,  he  should  endeavor, 
by  defensive  action,  to  hold  off  the  hostile  detachment 
near  17.  It  will  be  obliged  to  fall  back,  if  Major  A 
can  drive  back  the  main  hostile  force. 

It  is  in  situations  such  as  this,  that  a  commander  ap- 
preciates the  full  value  of  training  in  issuing  orders. 
The  orders  are  brief,  yet  they  are  perfectly  clear. 
They  meet  the  situation,  but  they  do  not  go  beyond  it 
and  attempt  to  provide  for  contingencies  which  may 
not  arise.  Captain  A  is  not  told  what  he  shall  do 
when  he  reaches  the  top  of  the  hill,  but  is  left  with 
full  liberty  to  shape  his  action  to  meet  the  situation 
when  he  sees  the  enemy.  Major  A  may  be  with  him 
at  that  time,  but,  if  he  is  not,  Captain  A  will  act  in 
accordance  with  his  own  judgment.  Similarly,  the 
main  body  is  given  no  orders  except  to  turn  into  the 
field  and  march  on  the  straw  stack.  Major  A  does 
not  know  enough  of  the  situation  beyond  hill  900  to 
warrant  giving  the  main  body  orders  to  attack.  These 
orders  will  be  sent  it  after  Major  A  has  had  a  look 
from  the  top  of  the  hill,  or  has  learned  more  of  the 
situation  in  some  other  manner. 

Continuation  of  the  Problem. 
As  Major  A  finished  issuing  his  orders,  the  support 
passed  through  the  sections  of  the  fence  that  had  been 
opened  in  the  mean  time,  and  started  towards  the 
straw  stack,  in  column  of  fours  at  a  trot.  When 
about  half  way  up  the  hill,  the  remaining  two  troop- 
ers at  the  straw  stack  galloped  back,  pursued  by  four 


CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY 


369 


hostile  troopers,  who  turned  and  fled  when  they  saw 
the  support  advancing. 

When  Major  A  comes  over  the  brow  of  the  hill 
near  the  straw  stack,  a  single  glance  shows  the  fol- 
lowing situation: 


lt_n    MILLWOOD/     T     v    ROAD 


30  OISMQI/NTEO 
MCN 


RCO  TF?OOP3 


am-?  BLUE:  TROOPS 
too      o 


<*oo  roa. 


A  deployed  line  of  about  thirty  dismounted  men 
is  moving  north  towards  the  crest  of  the  ridge;  it  is 
about  30  yards  south  of  the  crest,  with  its  right  flank 
about  300  yards  from  the  straw  stack,  and  its  left 
flank  about  100  yards  east  of  the  hedge  fence  running 


370       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

south  from  19.  (*)  The  men  are  deployed  at  one 
yard  interval. 

The  led  horses  of  half  a  troop  of  cavalry  are  mov- 
ing away  from  the  deployed  line,  at  a  walk,  down  the 
ravine  that  heads  near  the  deployed  line.  They  are 
about  150  yards  due  south  of  the  three  trees. 

A  troop  of  hostile  cavalry  in  column  of  fours  is 
coming  through  the  barbed  wire  fence,  900  yards 
south  of  the  19 — 17  road,  about  200  yards  east  of  the 
junction  of  the  barbed  wire  fence  with  the  hedge 
fence  running  south  from  19,  and  is  advancing  due 
north  in  the  field  of  wheat  stubble,  at  a  trot. 

No  other  enemy  can  be  seen  in  the  visible  terrain. 
The  corn  field  east  of  the  straw  stack  obstructs  the 
view  towards  17. 

The  support  of  Major  A's  advance  guard  is  just 
behind  him  at  the  straw  stack.  The  main  body  of  the 
squadron  is  coming  through  a  gap  in  the  hedge  fence, 
100  yards  east  of  19.  A  part  of  the  leading  troop  is 
through  and  is  forming  column  of  fours  from  col- 
umn of  twos.  The  firing  towards  17  has  ceased. 

So  far  as  Major  A  can  see,  the  field  south  of  the 
barbed  wire  fence,  through  which  the  hostile  troop  is 
passing,  is  closely  cropped  pasture  land.  The  stub- 
ble field  has  a  smooth  and  firm  surface. 

Required : 

Major  A's  decision  and  orders. 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 

Major  A  decides  to  attack,  mounted.  The  two  pla- 
toons in  the  support  of  the  advance  guard  will  at- 

*  All  the  positions  of  troops  in  this  problem  are  shown  on  the  ac- 
companying sketch. 


CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY  371 

tack  the  30  dismounted  men,  the  leading  two  troops 
of  the  main  body  of  the  squadron  will  attack  the  hos- 
tile mounted  troop  and  the  led  horses  in  the  ravine, 
and  the  rear  troop  of  the  main  body  will  be  held  in 
reserve. 

His  orders  are  as  follows: 

To  Captain  A  (commanding  Troop  A,  less  2  pla- 
toons), who  is  by  his  side: 

"Charge  that  dismounted  line  (pointing  to  the  30  dismount- 
ed men)  with  your  troop.  I  will  follow  you  with  the  main 
body." 

To  Captain  B  (commanding  Troop  B) ,  whom  Ma- 
jor A  joined,  in  less  than  half  a  minute,  at  the  head 
of  the  main  body: 

"Form  column  of  platoons  and  charge  a  mounted  troop  that 
is  about  to  come  over  the  hill  in  that  direction  (pointing  to  the 
south)  ;  Troop  C  will  support  you." 

To  Captain  C  (commanding  Troop  C) ,  whom  Ma- 
jor A  now  joins: 

"Troop  B  is  charging  a  mounted  hostile  troop.  Support  the 
charge  with  your  troop." 

To  Captain  D  (commanding  Troop  D) : 

"The  enemy  has  half  a  troop  dismounted  and  a  troop  mount- 
ed. Hold  your  troop  in  reserve,  and  move  it  towards  the  straw 
stack." 

Major  A  then  rides  back  towards  the  top  of  the 
hill  to  see  the  progress  of  the  combat. 

COMMENTS. 

Unless  the  30  dismounted  men  are  attacked,  they 
can  reach  a  position  in  less  than  half  a  minute  from 
which  they  can  fire  on  the  main  body  of  the  squadron 
coming  through  the  fence  into  the  field.  Hence  the 
two  platoons  (originally  the  support  of  the  advance 


372       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

guard),  now  with  Major  A  at  the  straw  stack,  are 
ordered  to  attack  the  30  dismounted  men  at  once. 

The  mounted  attack  is  perfectly  practicable,  since 
the  charging  force  has  to  cover  but  300  yards,  the  30 
dismounted  men  are  taken  by  surprise,  and  the  charge 
will  be  against  the  flank  of  their  deployed  line.  The 
desired  results  probably  would  be  secured  by  having 
the  two  platoons  dismount  and  open  fire  on  the  30 
men,  and  this  action  is  favored  by  the  nearness  of  the 
straw  stack,  which  affords  splendid  cover  for  the  led 
horses,  and  for  the  two  platoons  while  dismounting. 
The  mounted  action  is  preferred  because  it  is,  or 
should  be,  the  more  natural  way  for  cavalry  to  fight, 
under  the  circumstances;  it  is  simpler  and  promises 
speedier  and  greater  results ;  and  it  allows  the  30  men 
less  opportunity  to  escape. 

The  order  given  Captain  A  permits  him  to  make  his 
own  choice  of  formation  for  this  charge.  The  charge 
will  be  made  in  two  lines,  boot  to  boot,  with  a  platoon 
in  each,  the  rear  platoon  following  the  leading  pla- 
toon at  about  100  yards,  prepared  to  finish  the  work 
of  the  leading  platoon,  or  to  turn  to  the  left  and  strike 
the  head  of  the  mounted  troop.  Were  the  charge  to 
be  made  over  a  greater  distance,  and  against  the  front 
instead  of  the  flank  of  the  enemy,  it  probably  would 
be  better  to  charge  as  foragers. 

To  attack  the  30  dismounted  men  with  one  pla- 
toon, and  the  led  horses  with  the  other,  would  not  be 
the  best  method  of  employing  these  two  platoons. 
The  30  men,  if  permitted,  may  interfere  seriously 
with  the  attack  of  the  main  body  of  the  squadron,  and 
every  man  of  the  two  platoons  at  the  straw  stack,  ex- 
cept a  small  combat  patrol  to  be  sent  towards  the  Moss 


CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY  378 

house,  should  be  employed  in  the  attack  against  the  30 
men,  whether  the  attack  is  made  mounted  or  dismount- 
ed. The  capture  of  the  led  horses  is  a  matter  of  sec- 
ondary importance  that  may  be  attempted  later.  To 
attack  the  led  horses  with  all  of  the  two  platoons 
would  be  a  still  more  serious  error,  for  the  30  men  are 
then  free  to  fire  on  the  two  platoons  as  well  as  on  the 
main  body  of  the  squadron. 

The  charge  to  be  delivered  by  the  main  body  of  the 
squadron  should  be  started  at  once,  and  its  objective 
should  be  the  mounted  hostile  troop.  There  is  not 
sufficient  time  to  bring  the  entire  squadron  through 
the  fence  and  form  it  up  in  three  lines  before  start- 
ing the  charge,  and  the  best  we  can  do  is  to  order  each 
troop  forward  as  soon  as  it  has  come  through  the 
fence.  Until  Captain  B  has  reached  a  point  where  he 
can  see  the  mounted  hostile  troop,  the  best  formation 
for  his  troop  (at  the  head  of  the  main  body)  will  be 
column  of  platoons.  A  formation  with  a  broader 
front  would  be  more  difficult  to  direct,  and  the  chan- 
ces are  that  a  charge  by  a  part  of  the  line  would  be 
delivered  in  the  air.  The  formation  and  movements 
of  the  remaining  two  troops  will  depend  on  the  de- 
velopment of  the  fight.  Captain  B  may  have  to  in- 
cline to  the  left  with  his  troop  in  order  to  avoid  inter- 
fering with  the  charge  of  the  two  platoons  from  the 
straw  stack.  More  probably  these  two  platoons  will 
have  passed  Captain  B's  front,  and  in  that  event  he 
may  ride  through  and  over  the  remnants  of  the  30 
dismounted  men. 

Continuation  of  the  Problem. 
Major  A's  attack  drove  the  mounted  hostile  troop 


374       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

to  the  southwest.  The  30  dismounted  men  were  killed 
or  captured,  but  a  part  of  their  led  horses  escaped. 
The  hostile  platoon,  which  had  been  blocking  the  road 
at  17,  escaped  to  the  south.  Leaving  a  platoon,  under 
an  officer,  to  move  the  wounded  to  the  Sprong  house, 
and  to  bring  the  able-bodied  prisoners  and  captured 
horses  on  to  Fort  Leavenworth,  Major  A  sent  a  re- 
port of  the  encounter  to  General  B,  and  continued  his 
advance,  at  8:15  a  m.,  in  the  same  formation  as  be- 
fore. Distant  firing  could  then  be  heard  towards 
Leavenworth. 

Before  the  squadron  passed  15,  the  non-commis- 
sioned officer's  patrol  reported  from  Bell  point,  at 
8:15  a.  m.,  that  it  had  encountered  no  enemy  on  Sher- 
idan's Drive,  and  that  heavy  firing  could  be  heard 
south  of  Fort  Leavenworth.  The  squadron  was 
turned  to  the  south  at  11,  and  taken  up  the  slope  of 
Hancock  hill  to  Sheridan's  Drive.  At  Wagner  point, 
a  hostile  infantry  patrol  was  encountered,  which  de- 
layed the  squadron  for  about  10  minutes.  Nothing 
was  seen  of  the  hostile  cavalry  after  the  squadron  left 
17.  The  noise  of  firing  towards  Leavenworth  was 
continuous  during  the  advance  from  17. 

At  9  a.  m.,  Major  A  is  at  D,  at  the  junction  of 
Sheridan's  Drive  with  Hancock  avenue,  with  his 
squadron  closed  up  behind  him  in  columns  of  fours, 
and  a  hasty  reconnaissance  from  the  edge  of  the  wood 
shows  the  following  situation : 

Colonel  C's  force  is  occupying  shallow  trenches  on 
both  knolls  of  Merritt  hill.  (*)  The  trench  on  the 
western  knoll  follows  the  880  contour,  and  its  right 
flank  rests  on  the  road  leading  from  8  across  the  top 

*  These  positions  are  shown  on  the  accompanying  sketch. 


CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY 


375 


of  Merritt  hill.  The  trench  on  the  eastern  knoll  also 
follows  the  880  contour,  and  its  left  flank  appears  to 
rest  on  Grant  avenue.  A  short  trench  can  be  seen 
across  the  head  of  the  ravine  between  the  two  knolls. 
Two  Blue  companies,  deployed  on  a  front  of  about 
250  yards,  are  advancing  out  of  the  ravine  on  the 


north  slope  of  Merritt  hill,  and  are  parallel  to  and 
about  75  yards  from  the  road  from  8  to  Merritt  hill, 
with  their  right  flank  at  the  letter  "y"  in  "Cavalry." 
This  position  is  being  attacked.  Hostile  infantry, 
deployed  at  about  one  man  per  yard,  can  be  seen  ex- 
tending about  400  yards  along  and  in  the  ravine  which 
runs  a  little  southeast  from  the  letter  "1"  in  "Drill 
Ground,"  with  its  left  flank  at  the  same  letter  "1". 


376       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Parts  of  another  line  of  hostile  infantry,  similarly 
deployed,  can  be  seen  extending  west  from  the  words 
"Pope  Hill."  Extending  a  little  southeast  of  the  let- 
ter "D"  in  "Drill  Ground,"  along  the  crest  of  the 
ridge  across  Prison  lane  are  two  and  a  half  compan- 
ies of  hostile  infantry,  deployed  on  a  line  about  250 
yards  long,  the  left  of  the  line  about  100  yards  south- 
east of  the  same  letter  "D".  All  these  lines  are  de- 
livering a  heavy  fire  on  the  trenches,  and  the  fire  is 
being  returned  from  the  trenches. 

Two  hundrd  yards  west  of  the  letter  "o"  in  "Prison 
Lane"  is  a  company  of  hostile  infantry,  in  line  in 
close  order,  facing  east.  One  hundred  and  fifty  yards 
west  of  the  letter  "D"  in  the  word  "Drill  Ground," 
is  a  platoon  of  hostile  infantry  in  column  of  squads, 
advancing  towards  D  (where  Major  A  is  observing) . 
As  far  as  Major  A  can  see,  there  is  closely  cropped 
pasture  land  between  Grant  avenue  and  the  range  of 
wooded  hills  a  little  over  a  mile  west  of  Grant  avenue. 
Of  the  ravines  marked  with  a  full  blue  line  on  the 
map,  those  visible  to  Major  A  appear  to  be  serious  ob- 
stacles to  cavalry,  excepting  the  one  just  west  of  and 
about  parallel  to  that  part  of  Prison  lane  between  8 
and  XXII.  This  latter  ravine  has  been  filled  in  and 
levelled  off  to  make  an  additional  target  range  and  is 
now  overgrown  with  closely  trimmed  grass.  The 
squadron  appears  to  be  concealed  from  the  enemy  by 
the  wood  and  dense  underbrush  along  Sheridan's 
Drive. 

Required : 

Major  A's  decision  and  orders. 


CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY  377 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 
Major  A  decides  to    deliver    a    mounted    attack 
against  the  hostile  infantry,  sending  the  leading  three 
troops    (from  which  all  the  detachments  previously 
made  have  been  taken)  against  the  platoon  advancing 
in  column  of  squads,  the  company  standing  in  line  in 
close  order,  and  the  two  and  a  half  companies  de- 
ployed along  the  crest  of  the  ridge  across  Prison 
lane,  and  holding  the  fourth  troop  in  reserve. 
His  orders  are  as  follows: 
To  Captain  A,  who  is  beside  Major  A: 

"We  will  attack  that  infantry  mounted. 

"Charge  over  that  platoon  and  into  the  formed  company  be- 
yond with  your  troop. 

"Troops  B  and  C  will  support  you. 
"Troop  D  will  be  the  reserve." 

To  Captain  B,  as  he  approaches: 

"Charge   that   deployed   line    (pointing   to   the   two   and   one 
half  companies  across  Prison  lane)   and  support  Captain  A. 
"The  other  two  troops  will  follow  you." 

The  orders  given  Troop  C,  and  the  use  to  be  made 
of  Troop  D  in  reserve,  will  depend  on  the  develop- 
ment of  the  situation. 

COMMENTS. 

A  decision  to  make  a  dismounted  attack  against 
the  enemy's  left  flank,  with  the  entire  squadron,  would 
be  a  good  solution  for  this  problem,  but  the  solution 
given  above  is  preferred,  for  reasons  which  will  now 
be  stated. 

It  appears  that  the  attack  will  be  a  surprise  to  the 
enemy.  He  may  have  heard  of  the  squadron's  ap- 
proach, but  the  position  of  the  company  in  close  or- 
der, in  line  facing  east,  suggests  that  he  is  not  aware 


378       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

of  imminent  danger  to  his  left  flank,  although  the 
movement  of  the  platoon  towards  D  indicates  that  he 
is  taking  measures,  somewhat  tardily  to  be  sure,  to 
protect  this  flank.  The  position  of  the  marching  pla- 
toon is  an  advantage  for  Major  A,  for  it  is  but  300 
yards  from  the  head  of  the  squadron,  and,  at  the  best, 
it  can  deploy  and  accurately  fire  but  very  few  shots 
before  it  is  ridden  down,  and  it  will  serve  to  mask  the 
fire  of  the  formed  company  and  deployed  line  in  its 
rear. 

The  target  is  exceptionally  favorable  for  mounted 
action — a  deployed  line  about  250  yards  long,  busily 
engaged  in  a  severe  fire  fight  at  less  than  500  yards 
from  the  trenches,  and  a  company  in  close  order  but 
100  yards  in  its  rear,  both  with  a  flank  pointing  direct- 
ly towards  the  squadron,  and  both  apparently  un- 
aware of  the  danger  on  their  flank. 

Major  A  has  reached  the  battlefield  at  an  oppor- 
tune moment.  The  situation  appears  to  afford  the 
squadron  an  excellent  chance  to  decide  the  fight. 
What  Major  A  has  seen  indicates  that  the  enemy  has 
one  regiment,  and  is  attacking  the  front  of  Colonel 
C's  intrenched  position  with  one  battalion,  and  is  en- 
deavoring to  envelop  the  right  of  the  position  with 
two  battalions.  This  strength  agrees  with  the  infor- 
mation received  from  Colonel  C  before  the  squadron 
left  Millwood.  The  attack  has  about  reached  its  final 
stage.  The  battalion  extending  west  from  Pope  hill 
is  about  300  yards  from  the  trenches;  the  battalion 
along  the  ravine  southeast  of  the  letter  "1"  in  "Drill'* 
is  within  about  200  yards  of  the  trenches,  and  the 
whole  situation  indicates  that  both  are  making  the 
fire  preparation  for  the  final  assault.  These  battal- 


CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY  379 

ions  are  being  assisted  by  the  fire  of  the  two  and  a  half 
companies  deployed  across  Prison  lane,  and  the  shape 
of  the  ground  is  such  that  the  fire  can  be  continued 
from  this  position  (but  500  yards  from  the  trenches) 
until  the  assaulting  battalions  are  very  near  the 
trenches. 

On  the  side  of  the  defense,  Colonel  C  appears  to 
be  moving  his  last  formed  reserve  (2  companies)  up 
to  the  line,  to  extend  and  support  his  threatened  right 
flank,  or  to  make  a  counter  attack. 

This  being  the  situation,  a  mounted  attack  by  the 
squadron  should  succeed  in  driving  the  hostile  reserve 
battalion  into  the  XXIII — XXII  ravine,  and  may 
succeed  in  wholly  routing  or  capturing  the  battalion. 
The  charge  will  not  mask  the  fire  being  delivered 
from  the  trenches  on  the  hostile  battalion  in  the  ra- 
vine, and  the  termination  of  the  fire  that  is  being  de- 
livered on  the  trenches  by  the  two  and  one-half  hos- 
tile companies,  probably  will  make  it  possible  for  Col- 
onel C  to  push  his  two  reserve  companies  over  the  top 
of  the  ridge,  and  deliver  a  vigorous  counterstroke  with 
them,  against  the  battalion  in  the  ravine  that  heads 
at  the  letter  "1"  in  "Drill".  The  charging  cavalry  will 
be  seen  by  Colonel  C  and  his  command,  the  morale  of 
the  defenders  will  be  raised  by  the  sight,  and  they  will 
know  the  full  strength  of  the  assistance  that  has 
reached  them. 

But,  we  may  say,  all  this  can  be  accomplished  by 
making  a  dismounted  attack  from  the  edge  of  the 
woods  near  D.  True  enough,  it  may,  but  the  enemy 
will  be  given  time  to  recover  from  his  surprise  and 
to  deploy  a  part  or  all  of  his  reserve  battalion  on  a 
line  facing  north.  The  squadron  (less  2  platoons, 


380       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

some  wounded  left  at  the  S  prong  house,  and  a  patrol 
or  two)  can  put  not  more  than  250  men  in  the  dis- 
mounted attack.  The  hostile  reserve  battalion  has 
about  450  men,  and  should  be  able  to  hold  off  the  dis- 
mounted cavalry  with  two  companies  or  less,  while  the 
remainder  of  the  battalion  continues  to  assist  the  at- 
tack on  the  trenches  from  where  it  now  is,  or  from  a 
new  position  which  affords  cover  from  the  squadron's 
fire. 

Granting  that  the  dismounted  attack  would  suc- 
ceed, still  it  would  take  longer;  the  hostile  regiment 
would  have  a  better  chance  to  withdraw  from  the 
fight  in  some  sort  of  order,  and,  if  the  enemy  has  oth- 
er troops  approaching  the  field,  they  are  given  more 
time  in  which  to  get  within  supporting  distance  be- 
fore it  is  too  late.  The  dismounted  attack  probably 
would  result  in  greater  loss  to  the  cavalry  than  would 
be  suffered  in  a  mounted  attack,  and  in  less  loss  to  the 
hostile  infantry. 

A  dismounted  attack  is  the  more  conservative  ac- 
tion, but  does  not  promise  such  brilliant  results  in 
case  of  success.  But  there  is  another  very  weighty 
reason  why  properly  trained  cavalry  should  make  the 
attack  mounted,  viz.,  the  beneficial  effect  the  mounted 
attack  will  have  on  the  morale  of  this  cavalry,  when  it 
encounters  the  enemy  in  the  future,  as  compared  with 
the  manner  in  which  its  morale  for  true  cavalry  ac- 
tion would  be  impaired  by  a  dismounted  attack.  If 
a  cavalry  leader  forces  his  command  into  a  dismounted 
fight,  when  decisive  mounted  action  is  favored  by  con- 
ditions such  as  those  here  presented,  he  must  not  be 
surprised  if  his  cavalry  loses  its  spirit,  and  fails  when 
only  mounted  action  will  save  it.  Cavalry  properly 


CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY  381 

trained  is  taught,  in  time  of  peace,  to  place  its  main 
reliance  in  the  horse  and  the  saber;  and,  in  time  of 
war,  it  should  never  be  employed  dismounted,  against 
cavalry,  infantry  or  artillery  when  mounted  action 
promises  as  good  or  better  results. 

There  was  a  day  when  it  was  the  rule  for  cavalry  to 
attack  mounted  and  in  masses  against  infantry  still 
under  the  control  of  its  leaders,  but  sensible  cavalry- 
men willingly  admit  that  that  day  is  past.  By  this 
we  do  not  mean  to  say,  however,  that  the  modern 
battlefield  does  not  present  occasional  opportunities 
for  the  mounted  action  of  cavalry  against  infantry; 
and  in  this  problem  we  have  attempted  to  illustrate 
one  such  opportunity. 

Still,  dismounted  action  will  be  the  rule  in  the  fu- 
ture, when  cavalry  is  confronted  by  infantry,  and  be- 
cause of  this  we  are  in  danger  of  forming  the  opinion 
that  it  should  never  fight  mounted  when  engaged  with 
infantry.  Undoubtedly,  the  main  object  is  to  gain  a 
victory,  and  the  weapon  with  which  we  gain  it  is  but  a 
minor  consideration ;  but  it  would  be  a  pity  if  our  cav- 
alry leaders  were  not  trained  to  recognize  at  a  glance, 
the  few  fleeting  occasions  when  infantry  may  be  rid- 
den down,  and  victory  gained,  in  the  shortest  time, 
with  the  least  loss  and  with  the  greatest  results,  by 
mounted  action. 

As  a  rule  these  favorable  occasions  arise  when  the 
opposing  infantry  is,  for  one  reason  or  another,  in  a 
shaken  and  demoralized  condition.  Unshaken  infan- 
try of  good  quality  may  be  attacked  mounted,  with 
reasonable  chance  of  success  only  when  other  condi- 
tions are  exceptionally  favorable,  i.  e.  when  the  cav- 
alry can  approach  to  short  charging  distance  without 


being  seen  and  can  attack  by  surprise,  as  is  the  case  in 
the  situation  we  have  just  studied. 

The  question,  Under  what  circumstances  does  a  cav- 
alry charge  against  infantry  promise  good  results? 
would  be  very  easy  to  answer  were  it  possible  for  the 
cavalry  leader  to  know  the  condition  of  the  infantry. 
But,  right  here  is  the  difficulty.  There  is  no  well  de- 
fined line  dividing  shaken  from  unshaken  infantry, 
and  there  are  no  plain  signs  that  indicate  in  all  cases 
this  shaken  condition. 

Morale  is  one  of  the  deciding  factors  of  every  bat- 
tle, and  we  can  not  eliminate  it  from  war.  Whatever 
the  character  of  troops,  morale  and  the  conditions  af- 
fecting it  are  so  varying  that  the  probable  conduct 
of  those  troops,  in  any  particular  situation,  always 
contains  an  element  of  doubt,  and  for  this  reason  we 
can  not  say  with  certainty  what  the  result  of  a  charge 
will  be  before  it  is  delivered.  We  naturally  would 
expect  the  rapidly  moving  cavalry,  who  knows  the 
worst  is  over  if  it  can  but  close  with  the  foe,  to  have 
morale  superior  to  that  of  the  infantry  waiting  to  re- 
ceive the  charge,  with  the  full  knowledge  that  every 
additional  moment  increases  its  danger;  but  matters 
may  turn  out  just  the  reverse.  On  the  battlefield, 
things  are  what  they  are,  and  not  what  we  think  they 
should  be. 

A  squadron  may  charge  through  a  hail  of  bullets 
to-day,  losing  a  large  percent  of  its  numbers  and  driv- 
ing the  enemy  from  his  position,  while  to-morrow  it 
may  turn  to  the  rear  in  rout  and  disgrace  before  five 
percent  of  its  strength  has  fallen.  On  the  other  hand, 
infantry  may  repulse  a  cavalry  charge  to-day,  with  a 
fire  almost  as  steady  as  that  delivered  on  the  target 


CAVALRY  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY  383 

range,  and  yet  flee  in  a  panic  to-morrow  at  the  sight 
of  an  onrushing  horde  of  yelling  horsemen. 

No  leader  of  men  in  battle  dares  to  disregard  these 
psychic  phenomena,  and  because  of  them,  even  the 
most  daring  cavalry  commander  probably  will  have 
forced  upon  him  the  conviction  that  the  situation  must 
be  exceptionally  favorable  that  will  warrant  a  mount- 
ed attack  against  infantry,  unless  the  attack  is  in 
the  nature  of  a,  sacrifice  or  is  being  made  to  accomplish 
some  special  end.  In  a  prolonged  war,  situations  fre- 
quently will  arise  in  which  cavalry  should  unhesitat- 
ingly attack  unshaken  infantry,  and  even  infantry 
flushed  with  victory,  regardless  of  the  losses  it  may 
suffer,  and  in  such  situations  the  cavalry  leader,  or  the 
one  ordering  the  charge,  should  not  rely  on  the  rules 
which  ordinarily  guide  him  to  his  decisions.  The  pros- 
pect for  local  success  in  the  charge  itself  then  becomes 
of  little  importance  in  comparison  with  the  effect  the 
charge  is  expected  to  have  on  the  welfare  of  the  whole 
command,  and  the  leader  has  but  one  question  to  an- 
swer— Will  the  probable  result  of  the  charge  be  worth 
the  probable  loss?  If  so,  the  charge  should  be  made 
regardless  of  the  unfavorable  conditions. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT. 

SITUATION. 
(See  2  and  4-inch  maps). 

A  Blue  force  is  being  assembled  about  4  miles  east 
of  Platte  City  in  hostile  territory.  September  1,  a 
Blue  detachment,  under  Colonel  A,  consisting  of 

5th    Infantry, 

6th  Infantry,  and 

1st  Squadron,  7th  Cavalry  (less  Troops  C  and  D), 

was  ordered  to  cross  the  Missouri  river  and  get  infor- 
mation of  the  situation  west  of  Leavenworth. 

As  the  infantry  column  was  about  to  enter  Leaven- 
worth,  a  little  before  2  p.  m.,  a  staff  officer,  sent  ahead 
with  the  cavalry,  reported  that  he  had  impersonated  a 
local  agent  of  the  Red  government  and  learned  by 
telephone  that  a  hostile  force  of  1  regiment  of  infan- 
try and  1  troop  of  cavalry  passed  through  Easton 
about  1  p.  m.,  and  continued  towards  Leavenworth  on 
the  88 — 90  road,  and  that  no  Red  forces  had  been  seen 
in  other  villages  near  Leavenworth. 

Colonel  A  left  one  company  to  guard  the  Terminal 
bridge,  and  continued  with  the  remainder  of  the  col- 
umn towards  the  open  ground  north  of  Leavenworth. 

At  2:45  p.  m.,  when  the  head  of  the  column  is  ap- 
proaching Prison  hill  on  Metropolitan  avenue,  Col- 
onel A,  who  is  with  the  advance  guard  (1st  Bn.,  5th 
Inf.,  and  8  troopers),  receives  the  following  message 
from  his  cavalry  commander,  sent  from  28  at  2:30 
p.  m.: 


A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  385 

"Have  just  encountered  a  hostile  cavalry  patrol  near  30  and 
driven  it  back  towards  100.  A  patrol  at  16  reported  no  enemy 
visible  at  2  p.  m.,  on  Atchison  pike.  No  report  from  patrols 
towards  108  and  on  roads  to  south.  I  will  hold  the  high  ground 
at  this  point  and  endeavor  to  clear  up  the  situation  in  my  front." 

Note. — The  weather  is  fair  and  cool. 

Required : 

Colonel  A's  estimate  of  the  situation  and  orders, 
on  the  supposition  that  no  additional  information  of 
the  enemy  is  received  during  the  next  30  minutes. 

SOLUTION  AND  DISCUSSION. 

Our  first  task  is  to  determine  how  the  reports  re- 
ceived by  Colonel  A  should  affect  his  further  action* 
to-day.  He  has  crossed  the  river  for  the  purpose  of 
getting  information  of  the  situation  west  of  Leaven- 
worth,  and  the  execution  of  this  mission  should  be  the 
controlling  factor  in  all  his  decisions.  Although  the 
information  secured  by  his  staff  officer  is  very  import- 
ant, still  it  lacks  much  of  being  sufficiently  complete 
and  reliable  to  complete  the  task  of  the  Blue  detach- 
ment. The  reports  received  by  telephone  must  be  cor- 
roborated by  other  reports  from  more  reliable  sources ; 
and  the  reason  for  the  Red  detachment's  being  in  this 
vicinity  and  the  whereabouts  of  its  supporting  troops 
should  be  learned  if  possible. 

Colonel  A  cannot  hope  to  do  all  this  to-day.  His 
detachment  has  come  about  15  miles,  a  good  day's 
march,  and  it  should  not  be  required,  without  urgent 
reasons,  to  undertake  any  extensive  enterprises  in  its 
fatigued  condition.  His  chief  concern  now  should  be 
to  seek  a  camping  place  that  suits  the  tactical  situa- 
tion, and  prepare  his  command  for  to-morrow's  oper- 
ations by  giving  it  a  night's  rest.  We  will  examine 


386       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  situation  to  see  if  this  is  practicable,  for  we  can- 
not always  do  what  we  would  like;  often  the  enemy 
forces  upon  us  some  less  desirable  course. 

When  the  detachment  renews  its  operations  to-mor- 
row, it  probably  will  begin  by  crossing  the  range  of 
hills  that  lies  to  the  west  of  Leavenworth.  Should  the 
enemy  be  permitted  to  establish  himself  in  these  hills, 
he  will  secure  all  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from 
holding  this  commanding  and  easily  defended  ground. 
Consequently,  gaining  possession  of  these  hills  to- 
night will  greatly  simplify  to-morrow's  task,  especial- 
ly so  since  Colonel  A  has  a  good  chance  of  doing  this 
yet  to-day  without  a  serious  fight.  Assuming  that 
the  hostile  regiment  passed  through  Easton  about  1 
p.  m.  and  continued  an  uninterrupted  advance,  it 
should  be  somewhere  between  94  and  96  by  2 :45  p.  m. 
when  the  head  of  Colonel  A's  infantry  column  is  ap- 
proaching Prison  hill.  (*)  At  this  hour  then,  the 
two  columns  probably  are  about  5  miles  apart  and,  if 
they  continue  to  advance  toward  each  other  at  the 
same  rate,  their  heads  will  meet  on  top  of  the  ridge 
about  28.  However,  taking  everything  into  consider- 
ation, there  are  good  reasons  for  believing  the  ridge 
can  be  reached  by  the  Blue  detachment  without  in- 
volving its  infantry  in  a  fight.  Colonel  A's  informa- 
tion is  that  he  is  twice  the  enemy's  strength;  since  the 
enemy  is  in  friendly  country,  he  should  know  of  our 
presence  and  superior  numbers,  and  may  wish  to  avoid 
a  fight  to-day,  especially  as  the  hour  is  late  and  he 
probably  has  completed  a  day's  march.  Finally,  Col- 
onel A's  principal  advantage  is  that  his  cavalry  is  al- 

*  When  we  solve  the  problem  given  in  Chapter  XXIV,  we  will  see 
that  this  assumption  is  not  correct. 


A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  387 

ready  in  possession  of  the  ridge  and  may  be  able  to 
hold  it  until  the  Blue  infantry  comes  to  its  support. 

For  these  reasons,  Colonel  A's  arrangements  for 
the  night  will  be  such  as  to  insure  his  holding  this  line 
of  heights.  However,  unless  the  enemy  is  more  ag- 
gressive than  we  anticipate,  it  will  not  be  necessary 
for  this  purpose  to  move  the  entire  detachment  to  the 
top  of  the  ridge.  A  better  plan  will  be  to  hold  the 
ridge  with  the  outposts,  and  have  the  main  body  of 
the  detachment  camp  within  supporting  distance  on 
the  eastern  slope. 

This  makes  the  camping  place  of  the  main  body  de- 
pendent on  the  location  of  the  outpost  line.  This  will 
frequently  be  the  case,  especially  with  small  com- 
mands in  the  immediate  presence  of  the  enemy,  for 
tactical  considerations  then  take  precedence  over  com- 
fort and  convenience.  But,  when  the  enemy  is  so  dis- 
tant, or  so  lacking  in  aggressiveness,  that  there  is  lit- 
tle or  no  danger  of  his  attacking  our  outposts,  we  may 
give  more  thought  to  the  comfort  of  our  command 
and  locate  our  camp  with  reference  to  water,  fuel, 
shade,  supplies,  etc.;  the  outposts  must  then  take  the 
ground  as  they  find  it  and  make  the  best  possible  use 
of  it  for  observation  and  defense. 

So,  in  this  case,  Colonel  A  must  decide  on  the  line  to 
be  held  by  the  outposts  before  he  can  determine  the 
camping  place  for  the  main  body.  It  is  always  the 
duty  of  the  detachment  commander  to  prescribe,  in 
general  terms,  the  line  the  outpost  is  to  occupy,  and 
it  should  be  so  chosen  as  to  block  as  far  as  possible  all 
the  lines  of  approach  for  the  enemy.  In  the  situation 
before  us  they  are  the  Atchison  pike,  the  Zimmerman 
and  Barnes  roads,  the  105 — 128 — 126  road,  and  the 


388       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Lecompton  road.  Our  information  is  that  the  enemy 
proceeded  east  from  Easton  on  the  88 — 90  road,  and 
it  was  on  the  prolongation  of  this  road  through  100 
that  the  hostile  patrol  was  encountered.  The  patrol 
that  reported  from  16  at  2  p.  m.  could  observe  the 
Atchison  pike  to  and  west  of  I  and  saw  no  enemy  on  it 
at  that  hour.  No  reports  had  been  received  from  the 
patrols  on  roads  south  of  the  Barnes  road. 

The  logical  conclusion  is  that  the  90 — 96 — 100—30 
— 28  road  is  the  principal  line  of  approach  for  the  ene- 
my and,  consequently,  the  one  to  be  guarded  most 
carefully.  But  the  other  routes  from  the  direction  of 
the  enemy  must  also  be  covered,  for  we  cannot  be  sure 
that  he  has  not  or  will  not  turn  to  the  north  or  south  at 
or  east  of  90 ;  this  is  especially  true  with  respect  to  his 
cavalry,  and  also  with  respect  to  the  94 — 110 — 108 — 
104  road.  The  Atchison  pike  and  roads  to  the  south 
of  the  108 — 104  road  are  more  roundabout  routes  that 
may  be  guarded  with  smaller  detachments.  Conse- 
quently, the  principal  strength  of  the  outposts  should 
be  along  the  ridge  from  28  to  50,  covering  the  roads 
along  which  there  is  most  probability  the  enemy  will 
advance. 

The  probability  is  that  this  is  also  the  portion  of  the 
Vine  that  will  be  in  greatest  rieed  of  assistance  should 
the  enemy  attack,  and  the  camp  of  the  main  body  must 
be  located  with  direct  reference  to  the  ease  with  which 
reinforcements  can  be  sent  from  it  along  both  the 
Zimmerman  and  Barnes  roads.  Since  these  two  roads 
unite  at  56,  it  should  not  be  difficult  to  find  a  suitable 
location  for  the  camp. 

The  distance  the  main  body  of  a  command  should 
be  held  in  rear  of  the  line  of  observation  of  the  out- 


A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  389 

post  will  depend  on  so  many  conditions  such  as  the 
size  of  the  command,  the  nearness  of  the  enemy,  and 
the  character  of  the  terrain,  that  it  is  impossible  to  pre- 
scribe any  hard  and  fast  rule  for  determining  it.  The 
controlling  principle  is  that  the  distances  between  the 
different  elements  of  the  outpost,  and  between  the 
outpost  and  the  main  body  should  be  such  that  each 
element  can  furnish  the  necessary  protection  for  the 
next  one  in  its  rear,  and  yet  not  be  beyond  support- 
ing distance  of  it.  If  the  main  body  be  camped  near 
the  cross  roads  at  60,  it  will  be  within  a  mile  and  a  half 
of  the  top  of  the  ridge,  which  is  the  line  along  which 
the  outpost  will  make  its  resistance  in  case  it  is  at- 
tacked. This  is  close  enough  for  it  to  give  the  outpost 
timely  support,  yet  it  is  far  enough  to  the  rear  to  in- 
sure it  against  surprise  and  petty  annoyance  from 
every  false  alarm  at  the  front  line  of  the  outpost. 

Occasionally,  a  command  can  locate  its  camping 
place  in  such  manner  that  a  lake,  swamp,  impassable 
river  or  some  other  natural  obstacle  will  afford  it  per- 
fect protection  on  one  or  both  flanks,  or  even  along 
its  entire  front.  For  example,  if  the  tactical  situa- 
tion but  permitted,  Colonel  A  might  withdraw  to  the 
east  bank  of  the  Missouri  river  and  secure  complete 
protection  by  merely  posting  a  small  detachment  at 
each  of  the  bridges  (at  Leavenworth  and  Port  Leav- 
en worth ),  and  patrolling  the  river  with  a  few  cavalry- 
men. We  have  purposely  chosen  this  more  difficult 
situation,  for  it  is  the  one  we  will  ordinarily  have  to 
deal  with,  so  far  as  natural  obstacles  affect  the  prob- 
lem. When  the  flanks  need  protection  and  are  not 
protected  by  the  terrain,  security  must  be  obtained  by 
bending  back  the  flanks  of  the  outpost  line,  or  by  send- 


390       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

ing  out  special  detachments.  Still  there  must  be  some 
limit  to  this  doubling  back  and  stretching  out  of  the 
flanks,  else  we  will  employ  so  large  a  fraction  of  the 
command  on  outpost  that  we  will  defeat  our  real  ob- 
ject, which  is  to  secure  rest  for  the  bulk  of  the  com- 
mand. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  Atchison  pike  and  Le» 
compton  road  lead  directly  to  the  flanks  of  the  camp- 
ing place  selected  for  the  main  body.  We  have  seen 
that  it  is  not  probable  the  enemy  will  advance  in  any 
force  to-night  by  either  of  these  roundabout  routes; 
still,  he  may  send  cavalry  patrols  along  these  roads 
and,  all  in  all,  the  danger  is  not  so  slight  that  we  may 
afford  to  disregard  it  entirely.  Accordingly,  small 
detachments  will  be  posted  at  Atchison  cross-roads 
(14)  on  the  north,  and  68  on  the  south.  These  roads 
are  beyond  the  real  sphere  of  action  of  the  outpost, 
and  it  will  be  best  to  send  these  detachments  directly 
from  the  main  body,  and  leave  the  outpost  commander 
free  to  concentrate  his  whole  attention  on  that  por- 
tion of  the  front  more  directly  threatened  by  the  ene- 
my. 

The  real  outpost  line,  therefore,  will  extend  along 
the  ridge  across  the  Zimmerman,  Barnes  and  48 — 50 
— 68  roads,  and  the  outpost  commander  need  be  told 
nothing  more  than  this  of  the  outpost  dispositions,  for 
it  is  his  business  to  arrange  the  details  and  he  should 
be  given  a  free  hand.  Apply  to  him  the  rule  that 
should  be  observed  with  subordinates  in  general: 
Charge  him  with  a  specific  duty  but  allow  him  to 
make  his  own  choice  of  means  for  carrying  it  out,  and 
then  hold  him  responsible  for  results.  As  pointed  out 
in  previous  chapters,  each  commander  must  be  his 


A  HALT  FOE  THE  NIGHT  391 

own  judge  as  to  how  far  he  should  vary  from  this 
rule,  because  of  the  lack  of  experience  or  instruction 
of  his  subordinate. 

We  may  now  consider  what  troops  will  be  assigned 
the  outpost.  The  number  should  be  kept  as  small  as 
possible,  consistent  with  the  safety  of  the  command. 
Every  man  and  animal  on  outpost  duty  during  the 
night  is  deprived  of  a  part  or  all  of  his  rest  and,  as  a 
consequence,  is  poorly  fitted  for  duty  the  next  day. 
No  rule  worthy  of  the  name  can  be  given  for  deter- 
mining the  strength  of  the  outpost,  since  it  depends 
on  so  many  varying  conditions.  As  Colonel  A  is  al- 
ready in  close  touch  with  the  enemy,  he  will  have  not 
only  to  guard  the  roads  but  to  watch  the  country  be- 
tween them  as  well,  to  prevent  hostile  patrols  and  pos- 
sibly larger  hostile  bodies  from  penetrating  the  out- 
post line.  This  will  call  for  a  stronger  outpost  than 
would  be  necessary  were  the  enemy  still  many  miles 
away.  Still,  a  battalion  should  be  sufficient  infantry, 
for,  in  a  situation  such  as  this,  it  can  cover  a  front  of 
more  than  a  mile  and  afford  protection  for  a  command 
the  size  of  Colonel  A's. 

The  battalion  now  in  the  advance  guard  may  be 
assigned  this  task,  or  a  fresh  battalion  may  be  detailed 
for  this  duty.  In  favor  of  the  former  it  may  be  said 
that  troops  performing  the  duties  of  security  and  in- 
formation would  better  be  relieved  in  the  morning 
just  before  starting  on  the  day's  march  than  in  the 
evening  just  before  posting  the  outpost.  During  the 
day,  the  advance  guard  has  gained  a  comprehensive 
view  of  the  situation  that  will  greatly  assist  it  when 
assuming  its  new  duties  as  outpost  at  night,  while,  on 
the  other  hand,  fresh  troops  detailed  from  the  main 


892       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

body  would  be  temporarily  out  of  close  touch  with  the 
situation.  Besides,  the  advance  guard  can  occupy  the 
outpost  position  in  less  time  than  can  a  fresh  detach- 
ment from  the  main  body,  there  is  less  confusion,  and 
immediate  rest  is  secured  for  the  largest  possible  frac- 
tion of  the  command.  Finally,  relieving  the  securi- 
ty and  information  troops  at  the  beginning  of  the  fol- 
lowing day's  march,  facilitates  resuming  the  march,  as 
was  seen  when  discussing  an  advance.  (*) 

One  or  both  of  the  machine  gun  platoons  might  be 
attached  to  the  advance  guard  battalion,  but  this  is  not 
considered  advisable,  since  there  is  no  point  on  the  line 
of  resistance  where  they  would  be  of  particular  value, 
especially  at  night.  They  may  add  to  the  strength  of 
outpost  troops  when  they  can  be  trained  on  approach- 
es such  as  bridges,  that  the  enemy  must  make  use  of  in 
advancing  against  the  position ;  but  we  should  not  fall 
into  the  habit  of  assigning  these  guns  to  the  outpost 
on  all  occasions,  for  the  men  and  animals  with  them 
should  have  their  proper  share  of  rest  with  the  main 
body. 

The  employment  of  the  cavalry  deserves  some  ex- 
planation, but  it  may  be  well,  before  deciding  on  how 
it  shall  be  employed  in  the  situation  before  us,  to  call 
attention  to  the  fatiguing  character  of  cavalry  duty 
in  general.  By  way  of  illustration,  let  us  consider  the 
ordinary  march  of  a  force  of  all  arms  in  the  presence 
of  an  enemy.  The  trooper  must  be  up  and  caring  for 
his  horse  before  the  foot  soldier  is  awake.  Ordinarily, 
the  cavalry  precedes  the  remainder  of  the  command  on 
the  march  and  often  leaves  camp  some  minutes  before 
the  column.  Always  it  is  nearest  the  enemy  and  this 

•See  page  80. 


A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  393 

greatly  contributes  to  the  strain,  mental  and  physical, 
it  has  to  endure.  In  making  its  reconnaissance,  it 
marches  from  twenty  to  forty  miles  while  the  remain- 
der of  the  command  makes  from  ten  to  fifteen  miles. 
The  infantry  column  reaches  camp  and  makes  its  ar- 
rangements for  the  night  under  the  cover  of  the  cav- 
alry still  in  front;  in  large  commands,  hours  may 
elapse  before  the  most  distant  cavalry  detachments, 
such  as  patrols,  have  reached  their  bivouac;  even  then 
horses  have  again  to  be  groomed  and  cared  for.  This 
all  means  long  hours,  great  distances  covered,  and 
excessive  fatigue  for  both  man  and  horse.  The  next 
day  the  program  is  repeated;  all  the  cavalry  must  be 
thus  employed;  a  portion  of  it  can  not  regularly  re- 
lieve the  rest. 

Under  these  conditions,  a  wise  commander,  who 
thinks  of  his  command  of  the  three  arms  combined  as  a 
single  fighting  unit,  and  wishes  to  do  all  in  his  power 
to  increase  its  efficiency,  will  assign  his  cavalry  no  task 
for  the  night  that  can  be  equally  well  done  by  foot 
troops.  Even  so,  there  often  will  be  more  purely  cav- 
alry tasks,  in  connection  with  the  outposts,  than  cav- 
alry to  do  them,  and  the  tendency  generally  will  be 
to  overwork  and  ruin  the  cavalry. 

The  situation  confronting  Colonel  A  forms  no  ex- 
ception to  the  general  rule.  He  has  been  sent  out 
to  secure  information  of  conditions  west  of  Leaven- 
worth,  and  if  he  can  do  this  by  observing  only  and 
without  serious  fighting,  so  much  the  better.  His 
cavalry  is  his  principal  means  for  making  this  obser- 
vation close  and  effective,  so  long  as  close  contact  is 
not  established  between  the  two  opposing  forces  of  in- 
fantry. 


894       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

In  the  first  place,  the  cavalry  must  hold  on  to  the 
heights  about  28  and  44  until  the  infantry  can  come 
to  its  support.  It  is  not  necessary  to  send  it  orders  to 
this  effect,  for  the  cavalry  commander  has  stated  this 
as  his  intention.  It  will  then  be  free  to  devote  its 
whole  attention  to  clearing  up  the  situation  in  its 
front.  Much  as  we  would  like  to  withdraw  it  from 
the  front  at  once  and  get  it  into  camp  for  the  night, 
we  will  have  to  leave  it  out  until  it  has  determined 
what  it  can  of  the  enemy's  strength  and  his  camping 
place  for  the  night.  The  entire  cavalry  force,  less  the 
8  troopers  with  the  advance  guard,  should  be  given 
this  task,  for,  if  we  have  twice  as  much  cavalry  as  the 
enemy,  we  must  make  the  most  of  the  advantage  this 
gives  us. 

But  the  cavalry  will  not  be  left  out  any  longer  than 
is  necessary  to  secure  this  information,  and,  in  any 
case,  it  will  be  brought  in  at  nightfall.  Some  cavalry 
must  be  assigned  to  the  outpost  for  the  night,  but  it 
will  be  well  for  Colonel  A  not  to  settle  on  the  amount 
until  he  knows  more  of  the  situation;  for  the  present 
he  will  merely  notify  the  outpost  commander  that 
some  cavalry  will  be  given  him  for  the  night.  This 
will  be  better  than  telling  the  outpost  commander  at 
this  time  that  he  will  be  given  a  troop  or  half  a  troop 
for  the  night,  and  trusting  him  to  employ  only  so 
much  of  it  as  is  necessary;  he  cannot  be  blamed  if  he 
uses  all  the  troops  Colonel  A  gives  him,  and  it  is  Col- 
onel A's  business  to  give  him  only  what  he  needs. 

If  practicable,  Colonel  A  should  decide  now  on 
what  he  intends  doing  in  case  the  enemy  should  at- 
tack, for  the  outpost  commander  should  know  wheth- 
er he  is  to  hold  his  position  and  be  reinforced  by  the 


A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  395 

main  body,  or  is  to  fall  back  on  a  position  in  rear  to 
be  occupied  by  the  main  body.  We  have  already  seen 
that  Colonel  A's  main  idea  in  camping  at  60  is  that 
he  may  hold  the  heights  to  the  west;  accordingly,  in 
case  of  attack,  the  main  body  will  move  up  and  rein- 
force the  outpost. 

Some  guard  must  remain  at  the  bridge  at  Leaven- 
worth;  not  that  there  is  any  probability  that  a  strong 
hostile  body  will  march  around  the  Blue  outpost  dur- 
ing the  night  and  reach  this  bridge,  but  because  it 
might  be  damaged  and  made  impassable  by  hostile 
cavalry  patrols  or  even  by  the  inhabitants  of  Leaven- 
worth.  This  guard  need  not  be  large;  a  platoon  of 
infantry  would  be  sufficient,  but,  since  a  full  company 
is  now  there,  it  will  be  better  to  allow  it  all  to  remain. 
So  long  as  the  Leavenworth  bridge  is  held,  there  is  no 
special  object  in  guarding  that  at  Fort  Leavenworth 
also. 

Colonel  A  has  yet  to  consider  what  disposition  will 
be  made  of  the  regimental  wagons.  It  is  important 
that  troops  should  have  access  to  their  wagons  daily,  if 
for  only  a  few  hours;  they  contain  comforts  that  the 
command  should  not  be  deprived  of  without  good 
cause.  The  occasions  when  they  must  be  left  far  to 
the  rear  are  numerous  enough  without  manufactur- 
ing them.  If  the  outpost  were  in  serious  danger  of  at- 
tack it  would  be  unwise  to  have  the  wagons  join  it, 
for  they  might  block  the  roads  and  interfere  with  the 
movements  of  the  command,  and  would  be  in  danger 
of  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  But,  from 
Colonel  A's  information  of  the  hostile  strength,  he  is 
of  the  opinion  that  the  enemy  will  seek  to  avoid  rath- 
er than  bring  on  a  combat,  and  he  will  permit  the 
wagons  to  join  both  the  main  body  and  the  outpost. 


396       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

While  deliberating  on  the  situation,  our  colonel  has 
allowed  the  command  to  continue  its  advance  along 
Metropolitan  avenue,  and  has  withheld  his  orders  in 
the  hope  that  he  may  receive  further  information  from 
his  cavalry.  At  3:15  p.  m.,  when  the  reserve  of  the 
advance  guard  is  crossing  Avenue  hill  (see  4-inch 
map),  it  becomes  apparent  that  he  must  make  his 
decision  on  the  information  then  in  his  possession,  or 
halt  the  column  and  hold  it  along  the  road  while  await- 
ing the  arrival  of  fresh  reports  from  the  cavalry.  The 
latter  procedure  is  objectionable,  since  it  would  de- 
prive the  troops  of  a  part  of  their  rest  in  camp,  and 
the  situation  is  sufficiently  clear  for  an  intelligent  de- 
cision. 

Accordingly,  Colonel  A  decides  to  camp  for  the 
night  in  the  vicinity  of  60,  with  an  outpost  on  the 
28 — 50  ridge  across  the  Zimmerman,  Barnes  and  48— 
68  roads,  and  covering  detachments  from  the  main 
body  at  14,  68  and  Leaven  worth  bridge;  and  to  have 
the  cavalry  continue  its  reconnaissance  until  further 
orders.  He  has  assembled  the  regimental  and  ad- 
vance guard  commanders,  and  his  staff,  and,  without 
halting  the  column,  he  issues  the  following  orders  at 
Avenue  hill  at  3:20  p.  m.,  mainly  from  the  map: 

"Citizens  of  Easton  report  that  a  regiment  of  Red  infantry 
and  a  troop  of  Red  cavalry  passed  through  that  town  about  1 
p.  m.  and  marched  east  on  the  88 — 90  road.  Inhabitants  of 
other  towns  near  here  say  they  have  seen  no  Red  troops.  A 
hostile  cavalry  patrol  was  driven  back  from  30  towards  100 
by  our  cavalry,  at  2:30  p.  m.  Our  two  troops  are  now  holding 
the  high  ground  near  28,  and  reconnoitering  towards  the  enemy. 
A  patrol  at  16  reports  no  enemy  visible  at  2  p.  m.  on  the  Atch- 
ison  pike. 

"The  detachment  will  halt  and  establish  outposts  for  the 
night. 


A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  397 

"The  main  body  will  camp  near  60. 

"The  6th  Infantry  will  furnish  a  platoon  of  infantry  to 
cover  the  Atchison  pike  at  14,  and  another  to  cover  20th  street 
at  68.  Company  A,  6th  Infantry,  now  at  the  Terminal  bridge, 
will  remain  there  for  the  night. 

"The  advance  guard  will  establish  an  outpost  on  the  ridge 
to  the  west  across  the  Zimmerman,  Barnes  and  48 — 68  roads. 
It  will  maintain  communication  with  the  detached  posts  from 
the  main  body  at  14  and  68.  Additional  cavalry  will  be  as- 
signed to  the  outpost  later. 

"The  cavalry  will  hold  the  28 — 50  ridge  until  relieved  by 
the  outpost,  after  which  it  will  endeavor  to  determine  the  ene- 
my's strength  and  position. 

"If  the  enemy  attacks,  the  outposts  will  hold  a  position  along 
the  28 — 50  ridge. 

"The  field  train  will  join  the  main  body,  the  company  at 
Leaven  worth  (*)  and  the  outpost. 

"Messages  will  reach  me  with  the  main  body  at  60." 

Before  the  assembled  officers  disperse,  the  adjutant 
announces  that  Captain  B  is  the  detailed  officer  of  the 
day,  and  that  he  will  take  the  interior  guards  from  his 
company. 

The  following  order,  in  the  form  of  a  message,  is 
then  sent  to  the  cavalry  commander: 

Detachment, Division, 

To  Avenue  hill,  near  Leavenworth, 

Major  B,  1   Sept.  — ,  3:25  P.  M. 

Commanding  1st  Sq.,  7th  Cav. 

(f)  The  detachment  will  camp  at  60  for  the  night.  The 
advance  guard  will  establish  outposts  on  the  28 — 50  ridge,  cover- 
ing the  Zimmerman,  Barnes  and  48 — 68  roads. 

You  will  keep  the  enemy  from  the  28 — 50  ridge  until  re- 
lieved by  the  outpost,  after  which  you  will  advance  and  en- 

*  This  company  should  be  joined  by  its  wagon  when  the  field  train 
crosses  the  Terminal  bridge. 

t  The  cavalry  commander  is  in  possession  of  all  the  information 
of  the  enemy. 


398       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

deavor  to  determine  the  enemy's  strength  and  position.  With- 
draw from  the  front  so  as  to  join  the  main  body  not  later  than 
6  p.  m. 

Messages  will  reach  the  detachment  ^commander  at  60. 

By  order  of  Colonel  A: 

B. 
Capt.  &  Adjt.,  5th  Inf.,  Adjutant. 

The  detachment  quartermaster,  who  rode  forward 
and  joined  Colonel  A  at  Leaven  worth,  and  is  now 
about  to  ride  back  to  guide  the  field  train  to  camp, 
is  directed  to  explain  the  situation  to  Captain  A  (at 
the  Terminal  bridge)  and  instruct  him  to  remain  there 
during  the  night  and  protect  the  bridge.  A  written 
order  will  be  sent  Captain  A  later. 

Together  with  his  staff  and  regimental  command- 
ers, Colonel  A  now  rides  forward,  inspects  the  ground 
about  60,  assigns  camping  places  to  the  organizations, 
and  takes  general  supervision  of  the  interior  arrange- 
ments of  the  camp.  Captain  B,  who  has  been  notified 
of  his  detail  as  officer  of  the  day,  examines  the  ground 
about  the  camp,  decides  on  the  number,  strength  and 
location  of  the  interior  guards,  and  posts  the  same,  and 
then  reports  his  arrangements  to  Colonel  A.  When 
the  platoons  for  the  two  detached  posts  have  reported, 
Colonel  A  gives  them  their  orders  and  starts  them  out. 

Had  Colonel  A  issued  a  single  combined  order  it 
would  have  appeared  as  follows  when  in  written  form : 

Detachment,  Division, 

Field  Orders  Avenue  hill,  near  Leavenworth, 

No. 1st  Sept.  — ,  3:25  P.  M. 

1.  According  to  reports  of  the  inhabitants,  a  Red  force  of 
1  regiment  of  infantry  and  1  troop  of  cavalry  passed  through 
EASTON  at  1  p.  m.  to-day  and  marched  east  on  the  88 — 90 
road,  and  no  Red  troops  have  been  seen  in  other  towns  near 


A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  399 

LEAVEN  WORTH.  At  2:30  p.  m.,  a  hostile  cavalry  patrol 
was  driven  back  from  30  towards  100  by  our  cavalry,  which  is 
now  holding  the  high  ground  near  28  and  reconnoitering  to- 
wards the  enemy.  One  of  our  patrols  at  16  reported  no  enemy 
visible  at  2  p.  m.  on  the  ATCHISON  pike. 

2.  The  detachment  will  halt  for  the  night  and  establish 
outposts. 

3.  (a)  The  main  body  will  camp  near  60.  The  ATCH- 
ISON pike  at  14,  and  20th  street  at  68,  will  be  covered  by  a  pla- 
toon of  infantry  at  each  place,  to  be  furnished  by  the  6th  In- 
fantry. 

(b)  Company  A,  6th  Infantry,  now  at  the   TERMINAL 
bridge,  will  remain  there  for  the  night  and  protect  that  bridge. 

(c)  The  advance  guard,  under  Major  A,  will  establish  an 
outpost  on  the  22 — 28 — 50  ridge,  across  the  ZIMMERMAN, 
BARNES   and  48 — 68   roads,  maintaining  communication  with 
the  detached  posts  from  the  main  body  at  14  and  68.    Addition- 
al cavalry  will  be  sent  the  outpost  later. 

(d)  The  cavalry,  under  Major  B,  will  hold  the  enemy  away 
from  the  28 — 50  ridge  until  relieved  by  the  outpost,  and  will 
then  advance  and  endeavor  to  determine  the  enemy's  strength 
and  location.     It  will  withdraw  in  time  to  join  the  main  body 
not  later  than  6  p.  m. 

(e)  In  case  of  attack,  the  main  body  will  reinforce  the  out- 
post position  along  the  28 — 50  ridge. 

4.  The  field  train  will  join  the  main  body,  the  outpost  and 
the  company  at  the  TERMINAL  bridge. 

5.  Messages   for   the   detachment   commander   will   be   sent 
to  60. 

By  order  of  Colonel  A: 

B. 
Capt.  &  Adjt.,  5th  Infantry,  Adjutant. 

Verbally  to  the  regimental  and  advance  guard  commanders, 
and  staff.  Copy  to  commanders  of  the  cavalry  and  Company  A, 
6th  Infantry. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT. 

r 

PROBLEM. 

(See  2-inch  map). 

On  September  1,  a  Red  force,  temporarily  stationed 
about  15  miles  west  of  Easton,  in  friendly  country, 
detached  a  regiment  of  infantry  and  troop  of  cavalry 
to  make  a  reconnaissance  towards  Leavenworth. 

At  1:55  p.  m.,  when  Colonel  A  and  Major  A  (de- 
tachment and  advance  guard  commander,  respective- 
ly) reach  90  with  the  support  of  the  advance  guard, 
they  have  reliable  information,  sent  by  residents  of 
Leavenworth  over  rural  telephones,  that  two  troops 
of  hostile  cavalry  crossed  the  Terminal  bridge  into 
Leavenworth  at  1  p.  m.  and  that  a  column  of  hostile 
infantry,  whose  strength  was  not  determined,  was 
approaching  the  bridge  via  Stillings  at  1:45  p.  m. 
Wire  communication  with  the  town  was  wholly  in- 
terrupted at  that  hour. 

The  Red  regiment  is  advancing  on  the  88 — 90— 
94 — 96  road  in  the  following  order:  Advance  party 
(1  plat.  Co.  A,  and  8  troopers) — 500  yards — sup- 
port (Co.  A,  less  1  platoon,  and  Co.  B) — 700  yards 
— main  body  (remainder  of  the  regiment) — 1  mile 
—field  train.  (*)  At  1:30  p.  m.  the  cavalry  sent 
a  message  from  94  saying  that  it  had  seen  nothing  of 
the  enemy  and  would  continue  its  advance. 

*  Mark  on  the  map  the  positions  of  the  different  elements  of  the 
column. 


A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  401 

Note. — The  weather  is  fair  and  cool. 
Required : 

Colonel  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 
His  orders. 

SOLUTION. 

Colonel  A's  mission  is  to  make  a  reconnaissance 
towards  Leavenworth,  and  the  successful  accomplish- 
ment of  his  mission  imposes  on  him  the  task  of  se- 
curing all  possible  information  concerning  the  enemy 
just  reported  near  that  town.  Although  the  informa- 
tion received  over  the  rural  telephone  system  is  val- 
uable and  fairly  trustworthy,  still  it  is  not  definite 
with  respect  to  the  strength  of  the  hostile  infantry 
column,  and  is  not  as  reliable  as  the  reports  of  patrols 
in  contact  with  the  enemy.  The  reconnaissance  must 
be  continued  until  contact  with  the  enemy  secures  the 
information  desired. 

But  it  is  not  advisable  to  continue  the  advance  to- 
day. The  command  has  marched  eighteen  miles,  a 
long  day's  march  for  even  so  small  a  command,  and, 
under  ordinary  circumstances,  should  seek  the  first 
convenient  camping  place  for  the  night.  The  tacti- 
cal situation  also  renders  this  advisable.  The  enemy, 
in  undetermined  strength,  is  known  to  be  near  and 
advancing;  if  the  opposing  forces  continue  moving 
towards  each  other,  they  will  be  together  in  less  than 
two  hours,  and  an  engagement  will  be  precipitated. 
Colonel  A  should  not  lead  an  exhausted  command  in- 
to a  fight  against  an  enemy  of  unknown  strength.  It 
will  be  better  to  avoid  a  fight  to-day,  and  employ 
the  time  until  to-morrow  in  securing  information 
with  patrols  and  spies;  on  this  information  Colonel  A 


402       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

can  make  an  intelligent  decision  as  to  his  further  in- 
tentions. 

Having  reached  this  conclusion,  Colonel  A  looks 
about  for  a  camping  place.  Since  his  immediate  ob- 
ject is  to  avoid  a  fight  to-day,  his  chances  of  doing 
this  will  increase  if  he  retire  to  the  west  bank  of  the 
Big  Stranger  creek,  thus  placing  this  obstacle  and 
greater  distance  between  himself  and  the  enemy.  This 
would  mean  a  march  of  three  more  miles  for  the 
troops,  and  the  attitude  of  the  enemy  is  not  so  threat- 
ening as  to  warrant  giving  up  the  advanced  posi- 
tion near  90.  On  the  other  hand,  unless  there  is  some 
good  special  reason,  it  will  not  be  wise  to  advance 
much  beyond  90.  To  see  if  such  a  reason  exists,  let 
us  examine  a  little  more  closely  our  own  and  the 
enemy's  situation. 

From  the  situation  as  stated  in  the  problem,  it  is 
next  to  impossible  to  form  a  reasonable  idea  of  the 
enemy's  intentions,  where  he  came  from,  his  strength, 
whether  he  is  followed  by  stronger  hostile  forces,  etc. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  this  probably  constitutes  the  ne- 
cessity for  Colonel  A's  reconnaissance.  We  are  equal- 
ly in  doubt  as  to  how  far  he  has  marched  to-day,  but 
we  are  warranted  in  assuming,  until  circumstances 
show  the  contrary,  that  he  has  made  the  usual  day's 
march  when  he  reaches  Leavenworth.  His  cavalry 
will  soon  be  in  contact  with  ours,  and  the  situation 
probably  will  be  no  more  clear  to  him  than  to  Colonel 
A.  Some  time  between  two  and  three  o'clock  he  should 
know  of  our  presence,  although  he  may  hear  of  it 
earlier  by  using  the  telephone,  notwithstanding  he  is 
in  hostile  territory. 

Considering  these  things  in  connection  with  the 


A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  403 

time  of  the  day,  the  most  reasonable  supposition  is 
that  he  will  halt  for  the  night  in  the  vicinity  of  Leav- 
enworth.  We  may  expect  him  to  place  his  outposts 
on  the  ridge  west  of  the  town,  for  he  may  thereby 
keep  our  patrols  from  looking  down  on  his  position, 
and  the  possession  of  the  ridge  probably  will  consti- 
tute an  important  tactical  feature  in  his  further  oper- 
ations to-morrow.  If  he  determines  the  direction  of 
our  advance,  as  is  reasonable  to  suppose,  we  may  ex- 
pect him  to  block  the  roads  over  the  ridge  via  28,  44 
and  50,  at  the  least,  and  maybe  via  16  on  the  north 
and  138  on  the  south  as  well.  Consequently,  Salt 
creek  and  its  southern  branch  by  102  and  106  prob- 
ably will  form  the  front  line  of  his  outposts. 

So  we  see  that  Colonel  A's  position  at  90  is  about 
3Vfc  miles  from  the  probable  front  of  the  enemy's  out- 
posts. With  his  main  body  camped  near  90,  the 
front  line  of  his  infantry  outposts  will  be  about  a 
mile  and  a  half  farther  to  the  front,  say  near  the  cem- 
etery east  of  94,  and  his  cavalry  will  be  some  distance 
nearer  the  enemy.  To  bring  the  opposing  outpost 
lines  closer  together  will  place  the  command  in  un- 
necessary danger  and  needlessly  disturb  the  rest  of  all 
its  parts  during  the  night. 

Moreover,  a  careful  study  of  the  terrain  about  90 
reveals  strong  defensible  points  for  the  outposts.  To 
the  north  and  northeast  is  the  ridge  formed  by  the 
two  1100  foot  hills,  along  which  a  strong  defense  can 
be  made  against  an  advance  from  that  direction.  An 
attack  from  the  east  or  southeast  can  be  met  some- 
where along  a  line  running  south  from  the  easternmost 
1100  foot  hill  through  94  and  to  the  1000  foot  con- 
tour, thence  along  this  contour  to  the  west.  An  at- 


404       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

tack  along  the  112 — 90  or  the  84 — 90  road  is  not  prob- 
able, but  some  protection  must  be  provided  on  these 
roads  by  means  of  cavalry  reconnaissance  or  infan- 
try posts  of  some  strength. 

So  the  best  plan  seems  to  be  to  encamp  the  main 
body  at  90,  and  establish  outposts  on  the  line  84— 
94 — 112.  As  this  line  is  about  3  miles  long,  a  bat- 
talion has  none  too  many  troops  to  occupy  it  properly, 
but  this  is  too  large  a  fraction  of  the  command  to 
place  on  outpost  if  we  possibly  can  get  along  with 
less.  Along  this  front  the  greatest  danger  may  be  ex- 
pected in  the  section  extending  from  the  82 — 92  road, 
through  94  to  include  the  ravine  running  south  and 
east  from  the  orchard  just  west  of  92.  Considering 
the  size  of  the  command,  the  strength  of  the  outpost 
position,  the  good  view  from  it  towards  the  enemy, 
the  distance  away  of  the  enemy  and  the  slight 
probability  of  his  attacking,  two  companies  ap- 
pear to  be  sufficient  infantry  to  guard  this  sec- 
tion, and  a  single  platoon  should  be  ample  to  fur- 
nish the  two  detached  posts  on  the  84 — 112  road. 
Since  these  detached  posts  are  beyond  the  sphere  of 
the  real  outpost,  and  really  constitute  a  part  of  the 
guard  for  the  immediate  protection  of  the  main  body, 
they  will  not  be  placed  under  the  outpost  commander, 
but  will  receive  their  orders  from  Colonel  A  direct, 
or  from  his  officer  of  the  day. 

The  cavalry  troop  is  opposed  by  a  double  force  of 
the  enemy.  Since  Colonel  A  is  specially  desirous,  be- 
cause of  his  mission,  to  secure  information  of  the  ene- 
my, he  might  leave  the  entire  troop  out  until  night- 
fall and  give  it  orders  to  act  offensively  and  deter- 
mine the  enemy's  strength  and  position.  But  the 


A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  405 

execution  of  these  orders  probably  would  take  it  far 
to  a  flank,  for  it  could  learn  little  by  riding  against 
the  front  of  the  enemy's  outpost  line;  and  even  if 
not  defeated  in  a  fight  with  the  superior  hostile  cav- 
alry still  it  would  reach  camp  late  at  night  and  thor- 
oughly exhausted. 

The  troop  is  now  in  the  vicinity  of  100  (it  was  at 
94  at  1:30  p.  m.),  and  even  if  recalled  to  camp  at 
once  it  will  have  made  a  march  to-day  of  about  25 
miles.  For  the  same  reasons  that  the  infantry  should 
avoid  a  fight  to-day,  it  will  be  well  for  the  cavalry  to 
do  likewise,  and  confine  its  efforts  to  sending  out  a 
few  small  and  carefully  chosen  patrols  to  get  infor- 
mation, and  to  opposing  the  hostile  cavalry  should  it 
attempt  to  locate  the  Red  outpost  position.  While 
the  outposts  are  being  established,  it  will  endeavor  to 
keep  the  enemy  from  crossing  the  bridges  at  100,  and 
from  gaining  possession  of  the  1000  foot  ridge  just 
west  of  102  from  which  he  could  observe  the  Red 
outpost  dispositions. 

If  we  are  to  avoid  overworking  the  cavalry,  we 
must  not  assign  more  than  one  platoon  to  the  outpost 
proper.  With  this  force  all  the  principal  roads  lead- 
ing from  the  front  of  the  outpost  towards  the  enemy 
can  be  constantly  patrolled.  Sufficient  cavalry  for 
patrolling  purposes  might  also  be  assigned  to  the  de- 
tached posts  on  the  84 — 112  road  but  we  prefer  leav- 
ing this  to  the  infantry,  thus  saving  the  cavalry  from 
this  additional  work. 

The  main  body  can  get  water  for  cooking  and 
drinking  purposes  from  the  wells  of  the  farmhouses 
at  90.  The  wagons  of  the  outpost  companies  will 
join  the  outposts,  and  the  remainder  of  the  field  train 


406       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

will  join  the  main  body  at  90.  The  animals  may  be 
watered  in  the  stream  to  the  north  of  the  90 — 88  road, 
if  the  water  supply  at  90  is  not  sufficient  for  all  pur- 
poses. 

Colonel  A's  decision  is  to  halt  at  90  for  the  night, 
covering  the  camp  with  the  two  companies  in  the  ad- 
vance guard  (reinforced  by  about  one  platoon  of 
cavalry),  on  the  line  1100  hills — 94 — ravine  1200 
yards  south  of  94,  and  with  a  platoon  of  infantry  on 
the  84 — 112  road. 

While  deliberating  on  the  situation,  Colonel  A  halt- 
ed the  column  and  assembled  the  field  officers,  staff 
and  Captain  C  (commanding  Company  C)  ;  at  2:05 
p.  m.  he  issued  the  following  verbal  orders,  mainly 
from  the  map: 

"Residents  of  Leavenworth  report  that  two  troops  of  hostile 
cavalry  crossed  the  Missouri  river  into  Leavenworth  at  1  p.  m., 
and  that  the  advance  guard  of  a  column  of  hostile  infantry  was 
approaching  the  bridge  via  Stillings  at  1 :45  p.  m.  Communica- 
tion with  Leavenworth  was  interrupted  before  the  strength  of 
the  infantry  column  was  learned.  Our  cavalry  reported  from 
94  at  1 :30  p.  m.  that  it  had  seen  nothing  of  the  enemy. 

"The  regiment  will  camp  for  the  night  and  establish  outposts. 

"Major  A,  with  the  advance  guard  you  will  establish  a  line 
of  outposts  from  the  92 — 82  road,  inclusive,  through  94  to  the 
ravine  1200  yards  south  of  94,  inclusive.  As  soon  as  practica- 
ble your  cavalry  will  be  increased  to  about  a  platoon. 

"The  main  body  will  camp  here  (at  90).  Captain  C,  you  are 
detailed  officer  of  the  day  and  will  take  the  interior  guards  from 
your  company.  Guard  this  (84 — 112)  road  with  half  a  platoon 
at  the  farmhouse  1200  yards  north  of  here,  and  another  half 
platoon  at  the  farmhouse  1200  yards  south  of  here. 

"The  cavalry  will  remain  in  front  until  further  orders  and 
oppose  the  hostile  cavalry  should  it  advance.  It  will  be  told  to 
guard  the  bridges  at  100  and  hold  the  ridge  west  of  102  until 
the  outpost  is  in  position. 


A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  407 

"In  case  of  attack  the  outpost  will  be  reinforced. 
"The  field  train  will  join  the  troops,  including  the  compan- 
ies on  outpost. 

"Messages  for  me  will  be  sent  to  90." 

Colonel  A  then  sends  the  following  order  to  the 
cavalry  commander: 

1st  Infantry, 

Captain  A,  Cross  roads  at  9°> 

Troop  A,  1st  Cavalry.  *  SeP*-  ~   2:15  P'  M' 

Residents  of  LEAVEN  WORTH  report  by  telephone  that  two 
troops  of  Blue  cavalry  crossed  the  MISSOURI  river  into  LEAV- 
ENWORTH  at  1  p.  m.,  and  that  the  point  of  a  column  of  hos- 
tile infantry,  whose  strength  was  not  learned,  was  approaching 
LEAVENWORTH  via  STILLINGS  at  1 :45  p.  m. 

The  command  will  halt  here  for  the  night  and  establish  out- 
posts on  the  line  84 — 94 — 112. 

Until  further  orders,  you  will  oppose  the  enemy's  cavalry, 
should  it  advance  against  our  outpost  line. 

While  the  outposts  are  getting  into  position,  you  will  prevent 
the  enemy  crossing  the  bridges  at  100,  or  gaining  the  ridge  west 
of  the  100 — 102  road,  if  this  be  possible  without  your  becoming 
seriously  engaged.  Send  a  carefully  chosen  patrol  to  each  of  the 
enemy's  flanks  to  secure  information  of  his  strength  and  position. 
You  will  be  notified  when  you  are  to  withdraw  for  the  night. 

Send  messages  to  90. 

By  order  of  Colonel  A: 
B. 
Capt.  &  Adjt.,  1st  Infantry!,  Adjutant. 

The  above  order  is  sent  by  a  staff  officer,  either  regi- 
mental or  battalion,  who  is  accompanied  by  the  troop- 
er who  brought  the  message  sent  by  the  cavalry  com- 
mander at  1:30  p.  m. 

Colonel  A  then  prepares  a  brief  message  and  trans- 
mits it  by  wire  to  the  Red  commander,  15  miles  west 
of  Easton. 


408       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

COMMENTS. 

You  have  not  failed  to  note  that  the  Red  cavalry 
is  not  employed  in  the  same  manner  as  the  Blue  cav- 
alry (see  Chapter  XXIII),  but  the  reason  for  this 
may  not  be  perfectly  clear.  Both  commanders  are 
seeking  information,  and  the  Red  cavalry  is  no  more 
fatigued  than  the  Blue.  This  being  the  case,  if  it  is 
wise  to  require  the  Blue  cavalry  to  remain  out  until 
night  and  secure  what  information  it  can  of  the  ene- 
my, why  is  it  not  wise  to  require  the  same  of  the  Red 
cavalry? 

The  answer  is  to  be  found  in  the  difference  of  the 
strengths  of  the  two  cavalry  forces.  The  Blue  com- 
mander knows  he  is  opposed  by  one  troop  of  cavalry 
and  the  Red  commander  feels  certain  he  is  opposed  by 
two  troops.  An  energetic  reconnaissance  by  the  two 
Blue  troops  promises  to  be  successful,  whereas  the 
single  Red  troop  probably  would  have  only  addition- 
al fatigue  and  maybe  defeat  to  show  as  its  return  for 
a  similar  attempt.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is,  the 
known  superiority  of  the  Blue  cavalry  placed  the  Red 
cavalry  on  the  defensive,  while  it  acted  as  a  spur  to 
drive  the  Blue  cavalry  to  the  most  energetic  offensive, 
and  each  commander  selected  for  his  cavalry  that  line 
of  action  which  agreed  best  with  the  particular  situa- 
tion that  confronted  it. 

But,  it  may  be  asked,  what  is  a  single  troop  of 
cavalry  to  do  when  confronted  by  two  troops?  Is  it 
to  cease  its  efforts,  seek  the  protection  of  its  infan- 
try, and  allow  the  opposing  cavalry  to  roam  freely 
where  it  chooses?  Needless  to  say,  good  cavalry 
should  never  disgrace  its  record  by  such  spineless  con- 
duct, nor,  on  the  other  hand,  should  it  attempt  the  im- 


A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  409 

possible.  Cavalry  opposed  by  double  its  strength  is 
on  the  defensive  just  as  surely  as  is  infantry  similarly 
placed,  and  one  will  employ  offensive  tactics  in  such  a 
situation  no  more  frequently  than  will  the  other.  It 
will  not  be  able  to  do  all  it  would  like,  but  it  at  least 
may  deny  its  superior  enemy  free  rein  to  do  as  he 
pleases. 

And  that  is  what  the  single  Red  troop  must  be  con- 
tent to  do,  for  if  it  breaks  itself  to  pieces  in  a  fairly 
hopeless  fight  against  twice  its  numbers,  not  only  will 
it  gain  no  information,  but  it  may  also  fail  to  cover  its 
own  infantry.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  is  carefully 
and  conservatively  led  on  the  defensive  it  may  suc- 
ceed in  holding  the  Blue  cavalry  away  from  the  Red 
camp  until  nightfall.  At  the  same  time  it  probably 
will  secure  more  information  from  a  small  carefully 
led  officer's  patrol  than  the  whole  troop  could  obtain 
by  fighting. 

We  have  explained  this  point  at  some  length  be- 
cause there  is  a  very  common  tendency  in  map  prob- 
lems, war  games,  and  maneuvers  to  order  cavalry  on 
offensive  missions,  regardless  of  the  strength  of  the 
opposing  cavalry,  as  though  comparative  numbers  of 
the  contending  forces,  so  important  when  dealing  with 
infantry,  need  not  be  considered  when  dealing  with 
cavalry.  An  offensive  spirit  is  an  invaluable  asset  to 
cavalry  and  it  should  be  fostered,  but  the  cavalry  com- 
mander confronted  by  greatly  superior  cavalry  should 
curb  his  natural  inclination  to  close  with  the  enemy, 
which,  if  unchecked,  is  likely  to  lead  him  into  rash 
enterprises,  and  wait  with  patience  until  the  enemy's 
mistakes  or  some  change  in  the  situation  gives  him  the 
opportunity  he  is  hoping  for. 


410       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

The  Field  Service  Regulations  state  that  the  order 
to  halt  and  establish  outposts  should  reach  the  out- 
post commander  if  practicable  before  the  end  of  the 
day's  march  to  enable  him  to  study  the  situation.  It 
was  not  practicable  to  observe  this  very  excellent  pro- 
vision, either  in  this  situation  or  the  one  given  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  and  frequently  this  will  be  the  case 
when  in  close  proximity  to  the  enemy,  for  the  situation 
is  then  liable  to  sudden  changes  and  the  commander 
may  not  be  able  to  make  his  decision  until  the  time 
comes  to  go  into  camp.  For  the  same  reason  Colonel 
A  himself  selected  the  camp  site,  whereas,  had  the  ene- 
my not  been  in  the  neighborhood,  he  probably  would 
have  sent  a  staff  officer  forward  for  that  purpose. 

After  issuing  the  orders,  Colonel  A  would  assign 
camping  places  to  the  2d  and  3d  Battalions  and  the 
two  companies  of  the  1st  Battalion  in  the  main  body, 
all  of  which  probably  would  be  placed  in  the  northwest 
angle  of  the  cross  roads  where  the  slope  of  the  ground 
would  conceal  the  camp  from  an  observer  to  the  east. 
A  camp  site  would  be  reserved  for  the  use  of  the  cav- 
alry when  it  returns  to  camp,  and  such  wagons  of  the 
field  train  as  do  not  join  their  organizations  would  be 
parked  immediately  in  rear  of  the  troops.  The  water 
supply  would  be  examined  and  wells  would  be  as- 
signed to  organizations,  and  watering  places  designat- 
ed for  the  animals. 

Captain  C,  officer  of  the  day,  will  proceed  to  post 
the  interior  guards.  The  most  important  posts  have 
been  designated  by  Colonel  A  in  his  orders,  and  con- 
sist of  a  section  on  the  road  at  the  farm  house  1200 
yards  north  of  90,  and  another  section  on  the  road  at 
the  farm  house  1200  yards  south  of  90.  Captain  C 


A  HALT  FOR  THE  NIGHT  411 

gives  the  commanders  of  these  sections  their  orders 
(which  should  follow  the  prescribed  form)  and  sees 
them  started  towards  their  posts.  Later  he  will  in- 
spect their  dispositions,  which  should  be  similar  to 
those  of  an  outguard  of  the  outpost  proper,  which  will 
be  explained  in  the  following  chapter. 

Captain  C  will  next  make  an  inspection  of  the  camp 
and  its  approaches,  to  determine  the  number  and  posi- 
tion of  the  sentinels  needed  for  its  near-by  protection ; 
this  number  should  be  made  as  small  as  possible.  There 
should  be  a  sentinel  on  each  of  the  four  roads,  one  for 
the  colors,  and  one  for  the  wagon  park,  or  six  in  all. 
The  companies  furnish  their  own  guards  for  their 
arms,  which  may  or  may  not  be  stacked,  and  the  cav- 
alry guards  its  picket  line.  These  arrangements  are 
made  after  consulting  with  Colonel  A,  who  will  add 
any  instructions  he  may  have  to  give  concerning  pa- 
trols from  the  interior  guard.  Throughout  the  night 
a  patrol  should  cover  the  road  for  a  mile  west  of  90, 
and  another  should  frequently  visit  the  outpost  at  92. 
Hence  Captain  C's  platoon  at  90  will  have  to  furnish 
an  interior  guard  of  18  privates  and  3  non-commis- 
sioned officers,  and  three  reliefs  for  two  patrols  of 
two  men  each,  in  all  3  non-commissioned  officers  and 
30  privates. 

The  following  paragraph  is  found  in  the  order: 
"In  case  of  attack  the  outpost  will  be  reinforced." 
And  the  order  given  in  the  preceding  chapter  (see 
page  397)  contains  a  paragraph  which  says:  "If  the 
enemy  attacks,  the  outpost  will  hold  a  position  along 
the  28 — 50  ridge."  Opinion  is  divided  on  the  wis- 
dom of  inserting  such  a  provision  in  orders.  General 


412       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Griepenkerl  expresses  the  opinion  (*)  that  the  orders 
should  clearly  state  whether  the  outposts  should  hold 
their  ground  until  the  main  body  comes  to  their  sup- 
port, or  should  fall  back  on  the  main  body,  and  this 
opinion  agrees  with  the  German  Field  Service  Regu- 
lations. Our  own  regulations  allow  more  freedom 
and  prescribe  that  "when  necessary  the  outpost  orders 
state  what  is  to  be  done  in  case  of  attack." 

Genera]  von  Alten  is  of  the  opinion  that,  in  case  of 
attack,  the  outpost  commander  should  be  permitted 
and  required  to  make  his  arrangements  and  issue  his 
orders  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  the  sit- 
uation," and  that  the  detachment  commander  should 
not  attempt  to  order  in  advance  what  shall  be  done  in 
any  individual  case,  when  he  cannot  foresee  what  the 
enemy  will  do,  and  may  not  have  seen  the  terrain  in 
question.  "Orders  for  engagement  issued  in  advance 
can  only  be  disturbing  elements  and  interfere  with  in- 
dividual action."  (t) 

In  the  orders  we  have  given,  we  have  followed  the 
older  opinion,  but  whether  it  is  the  better  is  a  debata- 
ble question. 

*  In  Letters  on  Applied  Tactics. 

t  General  von  Alten  in  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

OUTPOSTS. 

SITUATION. 
(See  2  and  4-inch  maps). 

The  situation  is  the  continuation  of  that  given  in 
Chapter  XXIII. 

September  1,  the  5th  and  6th  Infantry,  and  the  1st 
Squadron,  7th  Cavalry  (less  Troops  C  and  D),  de- 
tached from  a  Blue  force  that  is  being  assembled  4 
miles  east  of  Platte  City,  marched  to  the  west  to  get 
information  of  the  situation  west  of  Leavenworth. 

By  impersonating  a  local  agent  of  the  Red  gov- 
ernment, a  staff  officer  learned,  during  the  march, 
that  a  hostile  force  of  1  regiment  of  infantry  and  1 
troop  of  cavalry  passed  through  Easton  about  1  p. 
m.,  and  continued  towards  Leavenworth  on  the  88 — 
90  road ;  and  that  no  Red  forces  had  been  seen  in  oth- 
er villages  near  Leavenworth. 

At  2:30  p.  m.,  a  hostile  cavalry  patrol  was  driven 
back  from  30  towards  100  by  the  Blue  cavalry,  and  a 
Blue  cavalry  patrol  at  16  reported  no  enemy  visible  at 
2  p.  m.  on  the  Atchison  pike. 

At  3:20  p.  m.,  as  the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard 
(1st  Bn.  5th  Inf.,  and  8  troopers)  is  passing  62  (see 
4-inch  map),  the  detachment  commander  finishes  is- 
suing his  orders  to  halt  for  the  night.  The  main  body 
is  to  camp  near  60,  covering  the  Atchison  pike  at  14, 
and  20th  street  at  68  with  a  platoon  of  infantry  at 
each  place.  The  cavalry,  now  at  28,  is  to  hold  the 


414       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

28 — 50  ridge  until  relieved  by  the  outpost,  after  which 
it  is  to  endeavor  to  determine  the  enemy's  strength 
and  position. 

Major  A,  commanding  the  advance  guard,  is  or- 
dered to  establish  outposts  on  the  28 — 50  ridge  across 
the  Zimmerman,  Barnes  and  48 — 68  roads.  Addi- 
tional cavalry  is  to  be  assigned  the  outpost  later,  and 
the  outpost  companies  are  to  be  joined  by  their  wag- 
ons. In  case  of  attack,  Major  A  is  to  hold  a  position 
on  the  ridge. 
Required : 

Major  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

His  orders  for  establishing  the  outpost. 

SOLUTION  AND  DISCUSSION. 

Major  A's  task  as  outpost  commander  is  to  protect 
the  main  body  so  that  it  may  rest  undisturbed  and,  in 
case  of  attack,  to  check  the  enemy  long  enough  to  en- 
able the  main  body  to  prepare  for  action.  His  ar- 
rangements must  be  such  as  to  insure  the  accomplish- 
ment of  this  task. 

It  may  be  well  to  point  out  at  the  very  beginning 
of  the  discussion  that  there  is  no  one  fixed  way  of 
distributing  the  outpost  on  the  front  it  is  to  guard; 
on  the  contrary  we  may  dispose  of  it  in  numerous 
ways,  each  of  which  may  be  good.  Probably  no  oth- 
er kind  of  tactical  problem  may  have  so  many  good 
solutions,  and  solutions  for  this  and  the  succeeding 
problem  may  differ  from  the  ones  given  herein  and 
still  be  excellent.  We  shall  endeavor  to  illustrate  only 
the  main  principles,  with  all  of  which  we  should  be 
f  amiliar  since  they  are  quite  clearly  stated  in  our  Field 
Service  Regulations. 


OUTPOSTS  415 

We  will  do  well  to  begin  our  arrangements  by  de- 
ciding on  the  location  of  the  line  of  resistance,  since 
in  the  event  of  a  really  serious  advance  by  the  enemy 
it  will  become  our  first  line  of  battle  where  the  enemy 
must  be  checked  until  troops  in  rear  can  form  up  and 
come  to  our  assistance.  In  a  general  way  this  line  was 
designated  by  the  detachment  commander,  (*)  but  it 
must  be  definitely  located  by  the  outpost  commander, 
first  from  the  map  as  far  as  possible,  and  later  by  an 
inspection  of  the  ground.  The  map  shows  no  excep- 
tionally strong  position  on  top  of  the  ridge,  but  we 
must  take  the  ground  as  we  find  it.  A  line  along  the 
28 — 40 — 42  road,  having  only  a  fair  field  of  fire,  is 
about  the  best  we  can  do.  South  of  42  the  field  of  fire 
is  even  worse,  and  it  may  be  necessary  on  this  flank  to 
push  the  line  of  resistance  out  to  the  western  edge  of 
the  strip  of  woods  between  46  and  44. 

Having  determined  the  line  of  resistance,  we  may 
proceed  to  locate  the  supports;  unless  there  be  good 
reason  to  the  contrary,  they  should  be  posted  on  this 
line,  for  it  is  their  resistance  in  the  first  place  that  will 
secure  time  for  the  troops  in  rear  to  prepare  for  ac- 
tion. First  to  come  to  their  assistance  will  be  the  re- 
serve of  the  outpost,  and  eventually  the  main  body, 
should  the  nature  of  the  hostile  advance  make  that  nec- 
essary. In  exceptional  cases  the  reserve  may  be  placed 
on  the  line  of  resistance,  and  the  supports  in  advance 
of  it,  in  which  case  the  supports  must  be  told  in  the 
outpost  order  that  they  are  to  fall  back  on  the  reserve. 
There  appears  to  be  nothing  in  the  situation  to  make  it 
an  exception  to  the  general  rule,  so  we  will  select  our 
positions  for  the  supports  along  the  line  of  resistance. 

*  See  the  order,  page  397. 


416       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

We  are  further  assisted  in  locating  the  supports  by 
the  rule  that  they  should  be  placed  on  or  near  the  main 
roads  leading  towards  the  enemy.  Under  ordinary 
circumstances,  and  especially  at  night,  any  advance 
of  the  enemy  in  force  will  be  confined  to  the  roads. 
Although  small  parties  may  penetrate  between  the 
roads,  still  the  outpost  will  be  in  no  serious  danger 
from  them,  for  they  can  do  little  more  than  learn 
something  of  the  outpost  dispositions.  The  measures 
taken  to  prevent  their  incursions  will  be  discussed  later 
on.  The  primary  object  in  posting  the  supports  is 
to  block  the  advance  of  large  bodies  of  the  enemy,  and 
the  place  to  do  this  is  on  the  main  roads. 

In  making  our  selection  of  roads  to  be  covered,  we 
should  choose  the  most  important  one  first — the  one 
along  which  the  greatest  danger  threatens,  and  locate 
a  support  on  it  near  where  it  is  crossed  by  the  line  of 
resistance.  Then  we  should  build  the  remainder  of 
the  outpost  structure  about  this  primary  disposition. 
The  number  of  additional  supports  needed  will  depend 
mainly  on  the  size  of  the  command  we  are  dealing 
with,  the  remaining  roads  to  be  guarded  and  the  extent 
of  the  outpost  front. 

It  appears  that  most  danger  may  be  expected  along 
the  98 — 100 — 30  road,  for  hostile  cavalry  has  been 
encountered  on  it  and  the  report  of  the  staff  officer  was 
that  the  hostile  force  continued  its  march  from  Easton 
on  the  88 — 90  road.  The  enemy  left  Easton  at  1  p. 
m.,  and  if  he  has  continued  his  march  he  should  be  ap- 
proaching 96  at  this  time  (3:20  p.  m.) .  Our  infantry 
is  probably  a  little  nearer  the  top  of  the  ridge  than  is 
the  enemy's,  and  we  have  the  additional  advantage 
that  the  ridge  is  already  in  the  possession  of  our  cav- 


OUTPOSTS  417 

airy.  Unless  the  enemy  is  stronger  than  our  informa- 
tion indicates,  it  is  not  likely  he  will  attempt  to  drive 
us  from  the  ridge  to-night,  if  at  all;  he  is  in  his  own 
country  and  probably  has  learned  as  much  of  us  as  we 
have  of  him,  and  it  is  hardly  probable  he  will  attack 
double  his  number.  Still,  the  enemy  may  be  stronger 
than  we  think,  and,  considering  what  we  now  know  of 
his  strength,  whereabouts  and  intentions,  the  30 — 100 
—98  road  is  the  most  important  of  all  roads  leading 
towards  him  and  must  be  guarded  by  a  support. 

Having  decided  on  the  location  of  what  appears  to 
be  the  most  important  support,  we  may  now  proceed  to 
examine  the  front  to  be  watched  by  the  outpost,  and 
determine  whether  additional  supports  are  necessary 
and  where  they  should  be  placed.  On  the  right  of  the 
position,  between  the  Zimmerman  road  and  the  Atch- 
ison  pike,  there  are  no  roads  leading  toward  the  enemy, 
and  the  terrain  in  places  is  almost  impassable  to  troops 
off  the  roads.  An  attack  in  force  in  this  section,  espe- 
cially after  night,  is  not  at  all  probable,  and  the  sup- 
port on  the  Zimmerman  road  can  make  all  necessary 
arrangements  for  watching  this  section  and  joining  up 
with  the  detached  post  at  Atchison  Cross,  although  it 
may  be  assisted  by  the  reserve,  as  will  be  seen  later  on. 

On  the  left  of  the  outpost  position  the  conditions 
are  very  different.  Passing  over  the  ridge  at  44  and 
50,  are  two  important  highways  leading  towards  the 
enemy.  They  unite  at  48,  an  important  road  junction 
that  can  be  reached  via  the  128 — 106  road  or  the  108 — 
104  road.  The  latter  road  communicates  at  108  and 
west  of  110  with  the  road  to  the  north  over  which  it  is 
reported  the  enemy  is  advancing.  Everything  consid- 
ered, the  danger  on  this  flank  is  such  that  a  support 


418       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

should  be  placed  in  the  vicinity  of  44,  but  the  Barnes 
road  and  the  50 — 48  road  are  near  enough  together  to 
admit  of  their  being  watched  by  a  single  support,  the 
bulk  of  which  will  be  held  nearest  the  more  important 
of  the  two  roads. 

There  is  still  another  road  leading  towards  the  ene- 
my— that  joining  42  and  102 — but  the  map  indicates 
that  it  is  only  a  trail  towards  102,  and  probably  very 
little  traveled.  This  road  might  be  covered  by  a  third 
support,  smaller  than  the  other  two,  at  42,  but  it  is 
preferable  to  assign  this  task  to  one  of  the  other  sup- 
ports and  avoid  so  much  division  of  responsibility  on 
the  line  of  resistance.  Since  42  is  nearest  the  support 
on  the  left,  and  the  least  danger  threatens  from  that 
direction,  we  will  include  this  road  in  the  left  section 
of  the  outpost.  The  distance  from  42  to  50  is  about 
1200  yards,  and  if  the  bulk  of  the  support  is  centrally 
disposed  on  this  line,  its  detachments  at  42  and  50  will 
be  within  easy  supporting  distance.  This  arrange- 
ment leaves  the  support  on  the  right  free  to  give  its 
whole  attention  to  guarding  the  more  dangerous  sec- 
tion along  the  28 — 30 — 100  road. 

We  have  yet  to  divide  the  outpost  front  into  sec- 
tions and  prescribe  their  limits,  and  this  must  be  done 
in  such  manner  that  each  support  commander  will 
know  just  where  his  responsibility  begins  and  ends. 
For  this  purpose  any  well  denned  line  in  the  terrain, 
such  as  a  stream,  ravine  or  marsh,  may  be  chosen ;  but 
the  dividing  line  between  sections  should  not  be  a 
road,  especially  an  important  road,  if  any  other  feat- 
ure is  available,  because  of  the  danger  that  the  road 
will  not  be  properly  watched  by  either  support.  Still, 
we  may  have  to  choose  a  road,  and  that  appears  to  be 


OUTPOSTS  419 

the  case  here,  for,  aside  from  the  42 — 102  road,  the 
map  shows  no  clearly  marked  line  suitably  located 
between  the  two  supports.  But  it  will  be  well,  when 
giving  the  commander  of  the  left  support  his  orders 
or  when  inspecting  the  outpost,  to  make  sure  that  he 
understands  he  is  to  watch  this  road.  The  left  sec- 
tion, therefore,  will  extend  from  the  50 — 48  road,  in- 
clusive, to  the  42 — 102  road,  inclusive;  and  the  right 
section  from  the  42 — 102  road,  exclusive,  to  the  Atch- 
ison  pike,  exclusive,  unless  some  provision  is  made 
for  watching  a  part  of  this  section  with  an  additional 
support  or  a  detached  post  from  the  reserve.  This 
brings  up  the  next  point  we  have  to  consider — the  lo- 
cation of  the  reserve. 

The  reserve  should  be  in  a  position  from  which  it 
can  quickly  reinforce  the  supports.  If  practicable, 
therefore,  it  should  be  within  about  half  a  mile  of  the 
supports  and  on  or  near  roads  leading  towards  them. 
Frequently  a  good  camping  place  for  the  reserve,  the 
lay  of  the  roads,  and  the  desired  distance  from  the 
supports  will  not  all  fit  in  as  we  would  like  them,  and 
Major  A  will  find  this  to  be  the  case  here  when  he 
comes  to  search  for  a  camping  place  for  the  reserve. 
He  has  not  time  to  make  this  search  before  issuing 
his  orders,  and  can  do  no  more  now  than  tell  the  offi- 
cers it  will  camp  somewhere  in  the  immediate  vicinity, 
probably  between  the  Zimmerman  and  Barnes  roads. 
When  the  roads  from  the  front  do  not  unite  in  the 
rear  of  the  line  of  resistance,  as  in  this  situation,  it 
generally  will  be  best  to  place  the  reserve  on  or  near 
the  main  road  leading  from  the  enemy.  Often  we 
will  have  to  open  up  roads  from  the  position  of  the 
reserve  to  the  supports,  or  to  the  main  highways  lead- 
ing to  the  supports. 


420       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

We  have  purposely  avoided  saying  anything  until 
now  of  the  strength  of  the  supports  and  reserve,  for 
it  is  well  to  have  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  whole 
outpost  arrangement  before  deciding  on  that  point. 
Since  our  dispositions  call  for  two  supports  and  a  re- 
serve, the  natural  subdivision  of  the  outpost  battalion 
is  to  place  one  company  in  each  support  and  two  in 
the  reserve.  This  arrangement  keeps  the  reserve 
strong,  while  at  the  same  time  it  places  a  complete 
tactical  unit  in  each  support  and  makes  them  strong 
enough  for  their  tasks.  However,  to  lessen  the  work 
of  the  right  support  and  enable  its  commander  to 
concentrate  his  attention  on  the  important  28 — 30 — 
100  road,  we  will  do  well  to  send  a  small  detached 
post  from  the  reserve  to  22 ;  it  will  form  a  connecting 
link  between  the  right  support  and  the  post  on  the 
Atchison  pike,  and  will  patrol  from  22  along  the  top 
of  the  ridge  to  16.  Twelve  men  will  be  enough  for 
this  post,  for,  as  already  stated,  there  is  little  likeli- 
hood of  the  enemy  advancing  over  the  difficult  ter- 
rain north  of  22. 

For  the  present,  Major  A  is  given  no  cavalry  but 
the  8  troopers  that  have  been  with  the  advance  guard. 
They  will  be  of  most  use  with  the  right  support,  from 
which  they  can  patrol  along  the  main  road  towards 
the  enemy  and  help  get  early  information  of  a  hos- 
tile advance  in  force.  Later  in  the  day,  when  addi- 
tional cavalry  is  given  him  for  the  night,  he  will  de- 
cide on  how  it  is  to  be  employed.  The  bulk  of  the 
cavalry,  which  will  not  be  withdrawn  from  the  front 
until  about  5  p.  m.  (see  page  398),  will  not  only  be 
of  great  value  in  obtaining  additional  information, 
but  will  also  help  to  secure  the  outpost  against  sur- 


OUTPOSTS  421 

prise  until  that  hour.  A  hostile  advance  in  force  will 
hardly  be  made  after  that  hour. 

When  Major  A  receives  his  order  at  Avenue  hill 
at  3:20  p.  m.,  Companies  C  and  D  in  the  reserve  of 
the  advance  guard  are  turning  the  corner  at  62;  the 
support,  Company  B  and  1  platoon  Company  A,  is 
about  300  yards  west  of  60;  and  the  advance  party, 
Company  A  (less  1  platoon),  is  about  to  turn  north 
at  56.  After  deliberating  on  the  situation  long 
enough  to  reach  his  decision,  he  gallops  ahead  to  56, 
picking  up  his  captains  on  the  way,  who,  to  avoid  de- 
lay, are  given  horses  of  the  mounted  orderlies.  When 
he  reaches  56,  the  support  is  at  that  point,  and  the 
advance  party  has  just  turned  the  bend  at  58.  He 
immediately  issues  the  following  orders,  mainly  from 
the  map : 

"From  the  inhabitants  it  has  been  learned  that  a  hostile  regi- 
ment of  infantry  and  troop  of  cavalry  passed  through  Easton 
at  1  p.  m.  and  marched  in  this  direction  on  the  88 — 90  road,  and 
that  no  Red  troops  have  been  seen  in  other  villages  near  Leav- 
enworth.  Our  cavalry  is  on  the  heights  in  our  front  and  will 
hold  them  until  we  get  up;  it  will  then  attempt  to  determine  the 
enemy's  strength  and  position;  at  2:30  p.  m.  it  drove  a  hostile 
cavalry  patrol  back  from  30  towards  100;  and  a  patrol  at  16 
reported  no  enemy  visible  at  2  p.  m.  on  the  Atchison  pike.  The 
detachment  will  camp  for  the  night  at  60,  and  will  place  a  de- 
tached post  at  14  and  another  at  68. 

"The  advance  guard  will  form  the  outpost  on  the  ridge  in  our 
front  across  the  Zimmerman,  Barnes  and  48 — 68  roads. 

"Captain  C,  with  your  company  (Company  C),  2  mounted 
scouts  and  the  8  troopers,  take  position  near  28  as  Support 
No.  1,  and  hold  the  line  from  the  ravine  north  of  22,  exclu- 
sive, to  the  42 — 102  road,  exclusive.  You  will  maintain  com- 
munication with  a  detached  post  from  the  reserve  which  will  be 
placed  at  22. 

"Captain  D,  with  your  company  (Company  D)  and  2  mount- 


422       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

ed  scouts,  take  position  near  44  as  Support  No.  2,  and  hold 
the  line  from  the  42 — 102  road,  inclusive,  to  the  50 — 48  road,  in- 
clusive. You  will  maintain  communication  with  the  detached  post 
at  68,  and  will  patrol  to  136  and  along  the  106 — 128  road. 

"Companies  A  and  B  will  form  the  reserve  and  camp  in  this 
vicinity. 

"In  case  of  attack  we  will  be  reinforced.  Fires  may  be  light- 
ed at  the  reserve. 

"The  company  wagons  will  join  the  reserve.  If  the  situa- 
tion permits,  the  wagons  of  the  support  may  join  them  later. 

"Send  messages  to  the  reserve." 

Although  our  major  wished  to  ride  along  the  out- 
post position  before  issuing  his  orders,  he  did  not  do 
so,  since  this  would  have  delayed  getting  the  supports 
into  position  and  the  reserve  into  camp.  Any  delay 
deprives  a  part  of  the  troops  of  some  of  their  rest; 
besides,  in  this  case,  it  is  important  that  the  supports 
should  get  to  the  top  of  the  ridge  as  soon  as  practica- 
ble and  free  the  cavalry  for  the  important  reconnais- 
sance it  has  to  make  yet  to-night.  However,  when- 
ever the  conditions  permit,  the  outpost  commander 
should  make  a  hasty  survey  of  the  ground  before  is- 
suing his  orders,  as  this  may  render  changes  unneces- 
sary later  on.  Frequently  the  detachment  command- 
er can  make  this  possible  by  issuing  the  halt  order 
some  time  before  the  termination  of  the  march,  but, 
as  we  saw  in  the  preceding  chapter,  that  was  not  prac- 
ticable in  this  situation. 

We  will  suffer  little  inconvenience  because  of  hav- 
ing to  issue  our  orders  from  the  map,  provided  we  are 
supplied  with  maps  showing  the  form  of  the  ground 
and  all  military  features  of  importance.  When  our 
maps  are  inferior,  as  will  often  be  the  case,  our  orders 
will  have  to  be  modified  accordingly.  For  example, 


OUTPOSTS  423 

had  our  major  stood  at  56  with  only  a  country  road 
map,  his  orders  to  Captain  C  would  have  been  some- 
thing like  the  following:  "Your  company,  etc.  will 
form  Support  No.  1  and  cover  the  Zimmerman  road. 
Move  provisionally  to  the  road  fork  at  28."  Similar 
orders  would  have  been  given  Captain  D,  and  the  ex- 
act location  of  the  supports,  the  division  of  the  front 
into  sections,  etc.  would  not  have  been  arranged  until 
later  on  when  Major  A  inspected  the  position.  If 
we  are  so  unfortunate  as  to  have  no  map  at  all  our 
difficulties  will  be  still  greater. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  rule  so  frequently  giv- 
en of  not  to  interfere  needlessly  with  subordinates  is 
again  observed  here ;  for  the  support  commanders  are 
left  with  almost  absolute  freedom  to  dispose  of  their 
supports  as  they  see  fit.  Their  tasks  are  clearly  de- 
fined— they  are  responsible  for  observation  and  de- 
fense within  their  respective  sections — but  they  are 
free  to  make  their  own  choice  of  means  for  perform- 
ing those  tasks.  This  does  not  mean  that  Major  A 
will  not  exercise  a  careful  supervision  over  their  dis- 
positions; on  the  contrary,  he  will  inspect  them  soon 
after  the  supports  are  in  position  and  will  suggest 
any  changes  he  may  think  necessary;  at  this  inspec- 
tion he  will  satisfy  himself  that  ample  arrangements 
have  been  made  to  watch  the  42 — 102  road. 

It  does  not  seem  necessary  to  order  the  support 
commanders  to  reconnoiter  along  the  main  roads  lead- 
ing towards  the  enemy,  for  they  will  do  that  as  a  mat- 
ter of  course;  but  there  may  be  some  doubt  about 
their  sending  patrols  along  other  routes  leading  in 
less  dangerous  directions.  Accordingly,  it  is  well 
to  direct  the  commander  of  the  left  support  to  rec- 
onnoiter towards  136  and  128. 


424       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

By  taking  his  two  support  companies  from  the 
reserve  of  the  advance  guard,  Major  A  makes  an 
equitable  distribution  of  the  difficult  tasks,  and  places 
the  two  companies  that  have  had  the  most  arduous 
duties  with  the  advance  guard  during  the  day  in  the 
reserve  of  the  outpost  where  they  can  obtain  most  rest 
during  the  night.  He  was  able  to  do  this  without  ma- 
terial delay  or  inconvenience,  but  even  if  the  change 
had  been  more  complicated  it  might  have  been  made 
nevertheless,  for  tactical  reasons  if  for  none  other,  for 
the  most  fatigued  troops  should  not  be  in  the  front 
line  of  the  outpost  during  the  night,  if  this  can  be 
avoided  without  great  delay  and  inconvenience. 

It  will  be  some  time  before  the  wagons  are  up,  (*) 
and  by  that  time  our  major  probably  will  know 
enough  about  the  situation  in  front  to  decide  whether 
it  is  advisable  to  send  the  wagons  to  the  supports. 
Even  if  it  is  not  safe  enough  to  leave  them  so  far  to 
the  front  all  night,  still  they  will  add  greatly  to  the 
comfort  of  the  supports  if  they  can  join  them  for  a 
few  hours.  So  also,  whether  or  not  cooking  is  done  at 
the  supports,  will  depend  on  the  situation  later  in  the 
afternoon. 

As  soon  as  our  major  finishes  issuing  his  orders,  he 
proceeds  to  locate  a  camping  place  for  his  outpost  re- 
serve. He  rides  first  to  the  vicinity  of  54  (see  4- 
inch  map ) ,  but  finds  the  terrain  unfavorable.  There 
is  no  good  camping  place  there,  and  the  ground  is  so 
cut  up  with  deep  ravines  that  communication  with  the 
support  at  28  apparently  would  be  extremely  diffi- 
cult. Near  the  farmhouse  300  yards  west  of  58,  he 

*  Major  A  sends  his  battalion  quartermaster  to  conduct  the  wagons 
to  the  camp. 


OUTPOSTS  425 

finds  a  bit  of  clean  pasture  land  about  midway  be- 
tween the  Zimmerman  and  Barnes  roads,  across 
which  troops  can  march  without  difficulty  to  54,  and 
without  further  search  directs  the  reserve  to  bivouack 
there.  For  the  immediate  protection  of  the  reserve  a 
sentinel  is  placed  over  the  stacks,  another  is  posted  on 
the  Zimmerman  road,  and  a  third  on  the  Barnes  road 
at  54.  A  non-commissioned  officer  and  12  men  are 
selected  for  the  detached  post  at  22,  given  their  orders 
and  sent  out.  The  following  message  is  then  sent  by 
a  mounted  orderly: 

Outpost, 

At  farm  house  just  west  of  58, 

To  Adjutant,  1   Sept.  — ,  4  P.  M. 

Blue  Detachment. 

The  outpost  is  moving  into  positions  as   follows: 
Company    C    near   28 ; 
Company   D  near  44; 

Reserve  (Companies  A  &  B)  300  yards  west  of  58; 
Detached  post  from  the  reserve  at  22. 
Messages   will  reach  me  here. 

A. 
Major. 

A  little  after  4  p.  m.,  Major  A  starts  on  an  inspec- 
tion of  the  outpost  line. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  arrangements  of  the  sup- 
port commanders.  On  reaching  28  with  his  support, 
Captain  C  makes  an  inspection  of  the  terrain  to  de- 
termine its  defensive  value  and  the  exact  location  of 
the  support.  He  decides  on  a  position  astride  the 
main  road  about  200  yards  west  of  28,  where  he  finds 
the  crest  of  the  ridge,  and  places  his  company  under 
cover  in  rear  of  this  position  on  the  gentle  slope  of  the 
ravine  just  south  of  28.  The  men  stack  arms,  remove 


426       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

their  equipment,  except  cartridge  belts,  and  fall  out. 
Preparations  are  made  for  cooking  in  case  the  out- 
post commander  permits  it.  The  two  troops  of  cav- 
alry have  advanced  against  the  ridge  west  of  102,  and, 
so  long  as  they  are  in  front,  3  of  the  8  troopers  with 
his  support  will  be  left  to  watch  the  bridge  at  100, 
and  the  remaining  5  will  be  recalled  to  the  support 
and  allowed  to  water  and  feed  by  turns.  But  he  must 
not  depend  on  the  cavalry  alone  to  protect  him  from 
surprise  from  the  direction  of  100.  Consequently,  an 
outguard  of  1  non-commissioned  officer  and  7  men  is 
posted  about  400  yards  to  the  front  at  the  crest  of  the 
hill  on  the  main  road.  This  outguard  places  a  double 
sentinel  on  the  crest  of  the  hill  further  north,  about  on 
the  prolongation  of  the  38 — 30  road.  The  support 
will  provide  for  its  own  immediate  security  by  post- 
ing a  sentinel  over  the  stacks  with  orders  to  keep  a 
lookout  towards  the  cemetery  at  40,  and  another  sen- 
tinel is  posted  on  the  spur  about  100  yards  north  of 
26. 

A  patrol  of  3  men  is  sent  along  the  road  to  establish 
communication  with  the  left  support  at  42,  and  re- 
turn through  the  strip  of  woods  just  west  of  the  cem- 
etery via  the  outguard  on  the  28 — 30  road.  A  sec- 
ond patrol  of  3  men  is  sent  along  the  road  towards 
22  to  establish  communication  with  the  detached  post 
at  that  point  and  return  by  following  around  the  crest 
of  Eleven  Hundred  hill.  A  third  patrol,  also  of  3 
men,  is  sent  to  follow  around  the  slope  of  Hund  hill 
and  return  by  way  of  the  post  on  the  28 — 30  road. 
Until  the  night  positions  are  taken  up,  other  patrols 
of  the  same  strength  are  sent  out  at  intervals  of 
about  one  hour  to  move  over  these  same  routes. 


OUTPOSTS  427 

So  we  see  that  during  daylight,  especially  when 
there  is  cavalry  in  front  and  the  terrain  favors  ob- 
servation from  the  support  itself,  it  may  not  be  neces- 
sary to  exhaust  the  support  by  sending  out  numerous 
outguards.  Any  disposition  is  good  which,  with  a 
small  number  of  men,  will  give  timely  warning  of  an 
approach  of  the  enemy  in  force  and  prevent  hostile 
patrols  from  penetrating  the  line.  In  addition  to 
the  dispositions  Captain  C  made,  a  small  outguard 
of  4  or  8  men  might  have  been  placed  at  the  cemetery, 
but  this  is  believed  to  be  unnecessary. 

Summarizing  these  dispositions,  we  find  that  our 
captain  has  10  men  in  observation,  2  at  the  support 
and  8  on  the  28 — 30  road,  and  9  men  patrolling — a 
total  of  19  men  on  duty  besides  the  3  troopers  near 
the  bridge  at  100.  When  the  outpost  commander  has 
inspected  the  position  of  the  support  and  approved 
the  dispositions  made,  he  directs  the  support  com- 
mander to  construct  trenches  or  otherwise  prepare 
hasty  cover  across  the  road  about  200  yards  west  of 
28,  on  a  line  having  a  good  field  of  fire  towards  the 
enemy. 

Captain  D,  on  reaching  44,  conducts  himself  in  like 
manner  to  Captain  C.  To  watch  the  Barnes  road,  a 
double  sentinel  post  is  established  on  top  of  the  ridge 
between  44  and  46.  This  ridge  is  200  feet  higher  than 
the  stream  between  48  and  104,  and  the  view  from 
its  top  into  this  valley  is  limited  only  by  the  trees.  A 
position  is  found  for  the  two  sentinels  from  which 
they  can  see  the  net  work  of  roads  about  48,  and  the 
road  running  southwest  from  106. 

Sixteen  men  under  a  lieutenant  are  sent  to  42  to 
watch  the  42 — 102  road  and  establish  communication 


428       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

with  the  right  support  at  28.  The  lieutenant  estab- 
lishes his  outguard  under  cover  at  42,  and  posts  two 
men  at  the  houses  on  the  road  400  yards  west  of  42; 
a  single  sentinel  is  posted  100  yards  west  of  42  for 
the  immediate  protection  of  the  outguard.  Before 
the  lieutenant  can  start  a  patrol  to  locate  the  right 
support,  the  patrol  of  3  men  from  the  latter  appears 
and  tells  him  where  that  support  is  posted.  Later  the 
lieutenant  takes  2  men  and  makes  a  thorough  inspec- 
tion of  the  terrain  from  the  ravine  southwest  of  42, 
thence  to  the  north  along  the  brow  of  the  hill,  thence 
by  the  cemetery  at  40  and  to  the  support  at  28,  and 
then  returns  to  42.  He  endeavors  to  become  so  fa- 
miliar with  the  ground  that  he  can  move  over  it  with 
certainty  after  dark. 

A  non-commissioned  officer  and  16  men  are  sent 
to  50  to  cover  the  48 — 50  road  and  establish  commu- 
nication with  the  detached  post  from  the  main  body 
at  68.  This  outguard  is  held  under  cover  at  50,  with 
a  single  sentinel  on  the  road  100  yards  to  the  west  for 
the  immediate  protection  of  the  outguard,  and  a  dou- 
ble sentinel  400  yards  farther  west  near  the  foot  of 
the  hill.  A  patrol  of  2  men  is  sent  along  the  road  to 
the  east  to  establish  communication  with  the  detached 
post  at  68,  but,  before  going  far,  it  meets  a  patrol 
from  that  post  and  turns  back. 

These  dispositions  did  not  meet  the  full  approval 
of  the  support  commander  when,  in  company  with  the 
outpost  commander,  he  reached  the  outguard  about  5 
o'clock.  The  double  sentinel  post  towards  the  foot 
of  the  hill  was  unnecessary,  since  it  could  see  even  less 
than  the  sentinel  at  the  top  of  the  hill ;  however,  since 
the  mistake  was  a  trifling  one  and  on  the  side  of  safe- 


OUTPOSTS  429 

ty,  and  the  two  sentinels  would  be  quite  necessary 
during  the  night,  the  support  commander  left  the 
post  where  it  was.  The  support  commander  (Cap- 
tain D)  had  neglected  to  tell  the  non-commissioned 
officer  to  patrol  along  the  top  of  the  ridge  to  136,  and 
the  latter  had  not  done  so  on  his  own  initiative;  ac- 
cordingly, a  patrol  of  3  men  was  started  over  this 
route  at  once.  This  left  the  non-commissioned  offi- 
cer and  11  men  at  50. 

Captain  D  located  the  bivouac  of  the  remainder  of 
his  support  in  a  bit  of  pasture  near  44,  and  posted 
a  sentinel  over  the  stacks.  Two  patrols  of  a  non-com- 
missioned officer  and  4  men  each  were  then  started  out 
to  move  united  over  the  Barnes  road  to  48,  where  they 
would  separate,  one  reconnoitering  to  the  west  as  far 
as  the  road  junction  at  104,  the  other  to  the  southwest 
to  the  western  edge  of  the  woods  on  the  106 — 128 
road.  Without  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  outpost 
commander,  the  captain  put  the  rest  of  the  support  to 
work  preparing  hasty  cover  on  top  of  the  ridge  in  an 
open  space  about  200  yards  wide  across  the  Barnes 
road. 

Before  passing  to  the  consideration  of  the  night 
positions  of  the  outposts,  attention  is  directed  once 
more  to  the  position  of  the  reserve,  which  is  farther  in 
rear  of  the  line  of  resistance  than  is  to  be  desired  or- 
dinarily. To  reinforce  either  support,  it  will  have  to 
advance  by  road  about  1500  yards,  whereas  it  should 
be  within  about  800  to  1000  yards  of  the  line  of  resist- 
ance, in  order  to  insure  giving  timely  support.  Such 
a  position  would  place  it  about  900  yards  due  west  of 
56,  near  the  Barnes  road  but  far  from  the  Zimmer- 
man road  along  which  there  is  most  danger  of  attack. 


430       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Still,  this  would  be  a  desirable  position,  if  the  terrain 
were  such  that  a  road  might  be  opened  without  un- 
due labor  connecting  with  the  support  at  28.  How- 
ever, with  a  complete  company  entrenched  in  each 
support,  and  considering  the  slight  probability  of  at- 
tack, the  supports  should  have  sufficient  defensive 
power  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check  much  more  than  20 
minutes,  which  is  about  the  distance  away  of  the  re- 
serve expressed  in  time. 

It  is  just  as  serious  an  error,  and  one  more  fre- 
quently committed,  to  place  the  reserve  too  close  to 
the  supports;  more  than  this,  beginners  are  liable  to 
shorten  unduly  all  the  distances  in  the  outpost  forma- 
tion. The  safety  of  the  troops  in  rear  depends  on  the 
outposts  having  sufficient  depth.  As  Major  A  has 
established  his  outpost,  the  reserve  is  about  1000  yards 
in  front  of  the  main  body,  the  supports  are  1500 
yards  from  the  reserve,  the  outguard  on  the  28 — 30 
road  is  about  500  yards  from  the  support,  and  its  sen- 
tries are  400  yards  farther  to  the  front.  The  enemy 
must  fight  his  way  over  a  total  distance  of  3400  yards 
before  he  can  strike  the  main  body. 

Continuation  of  the  Situation. 

About  3:50  p.  m.,  when  the  outpost  infantry 
reached  the  top  of  the  ridge  at  44  and  28,  the  cavalry 
advanced  against  the  ridge  west  of  102  and  gained 
possession  of  it  and  the  bridges  at  100,  after  a  hostile 
troop  fell  back  without  serious  fighting  to  the  hill 
south  of  110.  The  two  Blue  troops  continued  their 
advance  but  were  stopped  a  little  before  5  p.  m.,  at 
the  stream  west  of  the  108 — 128  road,  by  rifle  fire 
from  the  hill  south  of  110. 


OUTPOSTS  431 

A  little  after  5  p.  m.,  pursuant  to  orders  received 
from  the  detachment  commander,  the  cavalry  began 
to  withdraw  to  the  camp  of  the  main  body  at  60,  leav- 
ing half  a  troop  in  observation  on  the  ridge  west  of 
102,  with  orders  to  join  the  outpost  for  the  night. 
Between  4  p.  m.  and  5  p.  m.,  a  Blue  cavalry  patrol 
was  fired  on  by  infantry  at  the  cemetery  east  of  94. 
Patrols  on  the  Atchison  pike  and  Lecompton  road 
report  no  signs  of  the  enemy. 

At  5:15  p.  m.,  this  information  is  in  the  possession 
of  Major  A,  who  has  completed  his  inspection  of  the 
outpost  position  and  rejoined  the  reserve. 

Continuation  of  the  Solution  and  Discussion. 

When  in  close  contact  with  the  enemy,  the  situa- 
tion frequently  will  change  so  rapidly  that  the  out- 
post commander  will  wish  to  modify  or  add  to  his 
original  dispositions.  Generally,  the  outpost  is 
placed  in  position  before  its  commander  has  had  an 
opportunity  to  make  more  than  a  hurried  inspection 
of  the  terrain,  and  his  ideas  of  the  situation  may  un- 
dergo a  considerable  change  after  he  has  ridden 
around  the  position.  Also,  new  orders  from  the  de- 
tachment commander  may  call  for  a  change  in  the 
outpost  arrangements,  as,  for  example,  the  orders 
with  reference  to  the  cavalry  in  the  situation  before 
us.  Such  alterations  in  or  additions  to  the  outpost 
dispositions  are  covered  as  far  as  practicable  in  a  sec- 
ond outpost  order,  which  should  reach  the  advance 
cavalry  and  supports  some  time  before  they  occupy 
their  night  positions. 

The  most  important  feature  of  Major  A's  second 
outpost  order  will  be  the  disposition  of  the  half  troop 


432       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

of  advance  cavalry,  which  until  now  has  been  oper- 
ating under  the  direct  orders  of  the  detachment  com- 
mander. It  is  now  on  the  ridge  west  of  102,  a  very 
important  feature  in  the  terrain,  since  the  side  that 
possesses  it  has  a  vantage  point  from  which  to  observe 
the  outpost  position  of  the  other.  Its  possession  will 
also  be  of  value  to  the  Blue  detachment  when  it  re- 
sumes its  advance  to-morrow.  This  ridge,  then, 
should  be  held,  and,  since  it  is  more  than  a  mile  in 
front  of  the  infantry  line  of  resistance,  the  task  of 
holding  it  naturally  falls  to  the  cavalry.  But  it 
should  not  be  necessary  to  employ  the  entire  half 
troop  in  this  manner. 

It  is  not  unusual  to  find  for  the  cavalry  some  such 
detached  mission  to  the  front  or  on  the  flank  of  an 
outpost  position ;  but  the  number  and  strength  of  such 
detached  cavalry  posts  should  be  reduced  to  the  min- 
imum consistent  with  the  purpose  of  the  outpost,  for 
both  horses  and  men  get  very  little  rest  when  occupy- 
ing positions  so  exposed.  In  the  cavalry,  we  have 
to  think  of  the  horse  as  well  as  of  the  man,  and  the 
former  should  receive  quite  as  much  if  not  more  con- 
sideration than  the  latter. 

We  will  often  find  it  convenient,  when  disposing 
of  our  outpost  cavalry  for  the  night,  first,  to  deter- 
mine all  the  necessary  tasks  that  naturally  fall  to  the 
lot  of  the  cavalry,  and  second,  to  make  our  arrange- 
ments in  such  manner  as  to  perform  these  tasks  with 
the  least  possible  number  of  troopers.  Let  us  follow 
this  plan  in  the  problem  before  us,  but  first,  we  will 
examine  the  situation  in  the  light  of  the  later  infor- 
mation received  from  the  cavalry  commander. 

The  enemy  evidently  has  halted  in  his  march  from 


OUTPOSTS  433 

Easton,  or  his  infantry  would  have  appeared  before 
our  outpost  line  long  before  5  p.  m.  The  information 
received  from  the  hostile  inhabitants  has  been  con- 
firmed in  part  by  our  discovering  but  one  troop  of 
hostile  cavalry,  and  consequently  we  have  greater 
faith  in  the  additional  report  that  the  enemy  has  but 
one  regiment  of  infantry.  Accordingly,  it  is  not 
probable  we  will  be  seriously  molested  during  the 
night.  Whether  or  not  the  hostile  cavalry  was  sup- 
ported  by  infantry  near  110,  our  cavalry  did  not  de- 
termine, but  we  do  know  that  hostile  infantry  occu- 
pies the  cemetery  east  of  94.  The  natural  inference 
is  that  the  enemy  is  camped  close  in  rear  of  a  line 
through  the  cemetery  and  110.  Consequently  the 
30—100—96  and  48—104—108—110  roads  are 
still  the  most  dangerous  of  all  those  leading  towards 
the  enemy. 

Both  of  these  roads  must  be  patrolled  throughout 
the  night,  and,  since  the  distance  from  our  outpost 
line  to  the  supposed  position  of  the  enemy  is  about 
three  miles,  this  patrolling  should  be  done  by  cavalry. 
On  each  road  this  may  be  done  by  three  patrols  of  at 
least  3  men  each,  for  each  patrol  probably  can  make 
the  trip  out  and  back  in  less  than  two  hours,  provided 
the  hostile  outpost  line  is  where  we  think  it  is.  It  is 
not  enough  for  these  patrols  merely  to  proceed  some 
distance  along  the  roads  assigned  them  and  then  re- 
turn, but  they  must  advance  far  enough  to  get  con- 
tact with  the  enemy  and  then  maintain  it  during  the 
night.  The  detached  post  on  the  ridge  west  of  102 
should  be  as  small  as  practicable,  and  yet  it  is  not 
wise  to  make  it  weaker  than  12  men.  By  this  arrange- 


434       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

ment  30  troopers  will  be  needed  for  the  absolutely 
necessary  night  work. 

The  patrols  may  be  sent  out  directly  from  the  sup- 
ports, or  a  small  detached  post  of  9  men  may  be 
formed  in  front  of  the  supports  on  each  of  the  two 
roads.  In  favor  of  the  former  arrangement  is  the 
greater  security  and  consequently  the  better  oppor- 
tunity for  rest  the  men  and  horses  will  have  when  not 
patrolling;  and  in  favor  of  the  latter  is  the  shorter 
distance  the  patrols  will  have  to  cover  and  the  added 
security  given  the  infantry  in  rear.  It  may  be  well  to 
follow  both  plans  in  this  situation.  By  placing  a 
detached  post  at  the  bridge  at  100,  about  a  mile  and  a 
half  in  front  of  the  support  at  28,  we  not  only  short- 
en by  nearly  three  miles  the  distance  the  patrols  will 
have  to  cover,  but  we  also  bar  the  enemy's  patrols 
from  passing  this  important  point.  On  the  other 
road,  however,  the  patrols  might  better  be  sent  out 
from  the  support  at  44,  for  there  is  no  important 
point  in  front  to  watch,  that  can  not  be  watched  by 
infantry,  and  they  can  make  the  whole  distance  from 
44  to  110  and  return  in  about  two  hours. 

There  is  another  arrangement  which  may  give  bet- 
ter results.  The  task  of  cavalry  reconnaissance  dur- 
ing the  night  may  be  intrusted  wholly  to  25  troopers 
under  a  lieutenant  with  orders  to  hold  on  to  the  bridge 
at  100  and  the  ridge  west  of  102,  and  patrol  up  to 
the  enemy's  outpost  on  the  100 — 96 — 94  and  the  104 
—108 — 110  roads.  The  lieutenant  can  post  9  men 
at  the  bridge  at  100  to  watch  the  bridge  and  patrol 
towards  94  and  the  remaining  16  men  on  the  ridge  of 
102  to  hold  the  ridge  and  patrol  towards  110.  The 
advantages  of  this  arrangement  are  that  it  employs  a 


OUTPOSTS  435 

less  number  of  troopers,  and  strengthens  by  4  men 
the  detached  post  on  the  ridge  west  of  102,  and  we 
believe  it  preferable  to  the  one  first  discussed. 

The  supports  must  keep  in  communication  with  the 
advanced  cavalry  posts  during  the  night.  The  sup- 
port at  28  can  do  this  by  sending  an  occasional  in- 
fantry patrol  from  the  out  guard  on  the  28 — 30  road 
to  the  bridge  at  100.  The  distance  from  the  support 
at  44  to  the  cavalry  post  on  the  ridge  west  of  102  be- 
ing about  2  miles,  a  few  troopers  (2  patrols  of  2  men 
each  will  be  sufficient)  should  be  attached  to  this  sup- 
port to  make  occasional  visits  to  the  cavalry.  The  re- 
mainder of  the  cavalry  will  be  withdrawn  to  the  re- 
serve for  the  night,  but  will  be  sent  out  again  at  an 
early  hour  in  the  morning.  Since  the  sun  sets  about 
6:40  p.  m.,  we  may  have  this  cavalry  start  in  about 
6:15  p.  m. ;  even  then  it  will  not  reach  the  camping 
place  of  the  reserve  much  before  dark. 

Ordinarily  the  outpost  commander  is  not  so  direct- 
ly interested  as  the  support  commanders  in  the  in- 
fantry dispositions  for  the  night.  Were  it  necessary 
to  change  the  position  of  a  support,  it  would  be  done 
only  on  the  orders  of  the  outpost  or  higher  command- 
er; but  shifting  a  support,  once  it  is  well  established 
in  its  position,  is  an  exceptional  procedure.  The 
change  from  day  to  night  positions,  as  a  rule,  affects 
mainly  such  observation  groups  as  detached  posts, 
outguards  and  sentinels,  and  the  responsibility  for 
having  them  located  in  proper  positions  and  strength 
rests  directly  on  the  support  commander.  Accord- 
ingly, the  outpost  commander's  second  order,  like  his 
first,  should  say  nothing  of  the  location  of  the  groups 
sent  out  from  the  supports,  unless  there  be  some  par- 


436       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

ticularly  important  point  that  should  be  watched,  and 
it  is  questionable  whether  the  support  commander  ap- 
preciates this  fact. 

But  this  second  order  ordinarily  will  state  when 
these  groups  should  occupy  their  night  positions. 
This  usually  will  be  at  an  hour  sufficiently  early  to 
permit  them  to  occupy  and  inspect  their  positions  in 
daylight,  provided  the  positions  are  screened  from  the 
enemy's  view;  otherwise  the  changes  are  arranged 
for  during  day  but  they  are  not  actually  made  un- 
til after  dusk.  The  hour  at  which  the  day  positions 
are  to  be  resumed  in  the  morning  is  also  prescribed  in 
this  order;  since  an  outpost  is  especially  liable  to  be 
attacked  at  daybreak,  the  night  positions  should  not 
be  disturbed  until  well  after  sunrise. 

To  secure  certainty  and  uniformity  in  the  matter 
of  patrolling,  it  will  be  well  to  prescribe  the  distance 
to  the  front  the  infantry  patrols  shall  go  during  the 
night.  The  cavalry  will  be  given  the  task  of  keeping 
touch  with  the  enemy  and  patrolling  the  roads  west 
of  the  branch  of  Salt  creek  flowing  by  106,  102  and 
100.  The  infantry,  then,  should  send  its  patrols  as 
far  as  this  stream. 

Finally,  the  order  may  state  that  the  wagons  have 
been  sent  to  the  supports,  that  cooking  at  the  sup- 
ports will  be  allowed,  and  the  preparations  to  be 
made  for  defending  the  position.  We  have  seen  that 
Major  A  directed  or  approved  arrangements  for  de- 
fense at  28  and  on  the  ridge  near  44,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  he  probably  informed  the  support  commanders 
that  they  would  have  their  wagons  and  might  do 
cooking  at  the  supports;  nevertheless,  it  will  do  no 
harm  again  to  mention  these  matters  in  the  order,  and 


OUTPOSTS  437 

it  may  be  the  means  of  avoiding  misunderstandings. 
Probably  the  most  convenient  method  of  communi- 
cating the  order  will  be  to  reduce  it  to  written  form 
and  send  copies  to  the  cavalry  and  support  command- 
ers. The  retained  copy  will  be  as  follows: 

Outpost, 

At  farm  house,  just  west  of   58, 

Field  Orders  1   Sept.  — ,  5:30  P.  M. 

No.  2. 

1.  About  4  p.  m.  a  hostile  troop  of  cavalry  abandoned  the 
ridge  west  of  102  and  fell  back  to  the  hill  south  of  110.     Our 
cavalry  pursued  but  was  checked  about  5  p.  m.  at  the  stream 
west  of  108  by  rifle  fire  from  the  hill  south  of  110.     One  of 
our   patrols   drew   fire    from   hostile   infantry   in   the   cemetery 
east  of  94,  between  4  and  5   p.   m.      No   signs   of  the  enemy 
have  been  seen  on  the  ATCHISON   pike  and  LECOMPTON 
road.     Our  cavalry,  less  half  a  troop  which  now  occupies  the 
ridge   west  of    102   and   has   been   assigned   to   the   outpost,   is 
withdrawing   to   the   main   body    for   the   night. 

2.  The  following  changes  are  ordered  for  the  night. 

3.  (a)      Twenty-five  troopers  of  the  advance  cavalry,  under 
Lieutenant  A,  will  hold  the  bridge  at  100  and  the  ridge  just  west 
of  102,  and  keep  in  touch  with  the  enemy  towards  94  and  110. 
The   remaining  troopers   will  withdraw  to  the   reserve   at  6:15 
p.  m. ;  four  of  these  troopers  will  report  to  Support  No.  2  at  44 
for  night   duty. 

(b)  The  infantry  supports  will  be  in  their  night  positions 
by  6  p.  m.  Infantry  patrols  will  be  sent  as  far  as  the  stream 
passing  by  106,  102,  and  100.  Support  No.  2  will  maintain 
communication  with  the  cavalry  on  the  ridge  west  of  102.  The 
day  positions  will  be  resumed  at  6:00  a.  m.  Both  supports  will 
prepare  their  positions  for  defense.  Their  wagons  will  join 
them  and  fires  may  be  lighted  in  concealed  positions. 

4.  Messages  will  be  sent  here. 

By  order  of  Major  A: 

L. 

1st    Lieut.,    5th    Infantry, 
Battalion  Adjutant. 


488       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Copies  to  commanders  of  supports  and  advance  cavalry. 
Dictated  to  staff  and  commanders  of  reserve  companies. 

The  accompanying  sketch  ( see  page  442 )  will  assist 
you  in  understanding  the  dispositions  made  by  the 
support  commanders  for  the  night. 

Night  Dispositions  of  Support  No.  1. 

The  outguard  on  the  28 — 30  road  is  strengthened 
to  a  full  section  under  an  officer.  It  remains  in  the 
position  it  occupied  during  the  day,  but  it  pushes  its 
sentinels  forward  to  the  road  junction  at  38,  and, 
since  these  sentinels  should  not  be  so  far  (1000  yards) 
from  the  outguard,  a  sentry  squad  of  8  men  is  sent 
forward  from  the  outguard  to  30.  Although  the  34 
—32 — 26  trail  is  but  little  traveled  and  close  to  the 
main  highway,  still  it  must  be  watched,  and  a  double 
sentinel  post  is  sent  out  directly  from  the  outguard 
to  a  point  on  this  trail  about  500  yards  to  the  north. 

The  trail  along  the  top  of  the  spur  just  east  of  the 
102 — 100  road  is  in  the  section  assigned  Support  No. 
1,  and  must  be  watched,  notwithstanding  its  appar- 
ent unimportance.  For  this  purpose  a  detached  post 
of  12  men  is  established  at  the  farm  house  1000  yards 
west  of  28,  and,  because  of  its  distance  from  the  sup- 
port, the  post  is  commanded  by  the  second  lieuten- 
ant. It  posts  double  sentinels  at  the  forks  of  the 
trail  300  yards  away. 

The  following  patrols  are  sent  out  in  this  section: 
One  of  3  men  from  the  outguard  on  the  28 — 30  road 
to  advance  along  the  highway  to  the  cavalry  post  at 
100  and  return  via  the  34 — 32 — 26  trail;  and  anoth- 
er of  two  men  to  keep  up  communication  with  the 
detached  post  at  the  farm  house  west  of  28.  One  of 


OUTPOSTS  439 

2  men  from  the  detached  post  to  patrol  the  trail  on 
the  ridge  and  communicate  with  the  sentinels  on  the 
42 — 102  road.  From  the  support  a  patrol  of  2  men 
maintains  communication  with  the  detached  post 
(from  the  reserve)  at  22;  another  of  3  men  moves 
around  the  crest  of  Eleven  Hundred  hill ;  and  a  third 
of  2  men  preserves  communication  with  the  outguard 
(from  Support  No.  2)  at  42.  These  dispositions 
leave  more  than  half  of  the  company  at  the  support 
at  28. 

Night  Dispositions  of  Support  No.  2. 

The  outguard  at  42  is  increased  to  20  men.  It  es- 
tablishes a  sentry  squad  (8  men)  where  the  senti- 
nels were  during  the  day  ( at  the  two  farm  houses  400 
yards  west  of  42)  and  pushes  the  double  sentinels 
forward  to  the  junction  of  the  trails,  about  400  yards 
farther  west. 

The  outguard  at  50  is  also  increased  to  20  men  and 
placed  under  an  officer.  In  like  manner  to  the  out- 
guard at  42,  it  places  a  sentry  squad  of  8  men  down 
the  slope  in  front  and  posts  the  two  sentinels  at  48 
where  they  can  watch  both  roads. 

The  remaining  men  of  one  platoon  of  the  support 
are  posted  down  the  slope  towards  46  on, the  Barnes 
road;  this  post  sends  two  sentinels  to  the  road  junc- 
tion at  46. 

Patrols  are  sent  out  in  this  section  as  follows:  One 
of  2  men  from  the  outguard  at  42  to  move  along  the 
road  and  trail  to  102  and  return.  One  of  3  men  from 
the  post  on  the  Barnes  road  to  advance  beyond  the 
stream-crossing  southwest  of  106  and  return.  And 
one  of  2  men  from  the  outguard  at  50  to  move  along 


440       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  trail  to  136  and  return.  With  a  patrol  of  2  men, 
the  support  keeps  up  communication  with  the  out- 
guards  at  42  and  50  and  on  the  Barnes  road;  and, 
with  the  4  cavalrymen  it  patrols  the  48 — 104 — 102 
road  and  communicates  with  the  cavalry  detached 
post  west  of  102.  One  platoon  remains  at  the  posi- 
tion of  the  support. 

In  both  sections  of  the  outpost  line  most  of  the 
patrols  are  sent  out  at  intervals  of  from  one  to  two 
hours,  and  the  support  commanders,  accompanied  by 
a  few  men,  make  two  or  more  inspections  during  the 
night,  of  all  the  outguards  in  their  respective  sections. 
A  sentinel  is  posted  at  each  outguard,  and  a  sentinel 
is  kept  on  duty  over  the  stacks  at  each  support.  In 
addition,  the  supports  may  have  a  sentinel  about  200 
yards  away  on  each  of  their  flanks. 

Night  Dispositions  of  the  Reserve. 

Let  us  now  look  at  the  arrangements  for  the  night 
at  the  position  of  the  reserve.  Attention  has  already 
been  called  to  the  fact  that  the  reserve  is  farther 
to  the  rear  than  we  would  like  to  have  it,  and  to  make 
the  case  still  more  annoying,  we  will  suppose  that 
Major  A,  when  riding  around  the  outpost  position, 
discovers  an  admirable  position  for  the  reserve  be- 
tween the  two  small  streams  half  a  mile  east  of  42, 
with  farmroads,  not  shown  on  his  map,  leading  to  28 
and  the  54 — 52  road.  This  being  the  case,  should  he 
change  the  position  of  the  reserve? 

Before  answering  this  question,  it  will  be  well  to 
imagine  the  situation  at  the  reserve  when  Major  A 
returns  from  his  inspection  a  little  after  5  p.  m.  The 
reserve  companies  reached  their  camping  place  300 


OUTPOSTS  441 

yards  west  of  58  before  4  p.  m.  and  for  more  than  an 
hour  they  have  been  making  their  arrangements  for 
the  night.  The  men  have  unpacked  their  rolls  and 
pitched  their  shelter  tents,  and  many  have  made  the 
simple  toilets  of  soldiers  in  the  field,  and  all  feel  that 
they  are  located  for  the  night,  provided  the  outposts 
are  not  attacked.  Fire  wood  has  been  collected,  kitch- 
en fires  have  been  lighted,  the  wagons,  which  have 
just  arrived,  are  being  unloaded,  and  the  cooks  are 
busy  with  their  preparations  for  supper.  Without 
making  the  experiment,  we  can  tell  what  would  be 
the  temper  of  this  command  if  it  were  ordered  to 
break  camp,  only  that  it  might  be  moved  400  or  500 
yards  nearer  the  front.  Our  Field  Service  Regula- 
tions say  that  the  outpost  commander  will  order  such 
changes  in  the  dispositions  as  he  deems  necessary  aft- 
er making  a  careful  inspection  of  the  outpost  posi- 
tion, but  they  do  not  contemplate  such  extensive 
changes  as  would  cause  so  much  inconvenience  to  the 
troops  as  to  discount  the  advantages  gained. 

Perhaps  Major  A  should  be  criticized  for  not  lo- 
cating the  reserve  with  greater  care  at  the  start,  but 
before  blaming  him  let  us  imagine  ourselves  in  the 
place  of  that  officer.  He  finished  issuing  his  orders 
about  3:40  p.  m.  and  saw  the  outpost  supports  start- 
ed towards  their  position.  He  then  looked  about  him 
for  a  camping  place  for  the  reserve.  He  rode  along 
the  56 — 54  road,  and  the  open  pasture  on  his  right 
hand  appealed  to  him,  but  he  rode  on  to  54  looking 
for  a  location  nearer  the  front.  At  54  the  hills  were 
all  about  him,  and  the  woods  along  the  ravine  cut 
off  his  view  to  the  west.  It  would  require  much  la- 
bor by  his  tired  command  to  prepare  crossings  over 


442       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  deep  ravine  and  open  communications  to  the  main 
roads.  The  farm  roads  were  not  visible  and  the 
woods  had  a  forbidding  appearance.  Unless  one  has 
a  good  imagination  the  ground  looks  very  different 
from  the  map.  Time  was  pressing  and  our  major 
wished  to  get  to  the  front  to  see  the  situation  and 
make  necessary  changes  there  before  the  supports 
were  well  established  in  their  positions.  We  can  not 
blame  him  for  choosing  the  camp  ground  in  the  pas- 
ture west  of  58.  With  the  map  before  us  we  can 
scale  off  distances  and  say  this  force  will  go  here  and 
that  force  will  go  there,  but  we  cannot  always  use 
dividers  on  the  ground,  for  frequently  the  points  so 
chosen  will  be  wholly  unsuited  to  our  needs.  If  our 
peace  time  training  is  not  to  teach  wrong  lessons,  we 
must  approach  as  nearly  as  possible  the  conditions  as 
they  will  exist  when  we  are  on  the  ground  confronted 
by  the  enemy. 

For  the  night  a  sentry  squad  of  4  men  is  placed 
at  54,  another  at  56  and  a  third  on  the  Zimmerman 
road  about  midway  between  58  and  24.  They  will 
serve  to  warn  the  reserve  of  any  hostile  patrols  that 
may  have  slipped  by  the  supports.  At  the  camp  of 
the  reserve  a  single  sentinel  is  on  duty  over  the  arms 
(if  they  are  stacked)  and  other  property.  Every  two 
hours  during  the  night,  two  patrols  of  2  men  each 
are  sent  along  the  roads  to  communicate  with  the 
supports  and  the  detached  post  at  22,  and  Major  A 
will  make  at  least  one  inspection  of  the  outposts  be- 
fore morning. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

OUTPOSTS. 

PROBLEM. 

(See  2-inch  map). 

The  situation  is  the  continuation  of  that  given  in 
Chapter  XXIV. 

September  1,  a  regiment  of  infantry  and  troop  of 
cavalry,  detached  from  a  larger  Red  force  about  15 
miles  west  of  Easton,  marched  to  the  east  in  friendly 
country  to  make  a  reconnaissance  towards  Leaven- 
worth. 

As  the  column  was  passing  90,  residents  of  Leav- 
enworth  reported  over  rural  telephones  that  two 
troops  of  hostile  cavalry  crossed  the  Missouri  river 
into  Leavenworth  at  1  p.  m.,  and  that  the  advance 
guard  of  a  column  of  hostile  infantry  was  approach- 
ing the  bridge  via  Stillings  at  1 :45  p.  m.  Communi- 
cation with  Leavenworth  was  interrupted  before  the 
strength  of  this  infantry  column  was  learned.  The 
Red  troop  reported  from  94,  at  1 :30  p.  m.,  that  it  had 
seen  nothing  of  the  enemy. 

At  2 :05  p.  m.,  the  regimental  commander  issued  his 
orders  to  halt  for  the  night.  The  main  body  is  to 
camp  at  90.  Major  A  is  to  establish  the  outposts 
with  the  advance  guard  (1st  Bn.,  less  Cos.  C  and  D, 
and  8  troopers)  on  the  line  extending  from  the  92 — 
82  road,  inclusive,  through  94  to  the  ravine  1200 
yards  south  of  94,  inclusive.  As  soon  as  practicable 
his  cavalry  is  to  be  increased  to  about  a  platoon. 


444       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

The  troop  of  cavalry  is  to  remain  in  front  of  this 
outpost  line  until  further  orders  and  oppose  the  hos- 
tile cavalry  should  it  advance ;  it  is  to  guard  the  bridg- 
es at  100  and  hold  the  ridge  west  of  102  until  the 
outpost  is  in  position. 

The  main  body  will  guard  the  90 — 84  road  with  a 
section  of  infantry  at  the  farm  house  1200  yards 
north  of  90,  and  will  guard  the  90 — 112  road  with  a 
section  of  infantry  at  the  farm  house  1200  yards 
south  of  90. 

The  outpost  companies  will  be  joined  by  their 
wagons;  and,  in  case  of  attack,  the  outpost  is  to  be 
reinforced. 

When  Major  A  receives  his  order,  at  2:05  p.  m., 
the  support  of  the  advance  guard  (Co.  A,  less  1  pla- 
toon, and  Co.  B)  is  passing  90,  and  the  advance  par- 
ty (1  plat.  Co.  A,  and  8  troopers)  is  500  yards  in  ad- 
vance on  the  90 — 92  road. 

Required : 

Major  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

His  orders. 

The  day  positions  of  the  outpost,  in  detail. 

SOLUTION. 

As  soon  as  Major  A  received  his  orders  he  directed 
the  advance  guard  to  resume  its  advance,  and  gal- 
loped ahead  to  the  ridge  north  of  92.  At  92  he  left  a 
staff  officer  to  halt  the  advance  guard  when  the  sup- 
port reached  that  point  and  assemble  the  officers. 

From  the  western  1100  hill  his  view  along  the  84— 
P  road  is  shut  off  by  the  trees  in  the  ravine  to  the 
north,  and  only  portions  of  the  82 — 78  road  are  visi- 
ble. Riding  to  the  eastern  1100  hill  Major  A  finds 


OUTPOSTS  445 

his  immediate  view  to  the  north  and  northwest  some- 
what limited  by  the  fringe  of  trees  along  the  streams 
south  of  the  82 — 76  road,  although  the  greater  part 
of  the  long  spur  running  from  P  to  78  can  be  seen 
above  the  tops  of  the  trees.  To  the  east,  the  road 
junctions  at  96  and  98  can  be  seen  over  the  trees  in 
the  ravine  west  of  96,  but  the  road  from  98  to  100  is 
invisible  except  for  a  few  hundred  yards  near  98. 
The  main  highway  is  visible,  however,  the  entire  dis- 
tance from  92  to  the  ravine  west  of  96,  as  is  also  most 
of  the  country  to  the  south  of  it  as  far  as  the  branch 
of  Salt  creek  which  heads  at  92,  while  farther  to  the 
south  and  over  the  trees  can  be  seen  the  high  ground 
and  roads  near  112  and  110.  While  at  this  command- 
ing point  Major  A  makes  a  hasty  estimate  of  the  sit- 
uation. 

Nothing  is  known  of  the  enemy's  intentions,  and 
very  little  can  be  conjectured.  He  was  8  miles  away 
at  1 :45  p.  m.,  and,  considering  the  late  hour,  it  is  not 
probable  his  infantry  will  come  in  contact  with  the 
Red  outposts  to-day.  Most  probably  it  will  halt  for 
the  night  near  Leavenworth.  It  is  believed,  however, 
that  he  has  superior  cavalry,  and  Major  A's  outpost 
arrangements  must  provide  protection  against  possi- 
ble surprises  by  hostile  cavalry.  True,  the  Red  troop 
has  been  ordered  to  hold  the  Blue  cavalry  troops  at 
a  distance,  but  the  latter  may  elude  or  defeat  the 
former  and  reach  the  outpost  line. 

There  are  three  approaches  from  the  enemy's  sup- 
posed position  that  must  be  specially  guarded;  they 
are  the  74—76—78—82  road;  the  100—96—94  road; 
and  the  104 — 108 — 110  road.  The  most  important 
of  these  is  the  direct  road  over  which  the  command 


446        TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

has  been  marching,  and  the  arrangements  for  guard- 
ing it  will  form  the  main  feature  of  the  outposts  on 
which  all  other  dispositions  will  depend. 

On  this  road,  then,  will  be  placed  one  support, 
which  will  watch  the  right  section  of  the  line.  An- 
other support  will  be  placed  on  the  92 — 82  road,  near 
the  top  of  the  ridge ;  this  appears  to  be  the  best  avail- 
able position,  since  it  is  about  the  center  of  the  left 
section  of  the  outpost  line,  and  is  in  close  support- 
ing distance  of  the  remainder  of  the  outpost  troops. 

Although  it  is  objectionable  to  use  a  road  as  a  di- 
viding line  between  sections,  still,  in  this  case,  the  two 
sections  cannot  be  divided  by  any  natural  lines  other 
than  roads.  The  best  division,  under  the  circumstan- 
ces, will  be  to  have  the  left  section  embrace  the  front 
from  the  92 — 82  road,  inclusive,  to  the  92 — 94  road, 
exclusive,  and  the  right  section  the  remaining  front 
to  include  the  ravine  south  of  the  92 — 94  road. 

Major  A  may  dispense  with  a  reserve  and  place  a 
full  company  as  a  support  in  each  of  these  sections. 
It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether  the  two  sections  are 
of  equal  importance,  for  the  greatest  danger  appears 
to  be  in  front  of  the  right  section;  and,  since  it  is  not 
clear  where  the  bulk  of  the  force  will  be  needed  most, 
the  best  arrangement  probably  is  to  place  a  platoon 
in  each  support  and  hold  a  company  in  reserve.  To 
facilitate  mess  arrangements  as  well  as  to  enable  each 
support,  in  case  of  necessity,  to  be  reinforced  by  the 
remainder  of  its  company,  each  company  will  furnish 
a  support.  This  arrangement  also  enables  Major 
A  to  place  a  captain  in  command  of  each  support. 

At  92,  the  reserve  will  be  conveniently  located  for 
reinforcing  either  support;  no  fault  can  be  found 


OUTPOSTS  447 

with  the  distance  (880  yards)  that  separates  it  from 
the  main  body,  and  fuel,  and  water  will  be  within  easy 
reach.  The  road-fork  at  94  is  the  natural  place  for 
the  right  support;  here  it  will  guard  two  approaches, 
will  be  within  easy  supporting  distance  (880  yards) 
of  the  reserve,  and  will  have  its  arrangements  for  the 
night  simplified  by  the  nearness  of  the  school  and 
farm  houses.  But  it  will  not  be  wise  to  push  the 
left  support  forward  to  the  road-fork  at  82,  since  this 
would  take  it  a  mile  from  the  reserve,  and  locate  it 
nearly  half  a  mile  in  advance  of  the  line  to  be  defend- 
ed. Near  the  top  of  the  ridge  is  the  proper  place 
for  this  support,  and  its  commander  should  be  al- 
lowed considerable  latitude  in  selecting  its  position, 
since  it  may  be  difficult  to  get  cover  from  the  direc- 
tion of  the  enemy. 

At  the  present  time  Major  A  has  but  8  cavalry- 
men, and  they  can  be  employed  to  best  advantage  in 
patrolling  one  of  the  flank  roads,  since  the  94 — 96 
road  can  be  observed  from  the  position  itself.  The 
82 — 78 — 74  road  being  concealed  from  the  position 
throughout  the  greater  part  of  its  length,  and  being 
but  poorly  covered  by  the  cavalry  troop  on  the  ridge 
west  of  102,  the  8  troopers  will  be  given  to  the  left 
support  for  patrolling  this  road. 

Major  A's  decision  is  to  divide  the  outpost  line  into 
two  sections,  to  place  a  platoon  at  94  in  the  right  sec- 
tion, and  a  platoon  and  8  troopers  behind  the  1100 
ridge  near  the  92 — 82  road  in  the  left  section,  and  to 
hold  a  platoon  from  each  company  in  reserve  at  92. 

Galloping  back  to  92,  Major  A  issues  the  follow- 
ing orders  from  map  and  ground  at  2 :25  p.  m.,  to  all 
his  assembled  officers: 


448       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

"Inhabitants  of  Leaven  worth  have  reported  by  telephone  that 
two  troops  of  Blue  cavalry  crossed  the  Missouri  river  and  en- 
tered that  town  at  1  p.  m.,  and  that  the  point  of  the  advance 
guard  of  a  column  of  hostile  infantry  was  approaching  the 
river  via  Stillings  at  1 :45  p.  m.  The  telephone  lines  were 
cut  before  the  strength  of  the  hostile  column  could  be  learned. 
The  regiment  is  to  camp  for  the  night  at  90,  and  will  send  half 
a  platoon  to  the  farm  house  1200  yards  south  of  90  and  an- 
other half  platoon  to  the  farm  house  1200  yards  north  of  90. 

"The  advance  guard,  under  my  command,  will  form  the 
outposts,  and  will  hold  a  line  along  this  ridge  (800  yards  north 
of  92)  through  94  to  that  ravine  1200  yards  south  of  94. 

"Captain  A,  with  one  platoon  of  your  company  and  a  mount- 
ed orderly,  you  will  form  Support  No.  1 ;  take  post  at  the  road- 
fork  at  94  and  hold  the  line  from  the  ravine  1200  yards  south 
of  this  (92 — 94)  road  inclusive,  to  this  (92 — 94 — 96)  road  in- 
clusive. Maintain  communication  with  the  detached  post  from 
the  main  body  on  the  90 — 112  road. 

"Captain  B,  with  one  platoon  from  your  company,  8  troop- 
ers and  a  mounted  orderly,  you  will  form  Support  No.  2 ;  take 
post  near  this  (92 — 82)  road  and  under  cover  of  that  ridge 
(pointing  north),  and  hold  the  line  from  this  (92 — 94)  road 
exclusive  to  this  (92 — 82)  road  inclusive.  Patrol  the  82 — 78 — 
74  road  with  your  cavalry. 

"The  remaining  two  platoons  will  form  the  reserve  and  biv- 
ouack  here  (at  92). 

"Colonel  A  has  ordered  the  cavalry  to  keep  the  hostile  cav- 
alry away  from  our  position,  maintaining  possession,  if  possi- 
ble, of  the  bridge  at  100  and  the  ridge  west  of  102. 

"In  case  of  attack  we  will  be  reinforced. 

"The  company  wagons  will  join  the  reserve.  Cooking  for 
the  supports  will  be  done  at  the  reserve. 

"I  will  be  with  the  reserve." 

The  right  support  sends  an  outguard  of  a  lieu- 
tenant and  16  men  to  the  cemetery.  It  occupies  the 
eastern  edge  of  the  cemetery  with  12  men  and  sends  a 
patrol  of  4  men  along  the  road  and  down  the  ravine 
west  of  96  to  the  bridge  on  the  96 — 76  road.  Anoth- 


OUTPOSTS  449 

er  outguard,  consisting  of  2  squads  (16  men)  under  a 
sergeant,  is  sent  to  the  spur  850  yards  south  of  94. 
It  sends  a  patrol  of  3  men  along  the  road  south  and 
then  east  through  110;  another  of  2  men  along  the 
ravine  to  the  west  to  connect  with  the  detached  post 
on  the  90 — 112  road;  and  establishes  a  double  senti- 
nel post  about  500  yards  to  the  east  on  the  point  of 
the  spur.  Both  outguards  have  a  sentinel  nearby  ob- 
serving towards  the  enemy.  The  remainder  of  the 
support  prepares  a  position  across  both  roads  at  94, 
intrenching  if  necessary  for  cover,  and  then  falls  out 
and  finds  concealment  in  and  around  the  school  house. 
A  sentinel  is  posted  on  each  road,  one  about  300  yards 
to  the  south,  and  the  other  at  the  bend  in  the  road  to 
the  east;  and  a  patrol  of  2  men  is  sent  to  locate  the 
right  of  the  other  support  on  the  1100  hill. 

The  left  support  sends  an  outguard  of  a  lieuten- 
ant and  16  men  to  82,  which  posts  the  usual  sentinel 
at  the  outguard,  and  double  sentinels  400  yards  away 
on  the  82 — 78  road.  A  patrol  of  2  men  is  sent  from 
the  support  to  the  84 — 90  road  to  establish  communi- 
cation with  the  post  from  the  main  body,  and  a  sen- 
try squad  of  4  men  is  established  on  the  eastern  1100 
hill  to  observe  and  keep  communication  with  the  right 
support  at  94.  A  cavalry  patrol  of  4  men  is  sent 
along  the  82 — 78 — 74  road.  The  remainder  of  the 
support  prepares  a  position  across  the  92 — 82  road, 
posts  a  single  sentinel  on  top  of  the  ridge,  and  finds 
concealment  behind  the  ridge  just  west  of  the  92— 
82  road. 

The  reserve  stacks  arms,  falls  out  and  prepares  the 
evening  meal,  both  for  itself  and  for  the  support.  A 
sentinel  is  left  over  the  arms,  another  is  posted  on 


450       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  92 — 94  road  at  the  eastern  edge  of  the  orchard, 
and  a  patrol  of  3  men  is  sent  down  the  ravine  that 
heads  just  west  of  92. 

Continuation  of  the  Problem. 

At  2 :30  p.  m.,  a  Red  cavalry  patrol  was  driven  back 
from  30  by  superior  hostile  cavalry.  The  Red  troop 
then  left  a  guard  at  the  bridge  at  100,  and  occupied 
the  ridge  west  of  102;  there  it  remained  in  constant 
contact  with  hostile  cavalry  until  about  4  p.  m.,  when, 
in  order  to  avoid  being  cut  off,  it  fell  back  before 
two  troops  of  hostile  cavalry.  About  4:30  p.  m.,  it 
occupied  a  position  on  the  hill  south  of  110,  from 
which,  about  5  p.  m.,  it  checked  the  advance  of  the 
two  hostile  troops  at  the  stream  east  of  the  126 — 110 
road.  A  little  after  5  p.  m.,  the  two  hostile  troops 
were  seen  withdrawing  via  the  108 — 104  road  to  the 
east. 

Between  4  p.  m.  and  5  p.  m.,  hostile  cavalry  pa- 
trols were  driven  back  by  the  outpost  infantry  from 
the  cemetery  east  of  94.  No  hostile  infantry  has  been 
seen  by  the  outposts. 

At  5 :30  p.  m.,  the  above  information  is  in  the  pos- 
session of  Major  A.  At  that  hour  he  gets  the  fol- 
lowing message  from  Colonel  A:  "I  will  have  the  cav- 
alry withdraw  at  once  to  the  main  body.  The  re- 
mainder of  a  platoon  will  be  ordered  to  report  to  you 
for  duty  with  the  outpost." 

State  Major  A's  second  outpost  order,  and  give 
the  night  dispositions  of  the  outpost. 

Continuation  of  the  Solution. 
Apparently  the  enemy  has  halted  for  the  night, 
probably  in  the  vicinity  of  Leavenworth,  with  his  out- 


OUTPOSTS  451 

posts  on  the  high  ridge  west  of  the  town.  Three  and 
one-half  hours  have  elapsed  since  he  began  crossing 
the  bridge  at  Leavenworth,  and,  had  he  continued 
his  advance,  his  infantry  would  have  appeared  in 
front  of  Major  A's  outpost  line  before  5:30  p.  m. 
The  activity  of  the  hostile  cavalry  probably  was  for 
the  purpose  of  driving  the  Red  troop  from  its  threat- 
ening position  on  the  ridge  just  west  of  102,  and  as- 
certaining the  approximate  location  of  the  Red  camp 
for  the  night. 

With  the  ridge  west  of  102  in  the  enemy's  posses- 
sion, the  danger  threatening  along  the  100 — 94,  and 
the  104 — 110  roads  becomes  so  much  greater  that 
the  outpost  in  this  direction  may  well  be  strengthen- 
ed for  the  night.  This  may  be  done  by  having  the 
remainder  of  Company  A  join  the  support  at  94. 
A  single  platoon  will  be  left  at  92  in  reserve.  Since 
the  larger  part  of  the  outpost  position  is  visible  from 
the  ridge  west  of  102,  no  changes  should  be  made  in 
the  position  of  the  outposts  until  darkness  will  con- 
ceal the  movements  from  the  enemy. 

Major  A  will  use  his  additional  cavalry  for  pa- 
trolling the  roads  on  his  right  flank  towards  108  and 
126.  The  enemy  is  so  near  that  little  is  to  be  gained  by 
sending  cavalry  patrols  along  the  92 — 100  road,  al- 
though there  would  be  no  objection  to  sending  a  patrol 
along  this  road  early  in  the  evening  to  determine  with 
certainty  whether  the  enemy  holds  the  bridge  at  100 
and  the  ridge  west  of  102.  Accordingly,  the  eight 
troopers  now  with  the  left  support  will  remain  with  it, 
and  the  other  troopers  will  join  the  right  support. 

Major  A  decides  to  reinforce  the  right  support 
with  a  platoon  of  infantry  and  the  cavalry  sent  him, 


452       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

and  to  leave  the  supports  and  reserves  in  their  pres- 
ent positions. 

He  then  issues  the  following  order: 

Outpost,  1st  Infantry, 

At  92, 

Field  Orders  1  Sept.  — ,  5:45  P.  M. 

No. 

1.  Our  cavalry  fell  back  from  the  bridge  at  100  and  the 
ridge  just  west  of  102,  before  two  troops  of  hostile  cavalry,  and 
occupied  a  position  on  the  hill  just  south  of   110.      There  it 
stopped  the  advance  of  the  two  hostile  troops,  which  withdrew 
via  the  108 — 104  road  at  5  p.  m.     After  4  p.  m.,  hostile  cavalry 
patrols  were  driven  back  from  the  CEMETERY  east  of  94. 
There  is  no  additional  information  of  the  hostile  infantry. 

Our  cavalry  is  withdrawing  to  the  position  of  the  main  body 
for  the  night. 

2.  The  following  changes  will  be  made  in  the  outpost  dis- 
positions for  the  night: 

3.  (a)     Support  No.   1   will  be  reinforced  immediately  by 
12  troopers  and  at  dusk  by  the  platoon  of  Company  A  now  with 
the  reserve.     The  cavalry  will  patrol  towards  104  and  determine 
whether  the  enemy  holds  the  bridge  at  100  and  the  ridge  west 
of  102. 

(b)  Night  positions  will  be  occupied  under  cover  of  dark- 
ness. 

4.  Send  messages  to  92.  A. 

Major,  1st  Inf., 
Commanding  Outpost. 
Copies  to  Colonel  A,  and  Captains  A  and  B. 

Night  Dispositions  of  Support  No.  1. 

As  soon  as  the  cavalry  reports  to  this  support,  Cap- 
tain A  will  send  a  patrol  of  5  troopers  along  the  94 — 
100  road  to  determine  whether  the  bridge  at  100  and 
the  ridge  west  of  102  are  held  by  the  enemy. 
Throughout  the  night,  a  cavalry  patrol  will  be  kept 


OUTPOSTS  453 

on  the  road  by  110  and  108.  The  cavalry  may  remain 
with  the  support  during  the  night  or  it  may  form  a 
detached  post  at  110.  The  former  appears  prefera- 
ble. 

When  the  reinforcing  platoon  of  infantry  joins 
the  right  support,  the  outguards  at  the  cemetery  and 
on  the  spur  south  of  94  will  be  increased  to  a  full  sec- 
tion each.  The  cemetery  outguard  will  post  8  men 
at  the  bend  in  the  road  about  500  yards  to  the  east, 
from  which  double  sentinels  will  be  posted  about  200 
yards  farther  east  on  the  road. 

The  outguard  on  the  road  south  of  94  will  keep 
the  same  position  it  had  during  the  day,  on  the  spur 
850  yards  south  of  94.  It  will  have  a  sentry  squad  of 
8  men  at  the  bridge  400  yards  farther  south,  with  its 
double  sentinels  at  the  bend  in  the  road  south  of  the 
bridge;  and  another  sentry  squad  of  8  men  will  be 
located  400  yards  east  of  the  outguard  on  the  spur. 
The  latter  post  is  not  absolutely  necessary. 

The  rest  of  the  support  (1  platoon)  will  remain  at 
94,  posting  double  sentinels  about  400  yards  away  on 
each  road. 

This  section  will  be  patrolled  as  follows :  The  cem- 
etery outguard  will  constantly  patrol  the  main  road 
towards  100,  and  will  send  a  patrol  of  3  men  at  inter- 
vals to  communicate  with  the  sentry  squad  on  the  spur 
to  the  south.  The  outguard  south  of  94  will  patrol 
the  road  as  far  as  110,  and  will  occasionally  send  a  pa- 
trol of  2  men  to  communicate  with  the  detached  post 
from  the  main  body  at  the  farm  house  1200  yards 
south  of  90.  The  support  will  send  out  visiting  pa- 
trols to  the  outguard  on  the  1100  hill  from  the  left 
support. 


454       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

Night  Dispositions  of  Support  No.  2. 

At  dusk,  this  support  strengthens  the  outguard  at 
82  to  20  men,  and  the  post  on  1100  hill  to  8  men.  The 
outguard  posts  double  sentinels  about  400  yards  away 
to  the  east  on  the  road.  The  remainder  of  the  sup- 
port keeps  its  day  position,  and  posts  double  sentinels 
on  the  road  on  top  of  the  ridge. 

The  outguard  at  82  patrols  the  road  to  the  east  as 
far  as  the  point  where  it  bends  to  the  north,  and  sends 
a  patrol  of  2  men  from  time  to  time  to  communicate 
with  the  post  from  the  main  body  at  84.  In  addition 
to  the  usual  visiting  patrols  sent  out  to  the  observa- 
tion groups,  the  support  sends  cavalry  patrols  well 
to  the  east  on  the  82—78—76—74  road. 

Each  of  the  outguards  posts  the  usual  sentinel  to 
observe  in  the  immediate  vicinity,  and  the  supports 
each  post  a  sentinel  over  their  stacks. 

The  arrangements  made  by  the  reserve  for  its  pro- 
tection during  the  day  are  not  changed  for  the  night. 

COMMENTS. 

It  will  be  strange  if  your  arrangement  of  the  out- 
post is  the  same  as  that  given  in  the  solution,  nor  is  it 
necessary  that  it  should  be  in  order  that  the  outpost 
may  do  what  is  expected  of  it.  "Officers  on  outpost 
are  given  great  latitude,  so  long  as  their  dispositions 
insure  ample  warning  and  adequate  resistance."  (*) 
If  we  but  follow  the  principle  that  the  dispositions  of 
the  outpost  are  based  on  the  positions  of  the  two  op- 
posing forces  with  respect  to  the  net  work  of  roads, 
our  principal  arrangements  will  be  correct.  Our 
analysis  of  the  situation  should  convince  us  that  the 

*P.  S.  R. 


OUTPOSTS  455 

routes  of  importance  to  be  watched  by  the  outposts 
are  the  east  and  west  roads  through  76,  96  and  108, 
and  that  of  these  the  last  two  are  particularly  dan- 
gerous. This  being  the  case,  our  dispositions  should 
be  such  as  to  cover  these  three  roads  with  detachments 
whose  strengths  are  in  proportion  to  the  relative  im- 
portance of  the  roads.  If  we  have  done  this,  we  have 
correctly  solved  the  essential  parts  of  the  problem, 
and  so  far  as  the  details  are  concerned,  there  may  be 
a  number  of  good  arrangements  of  them  which  will 
satisfactorily  meet  the  situation. 

These  three  roads  may  be  covered  in  a  number  of 
ways,  all  of  which  are  good.  For  example,  a  reserve 
is  not  absolutely  necessary  in  this  situation,  and  there 
could  be  no  serious  objection  to  dispensing  with  one. 
The  force  is  small,  the  main  body  is  close  at  hand  and 
if  a  part  of  the  line  has  to  be  reinforced  it  may  be 
done  from  another  part  of  the  line  or  from  the  main 
body.  We  prefer  having  a  reserve,  because  the  road 
favors  its  location  close  to  the  supports,  part  of  the 
infantry  is  given  more  rest  than  it  otherwise  would 
have,  messing  arrangements  are  more  easily  made, 
and  last  but  not  least  the  outpost  commander  with  a 
reserve  at  his  disposal  will  be  in  better  control  of  the 
situation  in  case  of  an  emergency. 

The  outpost  may  be  divided  into  two  supports  of 
a  company  each,  with  one  at  94  and  the  other  on  the 
ridge  north  of  92.  Or  one  of  the  supports  may  be 
placed  at  92  with  a  strong  outguard  at  94,  and  the 
other  support  half  a  mile  north  of  92  with  a  strong 
outguard  at  82.  The  defect  of  this  arrangement  is 
the  insufficient  depth  of  the  outpost  on  the  92 — 94 — 
96  road.  Remember  that  the  safety  of  the  troops  in 


456       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

rear  depends  on  the  outposts  having  sufficient  depth. 
A  support  of  one  company  may  be  placed  at  94  and 
the  remaining  company  may  form  a  support  at  92 
with  an  outguard  on  the  ridge  to  the  north  across  the 
92 — 82  road.  The  weak  point  in  this  arrangement 
is  the  insufficient  depth  on  the  left  flank.  There  may 
be  still  other  good  ways  of  covering  the  three  import- 
ant roads. 

In  the  solution,  one  of  the  night  dispositions  was 
ordered,  not  because  it  was  believed  to  be  the  best  but 
in  order  that  attention  might  be  called  to  it  the  more 
forcibly  by  criticising  it  here.  We  refer  to  the  order 
given  one  of  the  reserve  platoons  to  reinforce  the  sup- 
port at  94.  This  should  be  an  exceptional  measure, 
and  to  avoid  it  the  support  should  be  made  strong 
enough  in  the  first  place  to  meet  all  probable  contin- 
gencies. If  we  reflect  a  moment  on  the  situation  at 
the  reserve  when  the  order  reaches  one  of  its  platoons 
to  leave  the  place  where  it  has  made  all  its  arrange- 
ments to  pass  the  night,  we  will  understand  the  rea- 
son for  this.  Troops  will  suff er  great  hardships  with- 
out complaining  when  they  have  confidence  in  the 
ability  of  their  leaders,  but  they  are  quick  to  recog- 
nize the  blunders  of  their  superiors  and  resent  fa- 
tigue and  inconvenience  that  might  have  been  avoid- 
ed. There  was  no  urgent  necessity  for  moving  one 
of  the  reserve  platoons  to  94,  and  the  additional  se- 
curity thereby  obtained  was  not  sufficient  to  warrant 
disturbing  the  platoon.  There  is  little  probability 
that  the  outposts  will  be  attacked  during  the  night, 
and  even  if  they  are  the  platoon  at  94  has  sufficient 
resisting  power  to  check  the  enemy  until  assistance 
can  reach  it  from  the  nearby  reserve.  It  takes  but  a 


OUTPOSTS  457 

few  such  ill-advised  moves  to  undermine  the  confi- 
dence troops  should  have  in  their  officers. 

The  double  sentinels  on  the  94 — 96  road  are  post- 
ed for  the  night  200  yards  in  advance  of  the  remain- 
ing 6  men  of  the  post,  but  the  double  sentinels  on  the 
94 — 110  road  are  pushed  out  400  yards  in  advance  of 
the  6  men  at  the  bridge  south  of  94.  It  is  unusual 
to  push  sentinels  so  far  from  their  supporting  posts, 
but  it  is  done  here  because  it  is  desirable  to  watch  the 
bridge  with  the  6  men  and  the  bend  in  the  road  south 
of  the  bridge  with  the  double  sentinels.  Our  Field  Ser- 
vice Regulations  recognize  that  these  and  other  dis- 
tances in  the  outpost  arrangements  depend  on  the  sit- 
uation and  terrain,  and  allow  commanders  full  lib- 
erty to  fix  these  distances  to  meet  the  conditions  of 
each  particular  case. 

We  must  not  forget  that  it  is  the  special  duty  of 
the  outguards  and  their  sentinels  to  observe  the  roads 
and  the  country  between  them  in  their  immediate 
front,  and  only  in  exceptional  cases  when  the  enemy 
is  very  near  will  they  be  able  to  watch  the  enemy  as 
well.  Observation  of  the  enemy  and  of  the  terrain 
beyond  the  range  of  vision  of  the  sentinels  must  be 
made  by  the  patrols,  and  particularly  by  cavalry  pa- 
trols which  must  remain  in  touch  with  the  enemy 
throughout  the  night.  In  this  night  reconnaissance 
the  cavalry  should  be  confined  to  the  roads,  for  while 
it  is  difficult  and  fatiguing  to  ride  across  broken  coun- 
try during  the  day  it  is  well-nigh  impossible  at  night, 
and  if  this  practice  is  persisted  in,  the  efficiency  of  the 
cavalry  soon  will  be  impaired. 

All  of  the  cavalry  platoon  might  have  been  as- 
sembled for  the  night  at  the  position  of  the  reserve. 


458       TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS 

the  patrols  being  sent  out  from  there  by  Major  A 
or  one  of  his  battalion  staff  officers.  The  greater  dis- 
tance the  patrols  would  have  to  cover  is  the  chief  ob- 
jection to  this  arrangement,  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  horses  probably  would  get  more  rest  during  the 
night,  for  the  saddles  could  be  removed  with  safety. 

Frequently  it  is  practicable  to  prescribe  in  the  sec- 
ond outpost  order  the  hour  at  which  the  supports 
should  withdraw  their  night  outguards,  sentinels,  etc., 
and  resume  their  day  positions,  and  it  is  desirable  to 
do  this,  since  many  arrangements  at  the  support  such 
as  messing  will  depend  on  the  hour  for  these  changes. 
In  this  situation  it  was  deemed  advisable  to  delay  fix- 
ing this  hour  until  the  intentions  of  the  detachment 
commander  for  the  following  day  were  known. 

In  the  orders  given  in  the  preceding  chapter,  the 
outpost  supports  are  ordered  to  prepare  their  posi- 
tions for  defense,  but  in  this  chapter  no  such  orders 
are  given.  This  difference  has  been  made  to  empha- 
size the  point  that  it  is  not  absolutely  necessary  to 
prescribe  in  the  orders  that  the  position  will  be  pre- 
pared for  defense,  for  the  "advance  portions  of  the 
outpost  habitually  intrench  and  strengthen  their  po- 
sitions, clear  the  field  of  fire  when  practicable,  and 
open  or  improve  communications  laterally  and  to  the 
rear."  (*)  Consequently,  the  orders  in  this  respect 
should  be  suited  to  the  known  tendencies  of  the  sup- 
port commanders.  If  it  has  become  an  established 
practice  in  the  command  for  the  outposts  always  to 
intrench,  orders  to  do  so  are  superfluous;  but  it  may 
be  quite  necessary  to  give  such  orders  to  an  officer  who 
is  inexperienced  or  obtuse.  If  the  enemy  is  distant, 

•F.  S.  B. 


OUTPOSTS  459 

the  comfort  of  a  fatigued  command  may  be  of  great- 
er importance  than  trenches,  but  fatigue  should  be 
no  excuse  for  neglecting  this  important  matter  when 
the  enemy  is  near  and  danger  threatens.  Frequently, 
natural  cover  may  be  so  utilized  that  the  work  of  in- 
trenching will  not  be  extensive. 


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